Tag: OfS

  • When OfS reopens its register, there will be implications for everyone else

    When OfS reopens its register, there will be implications for everyone else

    The process may be paused right now, but if you are thinking of registering with the Office for Students (by choice, or following the requirement for larger franchise providers to get on board) the game is changing.

    The Office for Students has issued a consultation on two new initial conditions of registration.

    Interested parties have until 23 April to offer feedback, with the overwhelming majority of conditions due to come into force from August – at the point where OfS is planning to resume registration activity following the current pause.

    This will have a particular impact on providers who are currently planning (or preparing to restart) submissions quashed when the pause started. Expectations and requirements will change – and while OfS hopes to primarily assess documents a provider will already have, these things do tend to be tailored to fit requirements.

    C5: Treating students fairly

    New condition C5 replaces C1 (consumer law) and C3 (protection plans) as initial conditions – an assessment will be based on identifying behaviours that constitute unfair treatment of students (there is a list) from documents providers already have.

    There are implications from that one that reach far beyond new applications to the register – Jim Dickinson has covered those in detail elsewhere on the site.

    E7: Effective governance

    This new initial condition replaces the current E1 (on public interest governance) and E2 (on management and governance), though those two remain as ongoing conditions. OfS offers a rationale:

    We are increasingly finding that newly established providers (with less experience of delivering higher education) are less sure about what is required in terms of the self-assessment we ask for at registration. This leads to inefficiencies in the assessment.

    Providers have been engaged in substantial back-and-forth conversations with OfS about what is expected during registration. The regulator has noted that people are describing existing documents where it would be quicker to submit them, and has spotted that what is submitted can often be poorly written and excessively tailored to paint a rosy (and hopefully successful) picture.

    Some applicants have been borrowing and adapting plans and documentation from other providers that are inapplicable (a small, single subject, provider using processes developed for a traditional, multi-faculty, university) – in part because of perceived expectations that newly established providers need to have the same range of processes and policies.

    So the self-assessment aspect will go – the plan is that providers should submit actual governance documents, a five year action plan, and other bits on the knowledge and experience of those involved.

    One surprising shift is that there will no longer be an explicit test of “public interest governance” (the Nolan principles and suchlike) in the registration process. OfS reckon that the strengths of the rest of these new requirements, plus the continued inclusion in ongoing condition E1, makes up for this.

    Ditto the absence of the (largely toothless) student protection plan – the line being that this should be visible to students via the documentation provided, which is a win for all those applicants who read governance documentation before they decide where to apply. See Jim’s piece for more detail.

    Documentation

    So what would you now need to submit:

    • The governing body’s terms of reference (or similar), which would cover purpose, membership, appointment procedures, responsibilities, decision-making procedures, meeting frequency and the arrangements for reviewing effectiveness
    • Establishing documents – like a Royal Charter or articles of association
    • A scheme of delegation (or anything else useful) about who makes decisions and how
    • Documentation pertaining to risk and audit – the operations of the committee responsible is given as one example
    • A policy on conflict of interest

    These are, to be clear, governance documents, not detailed operational arrangements – although of course such policies would need to be operationalised for ongoing conditions E1 and E2.

    In assessing these documents, OfS intends to look at the “appropriateness of arrangements”, bearing in mind a provider’s size, complexity, context, and business plan.

    Oh yeah, you need a five year business plan too. The regulator hasn’t been impressed with what has been seen so far.

    Some providers applying for registration have not been able to demonstrate that they have sufficient understanding of how the higher education sector operates. This can result in a provider making unrealistic assumptions in its planning, such as overestimating its ability to recruit students in a competitive market, which can pose risks to the ongoing viability of the provider and cause associated harm to students.

    Part of being sufficiently equipped to deliver higher education is preparing to meet the relevant regulatory requirements. We have encountered issues where newly registered providers were not sufficiently aware of the regulatory framework and so did not have robust plans in place to meet ongoing requirements

    And there’s a telling indication that problems multiply pretty quickly when the plans get hit with a dose of operational reality.

    Where a provider does not have robust plans in place, it may encounter financial challenges after registration. Providers have at times taken steps to address this without fully considering the risk of doing so, for example:

    a. Rapidly entering into new partnership arrangements because of the unexpected withdrawal of a current partner without having the governance and management processes needed to manage this change properly.

    b. Employing financially incentivised external recruitment agents to meet recruitment targets that are too ambitious.

    c. Taking out additional unplanned borrowing to fund unanticipated expenditure.

    All of these behaviours can result in negative consequences for students and taxpayers

    Being objective

    Who could possibly have foreseen, eh? Going forward OfS would like business plans to be comprehensive and clearly written – and demonstrate an understanding of the sector, of managing risks, and of the conditions of registration.

    It’s all standard stuff (objectives and targets and how to achieve them, risks and how to manage them, regulatory compliance) over a challengingly long five-year period. OfS’ assessment will not be based on the targets themselves, but whether the provider can deliver these in practice given their resources and prevailing sector conditions. As an overriding primary consideration the plans need to focus on the interests of students.

    There’s no expectation that there will be an assessment of the objectives in and of themselves (or whether they are a proper thing for the provider to pursue), and OfS would not endorse these objectives – it’s more a matter of understanding a provider’s chosen approach in looking at the plans it has to deliver. A neat distinction.

    People who need people

    So who will be delivering these plans? The new condition would set out key knowledge and expertise for the chair of the governing body, accountable officer, and where applicable, the person with overarching responsibility for financial management and an independent member of the governing body. There’s a sensible sounding list on pages 30-33, but the big shocker is that these would be assessed via an interview with OfS officers!

    Yes, you read that right: 30 to 60 minutes based on key questions allowing said knowledge and experience to be demonstrated. On one level it feels sensible to talk to the people involved as a way of establishing the credibility of plans, but the feeling that OfS is appointing (or approving the appointment of) your chief financial officer is a hard one to shake.

    In contrast the “fit and proper persons” test is pretty much as expected, with additional requirements to supply new information (if you are disqualified as a director or trustee, or declared bankrupt) during the course of the application process. This is a welcome admission that these processes can take a long time to work through.

    You’ve probably spotted that OfS and government are now very focused on fraud in the sector – and assessment of arrangements to prevent fraud will focus on an institution’s track record where it has already been delivering higher education as part of a franchise or partnership arrangement.

    Other requirements for registration applications

    Got all that? Well strap in, there’s more.

    There’s the new C5, the new E7, and OfS intends to beef up their financial information requirements from August 2025 too.

    Financial viability and sustainability is currently assessed via initial condition D – providers already submit full, audited, financial statements for up to three years alongside four years of forecasts and a commentary on these. OfS has noted that new registrants tend to defer their first year of recruitment (setting up a HE provider is hard!) and substantially under recruit when they do – with current financial and recruitment pressures this isn’t going to improve any time soon.

    The new requirement is an addition to the template, which allows a provider to model financial viability against different yet plausible scenarios: zero growth over four years and 40 per cent below forecast followed by three years of zero growth for those currently delivering HE – zero growth followed by 80 per cent below forecast for the next three years for those entirely new to the sector.

    These aren’t set in stone – OfS reserves the right to tweak them based on emerging sector issues. And we may also get an alternative for providers whether the business model is not predominantly balanced on higher education provision.

    The commentary to this new table would let the provider set out mitigations, or provide evidence that these scenarios are unrealistic. But even so, there is a risk here that condition D becomes the hard one to pass – OfS reckon this is fair enough given short– and medium– term challenges to the sector. Although one cannot help but think of the many existing registered providers that would not pass these tests.

    By OfS request

    There’s another welcome recognition that applying for registration takes ages in the requirement for a provider to submit updated finances, student numbers, and commentary in the late stages of application by OfS request. While this makes sense in that the regulator isn’t relying on year-old (and the rest…) numbers this is a hard sell for those prospective registrants now expecting to submit similar data twice – although it could be argued that this gets them used to regular submissions while registered.

    Likewise, if the financial year turns over during the registration process you’ll need to put an extra batch of audited financial statements in for that year.

    And, wonderfully, OfS wants an ownership and corporate structure diagram too – it’s been finding some structures “complex”, poor thing.

    If your provider is or has been under investigation by another regulator – or awarding organisation, professional body, funding body, statutory body, and so forth – you’d better believe that OfS wants to know about that up front too. Apparently it keeps finding out about such things midway through the assessment process – and it does tend to be relevant, even if it is not an automatic fail.

    The rules are for the 60 months proceeding application, any investigation that closed or opened during the application period is something OfS wants to know about: a brief description, the responsible body, the dates, and the findings and/or outcomes.

    And if you are looking forward to the exciting world of “reportable events”, something similar now applies during registration. If stuff happens (there’s a long and familiar list on page 42) then you’d best drop OfS a note within 28 days.

    Finally, from January 2026 you won’t be able to reapply within 18 months of an unsuccessful registration application. This “double jeopardy” rule is a new one, and it looks like it is aimed at ensuring that OfS capacity is not clogged with resubmissions of poor quality applications where identified weaknesses are not addressed. We learn that 40 per cent of applications don’t comply with the existing guidance.

    There is the possibility of individual exemptions from this rule, for example where there have been IIT problems or where information that was not available for reasons outside of the provider’s control is now available.

    How this will be done

    The changes to application requirements were done via the same “manner of application” loophole – section 3(5) of HERA – that was used to pause the registration process. It is, as we said at the time, a reach in terms of legislative interpretation but it is difficult to argue against many of the principles here.

    It is regrettable that the same group of providers that have been forced to delay or resubmit applications due to the pause will now have to do considerable extra work to get these into the new format.

    While the principle of assessing existing documents rather than new ones is a good one, the reality of this is not as neat as regulators sometimes think. For an expected influx of new registrations – the franchise thing, and whatever ends up happening with the lifelong learning entitlement is expected to flush out at least a few – it makes sense to have all this in order. But there are always winners and losers with these things, and the losers have lost several times in a row here.

    The only other disappointment is probably that these new approaches will apply only to new registrations – there’s clearly a lot of benefit to similar approaches (especially for C5 and the financial requirements) to be extended to existing registered providers, and it is likely that there is more to come on that front.

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  • DfE steps in to require franchise partners to register with OfS

    DfE steps in to require franchise partners to register with OfS

    The Department for Education is consulting on a requirement for providers delivering courses under a franchise model to register with the Office for Students in order that they and their students can access student finance. We also get an impact assessment and an equalities assessment.

    The consultation defines “franchise” as follows:

    A ‘franchised student’ is one who is registered with a lead provider, but where more than 50% of their provision is taught by a delivery partner

    The proposals suggest that should a provider delivering teaching as part of a franchise arrangement (a delivery partner) have over 300 (headcount) higher education students in a given year it would need to be fully registered with the Office for Students under the existing Approved or Approved (Fee Cap) rules. A failure to register would mean that the institution could not access fee loans, and that students could not access maintenance loans.

    There would be some exceptions: providers already regulated elsewhere (schools, FE colleges, NHS trusts, local authorities, and Police and Crime Commissioners) would be exempt. Providers (not courses) would be designated (by DfE) as being eligible to access student finance, meaning that providers running courses regulated by a Professional Statutory Regulatory Body (PSRB) would not be exempt.

    The consultation (which closes 4 April 2025) will inform regulation from April 2026 onwards, with the first decisions about designation made in September 2027 (based on 2026-27 student data) for the 2028-29 academic year. Once up and running this pattern will continue: providers will be designated (based on student numbers from the previous academic year) for the academic year starting the year after. This gives newly designated providers a year to register with OfS.

    Student numbers would not be allowed to breach the 300 threshold without registration – the expectation is that providers should register the year before this happens. Should the threshold be breached, the provider will lose a year of eligibility for student finance for new students: the upshot being that if an unregistered provider had 300 or more students in 2026-27 and then registered with OfS, it would lose a year of designation (so would not be able to access student finance in 2029-30).

    In November of each year, DfE intends to publish a list of designated providers for the following academic year – providing a point of reference for applicants looking to access finance. Interestingly, despite the requirement being to register with OfS it is intended that DfE runs the process: making decisions about eligibility, managing appeals, and communicating decisions.

    The background

    We’ve been covering some of the issues presented by a subset of franchise providers on Wonkhe for quite a while, and it is now generally accepted that higher education in the UK has a problem with the quality and ethics at the bottom end of such provision. Students either enrol purely to access student finance, or are duped (often by higher education agents rather than providers themselves) into accessing fee and maintenance loans for substandard provision. Continuation and completion rates are very low compared to traditional providers, and the qualification awarded at the end (despite bearing the name of a well-known university) may not open the career doors that students may hope.

    We knew that an announcement on this issue was supposed to be coming in January via the government’s response to the former Public Accounts Committee’s report on franchising, which was sparked by a National Audit Office (NAO) report on the issue from a year ago – so the announcement today has just squeaked in under the Treasury’s wire.

    There is a slightly longer backstory to all of this – and we’re not referring to the various bits of coverage on potential abuses in the system that we’ve run in recent years. It was back in 2023 when the Department for Education’s heavily belated response to the Augar review reached a conclusion – promising to “drive up” the of franchised provision, in part by promising to:

    …closely consider whether we should take action to impose additional controls, in particular regarding the delivery of franchised provision by organisations that are not directly regulated by any regulatory body.

    Given the NAO and the PAC’s interventions since, and the work of the OfS in addressing franchise (and other academic partnership failings) via the coming round of quality (B3) investigations, special investigations, and enhanced data gathering, it is perhaps a little surprising that it is DfE that is in the lead here.

    There’s an important lesson in that to be drawn at some stage – the repeated pattern seems to be that an issue is raised, the sector is asked to self-regulate, it seemingly can’t, the regulator is asked to step in instead, and then it is discovered that what we actually need is secondary legislation.

    How big a deal is franchising

    Despite a number of years trying, OfS has never managed to compile full data on the extent of franchised, validated, and other partnership provision – the details are not in any current public dataset. It’s important here to distinguish between:

    • Franchised provision: where a student is registered at one institution, but teaching is delivered at another
    • Validated provision: where a student is both registered and taught at one institution, but receives an award validated by another institution on successful completion of their course
    • Other academic partnerships: which include arrangements where students are taught by more than one institution, or where existing providers partner to allow students to apply to a “new” provider (like a medical or veterinary science school)

    Of the three, it is just franchised provision that is in the scope of this new DfE requirement. It’s also (helpful) the most easily visible of the three if you are a fan of mucking about with Unistats data (though note that not all courses are in the unistats release, and the other vagaries of our least-known public data release continue to apply).

    DfE has done a bang-up job in pulling together some statistics on the scale of franchise provision within the impact assessment. We learn that (as of 2022–23 – usual student numbers caveats for that year of data apply):

    • There were currently 96 lead providers, franchising to 341 partners, of which 237 were unregistered.
    • 135,850 students were studying via a franchise arrangement – some 80,045 were studying at unregistered providers (a proportional fall, but a numerical rise, over previous years)
    • These students tended to study business and management courses – and were more likely to be mature students, from deprived areas, and to have non-traditional (or no) entry qualifications.
    • An astonishing 92 per cent of classroom based foundation years delivered as an intercalated part of a first degree were delivered via franchise arrangements.
    • There were 39 franchise providers teaching 300 students or more – of which four would be subject to the DfE’s proposed exemptions because of their legal status. These providers accounted for 66,540 students in 2022–23.

    A note on OfS registration

    Office for Students registration is confusing at the best of times. Though the registration route is currently paused until August 2025, providers have the choice of registering under one of two categories:

    • Approved (fee cap) providers are eligible to access fee loan finance up to the higher limit if they have an approved access and participation plan, receive direct funding from OfS, and access Research England funding.
    • Approved providers can access fee loan finance up to the “basic” fee limit. They are not eligible for OfS or Research England funding – but can directly charge students fees that exceed the “basic” fee limit.

    In the very early stages of developing the OfS regulatory framework it was briefly suggested that OfS would also offer a “Basic” level of registration, which would confer no benefits and would merely indicate that a provider was known to the OfS. This was speedily abandoned, with the rationale being that it would suggest OfS was vouching in some way for provision it did not regulate.

    The long and painful gestation of the Lifelong Learning Entitlement (LLE) also yielded suggestions of a third category of registration, which would apply to providers that currently offer provision backed by the Advanced Learner Loans (ALLs) that would be replaced by the LLE. We were expecting the Office for Students to consult on this new category, but nothing has yet appeared – and it does feel unlikely that anyone (other than possibly Jo Johnson) would be keen on a riskier registration category for less known providers that offers less regulatory oversight.

    Statutory nuts and bolts

    The proposal is to lay secondary legislation to amend the Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011 – specifically the bit that is used to designate types of courses for student finance eligibility. There is currently a specific section in this SI – section 5 part 1 subsection d, to be precise – that permits registered providers to franchise the delivery of courses to partners.

    The plan appears to be to amend this section to include the stipulation that were more than 300 higher education students (in total, excluding apprenticeships) are taught at a given franchise provider (I assume in total, across all franchise arrangements) then it must be registered with the Office for Students in order to be designated for student finance (allowing students to receive maintenance loans or providers to receive fee loan income).

    This might seem like a small technical change but the implications are surprisingly far reaching – for the first time, the OfS (as regulator and owner of the register) has the ability to decide who can and cannot deliver UK higher education. If anyone – even a well established university – is removed from the OfS register it will be unable to access fee loans (and students will be unable to access maintenance loans) for intakes above 300 students, even if it enters into a partnership with another provider.

    Let’s say, for example, that a large university becomes financially unsustainable and thus breaches the conditions of registration D1 or D2. Under such circumstances it could no longer be registered with OfS and thus would no longer be able to award degrees. The hope would be that student interests would be protected with the support of another university, and one way that this could happen is that someone else validates the awards offered to students so they can be taught out (assuming temporary financial support is forthcoming from government or elsewhere). Under the new rules, this arrangement would only work for 300 students.

    What might go wrong

    OfS has classically regulated based on the registered student population – the implication being that providers involved in franchise provision would be responsible for the quality and standards of teaching their students experience wherever they were taught. There have been indications via the B3 and TEF dashboards that students studying at franchise partners tend to have a worse experience overall.

    This does pose the question as to whether franchise partners who registered with OfS would now be responsible for these students directly, or whether there will be some sense of joint responsibility.

    There’s also the question of how providers will respond. Those franchised-to providers who either worry about their own outcomes (no longer judged within a larger university’s provision) wouldn’t cut it might stay that way – an outcomes based system that is always playing catch up on experience could see some poor provision linger around for many years. On the other hand, if they are now to be subject directly to conditions like those concerning transparency, finances and governance, they might as well switch to validation rather than franchising, which will change the relationship with the main provider.

    We might in aggregate see that as a positive – but that then raises the question as to whether OfS itself will be any better at spotting issues than universities have previously been. They could, of course, not fancy the scrutiny at all, and disappear with a rapidity that few student protection plans are designed to withstand.

    It’s also worth asking not just about OfS’ capacity or regulatory design, but its powers. Many of the issues we’ve identified (and that have been called out by the NAO and the PAC) concern how the courses are sold – OfS’ record on consumer rights is at best weak, and completely untested when the profit incentives are so high.

    And even if the sunlight of better outcomes data puts pressure on over outcomes, we do have to worry about how some of the providers in this space get there. In at least one of the providers that we have seen an OfS report for, a call centre team in another country that is supposed to offer support to students sounds more like a debt collection agency, chasing students up to submit, with academic staff paid partly on outcomes performance. Remember, providers that do this are already registered with OfS – so clearly the registration process itself is not enough to weed out such practices.

    The impact assessment is very clear that it expects some (an oddly precise four in the first year and two in subsequent years) unregistered franchise partners to drop out of HE provision altogether rather than applying for registration. The unspoken codicil to this is that everyone hopes that this will be the poor quality or otherwise suspect ones – but many excellent independent providers (including a number of Independent HE members) have struggled to get through a lengthy and often bureaucratic process, even before registration was temporarily closed because OfS decided it didn’t have capacity to run it this year.

    The line between supporting students and spoon feeding them is often debated in HE, but we might worry that a decent dose of it in a way that few would think appropriate could enable providers to evade regulation for some time – especially if validation (and therefore less risk to the validator) becomes the norm.

    And naturally, this is an approach that ignores two other things: whether a demand-led system at the edges should respond to the sort of demand that seems to come from those profiting from selling more than it does from students themselves, and whether it’s right. Even if you accept some for-profit activity, for anyone to be arranging for predominantly low-income and disadvantaged students to be getting into full tuition fees debt when sometimes more than half is kept in profits, and what is spent seems to include high “acquisition” costs and quite low delivery and support costs.

    In other words, one of the tests should be “does any of this change the incentives,” and it’s not at all clear that it does.

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  • OfS with their heads: is Cromwell to blame?

    OfS with their heads: is Cromwell to blame?

    by Paul Temple

    If you’ve been watching the BBC adaptation of Hilary Mantel’s Wolf Hall: The Mirror and the Light, you may like me have been surprised by how little higher education featured in the story. (All right, they couldn’t cover every aspect of sixteenth-century English life, but still.) England’s two universities at that time (Scotland of course had four by the end of the sixteenth century) had essential roles as the principal providers of the skilled workforces that expanding commercial, administrative, and legal functions needed – although where Thomas Cromwell himself (played by Mark Rylance) gained his legal and administrative skills remains a mystery: presumably they were picked up during his travels as a young man around Europe. As a study covering a slightly earlier period put it, the medieval university professionalized knowledge, with increasingly specialised courses fitting students for careers in secular professions (Leff, 1968). Religious instruction, sometimes assumed to be the main function of the pre-modern university, was largely undertaken in separate monastic and cathedral schools. These might have developed into universities with secular roles, but instead in England largely faded away.

    The significance of England’s two universities is indicated by the powers that Cromwell took to control them in his ascent through English government in the 1530s. At Oxford, he saved the institution that his patron Cardinal Wolsey had established as Cardinal College and turned it into Christ Church College; and in 1534 “wrested the Visitorship of New College [by then 155 years old] from its customary holder as Bishop of Winchester, Stephen Gardiner” (MacCulloch, 2018: 275) – Cromwell’s implacable enemy, played creepily in the series by Mark Gatiss. This created another grudge that Gardiner held against Cromwell, and which he would repay with interest. Tensions surrounding what we would now call the governance of higher education had surprisingly important ramifications in the politics of the Tudor court. (Wolsey also established in 1528 a college in Ipswich, his place of birth, but for a number of complicated reasons it was short-lived, and so never, as it presumably might have done, became England’s third university.)

    Medieval and early-modern Oxford University was continually engaged in disputes, sometimes violent ones, with the city, and Cromwell was apparently regularly called in to arbitrate. This was the man at the very centre of the administration of the English state: if the Cabinet Secretary dropped in to help your University sort out a planning problem with the local council, it would indicate, I think, that we were looking at a big deal nationally. (We may gain a sense of the scale of these town vs gown disputes by referring to what are known as the St Scholastica’s Day riots of 1354 which led to the deaths of 62 Oxford scholars. As Oxford student numbers have been estimated at around 1,500 at this time, this implies a remarkable death toll of about 4% of the student population. Not for the last time in troubles involving university students, drink seems to have been implicated.)

    It seems that Cambridge University felt that they were getting a bit left out, and so in 1534 offered Cromwell the position of High Steward and a year later elected him Chancellor, in place of Bishop John Fisher, who was executed that year – although not, it seems, as a result of any failures in university leadership (MacCulloch, 2018: 276); so unfortunately we cannot properly read this as a warning about the risks involved in university management. It seems that Cromwell’s first job at Cambridge was to deal with the town vs gown hostilities centred around the annual fair held on Stourbridge Common: presumably he was by now something of an expert in managing these conflicts. He was also, it seems, interested in what we would now call curriculum reform, despite having no personal experience of university study: as MacCulloch remarks, under Cromwell’s direction, this was the first time “government had intruded on the internal affairs of Oxford and Cambridge, an interference that has never thereafter ceased” (306). Some of the blame for the activities of the Office for Students must therefore be traceable back to Thomas Cromwell: how did Hilary Mantel miss this plot angle?

    References

    Leff, G (1968) Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries New York, NY: Wiley

    MacCulloch, D (2018) Thomas Cromwell: A Life London: Allen Lane

    Dr Paul Temple is Honorary Associate Professor in the Centre for Higher Education Studies, UCL Institute of Education.

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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  • OfS approves renaming of UCLan and University of Bolton

    OfS approves renaming of UCLan and University of Bolton

    In two separate hearings published on December 19, the OfS granted approval for the University of Bolton to be renamed the University of Greater Manchester, and for the University of Central Lancaster (UCLan) to become the University of Lancashire.  

    The regulator permitted Bolton becoming the University of Greater Manchester despite objections from the University of Manchester that the change would be “very confusing and misleading”. Manchester Metropolitan University and the University of Salford also objected to the name change.  

    In a consultation on UCLan’s rebranding to the University of Lancashire, 90% of the 1,812 respondents said that the new name could be “confusing or misleading”, given that the existing Lancaster University carries the same official title.  

    During the ruling, the regulator considered the name change could be particularly confusing for international students “less familiar with contextual information” but concluded that it was “unlikely to lead to any material harm or detriment”. 

    The consultations in Bolton also garnered widespread opposition to the rebrand, with 64% of respondents saying the name change could cause confusion.  

    The OfS recognised that both instances could be confusing “for particular groups of stakeholders, including for example those for whom English is not their first language or who have difficulties in distinguishing or processing information”. 

    However, it concluded that “the range of contextual information that students use when applying to study” would help to prevent material harm arising from such confusion.   

    The name change is very good news for our students, very good news for the institution, very good news for the town and amazing news for jobs

    Professor George Holmes, University of Greater Manchester

    In both cases, the OfS ruled that its duties to protect the “institutional autonomy” of providers and “encourage competition” between universities weighted in favour of consenting to both new names.  

    In Bolton, the proposals to change the university’s name sparked backlash from local politicians and members of the public, with a motion put to Bolton Council in 2023 calling on the university to rethink the name change.  

    Announcing the news on December 19, vice chancellor Professor George Holmes told a group of staff members that he was “delighted” to announce the change.  

    “The name change is very good news for our students, very good news for the institution, very good news for the town and amazing news for jobs,” said Holmes, adding that it was “an important accolade to have the University of Greater Manchester based in Bolton”.  

    Professor Graham Baldwin, UCLan vice chancellor, also welcomed his institution’s new title, saying that it would “better reflect our regional economic importance and aid continuing efforts to raise brand awareness further afield. 

    “Locally the acronym UCLan was widely used but for many outside the region they didn’t know it was the title of a university nor where it was located,” said Baldwin.

    On December 2, 2024 the OfS announced it was temporarily pausing the registration of new institutions, as well as suspending applications for an institution to change its name “where it already holds university title”. Applications already submitted would be completed, it said.  

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