Category: Governance

  • Gender governance and the global grammar of illiberal inclusion

    Gender governance and the global grammar of illiberal inclusion

    by Ourania Filippakou

    Across global higher education, the terms of justice, equality and inclusion are being rewritten. In recent years, the rollback of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in the United States (Spitalniak, 2025) has unfolded alongside a global resurgence of anti-gender, ultra-nationalist, racialised and colonial politics (Brechenmacher, 2025). At the same time, the rise of authoritarian and far-right ideologies, together with deepening socioeconomic inequalities fuelled by an ascendant billionaire class (Klein and Taylor, 2025) and the growing portrayal of feminist and queer scholarship as ideological extremism (Pitts-Taylor and Wood, 2025), signal a profound shift in the rationalities shaping the politics of higher education. These developments do not reject inclusion; they refashion it. Equality becomes excess, dissent is recast as disorder, and inclusion is reconstituted as a technology of governance.

    This conjuncture, what Stuart Hall (Hall in Hall and Massey, 2010, p57) would call the alignment of economic, political and cultural forces, requires a vocabulary capable of capturing continuity and rupture. It also reflects the deepening crisis of neoliberalism, whose governing logics become more coercive as their legitimacy wanes (Beckert, 2025; Menand, 2023). As Hall reminds us, ‘a conjuncture is a period when different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions… or as Althusser said ‘fuse in a ruptural unity’’ (Hall in Hall and Massey, 2012, p57). A conjuncture, in this sense, does not resolve crisis but produces new configurations of ideological coherence and institutional control. In my recent article, ‘Managed Inclusion and the Politics of Erasure: Gender Governance in Higher Education under Neoliberal Authoritarianism’ (Review of Education, Pedagogy & Cultural Studies, 2025), I theorise these developments as a global grammar of illiberal inclusion: a political rationality that appropriates the language of equity while disabling its redistributive, democratic and epistemic force. The article develops a typology of symbolic, technocratic and transformative inclusion to examine how feminist, anti-caste and critical vocabularies are increasingly absorbed into systems of civility, visibility and procedural control. Transformative inclusion, the configuration most aligned with redistribution, dissent and epistemic plurality, is the one most forcefully neutralised.

    Across geopolitical contexts, from postcolonial states to liberal democracies, gender inclusion is increasingly appropriated not as a demand for justice but as a mechanism of control. The techniques of co-option vary, yet they consolidate into a shared political rationality in which equity is stripped of redistributive force and redeployed to affirm institutional legitimacy, nationalist virtue and market competitiveness. This is not a rupture with neoliberal governance but its intensification through more disciplinary and exclusionary forms. For example, in India, the National Education Policy 2020 invokes empowerment while enacting epistemic erasure, systematically marginalising the knowledges of women from subordinated caste, class and religious communities (Peerzada et al, 2024; Patil, 2023; Singh, 2023). At the same time, state-led campaigns such as Beti Bachao elevate women’s visibility only within ideals of modesty and nationalist virtue (Chhachhi, 2020). In Hungary, the 2018 ban on gender studies aligned higher education with labour-market imperatives and nationalist agendas (Barát, 2022; Zsubori, 2018). In Turkey, reforms under Erdoğan consolidate patriarchal norms while constraining feminist organising (Zihnioğlu and Kourou, 2025). Here, gender inclusion is tolerated only when it reinforces state agendas and restricts dissent.

    Elsewhere, inclusion is recast as ideological deviance. In the United States, the Trump-era rollback of DEI initiatives and reproductive rights has weaponised inclusion as a spectre of radicalism, disproportionately targeting racialised and LGBTQ+ communities (Amnesty International, 2024; Chao-Fong, 2025). In Argentina, Milei abolished the Ministry of Women, describing feminism as fiscally irresponsible (James, 2024). In Italy, Meloni’s government invokes ‘traditional values’ to erode anti-discrimination frameworks (De Giorgi et al, 2023, p.v11i1.6042). In these cases, inclusion is not merely neutralised but actively vilified, its political charge reframed as cultural threat.

    Even when inclusion is celebrated, it is tethered to respectability and moral legibility. In France, femonationalist discourses instrumentalise gender equality to legitimise anti-Muslim policy (Farris, 2012; Möser, 2022). In Greece, conservative statecraft reframes inclusion through familialist narratives while dismantling equality infrastructures (Bempeza, 2025). These patterns reflect a longer political repertoire in which authoritarian and ultra-nationalist projects mobilise idealised domestic femininity to naturalise social hierarchies. As historian Diana Garvin (Garvin quoted in Matei, 2025) notes, ‘what fascisms old and new have in common is they tend to look to women to fill in the gaps that the state misses’, with contemporary ‘womanosphere’ influencers in the US reviving fantasies of domestic bliss that obscure intensified gendered precarity (Matei, 2025).

    Such gendered constructions coexist with escalating violence. More than 50.000 women and girls were killed by intimate partners or family members in 2024, which means one woman or girl was killed every ten minutes, or 137 every day, according to the latest UNODC and UN Women femicide report (UNODC/UN Women, 2025). This sits within a wider continuum of harm: 83.000 women and girls were intentionally killed last year, and the report finds no sign of real progress. It also highlights a steep rise in digital violence, including harassment, stalking, gendered disinformation and deepfakes, which increasingly spills into offline contexts and contributes to more lethal forms of harm. These global patterns intersect with regional crises. For example, more than 7.000 women were killed in India in gender-related violence in 2022 (NCRB, 2023); eleven women are murdered daily in femicides across Latin America (NU CEPAL, 2024). At the same time, masculinist influencers such as Andrew Tate cultivate transnational publics organised around misogyny (Adams, 2025; Wescott et al, 2024). As UN Secretary-General António Guterres (2025) warns: ‘Instead of mainstreaming equal rights, we are seeing the mainstreaming of misogyny’.

    These global pressures reverberate across institutions that have historically positioned themselves as democratic spaces, including universities, which increasingly recast gender equity as a reputational risk or cultural flashpoint rather than a democratic obligation (D’Angelo et al, 2024; McEwen and Narayanaswamy, 2023). Equity becomes an emblem of modernity to be audited, displayed and curated, rather than a demand for justice. Ahmed’s (2012) theorisation of non-performativity is essential here: institutions declare commitments to equality precisely to contain the transformations such commitments would require. In this context, symbolic and technocratic inclusion flourish, while the structural conditions for transformative inclusion continue to narrow.

    These shifts reflect broader political and economic formations. Brown (2015) shows how neoliberal reason converts justice claims into performance demands, hollowing out democratic vocabularies. Fraser’s (2017) account of ‘progressive neoliberalism’ illuminates the terrain in which market liberalism coupled with selective diversity politics absorbs emancipatory discourse while preserving inequality. Patnaik (2021) argues that the rise of neofascism is a political necessity for neoliberalism in crisis, as rights are redefined as privileges and inclusion is repurposed to stabilise inequality. In this conjuncture, these tendencies intensify into what Giroux (2018, 2021, 2022a) names ‘neoliberal fascism’, a formation structured by three interlocking fundamentalisms: a market fundamentalism that commodifies all aspects of life, a religious fundamentalism that moralises inequality; and a regime of manufactured ignorance and militarised illiteracy that discredits critical thought and erases historical memory (Giroux 2022b, p48-54).

    The United States now offers a further manifestation of this global pattern, illustrating how attacks on DEI can function as a broader assault on higher education. As recent analyses of US politics show, the first and particularly the second Trump administration is actively modelling itself on Viktor Orbán’s illiberal statecraft, centralising executive power, purging public institutions and mobilising ‘family values’ and anti-‘woke’ politics to reshape education and media governance (Giroux, 2017; Smith, 2025; Kauffmann, 2025). The dismantling of DEI under the Trump administration, framed as a defence of merit, free speech and fiscal responsibility (The White House, 2025), marks the beginning of a wider attempt to consolidate political influence over higher education. Executive orders targeting DEI have been followed by lawsuits, funding withdrawals and intensified federal scrutiny, prompting universities such as Michigan, Columbia and Chicago to scale back equality infrastructures, cut programmes and reduce humanities provision (cf Bleiler, 2025; Pickering, Cosgrove and Massel, 2025; Quinn, 2025). These developments do not simply eliminate DEI; they position anti-gender politics as a mechanism of disciplining universities, narrowing intellectual autonomy and extending political control over academic life. They exemplify wider global tendencies in which inclusion becomes a field through which illiberal projects consolidate authority. The assault on DEI is thus not a uniquely American phenomenon but part of a broader authoritarian turn in which inclusion is recoded to stabilise, rather than challenge, existing power.

    Understanding gender governance in higher education through this conjunctural lens reveals not merely the erosion of equity but the emergence of a political formation that reconfigures inclusion into an apparatus of civility, visibility and administrative control. These tendencies are not aberrations but expressions of a larger global grammar that binds emancipatory rhetoric to authoritarian-neoliberal governance. The result is not the dilution of equality but its rearrangement as a practice of containment.

    The implications for the sector are profound. If inclusion is increasingly reorganised through metrics, decorum and procedural compliance, then reclaiming its democratic potential requires an epistemic and institutional shift. Inclusion needs to be understood not as a reputational asset but as a commitment to justice, redistribution and collective struggle. This means recovering equality as political and pedagogical labour: the work of confronting injustice, protecting dissent and renewing the public imagination. Academic freedom and equality are inseparable: without equality, freedom becomes privilege; without freedom, equality becomes performance.

    As Angela Davis (Davis quoted in Gerges, 2023) reminds us: ‘Diversity without structural transformation simply brings those who were previously excluded into a system as racist and misogynist as it was before… There can be no diversity and inclusion without transformation and justice.’ And as Henry Giroux (2025) argues, democracy depends on how societies fight over language, memory and possibility. That struggle now runs through the university itself, shaping its governance, its epistemic life and the courage to imagine more just and democratic possibilities.

    Ourania Filippakou is a Professor of Education at Brunel University of London. Her research interrogates the politics of higher education, examining universities as contested spaces where power, inequality, and resistance intersect. Rooted in critical traditions, she explores how higher education can foster social justice, equity, and transformative change.

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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  • Purpose, strategy, and operations in that order – how to make a federation work

    Purpose, strategy, and operations in that order – how to make a federation work

    I’ve been doing some work with the University of London on the past, present, and future of university federations.

    I’ve looked at well over 60 kinds of different kinds of university partnerships, alliances, and coalitions, and the idea of a university federation avoids an easy definition. Crudely, it is a group of universities working together to achieve a shared goal but lots of kinds of partnerships would fall in and out of that definition. The University of London is the obvious example – it has seventeen independent members and it defines its mission as expanding access to higher education. Globally, the vast majority of other kinds of federated models do not work like this.

    Whose federation is it anyway?

    The University of Oxford describes its 36 colleges as operating within a “federal system” which are “independent and self-governing.” It seems odd to suggest a federation within an institution can exist (albeit the legal forms here complicate things) but federations are about the distribution of resources as much as regulatory structures.

    On this basis the University of the Arts London would also qualify as a kind of federation. The colleges maintain their own identity with their own expertise and reputation. Their work is framed about the idea of six colleges with one university. Similarly, the University of California has a single legal identity but with nine campuses. They are one institution with a single leadership but diverse enough to operate across different geographies, programmes, and sub-identities.

    There is perhaps then a difference between working in a federal way and being federated. This definition would encompass coalitions of universities working toward a single goal with some shared resources like The N8 research partnership. It would also include the University of the Arctic which is an almost entirely federal institution where its direction, governance, and activities, are directed by the shared agreement of its members.

    Scales

    Governance forms and organisational function are often but not always linked. The University of London’s membership has a formal governance responsibility to direct its activity while the University of London maintains its own strong central purpose and activities.  The University of the Highlands and Islands (UHI) is potentially both more centralised and devolved than the University of London. Its degree awarding powers are centrally held by the university but delivery of programmes, in both FE and HE occurs over 70 learning centres. Additionally, the Post-16 Education (Scotland) Act 2013 identifies UHI as a regional strategic body with responsibilities for planning, delivery, monitoring, and efficiency savings in further education across its operating area.

    At the slightly less federated end there is somewhere like the University Arts Singapore (UAS) which emerged as an alliance between LASALLE College of the Arts (LASALLE) and Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts (NAFA). UAS has a vice chancellor, each member has its own president (who are the deputy vice chancellors of UAS), and they lean into both their shared capacity and individual identity. As they state:

    As an alliance, UAS has the unique advantage of leveraging the strengths of both our founding members, LASALLE and NAFA, while allowing each to remain distinct colleges. UAS will work in close collaboration with the two arts institutions to lead and provide strategic direction, and will validate, confer and award UAS degrees offered by both arts institutions.

    There are lots of other examples including Paris Sciences et Lettres University which is a single institution with eleven constituent schools (some of which are several hundred years old.) To the Canadian model where the likes of the University of Toronto hold three religious independent institutions within their group where they share resources and maintain their own identities.

    Models

    The strictest definition of federation involves a legal form – but there is much in-between. A federation may be a shared brand, an informal network, a federated project with individual or shared ownership, a national or regional mission with shared funds, shared infrastructure with formal governance relationships, a group of universities with a single degree awarder, a coalition of providers with a shared and funded purpose, or an entirely devolved body that only exists through dint of the activities of its members.

    If a federation has lots of different forms it by extension has a lot of different purposes. Ideally, the form of the federation should follow the agreed purpose if it is to be successful. The strategic vision has to be big enough to make the difficult compromises that come with working together make sense. Cost-saving is unlikely to be big enough to motivate all the pieces within a federated ecosystem but improving international standing, delivering better teaching, and funding research more effectively, supported by the efficient allocation of resources, might be.

    Across federations there is often legislation and regulation that enables the constituent organisations to work together. This was the case with UAS, UHI has a long history of partnerships, funding, and regulation, while there is underpinning legislation in France to encourage the geographic coordination of research assets. It is noticeable that while the OfS has welcomed the idea of closing working together by institutions there isn’t actually a legislative or regulatory underpinning to make that easier.

    Success

    If a federation has a clear purpose and an accommodating regulatory environment it may have a reasonable chance of success. This still isn’t enough to wish one into being because of the operational complexity that can underpin such arrangements. Strategically, this includes whether it is more efficient, effective, or clear, to have a single governance, quality, and approval regime, whether resources are best shared or kept local, and whether staff should be separate or together. Again, much of this depends on federal form but sharing infrastructure between institutions even within federations is not that common. The sharing of resources should be the second order concern after the purpose of doing so but the practicalities can be complex, expensive, and absorb much organisational attention.

    It is therefore difficult to define success but it is possible to improve the chances of federations being successful. Federations should begin with a clear purpose, then look at how the strategic sharing of assets can achieve that purpose, and then work to the practicalities of sharing those assets. A federation is about purpose, governance, finance, and brand, but it is also about creating an ecosystem where partners believe the shared negotiation of purpose, strategy, and execution, is more powerful than a single organisation doing this alone. A federation is about giving something up, whether that is some identities or some resources, in the shared belief the collective gain will outweigh any individual loss.

    If federations are to become more of a feature of the higher education landscape the largest challenges may not be structural but cultural. Recent reforms of higher education in England were largely about greater competition between providers. A federation is to acknowledge that agglomeration benefits may be achieved through cooperation, consolidation, and the strategic deprioritisation of some work where others may have greater expertise.

    The central plank of the government’s recent white paper is that the homogeneity of the sector is an impediment to the efficient allocation of resources. If it is serious about specialisation, particularly within specific geographies, it should open up more routes to federal structures and the strategic benefits they may bring.

    James Coe is chairing a panel on federations at The Festival of Higher Education with the University of London. Tickets can be purchased here.

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  • The higher education sector needs an honest broker to support structural change

    The higher education sector needs an honest broker to support structural change

    Of all the current headwinds faced by the higher education sector, one of the most challenging is a lack of expertise and experience in the area of structural change.

    In an environment where radical collaboration and merger are increasingly seen – rightly or wrongly – as a solution to the sector’s financial challenges, the expertise needed to broker and execute a successful merger or other collaboration seems to be patchy.

    As, arguably, are the somewhat different competences required to steward the longer term strategic integration of two or more distinct institutions, each with their own teaching and research portfolios and cultures. The answer to the question “who has done this before?” can only be answered in the affirmative by a handful of people.

    This issue was acknowledged in Mills & Reeve’s joint report with Wonkhe Connect More with the following insight from a one of the heads of institution we interviewed:

    We all have a skills matrix for boards and for courts and for councils. I think, increasingly, that needs to reflect people who’ve got some expertise and some background in this space…I don’t think there are many vice chancellors who would necessarily have the skills, the knowledge, and the background. Really, this is new territory, potentially, for us, it’s new turf.

    Of course, it wasn’t always thus. One of the ironies of the current dearth of experience is that large numbers of providers are themselves the product of historic mergers and collaborations. Taking the long view, the history of many providers is a complex genealogy, a narrative of mergers past and more recent.

    In part, the steady decline in institutional experience of these things was the natural result of a relatively benign financial environment. It’s easy to forget in the current climate but the period of low inflation and cheap borrowing meant that, at an institutional level, there was little impetus to challenge the operating model and, of course, the introduction of a marketised funding model meant that competition, rather than collaboration, was very much the order of the day.

    That marketised model was also accompanied by a marked shift in approach from the regulator. While HEFCE adopted a relatively low-key approach to mergers and collaboration – generally leaving the impetus to come together to institutions themselves – it did publish guidance on mergers and had a collaboration and restructuring fund to assist institutions to explore and implement structural change.

    Crucially, HEFCE was widely accepted to be a neutral broker who would help facilitate institutions coming together – and it had the funding to help smooth the path. By contrast, OfS, in its response to a question from the House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee, made it clear that it does not consider itself to have “the remit, powers or funding to intervene to prevent closure or to facilitate mergers or acquisitions.”

    Skills gap

    Where, then, does that leave providers? Typically, there is a reliance on the institution’s executive team, in particular, the vice chancellor, to steer the merger. But most higher education executives are not from the business world with experience in mergers and to a significant degree they have a conflict of interest. There is also a need to continue with their day jobs and manage business as usual in case the merger doesn’t happen.

    The next most obvious port of call is to look for expertise among their own governing bodies, and, specifically, their external members. After all, one of the main motivations of having lay external members is to draw upon their expertise and to fill gaps which (understandably enough) exist within the skill sets of senior management teams and the institution more widely.

    The problem, however, is that merger and radical collaboration require a very particular set of skills. It’s very easy for universities to get starry-eyed about a governor just because they happen to be an investment banker, an accountant, or have experience of public sector mergers in the NHS, for example. But the skills required in a university merger or a complex debt restructuring are very specific and even a governing body which is well-stocked with members from across different professional services and backgrounds cannot assume that its trustees have the requisite expertise to drive forward a merger of two institutions.

    Of course, an institution can buy in a certain level of expertise. But what perhaps can’t always be replicated by professional advice are the experience and war stories of those who have lived and breathed mergers and collaborations from the inside – particularly from the education and adjacent sectors. In Mills & Reeve’s joint report with KPMG UK – Radical collaboration: a playbook – we drew out some of those lived experiences in the form of case studies. However, written case studies need to be seasoned with real-life personal experience. What is really needed when scoping a potential merger or other kind of radical collaboration is access to a “hive mind” of critical friends.

    An HE Commissioner model

    Other sectors have taken a strategic approach to developing this expertise. The Further Education Commissioner is the most obvious parallel. Between 2015 and 2019 the FE sector saw 57 mergers, three federations, three joint FE and HE institutions and 23 academy conversions. If most of UK higher education no longer has institutional memory of mergers, FE has it in bucket loads.

    The FE Commissioner and their team offer a range of services to FE colleges – ranging from informal chats and financial health checks, through to more formal invention assessments. Their team – a mix of former leaders and finance professionals from within the sector – have genuinely seen and done it all before. Higher education deserves the same deep pool of knowledge to draw on, especially if the worst case scenario of institutional insolvency and/or disorderly market exit is to be avoided.

    For this to work successfully in HE there would need to be some level of funding and a decision as to whether a commissioner’s role might sit within DfE or OfS. Our sense – particularly given the size and complexity of universities and the involvement of key stakeholders such as banks and private placement bondholders – is that there will still be a large role played by private sector consultants, lawyers, and accountants. However, there is room for a more collegiate level of engagement from DfE and OfS than arguably exists at present.

    As well as pooling expertise on how to collaborate, placing an HE commissioner role on a formal footing might also allow it to broker conversations between providers seeking to work together more closely – something which, in our experience, is done very hesitantly at present, both because of the fear of breaching competition rules and, more generally, because every potential collaboration partner is, in a very real sense, also a competitor.

    What can’t be underestimated is how urgently this function is needed. Providers are capable of doing this alone, as recent examples such as the Anglia Ruskin/Writtle and St George’s/City mergers testify. However, how much better for the long-term future of the sector it would surely be if providers had ready access to some critical friends and some “protected” spaces to have conversations about how best to achieve and implement forms of radical collaboration.

    This article is published in association with Mills & Reeve. 

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  • Engaging policy review to smooth lumpy futures into transformative higher education

    Engaging policy review to smooth lumpy futures into transformative higher education

    Figure 1: Current and frontier contributions

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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  • Enhancing higher education governance will require agility and accountability

    Enhancing higher education governance will require agility and accountability

    Today Advance HE is publishing Shaping the future of HE governance, the findings of our “big conversation” on higher education governance.

    The report draws from wide-ranging engagement with governors, chairs, institutional leaders, board secretaries and others, conducted in partnership with the Committee of University Chairs (CUC), Association of Heads of University Administration (AHUA), Universities UK, GuildHE and Independent HE. The research examined the effectiveness of current governance arrangements, considered good practice from other sectors and identified what needs to improve or change.

    The big conversation explored the diversity of provider types, missions and individual contexts across UK higher education. Diversity and differences exist in governance arrangements, and this is appropriate to reflect the diversity of missions and scales which need differing governance arrangements.

    The findings from this research will feed into the CUC’s current review of higher education governance, of which I’m a steering group member. I will also share the findings with the Office for Students and Department for Education – both are showing a growing interest in how higher education institutions are governed.

    Here are some of the factors that should be priorities when considering governance reform.

    A question of culture

    At the heart of good governance is culture – and this should be central to efforts to enhance governance. The research found that culture is the biggest factor in determining the difference between a highly effective and a less effective board.

    This can be hard to measure, takes time to get right, and is a constant work in progress. This includes the culture of getting the right balance of challenge and support – and where the right level of information is supplied to governors, but equally where governors themselves have a sufficient degree of expertise and curiosity to ask the right questions and know when to probe and challenge.

    The right culture requires a sophisticated relationship between executive and board and specifically the head of institution, the chair and the secretary to the board. An open relationship, with no surprises, and a healthy tension of constructive challenge. Clear schemes of delegated authority, clarifying the difference between accountability and responsibility, can help to support this.

    As the context and issues change, higher education governance also needs to adapt to meet new challenges.

    Just because governance arrangements were suitable and effective in the past shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that no change is needed. There are examples of excellent practice in the sector. There are also weaknesses which should be the focus for improvement. It is necessary for institutions to regularly review, evolve and improve their governance arrangements.

    Agility and accountability

    To meet current challenges, agility is needed to support effective transformation and change. How can governing bodies be supported to get the right balance between the speed of decision-making and ensuring good governance oversight? Is the size and composition of the governing body helping or hindering effective decision-making?

    Consideration should be given to what can be done to maximise the time that governing bodies spend on discussion of strategy, strategic issues and oversight of major risk – and minimise time spent on processing bureaucracy. This may require ruthlessness about focussing on matters which are strategic, a regulatory or statutory requirement or of material significance (financially, reputationally, or otherwise). If an item does not meet these three tests, there should be challenge as to why it is taking up board time.

    The quality of strategic decision making can be enhanced by ensuring that the board contributes to formative thinking, giving governors the opportunity to challenge and scrutinise effectively, ensuring time to properly examine information to allow for evidence-based decisions in the context of the strategy.

    Are there examples – perhaps from other sectors – that can better enable governing bodies to support change, effectively balancing the need to manage risk with the desire to be agile, innovative and entrepreneurial?

    Institutions should also consider how they can better communicate their governance story – openly and creatively – to staff, students, partners and the public. There’s an opportunity to demonstrating how institutions are governed in the public interest. This can include more proactive and transparent approaches to showing adherence to codes and compliance to regulations.

    A developing story

    Given the risks (financial, international) and changes (digital, regulatory) facing the sector it has never been more important to support governors appropriately – and this should include proactively identifying and supporting development opportunities.

    This could include both HE-specific regulatory issues and learning about good governance best practice from other sectors. Beyond initial governor induction, institutions should support continuous professional development for non-executive board members throughout terms of service and ensure structured training opportunities for governance support professionals.

    The insights from our big conversation will provide a foundation and stimulus for meaningful change and continuous improvement in HE sector governance. The priorities identified will shape how Advance HE evolves its approach to governance support, board effectiveness reviews and development programmes.

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  • Dundee’s troubles and the state of the sector

    Dundee’s troubles and the state of the sector

    “Dundee University’s reputation soars,” shouted the front page of the Courier in 2004. Making the most of a rise in the league tables, the then university secretary highlighted the institution’s commitment to excellent learning and teaching, its outstanding research and its contribution to the local community.

    Fast forward 21 years and more recent press coverage has been less positive – the university’s desperate financial situation, rapid departures by senior staff, emergency government funding, threats of large-scale job losses and very painful sessions before the Scottish parliament education committee.

    A hard-hitting report by former Glasgow Caledonian principal Pamela Gillies put the blame on “poor financial judgement, inadequate management and reporting, poor monitoring of the financial sustainability KPI, a lack of agility in responding to a fall in income by the University leadership and weak governance in relation to financial accountability by the University Court” compounded by the “top-down, hierarchical and reportedly over-confident style of leadership and management” and “a culture in which challenge was actively discouraged.”

    The 64-page document is excoriating in its condemnation of senior officers and the university’s governors – a view shared by the select committee, where MSPs expressed their criticism in the strongest possible terms. Later events – including the departure of the interim finance director after a week in the job – have only made the agony worse.

    The financial collapse at Dundee inevitably raises questions for the rest of the HE sector in Scotland and the UK as a whole. Are the same weaknesses present in other institutions? Is higher education in crisis? And how should governments and the sector respond?

    Governance and management

    Before going any further, I must declare a personal interest – I was the university secretary quoted in the 2004 press article and I have retained an abiding affection for the University of Dundee since leaving in 2008.

    I also chaired the group that produced the latest revision of the Scottish Code for Good Higher Education Governance in 2023 – a document which Professor Gillies deems fit for purpose, provided institutions follow it carefully. However, implementing the code of governance, excellent as it is, will not be enough – we all need to learn lessons from the Dundee story and make sure that our own universities are protected from a similar fate. To that end, we ought to engage in an open discussion about what has happened and consider it from every angle.

    So far, the criticism has focused on the failings of Dundee’s senior managers and governors. In response, they have accepted that they should have spotted the financial problems earlier and taken avoiding action. That way, as one officer put it to the committee, they could have dealt with them “under their own steam”.

    Senior managers and the university court should certainly have been aware of the worsening financial situation in the second half of academic year 2023–24. Student recruitment fell in September 2023 and again in January 2024; meanwhile the international market was contracting and the UK government looked set to implement unhelpful policy developments as part of its anti-immigrant agenda.

    At that stage, the university’s executive board should have been keeping an eagle eye on the monthly management accounts, freezing all but essential staff recruitment and paring back expenditure. The failure even to recognise there was a financial deficit until October 2024 was a critical lapse.

    Reflecting on this, all universities will now be examining their systems, processes and culture to make sure they do not fall into the same trap. The sense of urgency will be especially acute in institutions which are running deficits – a plight that now affects many HEIs previously considered immune to such challenges. In Scotland, the cabinet secretary for education has urged the sector to address the problem of “unsustainable jobs” – apparently giving the green light to further staffing reductions.

    University courts and councils will be assessing governance arrangements and exploring how to strengthen financial scrutiny; some will also be reviewing the way they interact with their vice chancellors and senior teams. In doing this, they should ensure that senior officers and trade union reps are enabled to challenge heads of institutions and bring any concerns they have to the governing body.

    Model issues

    All of this is sensible, but the debate so far has largely ignored some fundamental points. Most importantly, the sector needs a different financial model – it cannot survive by placing ever greater reliance on the international student fee account. In England, the UK government has at least allowed the home undergraduate fees cap to increase in line with inflation but Holyrood has not made a similar move, and nor is it likely to before the 2026 Scottish election.

    The lack of funding will mean further retrenchments and cost-cutting in estates and IT budgets; unpalatable options such as delaying the national pay uplift or cancelling academic promotions rounds may also come into play. Against this background, Scotland’s politicians must step up – we need to treat university funding as a national problem which deserves an enduring solution, preferably identified through a review supported by all parties.

    Returning to Dundee, there is a reason why that university was so badly hit that goes beyond mistakes made by senior management. For at least 30 years, Dundee has been a powerhouse of life sciences research, with a special focus on cancer and tropical diseases. A glance at the 2021 REF results for biological sciences bears this out – there is Dundee, ranked number two behind the Institute of Cancer Research, ahead of Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial and many other universities with much greater resources.

    This is an extraordinary story – a relatively small, provincial university taking on and beating some of the greatest and best-funded institutions in the world; in the process, Dundee’s researchers have benefited humanity, not just in this country but also across the global south. Sir Alfred Cuschieri, Sir David Lane, Sir Philip Cohen, Cheryll Tickle CBE, Sir Pete Downes, Sir Mike Ferguson – the list of top biomedical scientists whose careers have flourished at Dundee is hugely impressive.

    However, this achievement comes at a price – even 20 years ago, Dundee struggled to generate surpluses which would protect the institution against a rainy day. As everyone knows, research funding simply does not cover the cost of the work it is supposed to support – universities have to cross-subsidise scientific endeavour with endowments, donations and international student fees.

    The challenge is even greater when much of your funding is from charities, which pay a lower overhead than government research councils. That left Dundee in an especially vulnerable position when the international student recruitment market began to contract in 2023–24 – a problem not shared by other universities with a fraction of Dundee’s research activity.

    Given what has happened, it is right that universities conduct self-audits and make certain that their own houses are in order. The Scottish government and the funding council should also seek assurance that Scotland’s HEIs are effectively led and managed. But the deeper question of how the sector should be funded still needs to be addressed, and quickly.

    As part of this we should recognise that world-class research of the kind nurtured in Dundee is something to be cherished; we should all back the recovery effort on Tayside. For my part, I believe strongly that the university will remain a powerhouse of research and excellence in learning and teaching for decades to come. With the right support, Dundee’s reputation will soon soar again.

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  • From where student governors sit, Dundee isn’t the only institution with governance challenges

    From where student governors sit, Dundee isn’t the only institution with governance challenges

    There are a couple of typical ways to “read” Pamela Gillies’ investigation report into financial oversight and decision making at the University of Dundee.

    One is to imagine that the issues in it are fairly unique to that university – that a particular set of people and circumstances were somehow not picked up properly by a governing body apparently oblivious to what was happening below the surface.

    In that extreme, the key failing was not doing all the Scottish Code for Good Higher Education Governance asks its governors to do.

    Another is to wonder whether, even with a clean bill of “good governance” health, it could happen elsewhere.

    One of the things that is fascinating about organisational failure is the way in which governance tends to be picked up as a problem – because it can lead to the conclusion that because organisational failure is not widespread, the governance issues must be local.

    If you position governance exclusively as scrutiny, it could of course be the case that the culture of governance is weak across the board – it’s just that most senior teams in universities don’t make the mistakes that were evidently made at Dundee, and thus we’d never know.

    After all, nobody questions governance when things are going well, when funding is flowing and when student numbers are on the up. If anything, in that positioning, the danger is in complacency – because governance needs to come into its own to avoid mistakes and catch issues before they become catastrophes.

    When Gillies’ report was published, I couldn’t avoid recalling countless conversations I’ve had over the years with student members of governing bodies about everything from the lateness of papers to the culture of decision making.

    So to test the waters, I pulled out 14 governance issues from the investigation and put a brief (anonymous) survey out to students’ union officers who are members of their Board, Council or Court.

    I can’t claim that 41 responses (captured in the second half of June and the first half of July) are representative of the whole sector, and nor are they representative of the whole of the governing bodies on which respondents have sat.

    But there is enough material in there to cause us concern about how universities around the UK are governed.

    A culture of control

    One issue that Pam Gillies picked up was leadership dominance, where the vice chancellor and chair were found to have “behaved like they have everything under control” while governing bodies failed to provide adequate challenge.

    When we asked whether student governors had experienced leadership that “routinely dominates discussions, controls narratives to present overly positive pictures, or makes it difficult for governors to raise concerns,” 68 per cent said they’d experienced this “a lot”. Another 27 per cent said “a little.”

    That’s 95 per cent of respondents experiencing some level of what one might generously call “narrative management” by their senior teams.

    The comments flesh out what this looks like in practice. One student governor observed:

    You are told at the start that your job is to manage the VC and the SMT but they manage the governors. The Chair and the VC behave like they have everything under control. The room just does not seem interested in education or the student experience, more whether it is running as a business.

    Another captured the emotional impact:

    Whenever I have asked a question or said something even questioning let alone critical about UEG it’s like I have suggested burning down their office. They are allowed to be both over-defensive and over-reassuring rather than treat contributions from me and some of the other more vocal governors as contributions to thinking. It makes the whole thing quite pointless.

    It’s not just about dominance – it’s also about active silencing. Gillies found that dissenting voices were marginalised and that “critical challenge was not welcomed.” Our survey bears this out.

    When asked about governors being “shut down, spoken over, dismissed as ‘obstructive,’ or otherwise discouraged when trying to challenge decisions,” 51 per cent reported experiencing this “a lot”. Another 37 per cent said “a little”.

    The mechanisms are subtle but effective. One respondent noted being warned at the start of their term that the previous student president had not been “constructive” and that to get things done, they needed to be “constructive” instead. The implied threat was clear – play nice or be frozen out.

    It was made very clear to me at the start that the previous President had not been ‘constructive’ and that if I wanted to get things done I needed to be ‘constructive’. All year I have felt torn – other governors would regularly ask me at the meal what was ‘really going on’ but I never felt like I could be critical in the actual meeting because of the ‘partnership’. I feel like the VC was under a lot of pressure to perform for the governors, and that makes it impossible to say anything about what you think is going wrong.

    Another described the choreography of exclusion:

    The power dynamics are fascinating if you’re into that sort of thing. Watch who the Chair makes eye contact with, whose contributions get minuted vs. ‘noted’, who gets interrupted vs. who can ramble for 10 minutes unchecked. I never got the premium treatment – I feel that the Chair needs some feedback on whose thoughts they obviously value.

    That isolation extends beyond meetings. Multiple respondents noted deliberate strategies to separate them from support:

    One tendency we picked up on a lot was to isolate me from support, I wasn’t allowed to discuss the papers with my CEO or have my CEO in the room. It’s only student on the board. They say that’s for confidentiality, but everyone else in the room is clearly discussing their issues with people who can put everything into a context. I think it should be the law that two students are on the board.

    The theatre of governance

    Gillies found that important decisions at Dundee were made outside formal governance structures, with a “small inner circle” controlling key outcomes. Our survey question on decision-making transparency suggests this is far from unique.

    When asked whether “important decisions are made by a small inner circle before reaching the governing body,” 51 per cent said this happened “a lot”, with another 44 per cent saying “a little”.

    The comments reveal how that manifests. One student governor described discovering a shadow governance structure:

    I think there’s a huge element of culture at my institution which prevents effective governance but it’s also the structure. There’s a meeting which isn’t included in the governance structure but everything goes to it before it can go anywhere else and it’s restricted to senior managers at the university. If it isn’t approved there, it won’t happen, even if things like rent negotiations have taken place in the ‘proper’ meetings, they can just scrap it and say ‘no, this is what needs to happen’ and then we’re just told. It feels like secret meeting which secretly governs everything and every other meeting is a rubber stamp for decisions made there.

    Another put it more bluntly:

    The meetings are very odd places, we don’t have any input at all on anything. Everything that comes to the Court is finished, and our job seems to be to politely probe what is in front of us (always once, follow ups frowned upon). Eye-opening but completely pointless.

    Gillies highlighted how late papers and missing documentation hampered effective governance at Dundee – the control of information emerges as a critical tool in maintaining this system across the sector. Over half (54 per cent) of respondents in our survey reported experiencing late papers, missing documentation, or “critical updates given verbally rather than in writing” frequently.

    But it goes deeper than administrative incompetence. When asked about financial information quality – an area Gillies found particularly problematic at Dundee – 37 per cent said they’d frequently received reports that “were unclear, seemed to obscure the true position, contained unexplained anomalies, or lacked integrated information.”

    One respondent shared a particularly telling anecdote:

    Training – our old CFO was a dick. He said that he wouldn’t train student members of Council in the finances because we ‘wouldn’t understand it’ which, in my mind, seems like something to a) find out and b) entirely irrelevant to a governor asking to see financial information.

    The systematic exclusion of student perspectives from board papers then compounds it:

    Many of the budget requests and department updates did not reflect the student experience accurately whether it was missing data from specific feedback routes or lacking in student perspective entirely, it made approvals difficult for me and difficult for the board as I would then be asked for the data and even though I can share some of the issues I know of I cannot represent the entire student body. With only 48hrs notice.

    The message seems to be that knowledge is power – and student governors aren’t meant to have it.

    Living in fantasy land

    Gillies found that Dundee’s governing body had been presented with “overly positive pictures” that obscured institutional reality. Quite striking in our survey is the disconnect between the institution presented in governance meetings and the one students actually experience.

    Multiple respondents described sitting through presentations that bore no resemblance to reality:

    The university that gets presented isn’t the university I was at as a student.

    Another elaborated:

    It feels a lot like a fantasy world in there but they really don’t know how the university actually works, and the questions they ask are so weird, like they are desperate for the university to be as good as they imagine it is when there are really a lot of problems with how it runs especially at school level.

    This fantasy is then maintained through what we might call the tyranny of positivity. When asked whether they’d felt “pressure to maintain positive messaging even when you have legitimate worries,” 61 per cent said they’d experienced this “a lot”.

    The enforcement mechanisms vary. Some are explicit:

    They love talking about ‘student voice’ in the abstract but hate it when we actually speak. I raised concerns about library hours during exams and the DVC literally rolled his eyes. Later the Chair pulled me aside and said I should ‘pick my battles more carefully’ and focus on ‘strategic matters’.

    Others are more subtle. Multiple respondents described being praised for contributions that never led to change:

    I was often praised in the minutes. ‘Thoughtful contribution from the student member.’ But praise without change feels hollow – a polite pat on the head.

    This disconnect between fantasy and reality is exacerbated by what several respondents identified as an unhealthy fixation on rankings:

    A lot of the meetings were really interested in what I had to say, but the obsession with league tables is bizarre. We spent easily an hour at the last meeting discussing how to game NSS metrics but when I suggested actually fixing the issues students raise – timetabling chaos, inconsistent feedback, broken IT systems – I got blank stares. One governor literally said ‘can’t we just manage student expectations better?’ What’s the point?

    Another observed:

    There are about sixteen of us in theory but really there are six people who speak at every meeting, and it is always about whether we are beating other universities. I don’t think the governors have any way to judge how well the university is doing other than by thinking about other universities. It is very weird.

    This comparative obsession substitutes for genuine evaluation of institutional health – where things become filtered through the lens of institutional positioning rather than student experience.

    The survey responses also reveal how regulatory compliance has become another distorting filter. Several respondents noted how the Office for Students has inadvertently created perverse incentives:

    It is very weird to me that whenever I’ve talked about student issues they are responded to with things like ‘that would not be an issue for the OfS’, like we are only supposed to worry about the student experience if OfS are doing a visit.

    It suggests that governing bodies are more concerned with regulatory perception than addressing underlying problems – a dangerous conflation of compliance with quality.

    The impossible position

    A particularly Byzantine aspect of student perceptions of governance emerges in the contradictions around representation. Multiple respondents noted being told explicitly that they were “not a representative” of students, only to have governors constantly ask them about student views:

    At the start of the year it is drilled into you that you are not a representative, and then at every meeting someone has asked me what students think, what students are saying, how students would react, and so on. It really is ridiculous.

    It creates an impossible position – student governors are simultaneously expected to embody the student voice whilst being forbidden from claiming to represent it, and are consulted when convenient but dismissed when challenging.

    The tokenism extends to how “the student experience” is conceptualised:

    There is a pressure not to rock the boat too much or the SU funding will be under threat. One other thing is that the other governors see ‘the student experience’ as one homogeneous thing. I represent 30,000 students – disabled students, commuters, mature students, international students, care leavers – but I get 5 minutes at the end of every meeting to cover ‘student matters.’ When I highlight different needs across student groups, eyes glaze over.

    One response powerfully captured another dimension of the problem:

    Too many decisions are made by white upper-middle class men who have no real understanding of student demographics or experiences and the effects that rushed, ill informed decisions can have on the student body.

    This homogeneity problem compounds all the others – if governance doesn’t reflect the communities it serves, how can it possibly understand their needs?

    Throughout the responses runs a theme of performative partnership that masks fundamental power imbalances. Student governors describe being valued for their “input” on predetermined decisions whilst being told their contributions are “premature” on anything still under genuine consideration:

    Two types of agenda items, ones where student input is ‘valued’ (anything they’ve already decided) and those where student input is ‘premature’ (anything they haven’t decided yet). Its never the right time for meaningful student contribution.

    The contrast between public and private behaviour is also revealing:

    I feel that the UET are like Jekyll and Hyde, they have listened to me outside of the meetings but when I have asked about things during Board meetings they react very defensively. I’m not supposed to be a rep for students but nobody else ever talks about students unless we count recruiting students.

    When push comes to shove

    Gillies found that committees at Dundee operated as “rubber stamping exercises” rather than providing genuine oversight. Our survey revealed similar patterns, with 46 per cent reporting committees feeling like “rubber stamping exercises.”

    Even when committees try to assert themselves, the resistance is telling:

    We had an issue with the auditors and the closest I’ve seen us come to blows as a Council was when the exec tried to treat the issue as annoying but closed and move on but Council had to say ‘actually, no, we’d like an audit of our auditors to work out how [confidential] was missed.’

    The fundamental problem, as one respondent observed, may be structural:

    I honestly think that the huge number of things the council are expected to know about and make decisions on are beyond them. They don’t meet often enough and they really do not understand their responsibilities.

    Gillies documented how Dundee’s governance processes were abandoned during crisis periods. Our survey asked about governance during “difficult periods,” and of those who didn’t say “N/A”, 51 per cent reported seeing “normal governance processes abandoned, informal advisory groups bypass committee structures, or key oversight bodies become inactive when they’re most needed.”

    It suggests that whatever thin veneer of good governance exists in normal times rapidly dissolves under pressure – precisely when robust governance is most essential:

    Student input in governance is at a real risk of just becoming a box ticking exercise as I have sat in meetings where the student experience is discussed by everyone but the students in the room. Once decisions need to be made at speed all thought for student and staff is ignored and it is often because of their own burdensome governance structures that inhibit the agility needed for such a volatile time in HE.”

    The human cost

    The emotional toll shouldn’t be underestimated. Multiple respondents described feeling “out of place,” “invalidated,” or like they were “betraying everyone” simply by asking questions.

    One particularly poignant comment came from a sabbatical officer who left their role early:

    It was a really tough experience as I had students relying on me. I wish that I could’ve stayed in my role for longer but the lack of transparency and wish to subdue the view for students contradicted my individual beliefs and leadership style. I was supportive and I wanted students to know what I was doing. This wasn’t always possible.

    And the lack of institutional learning is telling:

    It is telling that they spent so much time with me at the start but haven’t spent any time with me to get my feedback at the end. I feel that they should do exit interviews to learn about how intimidating the atmosphere can be.

    Perhaps most damning is the response to our final question. When asked whether they “feel confident that your governing body would identify and respond appropriately to serious institutional risks,” only 32 per cent expressed confidence.

    That means 68 per cent of student governors – governors who usually have the most intimate knowledge of how their institutions actually operate – doubt their governing body’s ability to spot and address serious problems.

    One captured the fundamental dysfunction:

    If I compare it to being on my union board I think the governors is a joke. If I ask why or how in the union we have a decent conversation. If I do it at governors the atmosphere is like I’ve betrayed everyone. And if I say something isn’t clear that is turned into something I’ve not done or read. We’re not governors. We’re an audience.

    Another summed up the experience with clarity:

    I feel that the whole thing is engineered to make the vice chancellor and her team to look good rather than gather our input or ideas, I would have side conversations with some of the community governors who shared my view but there just is not any part of any meeting where ‘input’ is welcome.

    We’re not governors. We’re an audience

    Some of the most problematic critiques came in respondents’ final reflections on what governance actually means in practice:

    What frustrates me most is the wasted potential. These are genuinely smart, accomplished people who could transform this place. But they’re trapped in this weird bubble where everything’s fine and any criticism is disloyalty. I know I’m not the only one.

    The sense of governance as performance came through repeatedly:

    In the January meeting I was invited to do a presentation before the formal meeting on what student life is like and I got a lot of praise from the Chair about how eye-opening it was. But about half of the governors were not there and the PVC-E went off on one about how the university’s surveys contradicted some of the things we were saying. I feel that the whole body just doesn’t have a clue about students or staff and what it is like to be a student in 2025.

    One respondent captured the Kafkaesque nature of their experience:

    The whole ‘critical friend’ thing is such a con. We’re meant to be critical but every time I challenge something I get ‘well, Council can only advise, we cannot instruct the executive.’ So we’re legally responsible for decisions we can only ‘advise’ on? The Vice Chancellor keeps saying Council is ‘not a court’ whenever we try to hold them accountable. I’ve started asking ‘what CAN Council actually do?’ because honestly I’m not sure anymore.

    The broader implications were spelled out starkly:

    The big, big, BIG thing for us as student leaders has been ‘what Council is and is not for’. Often, when we’ve brought issues for discussion or ‘airing’ at Council, I have had every variation of ‘Council is not a court’ ‘Council can only advise the exec, it cannot instruct it’ ‘Council is for critical challenge but cannot dictate’ some of which is absolutely at odds with then being legally responsible for the decisions you have only ‘advised on’ and ‘cannot dictate’.

    And perhaps most damningly:

    As a new Sabbatical officer, I felt extremely out of place with the culture of Court meetings, as if I wasn’t supposed to be or welcome there. It made my input feel invalidated and overlooked. Structurally, important decisions are already decided upon within committees before reaching court.

    What next?

    It’s important to set what I’ve gathered in context. Student governors have a particular perspective and a specific set of confidence and cultural capital asymmetries that are bound to make being on a body of the “great and good” a difficult experience.

    41 responses is not the whole sector (and may not even be from 41 universities), and it was a self-selecting survey. But we should be worried.

    Out of the back of the Dundee episode, both Graeme Day and the Scottish Funding Council have committed to exploring ways to strengthen governance to avoid a repeat.

    Universities Scotland has committed to collective reflection on Gilles’ findings and the lessons it shares to give “robust assurance” of financial management and good governance to funders, regulators, supporters and all who depend on universities.

    It has also said it will “connect” to Universities UK’s work to consider the leadership and governance skills required in the sector in times of transformation and challenge.

    As such, the same issue that students see in governing bodies is playing out nationally – there are questions that suggest a loss of autonomy, and reassurance about “performance” designed to retain it.

    There is therefore a real danger that the processes will conclude what these sorts of things always conclude – that with the right “skills” and adherence to a given Code, all will be well.

    But the experiences from students suggest that neither “getting the right skills” nor calls for better codes will solve the fundamental problems. The issue isn’t just about getting the “right” people around the table or training them better – it’s about reconsidering what we’re asking governance to do.

    Vertical or horizontal?

    As I noted here and here, the Dutch experience offers an alternative. Following a series of governance scandals in the early 2000s, the Netherlands rejected both excessive state control and unfettered institutional autonomy. Their 2016 Education Governance Strengthening Act created a “third way” – creating multi-level democratic participation from program to institutional level.

    Rather than imposing rigid rules, the framework promoted “horizontal dialogue” where students, staff, management, and supervisors engage in ongoing conversations about their university.

    A 2021 evaluation found meaningful channels for student and staff input had been created, with improved dialogue quality between stakeholder groups. If there’s enough of them, staff and students have turned out to be better at scrutiny than skilled lay members or someone from the funding council sat in the corner.

    It’s also partly about what is discussed. Most boards operate primarily in fiduciary mode (overseeing budgets, ensuring compliance) or strategic mode (setting priorities, deploying resources). While essential, these modes often crowd out what governance scholars call the “generative mode” – critical thinking, questioning assumptions, and framing problems in insightful ways.

    Generative governance asks probing questions: “What is our fundamental purpose?” and “How does this decision align with our core values?” It involves scenario planning, delving into root causes rather than symptoms, and actively considering ethical implications beyond legal compliance. And it allows senior staff to participate, rather than perform – a culture that then improves scrutiny in fiduciary mode.

    It is where staff, student, and community governors could add most value – yet it’s often where their contributions are most dismissed as inappropriate or “operational.” The standard line that governors should be “concerned with the university rather than as representatives” misses the point that understanding the lived experience of those working and studying there is essential to good governance, and actually improves fiduciary scrutiny.

    Put another way, maybe better fiduciary mode scrutiny could have probed more on the Nigerian students focussed business plan at Dundee. But it’s more likely that better generative mode governance could have explained what was starting to happen to the currency in Nigeria, how tough students were funding it to pay their fees, and what families were going through as the Naira went into collapse.

    It’s also partly about what we think “effectiveness” means. Universities facing unprecedented challenges – financial pressures, technological disruption, legitimacy crises – need governance capable of navigating complexity, not just ticking out risk registers. They need what the Dutch reforms sought – genuine accountability to the communities they serve, not just reassuring compliance with regulatory requirements.

    Universities at their best are spaces where different forms of knowledge encounter each other, and where democratic values are modeled and sustained. Their governance should reflect this reality.

    As such, we need to ensure we’re solving the right problem. The issue isn’t governors who need better training or institutions that need tighter control. It’s a governance model designed for a different era and different types of organisation, struggling to cope with contemporary complexity while excluding the voices that could help navigate it.

    What we do next requires courage to move beyond the false choice between corporatisation and collegial nostalgia. A third way is possible – one that takes seriously both institutional sustainability and democratic participation, that values both expertise and lived experience, that reconciles the university interest with the interests of those who study and work there rather than separating them or elevating one of them, and that governs for the public good rather than just institutional survival.

    The students sitting in those boardrooms, feeling like audiences rather than governors, deserve better. So do the staff, the communities universities serve, and democracy itself.

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  • University governance needs more imagination

    University governance needs more imagination

    University governance is not broken – but it does need to change.

    There are places where governance is not working very well. There are places where it is working exceptionally well. And in most cases the governance system works in the same way it always has but with a different and deeper set of issues.

    It may be that the resilience of “business as usual” is not a sign of stability – but a sign of a wider dysfunction.

    University governance is built with committees, a senate (usually), and a council. Information can flow up and down the chain with no more urgency than a stream trickling down a hill. The idea of a university being a deliberate (or slow) decision maker is not a design fault – but the entire purpose of the system.

    The challenge is that the moment we are working in is highly unpredictable. This means that the slowness inherent in the governance of universities is a barrier to making timely decisions. In turn, the lack of speed kills. If universities cannot make decisions quickly then they will be forever fighting yesterday’s battles as even bigger challenges come over the horizon.

    It is true that university governance can be slow. It is also the case that governance is no more than the collective will of people, accepted practice, navigating within a system which is continually changing because of the people and practices within it.

    It is not that governance is fundamentally broken – but that in places, it has not caught up with the world we are in or the issues we are dealing with. The institutional governance memory has largely been about growth, and now it is about changing shape, and in some cases contraction.

    And it is struggling to catch up for three main reasons. Intra-organisational dynamics, regulatory pressure, and a lack of experience and guidance in responding to this particular crisis.

    People

    The relationship between the vice chancellor and the chair of council is a critical one and one that can make or break the quality of governance. Usually, not a policy is passed, a major programme commenced, or in the most detail orientated a contract signed, without the permission of one of these two people.

    That critical relationship cannot be to act, consciously or otherwise, as gatekeepers – and instead needs to work to sharpen the focus of the wider discussion and decision making on the art of the possible in responding to the greatest aspirations and the most sizable threats.

    Sometimes the funnel of chair and vice chancellor contracts the necessary information, context and ambition rather than flipping the funnel around to allow a wider and richer understanding of the specific problem and the potential answers to it.

    A trend across the sector is that the strain placed on organisations is placing significant pressure on this relationship. Sometimes this pressure is forcing the chair and vice chancellor ever closer together and making them engage like never before. On the other hand, this pressure can spill into real disagreements and arguments.

    Neither excessive closeness nor distance is helpful for good decision making. One allows governance by relationship above process which can lead to decisions being too narrow or having considered too few sides. The distance makes issues fraught and honest conversations difficult.

    The role of the registrar has never been more crucial in this dynamic. They are the third leg of the stool that can facilitate private conversation but crucially, particularly now, can turn debates into issues that can be fed into the university governance system with a structure and purpose that reaches beyond the vice chancellor and chair in isolation. The registrar, or equivalent, is too often perceived as clerking or secretariat – rather than a function and role that can influence culture.

    The idea isn’t that governance should be conflict free, but that systems are robust enough to turn conflict into decision. In times like these strongly held disagreement is inevitable, sometimes it is even good as it shows things are being deeply felt, but governance cannot function where personal relationships dominate a governance system. The future is one which – as you might expect us to say – ever more deeply engages the registrar as the translator of discussion into decision.

    Regulators and regulation

    Governments and regulators have not been helpful in enabling the evolution needed in university governance. On the one hand, there is a reflexive defence to non-intervention because universities are autonomous institutions. And to be fair, when regulators and governments do something universities do not like it is also a defence they reach for. Autonomy is true at an institutional level but regulators seek to impede institutional autonomy all of the time through sector wide regulation.

    Taking Covid as an example, the Office for Students introduced a range of temporary market stabilisation measures which covered, amongst a range of other matters, “matters that may affect or distort decision making by prospective or current students in respect of their choice of higher education provider or course.” It isn’t enormously helpful that the regulatory environment can sometimes feel like either no intervention or extreme intervention.

    The space that is interesting is what does regulatory stewardship look like – neither the laissez faire of institutional failure nor the clunking foot of, well, boots on the ground.

    The overriding temptation is to introduce more regulation in a period where the sector is struggling. The logic is that universities are exposed to greater risk and the way to protect students from risk is to build boundaries around what universities can and cannot do.

    The problem is that universities do not have the resources to cope with any more regulatory burden. In fact, owing to the financial pressures they are under, universities have less resources than ever to deal with new regulatory burdens. This isn’t about the bonfire of the redtape, or a chainsaw as some world leaders prefer, but it is about an informed debate about how to sharpen the focus of an enormous regulatory burden.

    Introducing new regulation increases the chances that universities will fall foul of new regulations but that hardly seems like the point. There should be as much energy in reducing red-tape as there is in creating it in order to give universities the space to breathe. The sector is having to reduce its size and it can’t function with a regulatory burden designed for a time when it was much bigger.

    The effect of this would also be to free up the regulators time to focus on a narrower range of issues. The obvious rebuke is which things should any regulator spend less time on. The question, though helpful, misses the wider point that regulatory burden is created as much by approach as by the areas regulators choose to spend their time on. OfS Chief Executive Susan Lapworth made the case back in 2022:

    Your autonomy shouldn’t be a theoretical idea that you mobilise defensively to ward off regulation. It should be a living, active practice that you use to make your own decisions with confidence. So I’m encouraging you to think about whether the idea of self-directed autonomy might be a useful way to think about how you respond to regulation.

    Three years on, it’s fair to say that governing bodies often do not feel like they have sufficient insight into what the regulator believes to be the appropriate exercise of that autonomy. For example, it would be enormously useful for the OfS to provide an annual summary of the key issues they are dealing with – a bit like the OIA’s annual report on trends and outcomes.

    Reducing regulation, revealing potholes, and more clearly differentiating between issues of governance and those of leadership will help. It is also important to be clear that at times the sector has been caught in a trap of doing the same activity and expecting different results.

    Partners

    Even in the most extreme circumstances the sector now finds itself in radical discussions couched in terms of partnerships with the people that the sector has always worked with. It might be that some of the answers to the current crisis are not within the sector.

    There is an opportunity to explore partnerships with different kinds of public and private organisations. Traditionally, in universities, these have grown up within schools and faculties as research or teaching partnerships. It’s less frequent that senior leaders and their governing bodies seek out partnerships of mutual convenience to address a challenge.

    Now would seem to be the time to look at whether there may be partnerships with private providers on pre-degree teaching, PBSAs on addressing housing shortages, local authorities on a place-based marketing campaign, the local chambers of commerce on brokering land assets, and so on.

    Again, the challenge in realising this work is a governing one. Universities just have less muscle memory of trying to building these kinds of strategic partnerships – more imaginative partnerships require a different set of approaches.

    The first is absolute clarity from governing bodies regarding the problems they are trying to solve – and the discipline to stay within those core priorities. It is not enough to say that the problem is cash shortage caused by recruitment challenges. The deeper question is which qualifications are recruited to, the types of programmes on offer, and how clearly the link between income and programmes can be defined. Only then is it possible to look at which partners might be worth working with.

    The other challenge is that the regulatory environment is not always amenable to partnership. There is the issue of CMA compliance, where providers are reluctant to enter sensible conversations for fear of falling foul of regulations. A simple guide on the framework for who universities can work with in what circumstances would go far. Clearly, the current situation where the CMA is obligated to maintain the rules of a market which isn’t functioning properly is far from ideal.

    Breaking not broken

    People, regulation, and new partners are the three ingredients to move the university governance cycle on. It is easy to say universities need outside direction and internal commitment to meet the moment we’re in – but harder to pull off in practice.

    What universities have in their favour is that they have structures and processes that have been tried and tested. Now is the moment to adapt them.

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  • Higher education governance needs the conflict between academic and business imperatives to be successful

    Higher education governance needs the conflict between academic and business imperatives to be successful

    The sector’s financial challenges have shone a spotlight on governance effectiveness in higher education in England.

    When the incoming government tasked the Office for Students (OfS) with directing more of its energy towards financial sustainability in the summer of 2024, it was only a matter of months before director of regulation Philippa Pickford put forward the view that the sector needed “a conversation” about governance, specifically about how robustly boards had tested some of the financial projections they had been prepared to sign off.

    That signal of concern about governance has clearly manifested in the corridors of the Department for Education (DfE), if these words from the Secretary of State to the Commons Education Committee in May are anything to go by:

    The government is clear that there needs to be a focus on and improvement in providers’ governance. Planning and strategy development within higher education providers, including financial planning, should be supported by the highest standards of governance to ensure realistic planning, robust challenge and the development of sustainable business models.

    The sector has not been unresponsive to these cues – Advance HE in partnership with the wider sector is (taking the conversation metaphor literally) curating a “big conversation” about governance and the Committee of University Chairs (CUC) has pledged to review the higher education code of governance – which for a large number of institutions acts as a reference document for compliance with OfS’ conditions of registration on governance.

    The implicit underpinning premise from OfS and DfE is fairly stark: the government is disavowing any responsibility it might have to come up with a financial settlement that would shore up higher education finances while retaining the current delivery model; nor is it especially keen to have to deal with institutional bailouts arising from institutional inability to manage the changed funding landscape. The strong signal is that it is up to higher education institutions to work out how to survive in this environment – and if boards are not up to the task of finding the answers then it’s the boards that need reforming.

    Business acumen

    I read this communication as part of a discursive stand off between government and the sector in which the lines between the role of government and role of individual institutions in securing the future of higher education is contested. Within that context, the validity of the implied criticism – that boards are insufficiently businesslike and strategic – needs to be interrogated.

    There was a fascinating piece on The Critic last week by University of Buckingham academic Terence Kealey bemoaning the rise of the managerialist board. In Kealey’s analysis, when the balance of power in governance tilted towards the Senate – the governing body of academics – the institution thrived, as evidenced by strong performance in NSS and a financial surplus. But when the Council flexed its muscles, the university faltered, dropping in the league tables and spending more than it brought in.

    Kealey’s core argument – that academics are best placed to steward the core higher education mission of excellent teaching and research – picks up a longer standing critique of higher education governance that perceives organisational strategic objectives as articulated by institutional boards and executive teams as frequently in opposition to the academic endeavour, being far too concerned with financial efficiency, performance management, reputation/league tables, and capturing market share. Echoes of aspects of this critique appear in the recent Council for the Defence of British Universities’ proposed code of ethical university governance, which urges boards to adhere to high standards of transparent, principled, and public-spirited conduct.

    At the other end of the spectrum, the criticism of higher education governance – including sometimes from governors themselves – is that boards are insufficiently businesslike, fail to articulate long-term strategic objectives that will secure the institution’s sustainability, and have limited entrepreneurial spirit that would allow the institution to adapt to adverse headwinds. A more moderate version of this criticism argues that it is very difficult to convene the diverse skillset that could allow for effective board oversight of the wide range of activities that higher education institutions do.

    Thinking about activities like academic and knowledge exchange partnerships, the creation of new campuses or the erection of new buildings, or civic and international engagement, all of these have the the academic endeavour at their core but are mostly about deploying the knowledge and reputational assets of the institution to generate additional value – and they each carry complicated associated legal and regulatory compliance expectations and reputational risk. It’s not clear that developing those strategies and managing those risks and expectations coheres well with academic professional practice – though some academics will obviously have a keen interest and want to develop knowledge in these areas.

    The worst of both

    There has always been an expectation that higher education institutions need to be simultaneously academically excellent and sufficiently business savvy to make sure the institution remains financially stable. Both academic and institutional governance can fail – the latter often more spectacularly and with greater reputational impact – but the impact of academic governance failure is arguably greater overall both on the long term health of the institution and on the lives of the staff and students affected.

    So you could argue that it’s odd and/or problematic that the sector has witnessed the erosion of the power of senates and academic boards as part of a wider set of trends towards a more executive style of higher education leadership, the rise of metrics, league tables and more managerial approaches to institutional performance, the intensification of regulatory expectations, and the steady withdrawal of direct public funding from the sector. It’s telling that under the current regulatory regime in England institutional boards have had to master new expectations of oversight of academic quality, on the presumption that all institutional accountability should sit in one place, rather than being distributed – suggesting that quality is now seen as part of the wider business imperative rather than a counterweight to it.

    But simply pivoting the balance of power back to senates and the academic community doesn’t necessarily address the problem. It’s possible, I suppose, to imagine a relatively benign or at least predictable funding and regulatory environment in which some of the pressing strategic questions about institutional size and shape, partnerships, or external engagement are answered or moot, and in which knowledge stewardship, academic excellence, and (one would hope) student learning experience are the primary purpose of higher education governance.

    But even if that environment was plausible – I’m not sure it has ever existed – it doesn’t really address the more existential contemporary questions that governments and the public seem to be putting to higher education: how does the country see, and experience the value of all this knowledge stewardship and academic excellence? To realise that value and make it visible in more than an ad hoc way – to be institutionally accountable for the systematic manifestation of public value from academic knowledge – requires knowledge and professional practice beyond individual teaching and research excellence. And, more prosaically but equally importantly, buildings, infrastructure, and systems that create the environment for effective knowledge stewardship. Without a functioning institution there can be no knowledge stewardship.

    There’s a reason, in other words, even if you strip out all the neoliberal value propositions from higher education governance, why higher education institutions need a “business” arm and associated governance structures. And that’s before you confront the actual reality of the current situation where the funding and regulatory environment is neither benign nor predictable – and the need for effective external relationship-building and systematic collaboration is greater than it has been in decades.

    On the other hand, some of the business decisions that are made to secure financial sustainability or long term institutional success put the academic imperative at risk. Rapid growth in student numbers, redundancy programmes, departmental or services cuts or new strategic partnerships can compromise quality, as we have seen in a number of recent cases. There may be mitigations or the impact may be worth the reward, but there can be no meaningful strategic decision without being able to weigh up both.

    Yet where we have ended up, I fear, is in the worst of both worlds – institutional boards that are neither sufficiently academically robust to have a grip of academic excellence nor sufficiently strategic and entrepreneurial to ensure institutions are able to thrive in the current higher education landscape. This is no shade to the immense talent and knowledge of the individuals who take up roles as higher education governors – it is a structural critique.

    Creative tension

    Where I end up is with the question – if there is really an inbuilt tension between the academic and business imperatives of higher education institutions, what would it look like for that tension to be a productive one in higher education governance rather than a source of toxicity?

    I suspect – though I’ve not (yet) asked – many vice chancellors and their executive teams would argue that in their individual experience and team skillset they manifest both academic and business imperatives – that in fact, it is their job to reconcile these two aspects of institutional leadership in their daily practice, decisions, and communications.

    Yet if that reconciliation of two competing imperatives is the job of leadership, arguably it’s not going all that well. While this experience is by no means universal, it’s clear that at times both academic and professional staff can feel sidelined and disempowered in the tug of war for day to day resource – but also at a deeper level for a recognition of their purpose and contribution to the higher education endeavour. Each can feel subordinated to the other in the institutional hierarchy – yet while there are outliers on both sides I’d put money on the majority of individuals on both sides accepting and embracing the value and contribution of the other. Yet at the same time the real tensions and contradictions that manifest in the pursuit of the two parallel imperatives are deeply felt by staff yet not always acknowledged by leadership.

    What if the job of leadership and boards of governors was not to seek to reconcile academic and business imperatives, but to actively manage the conflicts that arise at times? Where strategic questions arise related to either opportunities or risks, boards need to understand the perspective of both “sides” before being able to judge whether the executive team’s decisions are appropriate. And for institutional staff (and students, to the extent they have a role in institutional governance) there needs to be confidence that the governors have the skills and understanding of the value and importance of both imperatives and the relationship between them – so that there is the trust that decisions have been made in the most effective and transparent way possible.

    There might even be a case for institutions to convene internal business strategy boards as part of the governance structure as a counterweight to academic boards – actively empowering both equally as sites of knowledge, expertise and influence – and potentially reducing the strategic burden on institutional boards through creating a more transparent and maybe even more democratic or at least representative forum for internal governance of strategic business development.

    It seems likely that the next academic year will see the higher education sector in England move on from “conversations” about governance into something more systematically developmental, whether that’s via the mechanism of the CUC’s review of the Higher Education Code of Governance, or a policy agenda from one of the sector bodies. This is one of those areas where the sector can help itself with government by taking a lead on reform.

    Yet there’s a risk that the financial pressures on the sector lead to too close a focus on the strategic business imperatives and not enough on the academic excellence imperative. Institutions need both to be successful, and boards and executive teams – as well as any reviewing organisation – need to give deep consideration to how those can – even if not always peacefully – coexist.

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  • A code of ethical university governance is overdue

    A code of ethical university governance is overdue

    It’s a thankless job being a university governor at the best of times.

    The structures and hierarchies – established over decades, even centuries – feel impenetrable.

    You’re overwhelmed with papers and reading, never completely sure what’s going on at meetings.

    Statutes and ordinances, rules and regulations, sub-committees and working groups. And all this you’re doing for free?

    But during precarious times for the sector, the job gets even harder. Income lags further behind expenditure. The funding model seems loaded against you.

    Doubt sets in. Have you really been holding institutional managers robustly to account? Are those course closures and staff redundancies really unavoidable?

    Behind the seens

    Governing bodies are the highest authorities in most institutions. Structures vary from one university to the next, as does the language of governance.

    But in England, all boards are legally accountable to the sector regulator, the Office for Students, and hold significant powers, up to and including the authority to remove the vice chancellor if they so choose.

    However, governing bodies remain a reticent and mostly unseen grouping. Students and staff may occasionally glimpse members at award ceremonies or public events, but closer forms of engagement tend to be discouraged (or carefully managed).

    On policies that reshaped the sector in recent decades, like the 2012 fee rise, governors had little to say. During Covid, one commentator was moved to ask if anyone had seen the governing body.

    Another had previously dismissed governors as “a small cadre talking amongst themselves.” Until a media exposé in 2018, almost all UK vice chancellors were members of the sub-committee that made recommendations on their own pay.

    A 2019 investigation found “significant and systemic” failings in one governing body.

    Yet many individual governors continue to invest substantial time and effort into their never-more-important role – lay members can bring vital external expertise to a sector that has too often been inward-looking and naïve, and staff and student members can help institutional managers see the campus from a ground-level perspective.

    Last year, the Council for the Defence of British Universities (CDBU) conducted interviews with current or former governors at over forty English universities.

    While most reported enjoying the opportunity to learn how universities operate, the same issues arose time and time again:

    • Membership was demographically and ideologically narrow, resulting in “business realist” discourses that privileged the university’s finance and estates over its educational purpose
    • Chairs were too close to senior managers to bring meaningful “challenge”;
    • Cliques had emerged, leading to some members’ views carrying more weight than others;
    • Power dynamics were problematic;
    • Meetings of the main board sometimes served as rubber-stamping exercises for decisions already taken;
    • Processes were reported to be opaque, with few governors understanding how the agenda was set, or knowing how to have an item added.

    More worryingly, as OfS has increased the burden of regulatory and legal compliance, so governing bodies appear to have become more ideologically compliant. The logic of the market goes unchallenged, and the whims of policy-makers and the sector regulator courteously indulged.

    Surprisingly, this critique emerged from lay members as strongly as from elected staff and student governors.

    Relevant, useable and inclusive

    Now the Council for the Defence of British Universities (CDBU) has launched a consultation for its new Code of Ethical University Governance. The sector already has a Higher Education Code of Governance, authored by the Committee of University Chairs (CUC Code) – the new Code supplements this, while presenting a vision of university governance that is more relevant, more useable and more inclusive.

    Practical advice is offered to all members on what to expect from governance, how to navigate complex organisation structures, and – most crucially – how to impact decision-making processes.

    The consultation is necessary so that the Code can be a co-produced document, capturing as many perspectives as possible. So please consider completing this short survey if you’re a current or former governor, a student, a university employee, someone with other connections to the higher education sector, or someone with no connections at all to the higher education sector.

    So far, governing bodies have mostly avoided using their potentially formidable powers to intervene as the sector has been politicised and defunded. Over 10,000 campus jobs are currently at risk, and 40 per cent of universities face budget deficits.

    But the aim of the Code is not to look backwards, let alone to apportion blame. It is to help give future generations of university governors the confidence and wherewithal to bring genuine, meaningful challenge.

    At a time when higher education needs urgently to reclaim its status as a prized public asset, governing bodies have a duty to surpass the Nolan principles, and operate to the very highest standards.

    The CDBU’s Code of Ethical University Governance may be the first step towards nudging governors beyond compliance, and empowering them to speak out. The long-term goal is for governing bodies to see their role as standing up for communities of students and staff, and for the value of higher education to everyone.

    The draft Code can be found here, and the consultation here.

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