Category: franchising

  • The franchise problem may not have a quick answer

    The franchise problem may not have a quick answer

    So everyone is (still, after more than a decade) agreed that student loan fraud and poor quality provision is a huge mark against the practice of franchise provision.

    Moreover, we’ve generally come to the conclusion that something needs to be done – and although an investigation will be helpful, that something needs to be fairly swift and concrete action.

    Most people are assuming that this will take the form of a requirement to regulate franchise partners, via compulsory registration by the OfS, or some other regulatory change.

    Didn’t we try something like that before?

    The government is currently consulting on whether all institutions in England delivering higher education to more than 300 students should register, at some level, with the regulator.

    This in itself is far from a new idea. When the Department for Education first consulted on what became the Office for Students regulatory framework, providers had the option to register in the “Registered basic” category – a third category that simply recognised that an institution was providing higher education in England.

    This category will provide a degree of confidence for students that is not present in the current system with providers in the Registered basic category being able to let students and other bodies know that they are recognised by the OfS as offering higher education courses.

    As registration in this category was intended to be optional there would need to have been a benefit to registration, and there would be no way of assuming that all England’s higher education provision was covered. On franchise arrangements in particular, the initial proposals suggested that:

    the delivery provider [in a franchise arrangement] will not normally be required to register. If it chooses to register, the Registered basic category will normally be the most suitable category because the lead provider is responsible for compliance with all required registration conditions for the Approved and Approved (fee cap) categories.

    For many in the sector responding to these ideas, these assumptions offered little to protect students or the system as a whole. In summarising the consultation responses, the government reported that

    there were widespread calls for the Registered (basic) category to carry additional conditions to protect students’ interests, such as transparency, student protection plans, student transfer and electoral registration conditions. Respondents were concerned that students at those providers in the Registered (basic) category would be at risk of assuming greater protection than will be provided in that category

    The combination of the limited oversight offered to those in the “Registered basic” category (which was configured pretty much as a list of people who had paid OfS £1,000), and the additional burden that that any more active requirement would place on smaller providers, meant that OfS concluded that:

    we have decided to remove the Registered (basic) category from the published regulatory framework. The effect of this decision is to avoid misleading students about the protections available at Registered (basic) providers

    But that wasn’t the end of it. OfS also noted (and this is worth setting out in full):

    we recognise that unregulated providers will continue to operate, as they would have done even if the Registered (basic) category had been included (albeit, possibly, in lesser numbers). We are concerned with all students, not only those at registered providers, and remain committed to the policy intention set out in the regulatory framework consultation – to improve transparency and student protection at those higher education providers that are currently unregulated. We shall therefore give priority to developing our understanding of providers and students in the unregulated parts of the sector, to determine how we can most effectively have a role in protecting the interests of students at these providers

    At the time, when franchise arrangements were considered at all by ministers, they were painted as an unnecessary rigmarole for exciting new entrants to the market. Speaking to Universities UK in 2015, then higher education minister Jo Johnson famously said:

    Many of you validate degree courses at alternative providers. Many choose not to do so. I know some validation relationships work well, but the requirement for new providers to seek out a suitable validating body from amongst the pool of incumbents is quite frankly anti-competitive. It’s akin to Byron Burger having to ask permission of McDonald’s to open up a new restaurant.

    So how’s all that going, then?

    Byron Burger, of course, entered administration twice in three years. In contrast, the franchise model in higher education never looked short of cash or interest. The Office for Students never used its own “validation powers” (section 51 of the Higher Education and Research Act allowed the OfS to get involved in academic partnerships directly, as kind of a response to the argument that delivering courses on behalf of a competitor in order to enter the sector was anti-competitive). Instead, it commissioned the Open University to be (effectively) a validator of last resort for FE colleges on others seeking to enter the HE market (this arrangement is set to conclude in July 2025).

    When the Higher Education Funding Council for England closed in March 2018, it directly funded 313 higher education providers, while having at least an awareness of 816 places in England where higher education was being delivered. The Office for Students currently has a funding and regulatory arrangement with 425 providers – for the current regulator, there is no regulation without funding. The impact assessment published alongside HERA implied that in 2024-25 there would be 631 in either the Approved or Approved (Fee Cap) registration category – postulating 1,131 institutions delivering higher education in England in total.

    The postulated rush to register did not happen, even when DfE closed the old “specific course designation” route to regulated and funded provision for alternative providers in August 2019. As sector interest group Independent HE has documented, the Office for Student registration process was generally experienced as expensive and cumbersome: where providers have been actively seeking regulation and oversight, it has been very difficult to obtain. Indeed, when OfS faced pressure to get more actively involved in securing sector finances, it was able to unlock significant internal resources by “pausing” registration.

    By closing the “specific course designation” route, and making full registration slow and difficult, OfS has incentivised smaller providers to enter the least regulated (and riskiest, for students and public funds) part of the higher education sector. If that constitutes “developing an understanding” of the unregulated part of the sector, one has to question what this “understanding” actually is.

    The other end

    The financial pressures currently engulfing the sector has encouraged many established providers to get involved in franchising arrangements – they get to keep a portion of the fee income related to students involved in such arrangements. In return, they are expected to provide oversight of quality and standards on courses leading to awards bearing their names, and handle all of the regulatory requirements relating to those students.

    The numeric threshold approach to regulation (wherein a provider faces further investigation if the proportion of students continuing on their course, completing their course, and progressing into employment or further study, falls below a minimum) does mean that such provision is regulated, after a fashion. There is an open investigation on franchising at Leeds Trinity University, and we understand that current quality-related investigations are focused in part on franchise provision.

    Where the Student Loans Company spots evidence of potential fraud (or when OfS is notified of a concern) usually but not always involving a franchise arrangement, both OfS and DfE may become involved in an investigation. A recent uptick in such cases has led OfS to set out expectations in more detail.

    For these reasons most providers that franchise out provision are assiduous in ensuring what is being delivered is of a decent quality. However, the market incentives – at least in the short term – are stacked in the other direction. Some larger providers are increasingly reliant on income relating to students studying within franchise arrangements, and the demand for such relationships gives franchise providers the ability to shop around. Where an awarding organisation has attempted to impose more stringent quality requirements, there have been instances where the delivery partner has simply ended the partnership and entered a new relationship that offers less work and/or more cash.

    What regulatory tools are actually workable?

    So when something bad is identified, there’s always a subset of the population who think that there should be a law (or at least, regulation) to stop it happening. It’s an attractive idea, until you start to think about implementation. There are many trade offs.

    Option one: ban all franchise provision

    In other words, you would decree that unless you have degree awarding powers, you shouldn’t be delivering higher education. You would, in practice, have to ban all new recruitment to franchised courses and allow for some form of teach-out, unless you want to face a mass legal action. On a teach out, with no likelihood of any new students, the quality of provision would fall even further as providers withdraw funding and interest.

    Meanwhile, a fair number of large providers rely on franchise income to make ends meet. So factor in the closure of a few universities – with further pressure on other providers to offer teach out – as that part of the sector slowly becomes unviable. Which would be a shame for all those students working hard at FE colleges (franchising pretty much started as a way to support FE colleges delivering HE in hard-to-reach areas), and at the quality and specialist end of franchise provision, and for on campus students at providers heavily involved in franchise provision.

    To be clear – you may not value some of the providers involved, or some of the courses students are enrolled on. But if either disappeared you would need to come up with a way to look after the interests of the legitimate students involved.

    Option two: selectively ban some franchise provision

    Take all the drawbacks of option one, but also add in the difficulty of reliably and consistently distinguishing the kinds of provision you want to see supported in this way from that which you want rid of. You could use metric thresholds in a B3-esque way, you could attempt to do something clever with subject areas, or even base the ban directly on your suspicions of fraudulent activity. You’d have to be absolutely certain, mind – such decisions will almost certainly end up in court (you are dealing with a lot of higher education income, and it is unlikely you will get it dead right every time). Even something as straightforward as a subject area (“business studies”) is notoriously tricky to define when you get down to actual course content.

    Option three: require all providers involved to register with OfS

    Even assuming OfS has the capacity to quickly register a load of providers currently delivering franchise provision, there has to be a question as to how quickly and how well the regulator can then act where there is low quality provision. Back in 2024 we got a promise that the next round of OfS quality investigations would have a particular focus on franchise provision (from last time this story cropped up) – as yet we’ve not even seen reports, much less regulatory action.

    It’s looks like this has been one of many casualties of the regulator, at the urging of the government, throwing as much effort as possible behind addressing the financial issues the sector has been facing (we’re also expecting findings from the investigation into the academic partners of Leeds Trinity University that kicked off more than a year ago)

    Option 4: continue with tripartite enforcement

    OfS, DfE, and SLC already work together (increasingly regularly) to act on evidence and information relating to student finance fraud. One approach to address the problems as reported – which encompass value for taxpayer funding in the wider sense of good quality provision as well as the more specific fraudulent and criminal examples – would be to continue to reinforce and prioritise this collaboration and data sharing. There have been some steps taken to ensure that OfS is gathering and using the appropriate data, and that the three organisations are able to work together in using regulatory or financial sanctions to deal with concerning situations.

    However, this is what we are doing currently, and it would appear that the rate of success is not yet high enough. There were recommendations in the NAO report that cover stuff like risk management, drawing on evidence, and agreeing responsibilities: all of which are examples of basic stuff that is not being done consistently or well. That’s a worry.

    Option 5: number controls

    There is a case for number controls for franchised provision, linked to a regular (ideally cyclical rather than risk based) quality engagement. Where there is good and useful franchise provision we should be happy to let it expand, where there are even mild concerns we should be happy to constrain recruitment. And there is no way that the kind of rapid scale up of activity we’ve seen at some providers can be done without compromising quality – there should be an absolute proportional limit on expansion.

    Last time this story did the rounds, Jim made a compelling case for a 25 per cent of total provision cap similar to that used by the ESFA to regulate franchise FE provision in 2020. There’s not a lot of the current HE sector that would be hit by such a rule, but there are a handful of prominent examples for whom a higher ratio is pretty much existential (yes, you could argue that such institutions may not be viable anyway, but how does that help students or the wider sector?). There would need to be a time delay on full implementation, and support and guidance for those that need to rapidly downsize existing operations. Again, you might need to consider teach out arrangements as well.

    So where next?

    If you’ve set up, as the government in England has over the last decade, a fairly open market for higher education provision based on students as consumers having enough information, you need to regulate in the interests of the consumer (in this case both the individual students and the taxpayer). It’s neither unexpected or unprecedented for schemes with incomplete safeguards and developing approaches to regulation to be at risk of fraud – and it is essential to be able to quickly identify and act where it is happening.

    For me, the speedier collection and use of data around franchise provision – regarding the student experience, student outcomes, and the financial and operational approaches involved – is essential. There should be specific and regular data submission points for lead providers involved in franchise provision – this should be assessed quickly and action taken where there are causes for concern. OfS already has a notification system, which should be better promoted – it should also work with other bodies who collect information about the student experience. As much data as possible should be published: transparency is a valuable tool in avoiding murkier practices.

    I’m not convinced of the benefit of a full regulatory relationship with franchise providers. OfS does need to know who they are and keep some records as to which delivery providers have been problematic in the past – but in terms of incentives it makes more sense to regulate the lead partner. And number controls, while far from universally popular, would help in this case.

    You’ll note that none of this requires new legislation – we should take with a grain of salt the claim that OfS does not have the powers to act in these situations, it absolutely does. However the regulator may not have the capacity to act as quickly or as decisively as it may like – so there may need to be additional money available from DfE to build these capabilities.

    Source link

  • DfE steps in to require franchise partners to register with OfS

    DfE steps in to require franchise partners to register with OfS

    The Department for Education is consulting on a requirement for providers delivering courses under a franchise model to register with the Office for Students in order that they and their students can access student finance. We also get an impact assessment and an equalities assessment.

    The consultation defines “franchise” as follows:

    A ‘franchised student’ is one who is registered with a lead provider, but where more than 50% of their provision is taught by a delivery partner

    The proposals suggest that should a provider delivering teaching as part of a franchise arrangement (a delivery partner) have over 300 (headcount) higher education students in a given year it would need to be fully registered with the Office for Students under the existing Approved or Approved (Fee Cap) rules. A failure to register would mean that the institution could not access fee loans, and that students could not access maintenance loans.

    There would be some exceptions: providers already regulated elsewhere (schools, FE colleges, NHS trusts, local authorities, and Police and Crime Commissioners) would be exempt. Providers (not courses) would be designated (by DfE) as being eligible to access student finance, meaning that providers running courses regulated by a Professional Statutory Regulatory Body (PSRB) would not be exempt.

    The consultation (which closes 4 April 2025) will inform regulation from April 2026 onwards, with the first decisions about designation made in September 2027 (based on 2026-27 student data) for the 2028-29 academic year. Once up and running this pattern will continue: providers will be designated (based on student numbers from the previous academic year) for the academic year starting the year after. This gives newly designated providers a year to register with OfS.

    Student numbers would not be allowed to breach the 300 threshold without registration – the expectation is that providers should register the year before this happens. Should the threshold be breached, the provider will lose a year of eligibility for student finance for new students: the upshot being that if an unregistered provider had 300 or more students in 2026-27 and then registered with OfS, it would lose a year of designation (so would not be able to access student finance in 2029-30).

    In November of each year, DfE intends to publish a list of designated providers for the following academic year – providing a point of reference for applicants looking to access finance. Interestingly, despite the requirement being to register with OfS it is intended that DfE runs the process: making decisions about eligibility, managing appeals, and communicating decisions.

    The background

    We’ve been covering some of the issues presented by a subset of franchise providers on Wonkhe for quite a while, and it is now generally accepted that higher education in the UK has a problem with the quality and ethics at the bottom end of such provision. Students either enrol purely to access student finance, or are duped (often by higher education agents rather than providers themselves) into accessing fee and maintenance loans for substandard provision. Continuation and completion rates are very low compared to traditional providers, and the qualification awarded at the end (despite bearing the name of a well-known university) may not open the career doors that students may hope.

    We knew that an announcement on this issue was supposed to be coming in January via the government’s response to the former Public Accounts Committee’s report on franchising, which was sparked by a National Audit Office (NAO) report on the issue from a year ago – so the announcement today has just squeaked in under the Treasury’s wire.

    There is a slightly longer backstory to all of this – and we’re not referring to the various bits of coverage on potential abuses in the system that we’ve run in recent years. It was back in 2023 when the Department for Education’s heavily belated response to the Augar review reached a conclusion – promising to “drive up” the of franchised provision, in part by promising to:

    …closely consider whether we should take action to impose additional controls, in particular regarding the delivery of franchised provision by organisations that are not directly regulated by any regulatory body.

    Given the NAO and the PAC’s interventions since, and the work of the OfS in addressing franchise (and other academic partnership failings) via the coming round of quality (B3) investigations, special investigations, and enhanced data gathering, it is perhaps a little surprising that it is DfE that is in the lead here.

    There’s an important lesson in that to be drawn at some stage – the repeated pattern seems to be that an issue is raised, the sector is asked to self-regulate, it seemingly can’t, the regulator is asked to step in instead, and then it is discovered that what we actually need is secondary legislation.

    How big a deal is franchising

    Despite a number of years trying, OfS has never managed to compile full data on the extent of franchised, validated, and other partnership provision – the details are not in any current public dataset. It’s important here to distinguish between:

    • Franchised provision: where a student is registered at one institution, but teaching is delivered at another
    • Validated provision: where a student is both registered and taught at one institution, but receives an award validated by another institution on successful completion of their course
    • Other academic partnerships: which include arrangements where students are taught by more than one institution, or where existing providers partner to allow students to apply to a “new” provider (like a medical or veterinary science school)

    Of the three, it is just franchised provision that is in the scope of this new DfE requirement. It’s also (helpful) the most easily visible of the three if you are a fan of mucking about with Unistats data (though note that not all courses are in the unistats release, and the other vagaries of our least-known public data release continue to apply).

    DfE has done a bang-up job in pulling together some statistics on the scale of franchise provision within the impact assessment. We learn that (as of 2022–23 – usual student numbers caveats for that year of data apply):

    • There were currently 96 lead providers, franchising to 341 partners, of which 237 were unregistered.
    • 135,850 students were studying via a franchise arrangement – some 80,045 were studying at unregistered providers (a proportional fall, but a numerical rise, over previous years)
    • These students tended to study business and management courses – and were more likely to be mature students, from deprived areas, and to have non-traditional (or no) entry qualifications.
    • An astonishing 92 per cent of classroom based foundation years delivered as an intercalated part of a first degree were delivered via franchise arrangements.
    • There were 39 franchise providers teaching 300 students or more – of which four would be subject to the DfE’s proposed exemptions because of their legal status. These providers accounted for 66,540 students in 2022–23.

    A note on OfS registration

    Office for Students registration is confusing at the best of times. Though the registration route is currently paused until August 2025, providers have the choice of registering under one of two categories:

    • Approved (fee cap) providers are eligible to access fee loan finance up to the higher limit if they have an approved access and participation plan, receive direct funding from OfS, and access Research England funding.
    • Approved providers can access fee loan finance up to the “basic” fee limit. They are not eligible for OfS or Research England funding – but can directly charge students fees that exceed the “basic” fee limit.

    In the very early stages of developing the OfS regulatory framework it was briefly suggested that OfS would also offer a “Basic” level of registration, which would confer no benefits and would merely indicate that a provider was known to the OfS. This was speedily abandoned, with the rationale being that it would suggest OfS was vouching in some way for provision it did not regulate.

    The long and painful gestation of the Lifelong Learning Entitlement (LLE) also yielded suggestions of a third category of registration, which would apply to providers that currently offer provision backed by the Advanced Learner Loans (ALLs) that would be replaced by the LLE. We were expecting the Office for Students to consult on this new category, but nothing has yet appeared – and it does feel unlikely that anyone (other than possibly Jo Johnson) would be keen on a riskier registration category for less known providers that offers less regulatory oversight.

    Statutory nuts and bolts

    The proposal is to lay secondary legislation to amend the Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011 – specifically the bit that is used to designate types of courses for student finance eligibility. There is currently a specific section in this SI – section 5 part 1 subsection d, to be precise – that permits registered providers to franchise the delivery of courses to partners.

    The plan appears to be to amend this section to include the stipulation that were more than 300 higher education students (in total, excluding apprenticeships) are taught at a given franchise provider (I assume in total, across all franchise arrangements) then it must be registered with the Office for Students in order to be designated for student finance (allowing students to receive maintenance loans or providers to receive fee loan income).

    This might seem like a small technical change but the implications are surprisingly far reaching – for the first time, the OfS (as regulator and owner of the register) has the ability to decide who can and cannot deliver UK higher education. If anyone – even a well established university – is removed from the OfS register it will be unable to access fee loans (and students will be unable to access maintenance loans) for intakes above 300 students, even if it enters into a partnership with another provider.

    Let’s say, for example, that a large university becomes financially unsustainable and thus breaches the conditions of registration D1 or D2. Under such circumstances it could no longer be registered with OfS and thus would no longer be able to award degrees. The hope would be that student interests would be protected with the support of another university, and one way that this could happen is that someone else validates the awards offered to students so they can be taught out (assuming temporary financial support is forthcoming from government or elsewhere). Under the new rules, this arrangement would only work for 300 students.

    What might go wrong

    OfS has classically regulated based on the registered student population – the implication being that providers involved in franchise provision would be responsible for the quality and standards of teaching their students experience wherever they were taught. There have been indications via the B3 and TEF dashboards that students studying at franchise partners tend to have a worse experience overall.

    This does pose the question as to whether franchise partners who registered with OfS would now be responsible for these students directly, or whether there will be some sense of joint responsibility.

    There’s also the question of how providers will respond. Those franchised-to providers who either worry about their own outcomes (no longer judged within a larger university’s provision) wouldn’t cut it might stay that way – an outcomes based system that is always playing catch up on experience could see some poor provision linger around for many years. On the other hand, if they are now to be subject directly to conditions like those concerning transparency, finances and governance, they might as well switch to validation rather than franchising, which will change the relationship with the main provider.

    We might in aggregate see that as a positive – but that then raises the question as to whether OfS itself will be any better at spotting issues than universities have previously been. They could, of course, not fancy the scrutiny at all, and disappear with a rapidity that few student protection plans are designed to withstand.

    It’s also worth asking not just about OfS’ capacity or regulatory design, but its powers. Many of the issues we’ve identified (and that have been called out by the NAO and the PAC) concern how the courses are sold – OfS’ record on consumer rights is at best weak, and completely untested when the profit incentives are so high.

    And even if the sunlight of better outcomes data puts pressure on over outcomes, we do have to worry about how some of the providers in this space get there. In at least one of the providers that we have seen an OfS report for, a call centre team in another country that is supposed to offer support to students sounds more like a debt collection agency, chasing students up to submit, with academic staff paid partly on outcomes performance. Remember, providers that do this are already registered with OfS – so clearly the registration process itself is not enough to weed out such practices.

    The impact assessment is very clear that it expects some (an oddly precise four in the first year and two in subsequent years) unregistered franchise partners to drop out of HE provision altogether rather than applying for registration. The unspoken codicil to this is that everyone hopes that this will be the poor quality or otherwise suspect ones – but many excellent independent providers (including a number of Independent HE members) have struggled to get through a lengthy and often bureaucratic process, even before registration was temporarily closed because OfS decided it didn’t have capacity to run it this year.

    The line between supporting students and spoon feeding them is often debated in HE, but we might worry that a decent dose of it in a way that few would think appropriate could enable providers to evade regulation for some time – especially if validation (and therefore less risk to the validator) becomes the norm.

    And naturally, this is an approach that ignores two other things: whether a demand-led system at the edges should respond to the sort of demand that seems to come from those profiting from selling more than it does from students themselves, and whether it’s right. Even if you accept some for-profit activity, for anyone to be arranging for predominantly low-income and disadvantaged students to be getting into full tuition fees debt when sometimes more than half is kept in profits, and what is spent seems to include high “acquisition” costs and quite low delivery and support costs.

    In other words, one of the tests should be “does any of this change the incentives,” and it’s not at all clear that it does.

    Source link

  • Exploring the explosion in franchise and partnership activity

    Exploring the explosion in franchise and partnership activity

    There’s a clear need for more regulatory oversight of franchise and partnership teaching arrangements, but – as regulators are finding – there’s no easy way to track which students are being registered, taught, or physically located at which provider.

    Knowing where students study feels like a straightforward matter – indeed “where do HE students study” is one of the top level questions posed in HESA’s Student open data collection. If you click on that, it takes you to an up-to-date (2022-23 academic year) summary of student numbers by registering provider.

    But as we’ve learned from concerns raised by the Office for Students, the Student Loans Company, the National Audit Office, and (frankly) Wonkhe there is a bit more to it than that. And it is not currently possible to unpick this to show the number of students at each provider – for any given value of “at” other than registering – using public data. But we can do it for the number of courses.

    The forgotten open data set

    Yes – I’ve started the year abusing the Unistats open data release (it’s the only open data release that lets you find details of courses was the clue). And you sort of, kind of, can unpick some of these relationships using it. After a fashion.

    It is worth unpacking our terms a bit:

    • A student’s registration provider is the provider that returns that student as a part of their official data returns. If the registration provider has degree awarding powers, this is generally the provider that awards the qualification the student is working towards
    • A student’s teaching provider is the provider where a student is actually taught – in the instances where this is different to the registering provider this usually happens via a partnership arrangement of some sort.
    • A student’s location provider is the actual place a student is taught – usually, this is the same as a teaching provider, but not always – for example a “university centre” based at an FE college counts as the university in question doing the teaching, but the location would be the FE provider that hosts the centre.
    • We’ve also got to deal with the idea of an awarding provider, the place that actually awards the degree the student is working towards. In the main this is the same as the registering provider, but where the registering provider can’t award the degree in question it will be someone else by arrangement.

    How does this appear in Unistats? You are probably familiar with the notion of the UK Provider Reference Number (UKPRN): a unique identifier for educational settings. In the unistats data we get something called PUBUKPRN, which identifies where a course is primarily taught. We get something called UKPRN, which identifies where students on a given course are registered. And we get LOCUKPRN, which identifies the location a student is taught at – where this a location with its own UKPRN that is not the same as the PUBUKPRN.

    Limits to sector growth visualisation

    What’s missing – we don’t get a UKPRN for the awarding body. Not in public data. It is collected (OTHERINST) and used on the Discover Uni website but it is not published for me to mess with. Not yet, anyway.

    So what I can show you is the number of courses at each combination of registering, teaching, and location provider. This shows instances where students may be registered at one provider but taught at another (your classic partnership arrangement), and the evolving practice of declaring unilateral branch campuses (where students are registered and taught at one provider, but located at a different one).

    That latter one explains the explosion of London “campuses” that area really an independent provider (that may cater to multiple institutions in a similar way). The whole thing gives some indication of where a given provider is involved in franchise/partnership activity – but only where this is shown on unistats.

    What I found

    First up – sorted by registering provider. You can filter by registering provider if you don’t want the whole list (whyever not?), and I’ve included a wildcard filter for course titles. This is instead of a subject filter – each course in unistats is meant to have a subject associated with it, but this tends not to happen for the kinds of courses we are interested in here:

    [Full screen]

    And the same thing, sorted (and searchable) by teaching provider:

    [Full screen]

    Many limitations, but a space to keep asking

    The limitations here are huge. What we really want is the number of students registered on each course – we can get this at various levels of aggregation but not reliably at a single course, single cohort level. HESA’s policy of rounding and aggregating to avoid identifying individual students (and of course the historic nature of much of the data presented on unistats) means that most of the information in the data set (entry qualification), NSS, graduate destinations is combined across multiple years and numerous related subjects.

    In the usual unistats fashion “courses” are a unique combination of qualification aim, title, and mode for each location. So the handful of remaining providers that do defined “joint” degrees (two or more subjects) look like they are spectacularly busy. And, as always, the overall quality of data isn’t brilliant so there will be stuff that doesn’t look right (pro tip: yes tell me, but also tell HESA).

    Here then, is a partial explanation as to why regulators and others have been slow to respond to the growth in franchise, partnership, and other joint provisions: almost by definition the novel things providers are up to don’t show up in data collection. That’s kind of the point.

    But is a simple list of available courses, where they are taught, what (and whose) awards they lead to, what subjects they cover, and how many students are on each too much to ask? It appears so.

    Source link