Tag: Paper

  • Higher education policy: the lie of the land in England and Wales on the cusp of England’s post-16 white paper

    Higher education policy: the lie of the land in England and Wales on the cusp of England’s post-16 white paper

    • This speech was delivered by HEPI Director Nick Hillman at the University of Cardiff on Thursday, 16 October 2025.

    Introduction

    The other day, I was speaking to the University of Liverpool Council at the Ness Botanic Gardens on the Wirral, which as you know is four hours due north of here, pretty much on the Welsh / English border. I started my speech there by noting that I only exist because of the University of Liverpool, as my maternal grandparents met there in the early 1930s. Well, I also only exist because of the Welsh university system, as my parents met while they were students here in Wales in the early 1960s, just as my own children only exist because I met my wife in the early 1990s at university. 

    The fact that three generations of my family originally met while at university is a powerful reminder, at least to me, that higher education change lives. And at HEPI, we had another powerful reminder of that during our first event of this academic year, when – last month – we hosted the UK launch of the OECD’s Education at a Glance publication.

    Education at a Glance

    In case you have not come across it before, this is the most useful but worst titled publication on education that appears anywhere in the world each year. It is a vast 541-page compendium of comparative data that you need to pore over rather than glance at.

    This year’s OECD report had a particular focus on tertiary education. While we have become used to people beating up on the UK higher education sector, the OECD actually painted a picture of a very successful sector playing to its strengths. When you look in from the outside, it seems the UK’s higher education institutions are not so bad after all.

    For example, the OECD showed that, among the many developed countries covered in their report, the UK has:

    • higher than average participation in higher education;
    • lower than average graduate unemployment, irrespective of whether the individuals studied STEM, business or humanities; and
    • among the very highest undergraduate completion rates anywhere in the world, vying with Ireland for the top spot.

    I recognise the OECD is looking at averages for the UK as a whole and the position of Wales is not necessarily the same but, in general, the weaknesses the OECD found in were on the lack of good opportunities for people who do not succeed in education first time around.

    Specifically, the OECD found a profound problem among young men, a rising proportion of whom are classified as NEETs (Not in Employment, Education or Training). While the OECD use historic data for a year or two past, last week’s brand new NEET data for Wales confirms the depressing picture. Indeed, it was even more salutary, noting:

    The proportion of young people aged 16 to 24 in Wales who were not in employment, education or training (NEET) was 15.1% in the year ending June 2025, an increase of 3.6 percentage points over the year.

    The OECD additionally found that the UK has the biggest gap of all developed countries when it comes to the difference in earnings between low-skilled adults and those who leave school with A-Levels (or equivalent). This should perhaps worry Wales even more than the rest of the UK, given that Wales scores the worst for schoolchildren’s academic performance for any part of the UK. Indeed, Wales is the only part of the UK to perform worse than the OECD average in all three areas of Mathematics, Reading and Science.

    When it comes to funding of higher education, the OECD found the UK spends more than most other countries … but the shift to loan-based finance means direct government spending on each student in higher education is only half the OECD average and only half the amount spent ‘at primary to post-secondary non-tertiary levels’ ($13,000). Of course, the UK’s figures are distorted by England’s numbers because England is much larger than the other parts of the UK and has moved towards loans to a greater degree than Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. That is one reason why we have worked with London Economics and the Nuffield Foundation to look at the picture in each part of the UK separately.

    There are three profound differences. First, the Exchequer cost is lowest in England, which also has the highest per-student income for institutions. Scotland is at the other end of the scale, with the largest Exchequer cost but the lowest unit-of-resource for institutions. Wales is, as you may expect, somewhere in the middle, with an Exchequer cost and a per-student income for institutions that lies between those in England and Scotland. 

    There is a similar picture when we look – secondly – at the balance of who is paying the costs of higher education. In England, it is mainly former students via the loan system; in Scotland, it is entirely taxpayers (and then some). In Wales there is a more even split approaching 50:50 between the Exchequer and graduates, arguably reflecting the public and private benefits of higher education more accurately. There are probably lessons from Wales for the rest of the UK here, though seemingly not for Kemi Badenoch, who complained at the Conservative Party Conference last week that higher education in England still costs taxpayers too much.

    The third big difference is on student maintenance, where the system in Wales is more generous and more logical than those elsewhere in the UK. Each student gets more and the non-repayable grants are more generous in Wales than elsewhere – all undergraduates have at least a small grant whereas no one currently gets a grant in England, where grants were abolished in 2016. (Ministers promised the return of grants in England at the Labour Conference a fortnight ago, but only for some students on some courses, meaning it is likely to prove a mouse of an intervention and a very complicated one at that. It is certainly set to be nothing like the Welsh system.)

    Many people I know are fans of the system in Wales for the way that it tries to strike a balance. However, while there are certainly far worse systems even within the rest of the UK, I personally think the benefits of the Welsh system are sometimes oversold. For example, I think the structure of student support in Wales is excessively generous to students who come from wealthy households. In other words, it is not means tested enough, perhaps explaining the need for the recent cuts to postgraduate support.

    I have held this view consistently since the current Welsh funding system was introduced on the back of the Diamond review in 2018, but it has got me in trouble. After my concerns reached the front page of the Western Mail, I got not only an official rebuke from the Welsh Government but HEPI also received a formal complaint that came jointly from Universities Wales and NUS Wales. Rather than persuading me to change my view, I must admit this mainly had the effect of making me wonder if higher education debates in Wales are sometimes a little too cosy and stifled.

    Boys, Boys, Boys

    One other area where the OECD painted a less positive picture is on the differential educational performance of young men and young women. Women are more likely to obtain tertiary education across the developed world but the gap between men and women is bigger in the UK than elsewhere and has been growing while it has stayed the same on average across the OECD as a whole. According to the OECD:

    In the United Kingdom, they [women] accounted for 56% of first-time entrants in 2023, up from 55% in 2013. Across the OECD, women make up 54% of new entrants on average, the same share as in 2013.

    This is a convenient segue into some more of HEPI’s recent output because we have long worried about the educational performance of boys and young men and have published a number of papers on the topic over the years, with the most recent one appearing in March 2025. As Mary Curnock Cook wrote in the Foreword:

    Something has surely gone wrong with education if boys – in aggregate at least – do worse than girls at all stages of education from early years to higher education and beyond.

    Overall, out of every 100 female school leavers, 54 proceed to higher education by the age of 19; out of every 100 male school leavers, just 40 do so.

    Again, the problems are worse in Wales than elsewhere. Over half of Inner London school leavers eligible for Free School Meals reach higher education by the age of 19; it is hard to get directly comparable figures for Wales but it seems the numbers are less than half as much for FSM Welsh-domiciled school leavers. Overall, while the gap in school leavers’ entry rates to higher education between men and women is dire in England, it is even worse in Wales. In fact, the proportion of young men who make it to higher education in Wales is lower than in every other part of the UK. It has been a known problem for at least 20 years yet for whatever reason, and perhaps because of misplaced fears of seeming politically incorrect, it has not been addressed.

    Yet if male educational underachievement is not tackled, it seems certain that we will store up further societal problems for the future – including having more under-educated men veering towards the political extremes. Here, I note in passing the high polling of Reform for next year’s Senedd election. It is not rocket science to solve the boy problem, however, to take just one example, some schools following a ‘boy positive’ approach have managed to equalise their results for boys and girls and there is some great work underway in our own sector – for example, at Ulster University and the Arts University Bournemouth.

    What remains completely absent, however, is any concerted interest at a national and ministerial level – certainly at Westminster and as far as I can tell in the Senedd too. People who did not want to take the Black Lives Matter protests seriously a few years ago sought to deflect attention from them by saying ‘All Lives Matter’, as if that was ever in doubt. Similarly, when Ministers wish to deflect attention from the crisis in boys’ education they like to respond by saying things like ‘Opportunity should be available to all’, which is true but it papers over the specific challenges faced by young men.

    Our work on male underachievement sits alongside our work on the disadvantages faced by women, such as our reports on the substantial gender pay gap that remains in higher education as well as our other work on the overall gender pay gap among graduates. It also sits alongside a new HEPI report published just three months ago on the impact of menstruation on undergraduates’ attendance, academic engagement and wellbeing.

    This revealed 70% of female students report being unable to concentrate on their studies or assessments due to period pain and that female students miss an average of 10 study days per academic year due to menstrual symptoms. It also suggested that just 15% of universities have a specific menstruation policy and, for those that do, the policy relates solely to staff rather than students.

    So as I hope you can sense, the topics that tend to work best for HEPI are issues – like boys’ underperformance and the impact of menstruation on learning – that we should be speaking about more than we have done. Another area where that is true is public perceptions of higher education.

    Misperceptions

    A year ago, I had a drink with a neighbour who has a background in banking and two graduate children, meaning – in theory at least – that he knows the value of money and the value of education. However, when it came to universities, he expressed some typical rhetoric about them being too numerous, too big, too expensive and so on.

    I responded by telling him I was on the Board at the University of Manchester and asking him to guess that institution’s financial turnover. His reply was £30 million – which is between 40 and 50 times smaller than the actual number of c.£1.3 billion (and over 20 times smaller than Cardiff’s turnover). Once my hangover had subsided, I contacted Bobby Duffy of the King’s College Policy Institute, who is the UK’s greatest expert on misperceptions – that is, the difference between what is true and what we tend to believe is true. This led over a process of many months to a new research project on what the public think about higher education, which we and King’s College launched the results of last month.

    The findings are worth poring over in detail and we have brought hard copies of the work along for each you. Sone of the results particularly stand out.

    For example, we gave people a list of seven institutions: Manchester City, Manchester United, the University of Manchester, the University of Oxford, the Daily Mail, MoneySupermarket.com and Greggs bakery.

    When the public were asked about the relative financial size of these seven, the University of Oxford came fifth and the University of Manchester seventh, at the very bottom. More than half of respondents said they thought either Manchester City or Manchester United was the biggest in terms of their financial size; only 6% chose the right answer, the University of Oxford. The University of Manchester should be third in that list of seven by the way because, while it easily beats City and United in terms of its financial size, you might be surprised to know that Greggs has a turnover of £2 billion.

    Similarly, when we gave the public a list of five big industries – legal services, accountancy services, aircraft manufacturing, telecommunications and higher education – and asked them to say which is least important in terms of export revenues, higher education was the most popular option. That result could not be any more wrong because higher education actually brings in much more export income than each of the others.

    Let me share three other fascinating data points from the survey with you too:

    • people greatly overestimate the level of graduate regret about going to higher education – on average, the public guess 40% of graduates would opt not to go to university if they had their again, when the actual proportion of graduates who say this is only 8%;
    • on average, the public guess half (49%) of graduates say their university debt has negatively impacted their lives – in reality  only 16% of graduates feel this way; and
    • a majority of people, including a majority of Reform voters at the 2024 general election, have positive feelings about universities.

    Oversight and regulation

    Over the past decade, the oversight of tertiary education and research has been transformed in England, though not necessarily for the better. When I worked as a Special Adviser in Whitehall a dozen years ago, there was one Minister for Universities and Science who sat in one Government Department and who had oversight of one regulator that oversaw both teaching and research (known as the Higher Education Funding Council for England). But in recent years we have had different regulators, different Ministers and different Departments for the teaching and research functions of universities, meaning coordinated oversight has been missing.

    Moreover, while the Westminster Government has promised more ‘clarity and coherence’, the latest Machinery of Government changes have made the current situation even more of a dog’s dinner. The Minister for Skills, who has responsibility for higher education, now has one foot in the Department for Education and another in the Department for Work and Pensions, which has just taken on the responsibility for ‘skills’, while the Minister for Science has one foot in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and another in the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. Split ministerial posts tend to be a recipe for chaos, as I saw close up during my own time in Whitehall.

    So while I know that the new Medr (the Commission for Tertiary Education and Research) here in Wales has had some teething challenges, on paper it makes a lot more sense than what England has. At one point, it was thought England’s long-awaited post-16 skills white paper was likely to be heavily influenced by Wales; given the latest reshuffle and associated changes, that now – perhaps regrettably – seems less likely.

    International students

    Finally, I want to end by touching on the issue of international students. The majority of the really big projects HEPI has undertaken over the past few years have focused on international students. Perhaps that is not surprising, given the OECD data I started with, which shows that, while there is one international student for every thirteen home students across the OECD as a whole, the ratio in the UK is completely different at 1:3.

    That helps to explain why we have calculated (more than once) the net economic benefits of international students to the UK. The latest iteration found a gross benefit of £41.9 billion for just one incoming cohort of students and a net benefit (after taking account of the impact on public services and so on) of £37.4 billion. We split up this total to reveal a number for each one of the 650 parliamentary constituencies across the UK, including Cardiff South and Penarth, which is the top-performing constituency in Wales and one where international students contribute significantly over £300 million a year.

    We have separately calculated the positive tax contributions of those former international students who stay in the UK to work after completing their studies, undertaken detailed studies on the Graduate Route visa and looked specifically at the experience of Chinese students in the UK. In addition, we produce each year a Soft-Power Index that looks at how many very senior world leaders have been educated to a higher level outside of their own home country. If they return home with fond memories of their time in the UK and a better understanding of our country, then this tends to bring real benefits. We will be launching the results for 2025 next week but last year’s Soft-Power Index, which is regularly quoted by Ministers, showed that, across the globe’s 195 countries, there were 58 serving world leaders who received some higher education in the UK, second only to the US.

    I am going to stop here because I started the speech on a positive – on the way higher education changes lives for the better. And despite all the numerous political, financial and geopolitical challenges facing higher education across the UK, the continuing immense soft-power benefits delivered by UK higher education institutions is another area where there is a huge amount of which we can be proud.

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  • Trump’s New York Times lawsuit is a call to action for the ‘paper of record’

    Trump’s New York Times lawsuit is a call to action for the ‘paper of record’

    This article originally appeared in MSNBC on Sept. 18, 2025.

    President Donald Trump’s escalating legal battle against America’s media industry continued Monday as he filed a lawsuit against The New York Times. The whopping 85-page complaint alleges the paper defamed him, and it seeks $15 billion, plus punitive damages, which exceeds the market cap of the entire company.

    The lawsuit refers to the Times’ historic reputation as the “newspaper of record,” and that’s important for understanding the stakes of the case. The moniker speaks to the Times’ massive readership and prestige but also to an authoritative role — often setting the standards in terms of fact-checking, objectivity and independence that produce a definitive accounting of events for the record books. They’re the standards to which other newspapers are held.

    In light of that role, and Trump’s continued successful shakedowns of media outlets of lesser prestige, a capitulation would be devastating. Instead, the Times has an opportunity, and an obligation, to rise to its historic role by categorically rejecting the lawsuit — and putting a stop to a particularly insidious legal idea that provides support for Trump’s media war.

    The complaint, which First Amendment law professor Don Herzog calls “a press release masquerading as a lawsuit,” is a massive document that leaves ample room to hit familiar Trump beats, finding time to pick at the Times’ “deranged” endorsement of Kamala Harris and to hail Trump’s 2024 win as the “greatest personal and political achievement in American history.”

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    The alleged damages center on reporting published in the pages of the Times and in the book “Lucky Loser: How Donald Trump Squandered His Father’s Fortune and Created the Illusion of Success,” written by Times reporters Susanne Craig and Russ Buettner, that suggested Trump’s multimillion-dollar inheritance from his father was largely a product of fraudulent tax evasion schemes and that Trump owes his later fortune to producer Mark Burnett’s “discovery” of him as a host for “The Apprentice.” But Trump alleges that he was already famous and that his success with “The Apprentice” was “thanks solely to President Trump’s sui generis charisma and unique business acumen.”

    Through what Trump alleges are false statements and negligent fact-finding, the lawsuit claims this reporting sought to illegally “damage President Trump’s hard-earned and world-renowned reputation for business success” and “sabotage his 2024 candidacy for President of the United States.”

    The lawsuit has been met with universal dismissal by First Amendment scholars. “The complaint is full of bluster,” said Katie Fallow, deputy litigation director at Columbia University’s Knight First Amendment Institute, but “short on any allegations of specific false statements of fact that would meet the rigorous standards for defamation claims brought by public figures.”

    One part of the complaint has been a particular focus of criticism, specifically where it states that the defendants had a “desire for President Trump to fail politically and financially. Each feels actual malice towards President Trump in the colloquial sense.”

    As Fallow alluded, to prove defamation Trump must show “actual malice” on the part of the Times — and that’s a tough hill to climb, even assuming that the reporting is proven to be false.

    As laid out in the landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, actual malice requires Trump to prove that the defendants actually knew their statements were false — or at least entertained actual, serious doubts about their truth. So resting this lawsuit on the idea that the defendants just really, really dislike Trump was met with predictable disbelief by legal experts.

    But this section and the broader lawsuit belie something more sinister than a blustery failure to establish its claims’ basic elements. Trump believes it is — or would like it to be — legally actionable to harm his political ambitions when you really, really dislike him. In his view, reporters should be liable for statements that make people not wish to support him.

    Beyond being a threat to the media, this idea is a threat to the very speech that makes up the core of our democratic process. No politician is entitled to support or votes, and to commodify them in this way is a perversion of democratic self-governance and a threat to core political speech.

    And we’ve already seen Trump advance this idea in his other lawsuits against the media.

    The lawsuit has been met with universal dismissal by First Amendment scholars.

    When he targeted CBS News last October, he alleged billions of dollars in damages from the impact of what he claimed was “deceptive editing” of a “60 Minutes” interview with Vice President Harris on campaign fundraising and “support values.” Later that year, he targeted pollster J. Ann Selzer and The Des Moines Register, claiming her polling miss was “election interference” that required him to “expend … campaign expenditures.” With legal help from my organization, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, Selzer is fighting these bogus claims.

    The New York Times must similarly take this lawsuit as an opportunity to reject this idea, full stop. Its unique role in the media industry warrants a strong and defiant message in defense of the First Amendment and the Fourth Estate that depends on it.

    Anything less risks a future in which Trump’s lawfare barrels through smaller outlets that don’t have the same resources.

    FIRE has seen this in the campus context.

    A negotiation and a settlement between Columbia and the Trump administration have led the administration to triumphantly charge at less resourced universities, such as George Mason University and George Washington University. As FIRE counsel Tyler Coward warned, “We said from the beginning it was going to take a big institution like Harvard or Columbia to stand up for its rights, and if they failed to do so — if they capitulated to unlawful demands from the administration — there was little hope for smaller institutions down the line.”

    The New York Times, the Harvard of newspapers, should understand its role here accordingly.

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  • Are treaties worth the paper they are signed on?

    Are treaties worth the paper they are signed on?

    If you agree to something and put it in writing, shouldn’t you abide by that agreement? Until now, that seemed to be a pretty basic idea. 

    Agreements at the international level come in the form of treaties. When countries sign treaties they voluntarily agree to follow a given set of rules. The agreements tend to be broad and carefully negotiated. Once signed and ratified, treaties commit countries to obligations. 

    In June, the countries of Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania announced that they will withdraw from the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Treaty. Signed by 165 international states, the treaty forbids the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, which are devices buried in the ground that explode when someone steps on them. 

    This month, Ukraine announced it would also withdraw. 

    Russia’s 2002 invasion of Ukraine radically changed the geopolitical context that existed when the Mine Ban Treaty was signed. But since landmines are only used in times of war, it seems like the potential circumstance of war would have been considered when the countries agreed to ban them. 

    But Russia, which invaded Ukraine in 2022, never signed the treaty. So has the war in Ukraine really changed everything?

    Disarming the power of treaties

    All five countries that announced their withdrawal from the treaty border either Russia or Russia-friendly Belarus. The use of anti-personnel landmines can be easily seen as a defensive military action against Russia. Norway, however, which has a 121 mile land border with Russia, remains committed to its anti-mine obligations. 

    The withdrawals represent a serious weakening of disarmament treaties that have humanitarian objectives as well as respect for international law. The five-country withdrawals could be setting a precedent that could see countries withdraw from other treaties such as those banning biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as well as withdrawals from international institutions.

    The withdrawals are a considerable reversal for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a loose coalition of non-governmental organizations that was awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize along with its founding coordinator Jody Williams. 

    The campaign was an unusual movement that garnered the support of many high profile people, including Princess Diana, Paul McCartney and James Bond actor Daniel Craig.

    While treaties are formally signed by states, it is unique that the initiative behind the ICBL came from non-state organizations. 

    Banning a conventional weapon

    Back in 1999, Williams wrote that widespread support for a landmine ban came as a surprise. “Few imagined that the grassroots movement would capture the public imagination and build political pressure to such a degree that, within five years, the international community would come together to negotiate a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines,” she wrote. She noted that it was the first time in history that a conventional weapon in widespread use had been comprehensively prohibited.

    That this is no longer the case has shocked land mine opponents.

    “We are furious with these countries,” said Thomas Gabelnick, the current director of the ICBL. “They know full well that this will do nothing to help them against Russia.”

    The signing of the 1997 Ottawa Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize were hailed as crucial steps in disarmament – getting governments to reduce their stockpiles of destructive weapons. 

    The treaty was the first disarmament agreement where governments and civil society worked closely together, representing a new form of international diplomacy. Unlike previous disarmament treaties, it banned weapons actually in use instead of striving to prevent or ban weapons designed as deterrents, such as nuclear weapons – weapons so destructive that the mere fear of their use would stop one country from attacking another.

    The treaty ratification process

    Historically, the treaty was signed during the euphoric period after the fall of the Berlin Wall and before the 11 September attacks that took down the World Trade Center in 2001. During this period global tensions seemed to be easing. Following the end of the Cold War many believed that more disarmament treaties would follow.

    The landmines treaty came into force in 1999 when it was ratified by a sufficient number of states. But some of the most largest and most powerful countries declined to sign. Besides Russia, other countries that stayed out include China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Israel and the United States.

    The treaty has successfully led to the destruction of tens of millions of stockpiled landmines. Hundreds of thousands of square miles have been de-mined (13,000 in Ukraine alone) and well the number of civilians maimed or killed by mines has been drastically reduced.

    The withdrawal by the five countries could be an unfortunate example for withdrawals from other disarmament treaties or multilateral organizations. 

    Mary Wareham, the deputy director of the crisis, conflict and arms division at Human Rights Watch, told The New York Times that the withdrawals set a terrible precedent. “Once an idea gets going it picks up steam,” she said. “Where does it stop?” 

    A treaty set to expire

    The last arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, for example, is scheduled to expire in January 2026. Will that treaty — the New Start Treaty — which eliminated important nuclear and conventional missiles, be renewed?

    The legitimate reason for leaving a treaty is force majeure, an unforeseen circumstance. As a Finnish Parliamentarian said justifying her country’s leaving the Treaty, the war in Ukraine “changed everything.” 

    Norway doesn’t agree.

    Writing for the European Leadership Network, Wareham and Laura Lodenius, the executive director at Peace Union of Finland, warned that the humanitarian impact will far outweigh any marginal military advantages. “The deterrent factor of re-embracing anti-personnel mines isn’t worth the civilian risk, humanitarian liabilities and reputational damage, all of which extend far beyond their borders,” they wrote.

    As for the United States, it has recently withdrawn from bilateral treaties — those between two nations — and several multilateral accords in which multiple parties sign on.

    A treaty that ended the Cold War

    In a historic ceremony in Iceland back in 1987, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which was largely seen as an end to the Cold War that had lasted since the end of World War II.

    Under the first Trump Administration in 2019, the U.S. withdrew from that treaty. 

    Trump has twice withdrawn the United States from the Paris Climate Accord and, in addition, withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty, which allows for the use of surveillance planes or drones for intelligence capturing purposes. 

    The United States has also withdrawn from institutions like the World Health Organization and is threatening to withdraw from the World Trade Organization. It has already left the U.N. Human Rights Council. 

    In an ominous move for multilateralism, Trump has set in motion a review of U.S. participation in intergovernmental organizations, including those that are part of the United Nations, with the intention of withdrawing from or seeking to reform them. 

    Breaking a treaty by executive order

    Trump’s executive order of 4 February 2025, started by saying: “The United States helped found the United Nations (UN) after World War II to prevent future global conflicts and promote international peace and security. But some of the UN’s agencies and bodies have drifted from this mission and instead act contrary to the interests of the United States while attacking our allies and propagating anti-Semitism.” 

    That’s his subjective interpretation of recent events. There is no justification in the mandate for the review for any change based on force majeure, certainly not that the United Nations and some of its agencies “drifted from this mission and instead act contrary to the interests of the United States.”

    Withdrawing from treaties or organizations has consequences for global stability. The announcement by the five countries that they are withdrawing from the Mine Ban Treaty is a worrisome addition to Trump’s general assault on multilateralism. Pacta sunt servanda, the underlying principle of contracts and law, translates to “agreements must be kept.” It is the foundation of international law and cooperation. 

    The withdrawals are a bad omen. They lessen the value of conventions and treaties. States should not respect their obligations only when they are in their favor. 

    Confidence that states will respect their obligations is the primary support for an international system. 

    The Ukraine war has not changed that. Without that confidence, the system collapses. 

    Can we agree on that?

    A version of this story has been published previously in the publication Counterpunch. 

     

    Questions to consider:

    1. What is a treaty?

    2. Why would a country decide to not ratify a treaty that bans landmines?

    3. When was the last time you agreed to do something. Was it difficult to keep that agreement?

     

     

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  • What might be in the Post-16 Skills and Higher Education White Paper for England?

    What might be in the Post-16 Skills and Higher Education White Paper for England?

    • This HEPI Blog post was kindly authored by Huw Morris, Honorary Professor of Tertiary Education, IoE, UCL’s Faculty of Education and Society and Richard Watermeyer, Professor of Education, University of Bristol.

    Introduction

    It is a year since the Labour Government was elected with a commitment to produce a post-16 skills and higher education White Paper by Summer 2025. In this article, we look at how changes in the UK’s economy and politics since July 2024 have altered what is likely to be in this policy statement and what might happen despite it.

    What has happened over the last twelve months?

    Last September, the Minister of State for Skills, Jacqui Smith, drew attention to the enormous economic challenges and tough choices facing the Government, but stressed the administration’s commitment to a mission-led approach to create a new era of opportunity and economic growth within a fairer society for everyone. Two months later the Secretary of State for Education, Bridget Phillipson, wrote to vice chancellors outlining the Government’s expectation that universities will:

    • expand access and improve outcomes for disadvantaged students;
    • make a stronger contribution to economic growth;
    • play a greater civic role in local communities;
    • raise teaching standards; and
    • deliver sustained efficiency and reform.

    There were also subsequent calls for more effective higher education leadership, strong governance and a new business model for the sector. To support these changes, ministers provided an increase in the undergraduate home tuition fee of £285/year and an uplift to the maximum maintenance loan support of £414. For those concerned with institutional finances, this uplift in income was more than matched by higher costs due to increases in employers’ national insurance contributions, reductions in foundation year fees, withdrawal of level 7 apprenticeship funding and reduced capital allocations, among other things. To deal with these changes, most universities have sought to increase their international student recruitment and classroom-based home undergraduate students, as well as higher margin postgraduate provision. For some of the institutions denied these opportunities because of their market position the alternative has been to expand their franchise operations and transnational education and/or to reduce costs. As figure 1 illustrates, these changes in funding and activity have produced some significant changes in forecasts for the money flowing to colleges, independent training providers and universities.

    Figure 1: Funding and Orientation Matrix

    Looking at the balance between areas of activity which enhance prestige and those that support widening participation, when combined with those that are funded publicly or privately, reveals some big changes. The increase in undergraduate home student tuition fees has not been enough to stem the decline of overall funding from foundation years, postgraduate courses and research grants. The balance in government funding has shifted from these areas of activity towards schools, further education and apprenticeship provision. Meanwhile, although funding from private sources for international students taught in the UK and for transnational education overseas has expanded, UKRI funding for individual institutions has declined due to increases in the number of grant applications from a wider range of institutions and a larger number of researchers leading to a halving of the success rate compounded by changes to the treatment of what was and is now again EU research funding.

    Explaining the changes, it’s the economy!

    Despite Government Ministers’ declared ambitions for further and higher education last Autumn, the participation of students from lower socio-economic backgrounds has declined over the last three years as measured by the proportion who had previously received free school meals or were enrolled at a state school.

    While further and higher education institutions are only one part of the influences on economic growth, the annual rate of change in productivity is negative at minus 0.2 per cent and GDP has declined for two months. The main contributors to this poor performance have been low levels of business investment, persistent skills shortages and low rates of innovation among domestic companies.

    Meanwhile, the impact of universities and colleges on local communities has been a tale in two parts. The annual Higher Education / Business Community Interaction survey reveals small increases in business start-ups and spinouts as well as partnerships with small firms, but measures of the impact on local economies is more difficult to demonstrate. These issues are less pronounced with apprenticeship providers and further education colleges where local community engagements are key to engaging adult part-time learners.

    The bright spot in recent activity has been the maintenance of high teaching standards in universities as recorded by the National Student Satisfaction Survey (NSS) and the Postgraduate Taught Experience Surveys (PTES), where between three-quarters and four-fifths of respondents are happy with their courses. More students see university education as providing value for money than do not, but there is pressure on students’ costs of living. These pressures stand behind the two-thirds of university students who indicate that they are working 10 to 15 hours per week part-time to generate the money they need to live. One fifth of students report working for more than 20 hours per week in paid employment and over a third indicate their income-generating commitments have a negative impact on their studies. There is also evidence of heightened competition for graduate jobs and a decline in the so-called ‘graduate premium’. This has doubtlessly contributed to the recent finding that 35% of graduates and 52% of postgraduates indicated that, with the benefit of hindsight, they would have made different higher education choices. There is no comparable recent education and outcome data for apprentices and further education students because the Further Education Choices Learner Satisfaction Survey was scrapped in 2020, but recent increases in the number of young people Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) suggests all is not well.

    Anticipating the future, it’s the politics!

    The Government has fared poorly in opinion polls over the last twelve months due to concern about the cost of living, immigration and the state of public services. This has prompted challenges from the political right and left. This is not confined to questions about tax, immigration and public spending, it has also extended to concerns about the role of universities and support for other forms of post-16 education. Across the voting population, recent private opinion polling has revealed that just over half of the electorate are questioning, sceptical or openly hostile to the role of universities in their communities. University research as an area of activity is poorly understood and where there is an appreciation of this activity, it is not automatically seen as meeting real-world needs. Meanwhile, among the leadership of many major civic and corporate organisations, universities are seen as profit-driven and not working in the public interest. In short, there is a lack of an emotional and relational connection between universities, local communities and national leaders.

    It has been argued that university leaders need to respond to these adverse public perceptions by stating the virtues of higher education and research more clearly and advocating for universities more often. Pursuing this approach, it is argued, will open the door to greater trust, less regulation and improved funding. More recently, it has been argued that public opinion has changed to such an extent since the Covid pandemic that this approach will not work and there is now a need, quoting Robbie Burns, for university staff “to see ourselves as others see us”, before considering how best to respond. The priorities of these others are likely to become more visible over the summer months as they question the evidence of university contribution and those who champion the current arrangements in the wake of this year’s home and international student recruitment rounds.

    The Autumn party conference season begins with the Liberal Democrats in Bournemouth (20 to 23 September), Labour in Liverpool (27 to 1 October), the Green Party in Bournemouth (3 to 5 October) and the Conservatives in Manchester (5 to 8 October). In today’s world of multi-party politics and jostling to define the public policy agenda, it is also important to note that the Reform Party conference will take place in Birmingham (5 to 6 September). Meanwhile, “Your Party”, the new left-wing party led by Jeremy Corbyn and Zarah Sultana, has not given a formal indication of its plans for an inaugural conference, but it seems likely that there will be events in early Autumn..

    The conference season is normally a time when parties outline what is planned or hoped for in the future. Governments are not supposed to announce new initiatives outside of the House of Commons, and although they occasionally do, they are rebuked by the Speaker of the House of Commons, as the Secretary of State for Education and Chancellor of the Exchequer have found out in recent months. This year is likely to be more difficult than usual as pressures on the public purse raise questions about tax changes in the Autumn budget and raise the spectre of changes to expenditure plans to meet the Government’s spending rules and to provide for defence, health and welfare commitments.

    Any post-16 education announcements are likely to be especially difficult because of the competition with other parties. The Reform party has promised to eliminate interest on student loans and to extend loan repayment periods (a graduate tax in all but name), as well as removing student loans for medical and STEM students and writing off the loans of long-serving NHS workers. There are also proposals to invest more in apprenticeships and technical education with an increase in publicly funded training courses.

    Similar proposals were made by the Green Party in their 2024 General election manifesto with commitments echoing the 2019 Labour Party manifesto to scrap tuition fees, restore maintenance grants and increase investment in skills and lifelong learning. Meanwhile, for completeness, the Liberal Democrats pledged to improve financial support for disadvantaged students by reintroducing maintenance grants, in part modelled on the arrangements introduced by the Liberal Democrat minister, Kirsty Williams, while she oversaw higher education for the Welsh Government (2016-2021). These promises of increased spending on student maintenance are likely to be attractive to many young voters and particularly newly enfranchised 16–18-year-olds. These promises can also be made by parties that believe they are unlikely to find themselves in government in 2026. The problem for university leaders and staff with these proposals is that while they will help students, they won’t help institutions to pay their bills, except perhaps for students’ halls of residence.

    What could possibly go wrong?

    Increased strain on university finances and growing pressure on the public purse, combined with demands for improved student maintenance funding, create a difficult context if anything unexpected goes wrong with the income and expenditure of individual institutions. These challenges have been added to by the publication of nine major Government strategy and policy papers with implications for post-16 education and training.

    The five missions that the Government was elected to pursue have been added to by a plan for the NHS, an Immigration White Paper, five critical technologies, six milestones, seven chapters in the Get Britain Working white paper, the eight priority sectors in the industrial strategy white paper, the nine regions identified in the national infrastructure plan and 10 priority skills sectors identified by Skills England. All of these plans have local dimensions that are being developed with the 12 established Mayoral Strategic Authorities and 12 new regional bodies outlined in plans for devolution to 44 English regions which will combine with 38 Local Skills and Improvement Plans (LSIPs). The complexity associated with these arrangements means that there will, in practice, have to be some simplification.

    It is reassuring to see this energy and commitment to change, but it is also a cause of concern that it is not clear how the various plans and governance arrangements will join up within Whitehall and across the regions. This may not be a problem in the largest city regions of Greater Manchester, Liverpool, London, North East, West Midlands and West Yorkshire. However, it is likely to be more of an issue in the less developed Mayoral regions of Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, the East Midlands, Sheffield, South Yorkshire, Tees Valle and West of England, not to mention the other 22 yet to be reorganised regions of the UK covering 50% of the population.

    The challenges of developing joined-up plans are likely to become problems if the reputational and financial risks being experienced by cash-strapped colleges, independent training providers and universities materialise. Among universities 43% are currently forecasting a deficit and the most recent published figures for further education colleges in 2022/3 revealed a figure of 37%. As recent experience with the University of Dundee has illustrated, the short-term direct costs can exceed £100m, and the longer-term indirect costs are even greater. These additional costs are likely to be substantial as national regulators, regional officials and local providers wrestle with the challenge of developing the capacity, capability and courage needed to align provision with employer demand as well as student interest.

    With low economic growth, high inflation and challenges to reductions in government expenditure and without additional funding for student maintenance and living expenses, it is difficult to see how universities will widen participation for students from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Without more funding for courses in the areas of skill shortage that underpin the eight industrial sectors and the requirements of the NHS and National Infrastructure Plan, it is difficult to see how local skills needs will be met and the improvements in productivity and economic growth achieved. Teaching quality might be maintained by a lower-paid and increasingly casualised workforce, but will the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions improve without support for the local coordination and rationalisation of activity?

    What might be in the Post-16 and Higher Education White Paper?

    Now that the anticipated publication of the Post-16 and Higher Education White Paper has been delayed until the Autumn it seems likely that it will be timed to coincide with the Budget in November. This Indian Summer schedule is needed to gain some certainty about the future funding position and associated changes to tax and spending decisions. So, what might be in the White paper? At present the following five strands of activity seem most likely.

    Widening participation and progression

    Proposals for the development of regional education and skills pathways to support the introduction of the credit and modular funding arrangements that will be needed with the Lifelong Learning Entitlement in January 2027. Proposals for consultation on how institutions could be required to introduce bursary and scholarship arrangements if they fail to meet regionally agreed targets for widening participation and progression.

    International students

    Proposals for consultation on how the 6% international student levy will be used to pay for the upskilling of domestic learners, rebalancing of funding towards institutions that have not recruited international students and underwriting of the costs of structural adjustments.

    Local Skills and Productivity

    Outline of how Local Skills Improvement Plans will be developed by Skills England to ensure that Mayoral Strategic Authorities and other regional bodies have tools to influence education provision to respond to the 10 skills priorities and 5 critical technologies while meeting the needs of local employers and communities. This might include local independent careers, advice and guidance arrangements of the sort developed in Greater Manchester.

    Quality and Standards

    Announcement of the provisional findings from an internal review of the standards and regulations applied by the Office for Students including tightened controls over franchise and transnational education arrangements.

    Efficiency, effectiveness and exit

    Changes to Competition and Market Authority guidance on regional institutional cooperation. The introduction of an insolvency and regime for higher education institutions to parallel arrangements for further education colleges and independent apprenticeship providers. This to include formal mechanisms for restructuring loans or similar transitional finance arrangements.

    What is currently missing from these arrangements is a multi-year agreement on fees and funding or a plan for supporting English regions that are not part of the current plans for devolution. All major post-16 White papers in the past have included an explicit or tacit exchange of support for the UK economy locally and nationally with an agreement on longer-term funding and finance. To achieve this realistically in the future will require guidance on how regional and institutional leadership and governance will be aligned with national plans. The UK’s devolved governments and a few established Mayoral Strategic Authorities have mechanisms to bring colleges and universities together to discuss their plans and the opportunities for alignment. In many instances these arrangements span more than one MSA or its equivalent. Most of the other regions lack these arrangements and will need support to develop local officials, senior managers and governing bodies. Most importantly what should these groupings do if one or more institutions in their patch fail?

    There is little appetite among the UK’s political parties and government departments for an independent review of higher education because of concern about the time this would take and the loss of control it would entail. However, the risks associated with current economic constraints and political polarisation pose substantial risks for local communities and regional economies in general and for the students and staff in individual institutions in particular. The summer months provide a useful time to reflect on these challenges and to consider how genuinely transformational change can be led and managed within city regions and rural combined authorities. For universities, further education providers and independent training providers and their representatives, this should involve more than improving their public affairs and relations and should consider how local and regional forms of organisation can be developed.

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  • Purdue Cuts Off Student Paper Citing Institutional Neutrality

    Purdue Cuts Off Student Paper Citing Institutional Neutrality

    Purdue University has ended a long-standing partnership with its independent student newspaper, The Purdue Exponent, and will no longer distribute papers, give student journalists free parking passes or allow them to use the word “Purdue” for commercial purposes.

    The Purdue Student Publishing Foundation board (PSPF), the nonprofit group that oversees The Exponent—the largest collegiate newspaper in Indiana—said the changes came without warning.

    On May 30, PSPF received an email from Purdue’s Office of Legal Counsel notifying the group that their contract had expired more than a decade ago and the university would not participate in newspaper distribution or give the students exclusive access to newspaper racks on campus.

    In addition, the message said, the university will not enter into a new contract for facility use with the paper to remain consistent with the administration’s stated policy on institutional neutrality.

    According to a statement from the university, it is not consistent “with principles of freedom of expression, institutional neutrality and fairness to provide the services and accommodations described in the letter to one media organization but not others.”

    The Exponent is the only student newspaper, though Purdue also has two student news channels, FastTrack News and BoilerTV.

    Legal counsel also asked The Exponent to keep “Purdue” off the masthead and out of the paper’s URL because “The Foundation should not associate its own speech with the University.” PSPF says it has a trademark on “The Purdue Exponent” until 2029.

    PSPF and Purdue have held distribution agreements since 1975, in which Exponent staff would drop papers off at various locations across campus and staff would then place them on newspaper racks.

    In 2014, the Exponent delivered the university a new contract to renew the agreement for the next five years, according to paper staff. The contract was never signed, but the terms of the agreement continued until Monday, June 2.

    Now, The Exponent is permitted to distribute papers themselves and have nonexclusive access to newspaper stands on campus, according to the university; students said they don’t have early access to many of the buildings the way staff do.

    “Purdue’s moves are unacceptable and represent not only a distortion of trademark law but a betrayal of the university’s First Amendment obligations to uphold free expression,” Dominic Coletti, a student press program officer for the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, told The Exponent. “Breaking long-standing practice to hinder student journalism is not a sign of institutional neutrality; it is a sign of institutional cowardice.”



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  • Podcast: Immigration white paper, Jacqui Smith

    Podcast: Immigration white paper, Jacqui Smith

    This week on the podcast we get across the government’s new immigration white paper. What does cutting the graduate route visa from two years to 18 months mean for international students and universities?

    Plus we examine the proposed 6 per cent levy on international student fees and tighter compliance requirements that could put some institutions at risk.

    We also discuss Skills Minister Jacqui Smith’s Telegraph op-ed criticizing universities for “losing sight of their responsibility to protect public money” – are her concerns reasonable?

    With Smita Jamdar, Partner and Head of Education at Shakespeare Martineau, Roscoe Hastings, Director of Teaching Excellence and Student Experience at the University of Exeter, James Coe, Associate Editor at Wonkhe and presented by Jim Dickinson.

    Read more

    Everything in the immigration white paper for higher education

    There are lots of ways to be more transparent about university finances

    Lessons from innovating in our student support model

    Euro visions: A playbook to fight the populists in the Netherlands

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  • The Immigration White Paper — an Indian student’s perspective

    The Immigration White Paper — an Indian student’s perspective

    Last week, I arrived back in London on a high. I’d spent five weeks in India with British colleagues promoting the benefits of U.K. higher education in seven cities. My audience was some of the most talented and entrepreneurial young people in the world, and they have plenty of choices about where to follow their dreams. But I know from my decade as Chair of the U.K. National Indian Students and Alumni Union (NISAU) that British education is an extraordinary opportunity for Indian students and their host country. It’s a win-win if ever there was one in talent, skills, investment and friendship. And all this was topped off with the announcement of the long-awaited India-UK trade deal. We were filled with possibility.

    Yet as soon as I stepped off the plane, I was faced with a barrage of news stories about the UK Immigration White Paper. Would all our hard work be put at risk? Surely we would not jeopardise the Graduate Route Visa so vital to Indian graduates and hard-won by many, including Indian students and alumni.

    So now the White Paper is published, what is our take on it?

    The Graduate Route

    First, let’s be clear. Our worst fears were averted. NISAU genuinely welcomes the Government’s decision to retain the Graduate Route and acknowledges the significant engagement that has taken place with stakeholders across the sector. NISAU has worked extensively over the past decade — and particularly intensively in the last year — with policymakers across all major political parties, including many now in government, to advocate for the continuation of this essential route.

    Of course, there are still worries. Any change is worrying when witnessed from thousands of miles away. So while we are relieved that the Graduate Route has been preserved — albeit with a modestly reduced duration — we urge that its implementation, and that of the wider reforms, be approached with care, clarity, and collaboration. Getting this right will shape the UK’s standing as a top destination for global talent in the years ahead.

    Why should we worry about a white paper on immigration?

    But here’s the rub. Many of us feel the UK’s worries about immigration are being applied inappropriately. International students are a distinct, high-contribution, temporary category of migration. They fund their own education, power innovation in universities, sustain local economies and build enduring bilateral ties between the UK and countries around the world.

    They (we) should be celebrated, not treated through the same policy lens as other forms of migration. Doing so risks undermining one of the UK’s most globally admired assets: its higher education sector.

    Universities, too, are one of Britain’s most powerful strategic assets. They drive regional growth, advance global research, and help produce the high-skilled workforce the country urgently needs. Supporting them — and the students who choose them — must remain a national priority.

    It’s an old argument, but worth repeating because it’s true. International students bring enormous benefits to the UK — to our high streets, workplaces, and campuses. They contribute billions to the UK economy each year, and the fees they pay help sustain vital subjects like Engineering and Medicine — courses which are essential to Britain’s long-term prosperity and global competitiveness.

    International students also create employment and support domestic skills through their impact on the wider economy and the cross-subsidy they provide for UK teaching and research.

    The White Paper talks about impact. But any local impact assessment or review of the domestic skills landscape should begin here — with a recognition that the presence of international students uplifts opportunities for UK nationals, not competes with them. And so we reiterate, no matter how often this request is dismissed, international students must be taken out of the net migration targets for purposes of robust policymaking and to ensure future efforts to reduce regular forms of migration don’t endanger this huge benefit.

    Home thoughts from abroad

    The White Paper was aimed, naturally, at a domestic political audience, but the world was listening. International communication must be extensively managed and properly executed — proactively and urgently — especially during this peak recruitment period. Panic must not be allowed to set in among current and prospective students. Immediate clarity is needed on who is affected and how.

    It’s easy to forget what this takes, and GREAT campaign funding, which promotes campaigns like Study London, has already been cut by 41%. How will the great stories we should be telling about global education reach the right students in an appropriate way?

    Think of the impact of our recent debates on Indian students, the largest users of the Graduate Route. For 70% of Indian students, a strong post-study work offer is the single most important factor in deciding where to study abroad. The ability to gain significant international work experience is critical. As we told the Migration Advisory Committee, work is not the same as work experience.

    What we need now are proactive, student-focused communications, delivered by those who understand how to engage students effectively. NISAU has already started evidence-based communications. We stand ready to scale our role in partnership with UK stakeholders, but we must be quick. Rumours and bad actors must not be allowed to shape the UK’s story and, as Mark Twain said, a lie will fly around the whole world while the truth is getting its boots on. So we encourage a joined-up national communications effort, led by government and supported by trusted sector voices like NISAU, to ensure international students receive accurate, timely and reassuring guidance.

    Skills and Immigration Alignment

    Here we see real opportunity. We strongly support the Government’s move to align immigration policy with domestic skills development. This is not new to us. NISAU has long championed this principle. Our advocacy has enabled productive sectoral dialogue, including at our 2024 and 2025 national conferences, where we specifically advanced the case for better integration of immigration, training pipelines and national workforce planning. Now we look forward to working with stakeholders to ensure these reforms drive opportunity, not exclusion. International students and graduates should be part of this thinking, not passive recipients.

    Tighter Regulation of Agents

    We should be afraid, though, of naming and fixing problems. NISAU has spent nearly a decade calling for tighter regulation of education agents, so we are pleased to see this now reflected in government policy. We, of all people, see the cost of this being done badly.

    However, implementation is everything. We urge clarity and accountability in the system, and ask for specific answers to:

    • What is the penalisation mechanism for misconduct by agents?
    • How can universities transparently share information on agent breaches?
    • What channels will be created for students to report agent wrongdoing safely and easily?

    So we recommend the following actions to ensure transparency and integrity:

    1. A sector-wide cap on agent commission to ensure that student interests are prioritised over volume incentives.
    2. Mandatory publication by universities of agent appointment processes and the fees paid to each agent, after every intake.
    3. Immediate monitoring of potential oligopolistic aggregators in the agent market, whose dominance may compromise student choice, competition, and accountability.

    Agent reform must centre student welfare, market integrity, and institutional accountability.

    Talent Route Enhancements

    And finally, we welcome the strengthening of the Global Talent, Innovator Founder, and High Potential Individual routes. These are important to the UK’s economic ambitions, especially in strategic sectors such as AI, deep tech, and life sciences. But talent does not always arrive ready-made. It is nurtured — often from within our international student community.

    International graduates are a strategic talent pool that can help meet the UK’s workforce gaps, drive innovation in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and build globally competitive businesses. Retaining them through structured graduate-to-founder pathways is not just in students’ interests — it is in Britain’s. We therefore urge:

    • A seamless pipeline between student, graduate, and entrepreneurship routes.
    • The right for students to start businesses while studying.
    • A bespoke international graduate start-up pathway, enabling the UK to tap into a future generation of founders, many of whom could otherwise take their innovation elsewhere.

    Supporting graduate outcomes must also become a central focus across the UK higher education sector. A recent survey revealed that only 3% of international graduates found employment through their university careers service, highlighting a clear opportunity for improvement in how students are supported beyond the classroom.

    This is not only a challenge for international students; domestic students, too, require more tailored and effective career support to meet the evolving demands of today’s job market.

    NISAU has long championed the need for improved careers provision, including through regular engagement with universities and stakeholders, and as a central theme at both our 2024 and 2025 national conferences. At a plenary session during our 2025 conference in February, we demonstrated how the absence of structured university-led careers support has given rise to an unregulated ecosystem of social media ‘careers coaches’ — many of whom charge students significant fees, often without delivering meaningful outcomes. We recognise that many universities are already taking meaningful steps to enhance the student experience and graduate outcomes. From employability hubs to expanded industry partnerships, we welcome and encourage these efforts — and believe they can be further amplified through shared best practice, consistent investment, and greater collaboration with student-led organisations such as NISAU.

    The White Paper on Immigration is challenging on skills. We call for a sector-wide paradigm shift — one that places measurable, inclusive, and industry-informed employability support at the heart of the student experience and ensures that students are not left to navigate their futures unsupported or exploited.

    There is much more to say. We are concerned about a lack of clarity on graduate-level jobs and the financial impacts of all these changes on the universities that attract global students in the first place. Nor do we want to be seen only as investors. The ‘best and the brightest’ are not necessarily the ‘rich and the richest’.

    We urge that any levies or associated costs placed on universities be ring-fenced for reinvestment into student support, careers, and compliance infrastructure, rather than passed on to students. Global education is changing. International students are discerning, strategic, and have options. If the UK offer weakens, the best talent will go elsewhere. The UK at the moment has a competitive advantage — that advantage must be protected through consistency, clarity, and commitment to the student experience. Let’s secure a UK that remains open, ambitious and globally competitive in higher education and in so many other ways.

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  • Everything in the immigration white paper for higher education

    Everything in the immigration white paper for higher education

    The Home Office immigration white paper – Restoring control over the immigration system – has arrived, and there are some seriously consequential decisions for international students and the higher education sector.

    The graduate route will be cut from two years (for undergraduates and master’s students) to 18 months. A range of new measures that will make visa sponsorship duties more onerous for higher education providers are coming into effect. There are steps to attract “top scientific talent.”

    And most unexpectedly of all, the idea of introducing a levy on international student tuition fees is floated, “to be reinvested into the higher education and skills system.”

    Mood music

    For all that there are some serious, significant changes to student and graduate visas contained within the white paper, the last few years of policy turmoil has demonstrated that much of the impact of migration policy on student recruitment is determined by how changes are interpreted by prospective students weighing up their choices between different destination countries.

    After having spent a couple of months in office making more positive noises about international students – and repeatedly patting themselves on the back about it – Labour has since plunged back into the murky waters of “talking tough on migration”, with students a political football yet again. How much this resonates abroad, and with what tenor the press in key recruiting countries reports on all of this, will probably have the greatest overall effect on what follows for the sector.

    But the white paper itself is pretty bullish on international students – more so than we might have expected. There’s plenty of language that would have not looked out of place in a Conservative policy document, had Rishi Sunak not scrambled for an election instead of providing a proper response to the MAC review. So the Home Office tells us:

    In recent years, we have seen an increase in students staying in the UK following their studies. Alongside this, we have also seen an increase in sponsored study visas for lower-ranking education institutions.

    And that:

    We have also seen a series of problems involving misuse and exploitation of student visas, where visas are used as an entry point for living and working in the UK without any intention to complete the course, and increasing numbers of asylum claims from students at the end of their course, even though nothing substantive has changed in their home country while they have been in the UK.

    Home secretary Yvette Cooper’s introduction even tries to paint the last government as recklessly pro-international recruitment (our bolding):

    Immigration policy during the last Parliament replaced free movement with a free-market experiment which incentivised employers to freely recruit from abroad rather than train at home, allowed education institutions to pursue unlimited expansion of overseas students without proper checks in place, and directly encouraged the NHS and care organisations to bring in far more staff from abroad while still cutting support or training places in the UK.

    The Office for National Statistics’ recent finding that more than half of students arriving in 2020 still held leave after three years gets an airing – a point which those in the sector who have repeatedly been arguing that the vast majority of international students return home after graduating would do well to heed.

    We’d also note that the white paper’s observation that growth in international recruitment has been particularly pronounced in those institutions further down the international rankings (made up as they are in the main of research output and spurious reputation surveys) is particularly inane, and yet another of those examples of the Home Office weighing in on education policy and the size and shape of the sector. It has its roots in the last government’s response to the MAC review, but it’s profoundly depressing to see it taken forward as a stick to beat teaching-intensive universities with.

    The graduate route

    The post-study work visa’s reduction in length will likely generate the most headlines, at home and abroad. Drawing on a new piece of evaluation conducted last spring, the Home Office concludes that:

    Too many graduates allowed to stay in the UK following the successful completion of their studies are not moving into the graduate level roles for which the Graduate visa route was created.

    A survey of just under 3,000 visa holders saw only 30 per cent report being in “professional” occupations, with others either not giving a straightforward answer to the question or (31 per cent) being in occupations whose entry requirements are likely to be A level equivalent or lower.

    The build-up to the white paper’s publication was accompanied by a somewhat ludicrous debate over whether the (non-sponsored) graduate visa would somehow be limited to graduate-level work or salary – regardless of the fact that this would have meant turning it into a completely different visa with a heavy overlap with the skilled worker route.

    Instead, the government has concluded that it should be reduced to 18 months – it appears that this applies only to undergraduate and master’s students, who currently are entitled to two years, rather than PhDs.

    It’s not really spelled out how this new length has been arrived at – the charitable interpretation would be that this is sufficient time to allow graduates who are going to find graduate-level work to indeed find it, while those who are either unable to or were never really serious about doing so (in the government’s eyes) will be obliged to leave sooner.

    This Home Office’s statement of the problem is that “the intention behind the Graduate route was to support the economy.” No mention is made of enhancing the UK’s attractiveness as a study destination, which was also a strategic objective at the route’s launch, and part of the international education strategy. The government no longer seems to want to have this conversation.

    The survey that (in parts) provides the evidence base for the curtailment of the route also notes that 65 per cent of users said that gaining work experience was one of the most important reasons to engage in post-study work. But – as we’ve observed before – this function of the graduate route gets increasingly ignored. The Home Office frames all graduate route holders as needing to acquire graduate-level roles, as quickly as possible, and then disapproves of the contribution to net migration that this begets.

    Diving a bit deeper into the graduate route evaluation that is, in theory, the justification for the changes, we again see the Home Office continuing to divide up the sector in terms of Russell Group and non-Russell Group, despite the fact that DfE under Labour has discontinued this practice in school performance management.

    The majority of Graduate route users graduated from a non-Russell Group university (72%), while a quarter (26%) graduated from a Russell Group university.

    While this finding doesn’t get a mention in the white paper itself, it’s of a piece with the pronouncements elsewhere that too many students seem to be coming through those less prestigious universities for the Home Office’s liking.

    So what’s the upshot? Yet again, the impact modelling deployed in government to assess the effects of visa changes on the higher education sector is pretty pathetic. A student route evaluation published alongside the white paper sees 66 per cent of survey respondents say they were aware of the Graduate route (this gets us down to n = 1,265). Of these, 73 per cent said it influenced their decision. Of these, 29 per cent said they would not have come if it wasn’t available. Blithely multiplying these percentages together leads to an assumption (in the white paper’s technical annex) that 14 per cent of applicants would be put off if the graduate route were abolished.

    Of course, the Home Office didn’t ask about reducing it by six months – it’s almost as if this decision was thrashed out in Whitehall horse-trading rather than a pragmatic example of policy implementation. As they are lopping a quarter of the graduate route, they have – genuinely – divided 14 per cent by four to get 3.5 per cent. This would equate to around 12,000 students a year if by some stroke of dumb luck the assumption turned out to be true. But what really comes across is that they have no idea.

    For international students who are not put off, the result of shortening the route will be either to reduce the amount of time they have to accrue valuable work experience or – for those who are hoping to build a career in the UK – accelerated pressure on the job hunt. Institutions will need to get even more serious about advice, careers support, and evaluation. This is especially the case given all the other wholesale changes to work visas that the white paper detonates – students will need support in navigating a system that each year is a little different to how it was when they started thinking about where to apply.

    Compliance

    In a lengthy section entitled “responsible recruitment”, the white paper sets out some serious reforms to how UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) will manage compliance among those higher education institutions sponsoring students. It’s argued that current thresholds are “too lenient” and “have left the route open to abuse and exploitation.”

    We saw promises to make compliance standards stricter in the last government’s response to the MAC review, so there is a sense that some of what’s proposed in the white paper has been held back over the autumn to be made public here. UKVI has already been subjecting certain institutions to enhanced scrutiny for the last few months – but what’s proposed here goes quite substantially beyond that, and could be extremely challenging for some (especially small) institutions.

    The current metrics used to determine whether a sponsoring higher education provider is fulfilling its duties are – via the annual basic compliance assessment, or BCA – having a visa refusal rate of less than 10 per cent, a course enrolment rate of at least 90 per cent, and a course completion rate of at least 85 per cent.

    The white paper reveals that all of these measures will be made five percentage points stricter. To get an indication of how substantive such changes would be, it is noted that:

    Data from the 2023–24 BCA suggests that 22 HEIs would not have met at least one of the tightened criteria set out in this paper. These institutions sponsored approximately 49,000 students while refusing 400 during their 12-month assessment period.

    The technical annex also assumes that, of these 22, five would not be able to become compliant and therefore lose sponsorship rights, for at least a year. It puts the impact at between 9,000 and 14,000 fewer student visa grants, given that some students will be squeezed out of the system, whereas other genuine applicants will find alternative study destinations. It’s very much a guesstimate though – but the vastly increased requirements will put enormous pressure on higher education institutions to play it extremely safe with recruitment and agent partnerships, and to subject applicants to even more rigorous checks.

    There’s more as well – UKVI will roll out new interventions for sponsors “close to failing metrics”, sign-up to the Agent Quality Framework will be mandated – a measure that has been proposed about a hundred times by this point, and the framework is already widely subscribed to – and a new RAG rating will be used to rate each sponsoring institution’s compliance. On this latter point, it’s mentioned that this will help the public assess institutions’ compliance, raising the intriguing possibility that we are about to get a lot more transparency from UKVI than was ever the case. And massively ramping up the pressure on universities (and, especially, smaller providers) to avoid falling foul of the rules.

    It’s also worth not losing sight of the impact on international students themselves of all this bearing down on compliance – a measurably more bureaucratic study experience and, if not well implemented by providers, one that reinforces a sense of unwelcomeness as they are repeatedly asked to jump through hoops that home students do not face.

    But probably the most important measure contained within the proposals – and, if implemented properly, an extremely welcome one – is obliging a provider who wants to request a larger CAS allocation to “demonstrate that they are considering local impacts when taking its decision on international recruitment.” There’s no further information on what this would look like, but housing must clearly be front and centre of the government’s thinking here – it’s something Yvette Cooper has mentioned on a number of occasions.

    Asylum claims

    In the run-up to the white paper’s publication, leaks to the press made it clear that one area where international higher education was in the Home Office’s crosshairs was over the proportion of asylum claims generated by those who had arrived in the UK on student visas – as we’ve recently written about on Wonkhe, this hit 16,000 in 2024, almost 15 per cent of all claims in the year.

    The white paper says that this number has been increasing “at pace”, and also reveals that the majority of the students claiming asylum “do so as they approach their visa expiry date” – a fact which is ascribed to students making claims to stay in the UK, rather than due to changes in their own country.

    It had been briefed to the media that applications for work and study visas by those deemed most likely to overstay and claim asylum would face higher rejection rates, through some of “pattern spotting” – a predictive measure that would inevitably face legal challenges, it should be noted. The white paper doesn’t, in fact, get too much into the detail here, rather setting out towards the end a “series of further measures” that will be explored.

    One of these seems likely to be the use of international students’ proof of funds as evidence that they should not be eligible for asylum. We also get reference to potential “financial measures, penalties and sanctions” for sponsoring institutions – which would include universities. Detail on all this is going to come at a later point.

    An international student levy?

    When the Australian government commissioned a wholesale review of higher education – the Accord – one of the ideas that generated most pushback from the sector was for a levy on international students. It came out of the Accord commission’s interim report – then education minister Jason Clare said it was analogous to a “sovereign wealth fund” for the sector, and could be spent on infrastructure or research.

    Australia’s research-intensives – the Group of Eight – called it a “damaging international student tax”. It was absent from the Accord’s final recommendations, replaced by a “futures fund” with joint contributions from universities and government. It still wasn’t popular and, like much of the Accord’s long-term thinking, there hasn’t been any sign of policymakers picking it up.

    And yet – completely out of the blue, something similar has cropped up in today’s white paper:

    The Government will explore introducing a levy on higher education provider income from international students, to be reinvested into the higher education and skills system. Further details will be set out in the Autumn Budget.

    The Home Office wants to stress that this is not a final policy position – indeed, it is not something that one government department could move forward with on its own. The technical annex gives the “illustrative” example of a six per cent levy on tuition (and also notes that it would likely be passed on to students in higher fees).

    A six per cent levy would generate something in the order of £570m, if we generously take into account the reductions in recruitment that the Home Office has modelled (the levy’s putative effects are transmogrified into assumptions about changes to student demand based on some work from London Economics that was only focused on students from the EU, but it’s not even worth getting into that).

    There’s no way to reliably say which universities would lose out in terms of paying the levy – the government appears to be assuming that the students that won’t now come are the ones that they don’t want to come, which would likely hit less prestigious providers with more international students. You might imagine that some part of the levy would have to be used to prop up otherwise struggling providers in deprived areas – as we would otherwise lose them.

    What that would amount to is a word we’ve not heard from any government for a good few years – redistribution. Though the idea of the sector as a single set of accounts is familiar among headline writers and UCU campaigners, in practice there’s been little deviation from the idea that the market is the fairest means to distribute resources (“the funding follows the student”) with the exception of a very small amount of funds for “world class” small and specialist providers.

    Of course, by mentioning that the levy would be spent on “higher education and skills” opens the door to the money going elsewhere in the tertiary space. And, as with the apprenticeship levy, there’s no guarantee that the funds would not be top-sliced by the Treasury. There is absolutely no doubt that such a system, in the event that it came to pass, would be the subject of policy instability for many subsequent years, with everyone and their dog coming up with tweaks, fiddles and overhauls in how it should best be deployed.

    We’ve noted that the Home Office vaguely intimates that the cost of the levy would be borne by students (via increased fees) rather than by higher education providers. This may well not be the case. The last decade has shown that providers will set the fees at the level where they think they can recruit, rather than with reference to cost of provision (or home fees). If fees could comfortably go up six per cent, then they already would have. So expect a serious lobbying effort from universities against any further plans to introduce this levy.

    There are also substantial issues around devolution here. International student fees are really not there for the Home Office to grab and claim that they are a reserved matter, in the way that visas are. Presumably what’s being considered here would apply England-only – unless the devolved governments suddenly think this is worth going along with.

    All the other stuff

    Given that higher education is so intimately interconnected with both the visa system and the labour market, there’s barely a page of the white paper that doesn’t have some degree of consequence for the sector. Here’s a rundown.

    Global talent: the one area where there is a commitment to increasing migration is “very high talent routes.” There is talk of simplifying the use of the global talent visa to recruit top scientific talent, as well as possibly doubling the number of overseas universities whose graduates qualify for the high potential individual work visa route. Eligibility here is based on international university rankings, and consequently is a complete mess.

    Student dependants: there will be a new English language requirement for all adult dependants, at A1 on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). It’s also noted that the intention is to increase this over time.

    Short-term study visas: the government has already increased scrutiny of these visas for students coming on short (six to eleven month) English language courses, but there will also be a review of accreditation bodies, due to a very high refusal rate.

    Immigration skills charge: This charge for companies sponsoring those on skilled worker visas (currently £1,000 a year for medium or large sponsors) will be increased by 32 per cent. It’s one of those things that sounds good on paper – reinvesting visa fees into the skills system – but has never been implemented properly, with money just vanishing into the Treasury. In theory, that’s now going to change, with the spending review to announce “skills funding for priority sectors” paid for out of these funds.

    We should also note that higher education institutions are currently exempt from paying this charge for many categories of scientist, research managers and teaching professionals – so worth keeping an eye on the detail of the changes here when they do appear.

    The Labour Market Evidence Group: this body, which had previously been referred to as “the quad”, is to be made up of the industrial strategy advisory council, the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), Skills England (and the devolved nations’ skills bodies, to the extent the government will properly involve them rather than dumping policy on them), and the DWP. We don’t learn much that wasn’t in the MAC’s annual report, but this group’s evidence will be used to inform workforce strategies for sectors that have high levels of overseas recruitment.

    The Immigration Salary List: this set of occupations eligible for discounts on skilled worker visa salary premiums is to be abolished. This was until recently known as the shortage occupation list, to give you a sense of how much churn successive governments have instituted in migration policy. Instead, the MAC is going to conduct a review of how discounts are used, with the result that the exact salary requirements for different jobs – which universities may want to recruit onto, or international graduates might want to progress to – are up in the air again. Currently those on student or graduate visas are entitled to a discount in the required salary for sponsorship.

    International education strategy refresh: Nope, no mention of this. The last we heard this was due for “early spring”, and presumably now the white paper has landed the DfE and the business department have a freer hand to get it launched.

    It’s hard to see how some of the original IES targets around diversification can persist, given the increased pressure on compliance (stay out of “risky” markets), potential plans to profile certain nationalities, and the fearmongering about students attending less prestigious institutions. A student number target feels a million miles away from how Labour is trying to position itself politically. And education export objectives, without any detail on what aspects on international activity the government is OK with increasing, are pretty meaningless. So what’s left to be in it?

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  • An end to sticking plaster politics? Why the government needs to use its upcoming white paper to take a different approach to immigration

    An end to sticking plaster politics? Why the government needs to use its upcoming white paper to take a different approach to immigration

    The Labour Party was elected to government last year on a promise to reduce net migration. Their victory in the 2024 General Election followed a period in which net migration to the UK peaked at 906,000 and public concerns over migration began to rise again for the first time since the Brexit referendum.

    Unsurprisingly, Number 10 views progress on this issue as central to their re-election prospects. Precisely how the government will look to do this is still unclear, yet recent weeks have seen growing speculation over an immigration white paper which is expected to land pretty soon.

    White paper

    A new approach to immigration is needed. Too often, immigration policy has been dictated by the release of the latest migration figures and so the development of a white paper on immigration in and of itself is no bad thing. Moreover, it provides the government with an opportunity to take a more strategic approach to migration policy.

    Prior to the election, the Labour Party committed to a different style of governing which would end ‘sticking plaster’ politics. But how to apply this longer-term view to immigration policy? To be judged as successful, any new approach to immigration would need to see net migration reduced given their manifesto commitment. As such, tough choices need to be made about where further reforms could be made to reduce the overall number of people coming to the UK.

    This creates some obvious risks for UK universities given the importance of international students to the financial sustainability of our sector. Universities UK (UUK) has been clear that, over the long-term, international recruitment should not be the answer to the financial sustainability of higher education institutions. Instead, we need to work with government on a long-term plan, secure increased investment, and explore new approaches to efficiency and transformation in the sector.

    In the absence of a long-term plan to address the underfunding of the higher education sector, any new approach to immigration would, at the very least, need to enable universities to continue to attract international students to study in the UK to prevent current financial challenges from deteriorating further.

    Three tests

    This is no easy task, but it is possible. So, what could a different course of action on migration policy actually look like? I think there are three clear things we need:

    1. A joined up, coordinated approach.

    2. Look forward not back, (as the Labour Party once encouraged us to do).

    3. Draw a line between temporary and permanent migration.

     

    The left-hand ought to know what the right-hand is doing

    The starting point of any new immigration policy ought to be based on having a joined-up and co-ordinated approach. This may seem obvious but would be a welcome change.

    The key opportunity for the new government is to use their immigration white paper to finally align migration policy with wider government objectives. Based on what the Home Secretary has outlined, at least part of this would be to create much greater join-up between the UK’s visas and skills systems so that immigration is not used as an alternative to training or tackling workforce problems, thereby reducing overall net migration. This is a good start, but the white paper offers an opportunity to go further.

    Under previous administrations, there was a distinct lack of coordination and coherence in policy and strategy. This can be seen most clearly in the development of an International Education Strategy – which set an explicit aim of government policy to grow the number of international students coming to the UK, but which then came up against a Home Office who had been instructed to curb the growth in international students.

    Don’t use the rear-view mirror

    With a clear joined-up strategy, the government should then look to shift the focus of immigration policy away from retrospective net migration trends, towards focussing on future forecasts, thereby creating a more realistic timeframe to achieve their strategy.

    It is quite clear that reducing net migration is going to continue to be the focus of government policy. Yet as we have seen, annual net migration focuses too much on short-term migration trends – be it the increase of people coming from Ukraine, or Hong Kong – and doesn’t focus enough on the anticipated impact of recent policy – such as changes to dependant’s which has led a dramatic reduction in the UK’s attractiveness as a study destination in certain countries.

    By shifting towards long-term projections (measured over a rolling 5-year average), the government could then create the political space to actually achieve their wider objectives. For example, providing a longer-term timeframe to work with employers to implement skills and training initiatives to support those roles where recruitment is primarily met through immigration.

    Any future forecast would, inevitably, be subject to changes and revisions but it would represent a far better metric than basing government policy on retrospective and highly volatile net migration trends from the previous year.

    Separate the temporary from the permanent

    A final welcome change would be for the government to distinguish more between ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ migration. After all, while many migrants do settle in the UK, many others do not and have little intention of doing so.

    This applies to many international students. They may stay for a few years after their studies, but very few end up remaining in the UK for the long-term and get settlement. Rather than taking students out of net migration – which would only serve to highlight the contribution which international students do make to net migration while ignoring the impact which students do have on housing and local services – the government should look to place greater focus on different types of visas being granted to those coming to the UK.

    There are lots of ways this could be done, but focussing more on those visa routes which lead to settlement (or ‘indefinite leave to remain’) would help improve public understanding of migration and better reflect the fact that many migrants included in the net migration stats do not contribute significantly to the long-term population of the UK.

    Concerns about immigration are unlikely to go away anytime soon, but the opportunity for a better approach is there for the taking.

    Many parts of the world – particularly across the Anglosphere – are currently seeing higher levels of net migration, and how countries respond is an issue facing many governments.

    With aging societies, slowing rates of economic growth, not to mention an increasing number of people displaced due to climate change, conflict, and natural disasters, immigration will continue to be high on the political agenda.

    Through their immigration white paper, the new UK government has a clear opportunity to address this challenge head on and take a different approach to previous administrations and, in doing so, demonstrate that well-managed immigration can be – and indeed is – a force for good.

    In developing a more joined-up approach, while focussing on future projections – rather than retrospective trends – and which makes a clearer distinction between temporary and permanent migration, the UK government could go a long way to developing a more sensible approach to immigration policy.

    The opportunity is there, the question is whether the government will take it.

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  • Innovation and skills in the English devolution white paper

    Innovation and skills in the English devolution white paper

    Devolution is a central plank of the government’s growth agenda. Providing places with the tools and resources to address local problems in ways that make sense on the ground is a means to unleash potential – and to end what English devolution minister Jim McMahon is happy to call the “top-down micromanaging” approach of ringfencing funds and centralising decision making.

    The launch of the English devolution white paper is the first step on that journey. Strategic authorities, led (for preference) by elected mayors, will cover the entirety of England. Integrated settlements will provide powers covering transport, infrastructure, housing, public services – and, of particular interest to the higher education sector, skills and innovation.

    A big part of the work of the white paper is in consolidating and standardising what had become an unruly system. Sitting above unitary, county, and district councils, a layer of strategic authorities will take on the services that larger areas need to thrive:

    Our goal is simple. Universal coverage in England of Strategic Authorities – which should be a number of councils working together, covering areas that people recognise and work in. Many places already have Combined Authorities that serve this role.

    The forthcoming English Devolution Bill will enshrine this concept in law. We get a computer game-like hierarchy of how strategic authorities will level up (so to speak): foundation strategic authorities (which do not – yet – have a mayor), followed by mayoral strategic authorities, which can then “unlock” designation as established mayoral strategic authorities through fulfilling various criteria. This will grant integrated funding settlements and other treats such as the ability to pilot new kinds of devolution.

    Already eligible for this top designation are Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region, the North East, South Yorkshire, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire. There’s an aspiration for something similar to apply to London as well, but some legislative fiddling will be needed due to the capital’s “unique circumstances.”

    Innovation

    If you’ve got your head around the different levels of hierarchy, there’s actually quite a lot in the white paper for research and innovation, dependent on an area’s level of devolution.

    In language echoing the industrial strategy green paper, we are told that a strong local network of public and private institutions focused on R&D, innovation, and the diffusion of ideas “is one of the factors which sets highly productive local economies apart.” A big part of this is closer join-up between UKRI and local government.

    Working our way up the devolution ladder, all strategic authorities (including foundation level) will be able to draw on UKRI data on the location of R&D investments, to better allow them to “understand publicly supported innovation activity in their region and how to best take advantage of it.”

    Those mayoral strategic authorities will additionally work with Innovate UK to produce joint plans, to shape long-term innovation strategies and investments in places. UKRI will also be extending its regional partnerships and “network of embedded points of contact” with mayoral strategic authorities.

    And then coming up to the pinnacle of devolution, those established mayoral strategic authorities – to remind you: Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region, the North East, South Yorkshire, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire, and possibly London – will get actual devolved research funding, in the form of a future regional innovation funding programme allowing local leaders to develop “bespoke innovation support offers for their regions.”

    This draws somewhat on the spirit of the Regional Innovation Fund, though this was allocated to individual higher education institutions – what’s on offer here sounds like a pot of money controlled by mayors. Its format is also to be based on lessons learned from the Innovation Accelerator pilot, which was funding by levelling up money.

    Plus, established mayoralties will get an annual meeting with the science minister, more regular engagement with senior staff at UKRI, and the chance to be consulted on the development of relevant DSIT and UKRI strategies.

    All in all, it’s a decent start down the road of a more significantly devolved research landscape. Important to note, however, that the actual funding on offer to established mayors is contingent on next year’s spending review, and so we’re talking about 2026–27 onwards here. And we might also observe that the House of Commons science committee’s inquiry into regional R&D, announced last week, has clearly been set up with an eye to influencing how this all comes together.

    At least to begin with, there will also be a not insignificant gap between what’s on offer to the most established sites of devolution – some funds to spend as desired, a seat at the strategy table – and what those “foundation” strategic authorities receive, which will be little more than a bit of regional R&D data. There’s potential for imbalance between regions here. Foundation-level authorities are described as a “stepping stone” to later acquiring a mayor, but it could be a long and drawn-out process.

    Skills and more

    On skills, strategic authorities will retain ownership of the Adult Skills Fund (with ringfencing removed from bootcamp and free course pots to allow for flexibility), take on joint ownership of Local Skills Improvement Plans alongside employer representative bodies, and work with employers to take on responsibility for promoting 16-19 pathways. In future, strategic authorities will have a “substantial role” in careers and employment support design outside of the existing Jobcentre Plus network, as the Get Britain Working white paper gestured towards.

    You’ll have spotted that this does not immediately extend to higher education, except to the extent that universities and colleges already get involved with adult skills provision. However the centre of gravity is such that any provider with an avowed interest in the local area will end up developing close relationships with strategic authorities. It isn’t just on skills or innovation – many universities work with local government on issues that affect students (and staff!) such as housing, infrastructure, and transport, and will have a strong interest in working with strategic authorities with new and wider powers to act.

    Administrative geography corner

    If you are labouring under the impression that dividing England up into administrative chunks is a fairly straightforward task, may we introduce you to possibly the single finest document ever published by the Office for National Statistics: the Hierarchical Representation of UK Geographies.

    Pedants may also note that the existing geography of LSIPs, which was controversially allowed to evolve into being outside of the established local authority boundaries, does not map cleanly to current or proposed local authorities – something that a future iteration of plans may need to consider. Likewise, the scope of university core recruitment areas or civic aspirations may not map to either.

    What we’d have loved to have shown you is a map showing which of the new strategic authorities your campus might be in. Sadly the boundaries of the “current map of English devolution” included in the white paper do not cleanly map to England’s many contradictory systems of administrative geography. Some of the devolved areas depicted are almost LSIP regions, one (Surrey) is a non-metropolitan ceremonial county, and one – Devon, including Torbay but not under any circumstances Plymouth – is just plain mad.

    As soon as we get an answer and some boundaries from ONS, we’ll let you know. In the meantime, here’s the map from the white paper:

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