Category: government

  • With no warning

    With no warning

    The term ‘observations’ comes from the days trained weather observers recorded standard meteorological information. Now observations from radiosondes — attached to weather balloons rising to the upper stratosphere — collect data on temperature, humidity, air pressure and wind. 

    Automated surface-observing systems on land provide real-time data and satellites gather imagery and more data which is fed into supercomputers to provide forecasts.

    So what are the benefits of accurate weather forecasts?

    Staying prepared for the worst

    Evan Thompson, the director of the Meteorological Service in Jamaica, has seen his island hit by extreme weather events as seasonal hurricanes have become more severe.

    Thompson said that people need to know how to protect themselves from extreme weather such as tropical storms and hurricanes.

    “Whether it means moving to higher ground in the moment or at least ensuring you don’t take chances crossing flooded roadways that are with waters moving fast, or rivers,” he said.

    Thompson wants his country to be prepared for severe weather. “More data always means better observations which in turn leads to better forecasts.”

    Over the last decades, the accuracy of weather forecasting in the United States has vastly increased what is known as storm resiliency, helped airlines reroute flights, farmers to plant crops at the optimal times and power companies to deal with demand from their customers.

    Climate change intensifies weather.

    Elsewhere, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the World Environmental Programme (WEP) have targeted the need for more observation stations in countries across the Middle East, Africa, South America and Pacific Island states, countries which are at risk of seeing economic progress wiped out by increasing impacts of climate change. 

    The WMO target is for weather observation to reach the levels of countries in Europe and the United States. But it may not be citing the United States as a model in the future. Since January, the United States has been reducing its capacity to provide weather data.

    The cuts come at a time when the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events have increased due to climate change linked to human induced warming according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report of August 2021. However, the Trump administration has taken a decision to eliminate the term “climate change” from federal websites. 

    Especially dependent on accurate forecasts are the construction industry, agriculture, power companies and aviation. 

    Fabio Venuti of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts inputs weather data into a supercomputer. “Global weather forecasting like ours can assimilate data then produce high resolution local forecasts for each country,” he said. “They can be more prepared.”

    Information farmers can rely on

    Fabio said that the ability to forecast rain and drought can help farmers and governments plan food crops. And it can help public health officials prepare for and lessen the spread of diseases, such as malaria, that are affected by environmental factors as insects transported by winds. 

    Thompson in Jamaica said that the policies and plans that governments take are affected by weather forecasting. “For example, building codes can be adjusted because we recognise more severe downpours in areas that don’t normally have flooding,” he said. 

    In the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the parent agency of the National Weather Service, is tasked with daily weather forecasts, severe storm warnings and climate monitoring. In 2025 NOAA has already lost 800 employees and a further 500 have been offered buyouts.

    According to the former heads of the National Weather Service, the proposed cuts of close to 30% for NOAA would essentially eliminate NOAA’s research function for weather.

    Inger Anderson, executive director of the UN Environment Programme, said that accurate weather forecasting pays off in many ways — lives saved, improved disaster management, protecting livelihoods, biodiversity, food security, water supply and economic growth. 

    Besides cutting staffing, the Trump administration has also cut back on funds used to record tidal predictions and weather disasters such as heat waves, hurricanes, tornados, floods and wildfires. The U.S. National Centers for Environmental Information, the agency that collates historical meteorological records, will cease to update its Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters database beyond 2024. Previous records will be archived. 

    Jeff Masters, a meteorologist for Yale Climate Connections says the database is the “gold standard” used to evaluate the costs of extreme weather. “It’s a major loss, since it comes at a time when we need to better understand how much climate change is increasing disaster losses,” he said.

    Weather forecasting can tell us more than whether to carry an umbrella, when to plan a picnic or plant flowers in the gardens. Accurate forecasting can save your life, your home and your livelihood. 


     

    Questions to consider:

    1. How do you use weather forecasts?

    2. Should politicians work more closely with scientists?

    3. Have you experienced a severe weather event?


     

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  • Incremental Change or System Overhaul? An Update on Higher Ed Reform in NZ with Roger Smyth

    Incremental Change or System Overhaul? An Update on Higher Ed Reform in NZ with Roger Smyth

    In some countries, higher education policy just seems to sit still for decades. In others, hyperactivity is a more normal state. Today we’re looking at the 2020s poster child for higher education hyperactivity. It’s not the usual suspects, the UK or Australia, it’s little New Zealand where we’re making our fourth stop on this podcast in just over two and a half years.

    When last we were in Wellington, we talked to Chris Whelan from Universities New Zealand about university underfunding the consequences of losing international students, and something called the University Advisory Group, which was supposed to set the national system on a new course along with a research advisory group who weirdly was made up of exactly the same people only following a different mandate.

    Since then, while these groups were noodling on how best to steer the system, the government made two big table flipping moves. One musing about creating a new type of institution, which was neither a university nor a college, and nobody knew what they were talking about, and the other simply deciding it wasn’t going to fund any more research in the social sciences and humanities through its research granting system. Fun times.

    Anyways, with all this excitement, we figured it was worth going back to the Tasman Sea to check in with one of our regular correspondents, Roger Smyth. He’s a former senior New Zealand public servant and now a consultant based in Canterbury. He’s got all the skinny for us. And so, over to Roger.


    The World of Higher Education Podcast
    Episode 3.32 | Incremental Change or System Overhaul? An Update on Higher Ed Reform in NZ with Roger Smyth

    Transcript

    Alex Usher (AU): Roger, the last time we did a show about New Zealand, we had Chris Whelan from Universities New Zealand on, and we talked a lot about the University Advisory Group process. How far along is that work, and what are people in the sector saying about it? What’s the view at this stage? Is there still interest and momentum behind the process, or has it stalled out a little?

    Roger Smyth (RS): Okay, so the advisory group submitted an interim report late last year, and it’s scheduled to submit its final report this month. I understand that the report has now been submitted, but nothing has been published yet. Neither the interim report nor the final report, nor any of the dozens of submissions made in response to the UAG’s questions, have been released publicly.

    In these sorts of cases, the report usually isn’t published until the government has had a chance to make its initial decisions on some of the high-level questions—and that could still be a little way off.

    Of course, as you implied, Alex, there are rumors. And in some of the face-to-face consultations, the UAG has given a bit of a steer as to where it was heading. For instance, it’s pretty clear that in their interim report, they were proposing a machinery of government change—a reorganization of some of the government agencies in higher education, such as the Tertiary Education Commission, the Ministry of Education, and the policy unit responsible for research and innovation. But we won’t know that for sure until the report comes out.

    One of the big challenges the advisory group would have faced is that the government is committed to returning to a financial surplus in the 2027–28 fiscal year. That’s a significant challenge, with major demands on the budget. So the advisory group would have been instructed to make their proposals fiscally neutral, and that’s a big constraint on what they could recommend.

    My main view on this whole process is that it was never really clear what problem the University Advisory Group was set up to solve—apart from a general instruction to look for improvement and to make the system work better. One of the most distinctive features of the New Zealand system is its homogeneity. That has a lot of positives—it means that wherever you go, you’re guaranteed a reasonable level of quality. But it also has the downside that there isn’t really any outstanding, world-leading university.

    AU: Let me stop you there, because alongside the University Advisory Group, there’s also been a commission on research—on research and science—a review going on at the same time. Why did that happen in parallel rather than together?

    RS: Yeah, I think that’s an important point. The first thing is that the two advisory groups were actually chaired by the same person—Peter Gluckman, a distinguished medical scientist and academic—and they began operating at roughly the same time.

    You can see there was a desire to think about knowledge transfer opportunities within universities and how they contribute to the broader economy and the wider science system.

    The Science Advisory Group has now completed its report. It’s been submitted, and the government has published its initial decisions. This is an area where the review proposed a very substantial overhaul of the machinery of government. They proposed creating a super ministry for higher education, science, technology, and innovation.

    The government, however, did not accept that proposal. Most governments are a bit wary of major machinery-of-government reshuffles unless there’s a very strong rationale. These kinds of changes often involve a settling-in period where the system can lose its way, as people jockey for position and the focus shifts away from the core goals the system is meant to achieve.

    Instead, the review also proposed merging the seven non-university research institutes into a single public research organization. The government opted for a partial reorganization, establishing three public research organizations—focused on the bioeconomy, earth sciences, and health and forensic science. They’re also creating a new organization to cover advanced technology fields like AI, synthetic biology, aerospace, and quantum tech. So that’s probably a reasonable foundation for advancing the science system.

    AU: But of course, before they even got to that point—before the advisory group had reported—the government unilaterally made a change to what’s called the Marsden Fund. That’s sort of like our combination of the social sciences, humanities, and natural science councils. And it effectively nuked the humanities and social sciences, as I understand it. They basically said, “We’re not going to fund those anymore.” Why did the government do that? Why undercut your own report before it even comes out?

    RS: Yeah, this was definitely a decision that caused a lot of pushback and consternation—real ill feeling in universities and across the broader community.

    Most of the government’s research funding is directed toward major national strategic priorities, so it tends to go to areas like health, the hard sciences, engineering, agriculture—things like that. The Marsden Fund was one of the few avenues where humanities researchers could secure external funding, outside of what universities provide internally.

    I think part of this decision reflects the government’s desire to place greater focus on the hard sciences. If you look at the Marsden Fund trends, the social sciences and humanities panel had been gaining a slightly larger share of the funding in recent years, which naturally came at the expense of the hard sciences. So in some sense, this was a declaration that the government wants to reorient support toward areas seen as having greater economic impact.

    That said, the main driver was probably to send a message. But in doing so, it sent a very negative signal to the humanities community. Even researchers in the now-favored areas were concerned about the loss of this funding stream—particularly given that social science research can produce huge social value.

    AU: This tension between favored STEM subjects and less-favored fields like the social sciences, humanities, and business is also playing out in discussions around the government’s funding model. My understanding is that in New Zealand, the funding model essentially funds places. So, the government allocates a certain number of places to each institution. Now we’re projecting that there will be more enrollments than there are funded places, and the government would like to provide a bit of additional funding for STEM subjects, but not for others. We’re very familiar with this in Canada—it’s exactly what’s happening in Ontario right now. I’m curious how you think that will play out in New Zealand?

    RS: Okay, well, just to give a bit of context on the financial situation of the universities: like most Anglophone countries with a heavy reliance on the international student market, COVID hit New Zealand universities hard. In 2021, the impact was cushioned by a surge in domestic enrollments. The labor market was weak due to the pandemic, so more people turned to study, and universities did okay financially.

    But in 2022, following government stimulus measures, the labor market recovered and became more robust. Domestic enrollments fell sharply, and the international student market still hadn’t bounced back. That made 2022 the worst financial year ever for the universities. Six of the eight were in deficit, and one was just breaking even.

    In 2023, when finances were still tight, there was a lot of concern about university viability. The government stepped in with a short-term funding rate boost—not an increase in the number of places, but an increase in the dollars per place.

    Then there was a small increase in funding again last year. But the broader funding review never happened. The government changed, and that process was superseded by the UAG process we discussed earlier.

    And that process, as we said, is likely to avoid anything that would seriously impact the government’s bottom line. So, the universities have been in a tough situation.

    But now, the international market is starting to recover. It’s been slower than in the other countries we compete with, but in EFTS terms—equivalent full-time students—2024 saw an 11% increase in international enrollments. It’s still below pre-pandemic levels, but the trend is positive. And that matters because each international student generates about 60% more revenue than a domestic student.

    Right now, we’re in the middle of the financial reporting season. Five of the universities have reported for 2024. One reported a small deficit on its core business, but it was much lower than expected and offset by a surplus on its wider trading operations.

    So, it’s still tough—marginal—but not as gloomy as it was a couple of years ago.

    Even though there’s still pressure, and enrollments may be shifting toward more expensive fields, financially speaking, the worst appears to be over. The system is beginning to grow again.

    And on the point about STEM versus other fields—it’s worth remembering this is a system driven by student choice. The government doesn’t have much influence over where students choose to go. So, no matter how the government might want to steer things, it can’t really control those choices under the current policy environment. So, I’d say that the universities are managing through this.

    AU: Roger, I want to get into something I read recently—there was a fascinating article where the government, or at least the minister, was musing about the idea of creating a new type of tertiary institution. Something that’s not quite a university and not quite a polytechnic.But before I ask you about that, I think we need to give our listeners a bit of background on polytechnics in New Zealand.

    Your system merged all the polytechnics into one big national institution just before COVID, right? That was Te Pūkenga. Why do that? What was the point of one national institution? It’s a big country—two islands, 15 campuses. That’s a lot to bring together. What was the thinking behind that?

    RS: These reforms had two separate sources.

    First, we talked earlier about the financial challenges in the university sector, but the polytechnics were facing a real financial crisis. They’d been growing for years and carried high fixed costs, with relatively small student numbers spread across multiple campuses.

    Between 2012 and 2019, domestic enrollments dropped by about 25%. By 2019, nearly all the polytechnics were running deficits, and the sector’s collective deficit was quite substantial. So something clearly had to be done.

    Second, the government looked at what had been done in Australia. In New South Wales, for example, they merged all the TAFE institutions into a single statewide TAFE. It worked reasonably well there, and in Queensland as well.

    So they decided to follow a similar path and merge all 16 institutions—along with all work-based training—into a single national organization. That was the rationale behind the creation of Te Pūkenga.

    AU: What about the un-merger? So, a few years later you get a new government—the National government—and they’re going to undo the whole thing. Was that because it was, as you said, a machinery-of-government issue? Or was it more about a shift in how the government views vocational education?

    RS: I think it was both.

    Let’s look at both sides. First, the merger didn’t go well. There were some good aspects to the reforms. For instance, they set up six Workforce Development Councils to set standards for training and take a forward-looking view of labor market needs in specific fields. That was a positive.

    The idea of reintegrating polytechnic and work-based training into one coherent trades training system was also a good one. But the merger was very poorly executed.

    Costs blew out, and after three years they still hadn’t settled on a functioning operating model. There was almost no progress on the actual integration of work-based and polytechnic-based training. The initial chief executive didn’t work out and had to go.

    So that was one rationale for reconsidering—or unpicking—the merger.

    But the second reason was political. The incoming minister in 2023 had previously been a very successful chief executive of one of the polytechnics that was merged into the national institution.

    She was deeply committed to undoing the merger and restoring control to regions and local communities. So, the government came in with a clear policy to do this, and she got the ministry, and things got moving quickly.

    But, of course, life’s not that simple. No one wanted to go back to a system everyone agreed had serious problems. So how do you reconcile those two positions?

    After two years of back and forth, we’re now getting close to the new model. Those six Workforce Development Councils—the best part of the previous reform—are being disbanded and replaced with smaller organizations focused mainly on setting standards.

    The polytechnics, which remained as divisions within the larger organization, have all gone through what are called ruthless efficiency reviews to determine what could be dropped or changed to make them financially viable.

    We haven’t seen the full results of those yet, but some institutions will likely be deemed viable and split off as standalone, autonomous polytechnics. These will focus partly on trade training, but also on foundation education and some degree-level programs. Those will become autonomous institutions.

    But for those polytechnics that aren’t viable in the long term, they’ll be required to join a federation anchored by the Open Polytechnic, which delivers programs online. The idea is that those institutions can draw on the federation’s expertise and infrastructure to complement their face-to-face delivery with online components.

    AU: So I don’t want to ask you what’s going to happen, but I do want to ask when it’s going to happen—because there are a whole bunch of moving parts here, and you’ve got an election coming up. Is there enough time for the government to unwind all of this before the next election? Because I know, for example, with the Universities Accord process in Australia, the report came out well before the election, and even then, they couldn’t get everything done before voting day. So, what’s the pace of decision-making here?

    RS: The first thing is that if we look at the University Advisory Group, we should see the results of that fairly soon. I’d expect it within a couple of months—possibly even sooner. It might come out all at once, or it could follow the science review model, where there were high-level interim decisions released first.

    My sense of the brief given to the UAG is that we’re not going to see truly transformational change—nothing on the scale of the three big reviews we’ve had in the past: 1961, 1989–90, and 2002–03.

    So I’d expect incremental change rather than sweeping reform. And because of that, I think the university review will largely settle before the election.

    In contrast, the un-merging of Te Pūkenga and the broader vocational education reforms will take longer.

    Under the new arrangements, there will be greater integration between workplace and institutional training. Polytechnics and private providers will be allowed to act as arrangers and supervisors of work-based training.

    But implementing that integration will take time. There’s a two-year transition period, starting in 2026—which is the election year. So the un-merging process will only be partly complete when voters go to the polls.

    That said, I think this process will continue to play out slowly over time. Hopefully, it results in something positive.

    Despite everything—despite what will have been six years of turbulence and ongoing uncertainty—I do believe the sector will move forward with reasonable operating models.

    AU: May you live in interesting times. Roger, thanks so much for joining us today.

    RS: Thank you very much, Alex.

    AU: And that just leaves me to thank our excellent producers, Tiffany MacLennan and Sam Pufek—and you, our listeners, viewers, and readers—for joining us. If you have any questions or comments about today’s episode, or suggestions for future ones, don’t hesitate to get in touch with us at podcast@higheredstrategy.com. Run—don’t walk—to our YouTube page and subscribe. That way, you’ll never miss an episode of The World of Higher Education.

    Join us next week when our guest will be David Lloyd. He’s the remarkable individual who serves as both the Vice Chancellor of the University of South Australia and the co–Vice Chancellor of the University of Adelaide. How does he manage it? Those two institutions are on the brink of what’s likely the biggest institutional shakeup in Australian higher education since the Dawkins reforms of 1988. He’ll be here to talk about the merger, how it came about, and what the future looks like. Until then—bye for now.

    *This podcast transcript was generated using an AI transcription service with limited editing. Please forgive any errors made through this service. Please note, the views and opinions expressed in each episode are those of the individual contributors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the podcast host and team, or our sponsors.

    This episode is sponsored by KnowMeQ. ArchieCPL is the first AI-enabled tool that massively streamlines credit for prior learning evaluation. Toronto based KnowMeQ makes ethical AI tools that boost and bottom line, achieving new efficiencies in higher ed and workforce upskilling. 

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  • Provincial Budgets 2025-26 | HESA

    Provincial Budgets 2025-26 | HESA

    Ok everyone, all the provincial budgets are in and so it’s time for our annual look at what another round of irresponsible pan-partisan political leadership has wrought for our sector for the next twelve months.

    Figure 1 shows the province-by-province breakdown of this year’s budgets, showing the change in transfers to institutions in real dollars over 1 year and 5 years for each of the ten provinces. In most provinces, collecting this data is pretty easy—you just look at the Main Estimates. In Ontario it is more difficult because due to the Ministry of Finance’s crapulous incompetence, it is the one province in the country where Estimates do not appear on the day of the budget (it takes them several months to put out the detailed data; and while prior to 2018 the Ministry of Colleges and Universities was able to give out actual expenditure data on the day of the Budget, the Government no longer chooses to provide such information because shovel, manure, mushrooms, etc.). So in Ontario what you have to do is collect the previous year’s data, add the announced changes in expenditure, and then make some assumptions about the way funds are phased in (because the communications jackals who have taken over public budgeting in this province insist on phrasing spending as “$750 million over five years” to make numbers as big as possible, rather than explaining how the $750 million will be phased in on an annual basis). Which is all to say, these numbers are all pretty accurate except for Ontario, where there is a bit of a margin of error.

    Figure 1: 1-year and 5-year Changes to Budgeted Provincial Transfers to Institutions, Canada, 2025-26 Budget Year

    The one province that shows big change for 2025-26 is Prince Edward Island, which dropped a lot of money on UPEI this year in order to start a new medical school. Five other provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Newfoundland and Labrador saw real increases (that is, increases greater than the rate of inflation) this year of between 1 and 4%. Four other provinces (Saskatchewan, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia) saw real declines of between 1% and 3%. Altogether, that combined nationally for real growth in provincial spending of about 0.9%.

    Over a five-year horizon, things are a bit different. The oil provinces—Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador—have all shown double digit declines in real expenditures (19%, 11%, and 18%, respectively), the “big two” (Quebec and Ontario) are down seven and six per cent respectively, while Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are down eight and two percent respectively. The only provinces that are up are Manitoba, where just before leaving office the Tories reversed a huge portion of their cuts of the previous eight years or so, British Columbia, which build a new med school at Simon Fraser and decided to give hefty wage increases to university and college staff (which did not, in the end, leave universities and college much better off—see Vancouver Island University for evidence), and the afore-mentioned PEI. Nationally, the drop in spending after inflation was 4%, and obviously would have been much higher without that anomalous BC result.

    So what does the overall picture look like nationally? Well, take a look at Figure 2. Basically, the picture is one of long-term stagnation.

    Figure 2: Total Budgeted Provincial Expenditures on Post-Secondary Education, 2006-07 to 2025-2025, in Billions of Constant 2025 dollars

    I suppose I should also update some charts I first made available earlier this year, looking at expenditures on post-secondary education as a percentage of total government expenditures, which I do below in Figure 3. Across the country, these percentages are down a long way over the past fifteen years, particularly in Alberta, which has gone from being by far the biggest spender in 2008 to being below the national average now.

    Figure 3: Budgeted Provincial Expenditures on Post-Secondary Education as a Percentage of Total Budgeted Provincial Expenditures, Canada and selected provinces, 2006-07 to 2025-26.

    Now, your brain might be whirring a bit trying to would out how Figures 2 and 3 can both be true. Overall spending is down only gently, but PSE expenditures as a percentage are crashing? It’s easy to explain, but not intuitive if you believe all the left-wing CBC nonsense about how governments are in austerity mode. This is nonsense: Canadian provincial governments are absolutely NOT in austerity mode. In most provinces, overall spending is wayyy up. It’s just that they are not choosing to spend any of that on postsecondary education. Since COVID, overall government expenditure is up 20% after inflation; since 2008-09, when post-secondary education peaked as a percentage of total expenditures, it’s up 59% after inflation.

    Figure 4: Real Change in Total Provincial Expenditures vs. Provincial Expenditures on Post-Secondary Education 2006-07 to 2025-26 (2006-07 = 100)

    Got it? Provinces are still spending. They just aren’t spending on postsecondary education.

    Anyways, just to finish things off, figure 5 shows changes in overall provincial spending on student assistance programs. It’s up a bit this year mainly because of Ontario. Unclear why there has been a rise, though I suspect it has something to do with the ongoing crappiness in the youth job market (something I will get back to in a blog next week) and the need for student aid to backfill.

    Figure 5: Total Budgeted Provincial Expenditures on Student Financial Assistance, Canada 2006-07 to 2025-26, in Billions of Constant 2025 Dollars

    So that’s your 2025-26 budget round up. Not as bad as some previous years but man, our sector is in a bit of a whole and just can’t get out of it. The message, as always, is: no one is coming to save us.

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  • The one thing that unites French voters

    The one thing that unites French voters

    French President Emmanuel Macron’s grip on stability, progress and voter approval seems to be slipping.

    His party lost its absolute majority in the National Assembly and, following snap elections in the summer of 2024, its relative majority as well. Now, he faces a budget crisis, voter pushback and a geopolitical crisis involving Europe, the United States and Russia.

    Macron had once hoped to bridge France’s political divides and reinvigorate its economy but is now mired in political quicksand and many French voters feel helpless. That’s what I discovered while interviewing people on the street in Rennes, France, where I’m spending a year studying abroad and trying to make sense of French politics.

    One elderly woman I spoke to described what was happening as a catastrophe. “It’s embarrassing,” she said. “All we can do is wait for the next presidential election.”

    My interviews aligned with a November 2024 IPSOS survey, which found that 74% of respondents lack confidence in the presidency, while an overwhelming 86% distrust political parties. Trust in the National Assembly has plummeted as well, with 74% of respondents expressing no faith in the institution.

    What voters say

    People are frustrated. A middle-aged man told me: “Macron has lost his authority. France is unstable, gridlocked and hostile.”

    Back in September, Macron appointed Michel Barnier as prime minister in an attempt to stabilize his government but it backfired. By December, Barnier’s government had collapsed after losing a no-confidence vote, ousting him and his ministers and triggering yet another governmental reset.

    The vote came in response to Barnier’s use of Article 49.3 of the French Constitution, which allows the executive to pass a budget without parliamentary approval.

    It wasn’t until February 2025 that lawmakers finally agreed on a budget — one met with widespread discontent over spending cuts and reallocations. Now, many French citizens are asking: What’s next for the Republic?

    A law student I spoke with who goes to the University of Rennes expressed uncertainty about the country’s future. “I’m scared because we’re walking back on progress,” he said.

    A nation disunited

    Political divisions seem to be deepening, amplified by social media.

    A political science student at Rennes 2 University noted that people seem unable to talk to each other. “It’s harder than ever to have conversations with people who disagree with us,” the student said. “We don’t just see differing opinions, we see them as attacks on who we are.”

    Another student said that at university, now, you find yourself attacked or excluded if you don’t agree.

    This polarization was evident in the most recent European elections. The far-right Rassemblement National secured 31.5% of the vote — a 40-year record for any French party in a European election. Their campaign focused on hard-line immigration policies, crime reduction and tax cuts on fossil fuels.

    Despite shared dissatisfaction, French citizens are divided on the changes they seek. One university student emphasized the need for a more equitable education system.

    “We’ve made strides in accessibility, but students are locked into career paths too early,” she said. “My younger brother, for example, always dreamed of becoming a pilot. But because his undiagnosed ADHD hurt his test scores, he was placed in a vocational high school instead of a general one. Now he’s studying to be an air steward.”

    Some want a strong government.

    A retired woman expressed concern over global instability. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is terrifying,” she said. “And with Trump distancing the U.S. from the EU, I worry our military isn’t strong enough. France and the EU need to invest in defense.”

    To put what I found on the streets into perspective, I spoke with Alistair Lyon, a News Decoder correspondent and former reporter with the Reuters international news service who lives in France.

    He highlighted the long-term consequences of the gridlock in French politics. “In a time when France faces huge challenges like a budget deficit and a major geopolitical crisis involving the U.S., Europe and Russia, now is not a great time to have a political stalemate,” Lyon said.

    He expects the stalemate to continue until the 2027 presidential election, given Macron’s loss of both absolute and relative majorities in the National Assembly.

    He pointed to two major sources of division: growing disillusionment with politicians and resistance to reform. Many French voters feel politically homeless, fueling a cycle where reforms are met with fierce backlash, ultimately deterring further change.

    Disinformation breeds distrust.

    Compounding the problem is the erosion of independent journalism.

    “You have to be very careful reading the news,” Lyon said. “Journalists that remain anchored to traditional values of accuracy and impartiality are becoming few and far between.”

    In France, billionaire and right-wing proponent Vincent Bolloré has bought up news and media outlets, raising concerns about bias and misinformation. In a way, Lyon said, the media is fueling the fires of divisions in new ways because now the press is controlled and owned by people with vested political interests.

    France finds itself at a crossroads. Uncertainty, frustration and political polarization are creating more gloom than ever.

    Whether stability can be restored depends on Macron, the parliament and their willingness to compromise. If cooperation remains minimal, France may continue down a path of deepening division, one with consequences far beyond its borders.


    Three questions to consider:

    1. Why has French President Emmanuel Macron lost significant support from voters?

    2. What is one thing voters are in France want from their government?

    3. As a citizen of your country, what do you expect your government to do for you?


     

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  • Marc Miller removed as Canadian immigration minister

    Marc Miller removed as Canadian immigration minister

    The cabinet reshuffle came upon Carney’s swearing-in ceremony as Canada’s new Prime Minister on Friday 14 March, following his landslide victory in the Liberal leadership race announced on March 10.  

    Miller has been replaced by Rachel Bendayan, formerly the minister of official languages and associate minister of public safety under Trudeau. Bendayan is one of 11 female ministers in Carney’s 24-member cabinet.  

    Holding various government positions since being elected to parliament in 2019, Bendayan was the first Canadian of Moroccan descent to join the federal government.  

    While a change of tack regarding immigration is unlikely until after the federal election, international education stakeholders are hopeful about Miller’s successor who will head up Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).

    “Canada is due for a reset on the immigration file. The former minister rode a wave of negative sentiment to make Canada feel increasingly unwelcoming to international students and their family members,” Canadian immigration lawyer Matthew McDonald told The PIE News.

    “My hope is that Minister Rachel Bendayan will bring a more positive spirit to the country’s immigration conversation,” he added.

    Based on Bendayan’s role as minister for official languages, McDonald said he expected she would continue IRCC’s commitment to the prominence of the French language in permanent residence programs.

    Bendayan’s legal background also suggests that she may continue the “technocratic approach” to policy seen of her predecessor, he added.

    The former minister rode a wave of negative sentiment to make Canada feel increasingly unwelcoming to international students

    Matthew McDonald, Canadian Immigration Services

    “We are changing how things work, so our government can deliver to Canadians faster – and we have an experienced team that is made to meet the moment we are in. Our government is united and strong, and we are getting right to work,” said Prime Minister Carney.  

    Carney, formerly head of the Bank of Canada and Bank of England, and a relative political newcomer, will succeed Justin Trudeau as relations hot up between the US and Canada over Donald Trump’s trade war against its northern neighbour.  

    Trudeau’s large cabinet was made up of 37 ministers, including his longtime personal friend and the best man at his wedding, immigration minister Marc Miller.  

    Carney himself never sat on Trudeau’s cabinet, which was part of his appeal to some Liberal voters.  

    While several Trudeau stalwarts have been dropped from Carney’s cabinet, there is still considerable overlap and only three new faces, which Carney’s team said would ensure “continuity”.

    We are changing how things work, so our government can deliver to Canadians faster

    Mark Carney, Canadian Prime Minister

    In the absence of an education minister at the federal level, Miller has delivered many of the turbulent policy changes in international higher education over the past 14 months. He has become notorious in the sector for repeatedly doing so on a Friday afternoon.  

    During this time, Canadian institutions have been delivered study permit caps, twice, restrictions on post-graduate work opportunities and procedural changes around recruiting and enrolling international students, among myriad further disruptions.  

    Against the backdrop of a recent increase in anti-immigration sentiment across Canada, McDonald said that Bendayan had “the opportunity to seize this existential moment for Canada and reinforce that we are a country whose past, present, and future is an immigration story”.

    Previous statements made by Carney about tackling Canada’s housing crisis, prioritising those already in Canada for permanent residency and reducing temporary foreign worker levels suggest the government’s ongoing immigration policy will largely align with Miller’s going forward.  

    While Carney has not explicitly said anything about limiting international students, he has previously voiced concerns about institutions’ reliance on international students and has advocated for increased funding for postsecondary education.  

    Under Canada’s current immigration levels plan, the government is aiming to reduce temporary residents including international students and temporary workers to 5% of the total population by 2027.  

    Canada’s next federal election is currently scheduled for October, though there is speculation that Carney could call an election before parliament is expected to return on March 24.  

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  • 6 recommendations for AI in classrooms

    6 recommendations for AI in classrooms

    Key points:

    As states move forward with efforts to adopt artificial intelligence, the nonprofit Southern Regional Education Board’s Commission on AI in Education has released its first six recommendations for schools and postsecondary institutions.

    Because of its broad membership, regional breadth, early creation and size, SREB President Stephen L. Pruitt said the commission is poised to produce critical recommendations that will inform not only Southern education decision makers but those throughout the nation.

    “AI is fundamentally changing the classroom and workplace,” Pruitt said. “With that in mind, this commission is working to ensure they make recommendations that are strategic, practical and thoughtful.”

    The commission is set to meet for another year and plans to release a second set of recommendations soon. Here are the first six:

    Policy recommendation #1: Establish state AI networks
    States should establish statewide artificial intelligence networks so people, groups and agencies can connect, communicate, collaborate and coordinate AI efforts across each state. These statewide networks could eventually form a regional group of statewide AI network representatives who could gather regularly to share challenges and successes.

    Policy recommendation #2: Develop targeted AI guidance
    States should develop and maintain targeted guidance for distinct groups using, integrating or supporting the use of AI in education. States should include, for example, elementary students, middle school students, high school students, postsecondary students, teachers, administrators, postsecondary faculty and administrators and parents.

    Policy recommendation #3: Provide high-quality professional development
    State K-12 and postsecondary agencies should provide leadership by working with local districts and institutions to develop plans to provide and incentivize high-quality professional development for AI. The plans should aim to enhance student learning.

    Policy recommendation #4: Integrate into standards & curricula
    States should integrate into statewide K-12 standards and curricula the AI knowledge and skills students need to prepare them for success in the workforce.

    Policy recommendation #5: Assess local capacity and needs
    States should develop and conduct AI needs assessments across their states to determine the capacity of local districts, schools and postsecondary institutions to integrate AI successfully. These should be designed to help states determine which institution, district or school needs state support, what type of support and at what level. 

    Policy recommendation #6: Develop resource allocation plans
    States should develop detailed resource allocation plans for AI implementation in schools, school districts and institutions of postsecondary education to ensure that the implementation of AI is successful and sustainable.
    These plans should inform state fiscal notes related to education and AI.

    The 60-plus member commission was established in February of 2024. Members include policymakers and education and business leaders throughout the 16-state SREB region.

    For more information about the commission please see the following links:

    Latest posts by eSchool Media Contributors (see all)

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  • Effect of Institutional Autonomy on Academic Freedom in Higher Education Institutions in Ghana

    Effect of Institutional Autonomy on Academic Freedom in Higher Education Institutions in Ghana

    By Mohammed Bashiru and Professor Cai Yonghong

    Introduction

    The idea of institutional autonomy in higher education institutions (HEIs) naturally comes up when discussing academic freedom. These two ideas are connected, and the simplest way to define how they relate to one another is that they are intertwined through several procedures and agreements that link people, institutions, the state, and civil society. Academic freedom and institutional autonomy cannot be compared, but they also cannot be separated and the loss of one diminishes the other. Protecting academic freedom and institutional autonomy is viewed by academics as a crucial requirement for a successful HEI. For instance, institutional autonomy and academic freedom are widely acknowledged as essential for the optimization of university operations in most African nations.

    How does institutional autonomy influence academic freedom in higher education institutions in Ghana?

    In some countries, universities have been subject to government control, with appointments and administrative positions influenced by political interests, leading to violations of academic autonomy and freedom. Autonomy is a crucial element in safeguarding academic freedom, which requires universities to uphold the academic freedom of their community and for the state to respect the right to science of the broader community. Universities offer the necessary space for the exercise of academic freedom, and thus, institutional autonomy is necessary for its preservation. The violation of institutional autonomy undermines not only academic freedom but also the pillars of self-governance, tenure, and individual rights and freedoms of academics and students. Universities should be self-governed by an academic community to uphold academic freedom, which allows for unrestricted advancement of scientific knowledge through critical thinking, without external limitations.

    How does corporate governance affect the relationship between institutional autonomy and academic freedom?

    Corporate governance mechanisms, such as board diversity, board independence, transparency, and accountability, can ensure that the interests of various stakeholders, including students, faculty, and the government, are represented and balanced. The incorporation of corporate governance into academia introduces a set of values and priorities that can restrict the traditional autonomy and academic freedom that define a self-governing profession. This growing tension has led to concerns about the erosion of academia’s self-governance, with calls for policies that safeguard academic independence and uphold the values of intellectual freedom and collaboration that are foundational to higher education institutions. Nonetheless, promoting efficient corporate governance, higher education institutions can help safeguard academic freedom and institutional autonomy, despite external pressures.

    Is there a significant difference between the perceptions of males and females regarding institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and their relationship?

    The appointment process for university staff varies across countries, but it is essential that non-academic factors such as gender, ethnicity, or interests do not influence the selection of qualified individuals who are necessary for the institution’s quality. Unfortunately, studies indicate that women are often underrepresented in leadership positions and decision-making processes related to academic freedom and institutional autonomy. This underrepresentation can perpetuate biases and lead to a lack of diversity in decision-making. One solution to address these disparities is to examine gender as a factor of difference to identify areas for improvement and promote gender equality in decision-making processes. By promoting diversity and inclusivity, academic institutions can create a more equitable environment that protects institutional autonomy and promotes academic freedom for everyone, regardless of their gender.

    Methodology and Conceptual framework

    The quantitative and predictive nature of the investigation necessitated the use of an explanatory research design. Because it enabled the us to establish a clear causal relationship between the exogenous and endogenous latent variables, the explanatory study design was chosen. The simple random sample technique was utilised to collect data from an online survey administered to 128 academicians from chosen Ghanaian universities.

    The conceptual framework, explaining the interrelationships among the constructs in the context of the study is presented. The formulation of the conceptual model was influenced by the nature of proposed research questions backed by the supporting theories purported in the context of the study.

    Conclusions and Implications

    Institutional autonomy significantly predicts academic freedom at a strong level within higher education institutions in Ghana. Corporate governance can restrict academic freedom when its directed to yield immediate financial or marketable benefits but in this study it plays a key role in transmitting the effect of institutional autonomy. Additionally, there is a significant difference in perception between females and males concerning the institutional autonomy – academic freedom predictive relationship. Practically, higher education institutions, particularly in Ghana, should strive to maintain a level of autonomy while also ensuring that academic freedom is respected and protected. This can be achieved through decentralized governance structures that allow for greater participation of academics in decision-making processes. Institutions should actively engage stakeholders, including academics, in discussions and decisions related to institutional autonomy and academic freedom. This will ensure that diverse perspectives are considered in policy development.

    This blog is based on an article published in Policy Reviews in Higher Education (online 02 January 2025) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23322969.2024.2444609

    Bashiru Mohammed is a final year PhD student at the faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University. He also holds Masters in Higher education and students’ affairs from the same university. His research interest includes School management and administration, TVET education and skills development.

    Professor Cai Yonghong is a professor at Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University. She has published many articles and presided over several domestic and international educational projects and written several government consultant reports. Her research interest includes teacher innovation, teacher expertise, teacher’s salary, and school management.

    References

    AAU, (2001). ‘Declaration on the African University in the Third Millennium’.

    Akpan, K. P., & Amadi, G. (2017). University autonomy and academic freedom in Nigeria: A theoretical overview. International Journal of Academic Research and Development,

    Altbach, P. G. (2001). Academic freedom: International realities and challenges. Higher Education,

    Aslam, S., & Joshith, V. (2019). Higher Education Commission of India Act 2018: A Critical Analysis of the Policy in the Context of Institutional Autonomy.

    Becker, J. M., Cheah, J. H., Gholamzade, R., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2023). PLS-SEM’s most wanted guidance.

    Hair, J., Hollingsworth, C. L., Randolph, A. B., & Chong, A. Y. L. (2017). An updated and expanded
    assessment of PLS-SEM in information systems research. Industrial management & data
    systems,

    Lippa, R. A. (2005). Gender, nature, and nurture. Routledge.

    Lock, I., & Seele, P. (2016). CSR governance and departmental organization: A typology of best practices. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society.

    Neave, G. (2005). The supermarketed university: Reform, vision and ambiguity in British higher education. Perspectives:.

    Nicol, D. (1972) Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility: The Tasks of Universities in a Changing World, Stephen Kertesz (Ed), Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.

    Nokkala, T., & Bacevic, J. (2014). University autonomy, agenda setting and the construction of agency: The case of the European university association in the European higher education area..

    Olsen, J. P. (2007). The institutional dynamics of the European university Springer Netherlands.

    Tricker, R. I. (2015). Corporate governance: Principles, policies, and practices. Oxford University Press, USA.

    Zikmund, W.G., Babin, B.J., Carr, J.C. & Griffin, M. (2012). Business Research Methods. Boston: Cengage Learning.

    Zulu, C (2016) ‘Gender equity and equality in higher education leadership: What’s social justice and substantive equality got to do with it?’ A paper presented at the inaugural lecture, North West University, South Africa

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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  • How foreign aid helps the country that gives it

    How foreign aid helps the country that gives it

    In international relations, nation states vie for power and security. They do this through diplomacy and treaties which establish how they should behave towards one another.

    If those agreements don’t work, states resort to violence to achieve their goals. 

    In addition to diplomatic relations and wars, states can also project their interests through soft power. Dialogue, compromise and consensus are all part of soft power. 

    Foreign assistance, where one country provides money, goods or services to another without implicitly asking for anything in return, is a form of soft power because it can make a needy nation dependent or beholden to a wealthier one. 

    In 2023, the U.S. government had obligations to provide some $68 billion in foreign aid spread across more than 10 agencies to more than 200 countries. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) alone spent $38 billion in 2023 and operated in 177 different countries. 

    Spreading good will through aid

    USAID has been fundamental to projecting a positive image of the United States throughout the world. In an essay published by the New York Times, Samantha Power, the former administrator of USAID, described how nearly $20 billion of its assistance went to health programs that combat such things as malaria, tuberculosis, H.I.V./AIDS and infectious disease outbreaks, and humanitarian assistance to respond to emergencies and help stabilize war-torn regions.

    Other USAID investments, she wrote, give girls access to education and the ability to enter the work force. 

    When President John F. Kennedy established USAID in 1961, he said in a message to Congress: “We live at a very special moment in history. The whole southern half of the world — Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia — are caught up in the adventures of asserting their independence and modernizing their old ways of life. These new nations need aid in loans and technical assistance just as we in the northern half of the world drew successively on one another’s capital and know-how as we moved into industrialization and regular growth.”

    He acknowledged that the reason for the aid was not totally humanitarian.

    “For widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area,” Kennedy said. “Thus our own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperilled. A program of assistance to the underdeveloped nations must continue because the nation’s interest and the cause of political freedom require it.” 

    Investing in emerging democracies

    The fear of communism was obvious in 1961. The motivation behind U.S. foreign assistance is always both humanitarian and political; the two can never be separated. 

    Today, the United States is competing with China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for global influence through foreign assistance. The BRI was started by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2023. It is global, with its Silk Road Economic Belt connecting China with Central Asia and Europe, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road connecting China with South and Southeast Asia and Africa and Latin America.

    Most of the projects involve infrastructure improvement — things like roads and bridges, mass transit and power supplies — and increased trade and investment. 

    As of 2013, 149 countries have joined BRI. In the first half of 2023, a total of $43 billion in agreements were signed. Because of its lending policy, BRI lending has made China the world’s largest debt collector.

    While the Chinese foreign assistance often requires repayment, the United States has dispensed money through USAID with no direct feedback. Trump thinks that needs to be changed. “We get tired of giving massive amounts of money to countries that hate us, don’t we?” he said on 27 January 2024. 

    Returns are hard to see.

    Traditionally, U.S. foreign assistance, unlike the Chinese BRI, has not been transactional. There is no guarantee that what is spent will have a direct impact. Soft power is not quantifiable. Questions of image, status and prestige are hard to measure.

    Besides helping millions of people, Samantha Power gave another more transactional reason for supporting U.S. foreign assistance.

    “USAID has generated vast stores of political capital in the more than 100 countries where it works, making it more likely that when the United States makes hard requests for other leaders — for example — to send peace keepers to a war zone, to help a U.S. company enter a new market or to extradite a criminal to the United States — they say yes,” she wrote.

    Trump is known as a “transactional” president, but even this argument has not convinced him to continue to support USAID. 

    Soft power is definitely not part of his vision of the art of the deal.


     

    Three questions to consider:

    1. What is “foreign aid”?
    2. Why would one country give money to another without asking for anything in return?
    3. Do you think wealthier nations should be obliged to help poorer countries?


     

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  • Ontario in 2029 | HESA

    Ontario in 2029 | HESA

    Back in 2022, just after the last provincial election, I wrote a piece looking forward a few years and predicted that the years 2023-25 were going to be chaos for Ontario postsecondary institutions. And I was right, although I can’t claim to have anticipated any of the specifics. Given that we are now going back into an election, I thought I would try to look into a crystal ball and look at what the province’s postsecondary system will look like financially if our glorious premier is re-elected for another four years.

    To do this, of course, requires making a few assumptions, not just about what will happen in the future but, given the inevitable Canadian delays in producing data, what’s been happening in the past two years as well. Hard data on the student numbers which drive aggregate tuition income does not exist beyond 2022 because the provincial government is deliberately suppressing data on this subject. Yes, really. Until last year, Ontario had one of the best records in the country when it came to openness on enrolment stats, usually publishing quite detailed data within six months of end of the calendar year. As of today, it has now been twenty-one months since the last update. By complete coincidence, the data that has not been updated covers the exact period where provincial government was asleep at the wheel in terms of oversight of international student intake. Can’t have that data going out before an election, I guess.

    Anyways, that means the following projections require a bit more educated guess work than usual. For transparency, here are my assumptions:

    • I have based student number projections for 2023-24 and 2024-25 on data I could find from the Ontario Universities Application Centre (OUAC) and from federal open data on student visas issued up to fall 2024.
    • I am assuming that international student enrolment will bottom out in 2025-26 and resume 10% annual growth thereafter, and that domestic enrolment will grow 2% per year, in line with projected increases in the 18-21 population. The assumptions on international students might be too generous, in which case all my projections will be too optimistic. Keep that in mind as you read this.
    • I am assuming that the provincial government will not add any new funding to the system beyond what was announced in the run-up to the 2024 budget, but that the extra funding announced as a response to the Blue-Ribbon Panel will be maintained past 2027.
    • I am assuming the freeze on tuition will be maintained, but a gentle (but below-inflation) rise in average tuition will continue due to students switching from cheaper humanities courses to more expensive STEM ones.
    • I am going to focus on the main sources of institutional operating income, which are tuition fees and provincial operating government. I am excluding from this analysis anything to do with income from federal or private non-student sources.

    Let’s start with public expenditures on postsecondary education. The problem of falling real public expenditures began well before Ford took power, but this trend has worsened under Ford. Until last year, he consistently allowed inflation to erode funding. The only time he increased institutional funding was in 2024, after the report of the blue-ribbon panel, and even then the three-year package he announced barely allows funding to keep up with inflation. When this new funding evaporates in 2027, the prospects for any new funding are uncertain: I think it is more likely that the government will revert to its previous practice of holding funding constant in nominal dollars but fail to provide any help to offset inflation. Assuming this is true, the path of government funding for Ontario postsecondary institutions will be as shown below in Figure 1.

    Figure 1: Ontario Government Transfers to Post-Secondary Education, 2001-02 to 2028-29 (projected) in Billions of $2023

    Now of course, public funding only makes up about a third of total funding in Ontario postsecondary education. What happens when you include tuition fees? Well, it looks like the graph below, Figure 2. Again, as you can see, the “take-off” point for the system we have today clearly lies in the McGuinty/ Wynne period, but boy howdy did the Ford team double-down on the model it inherited.

    Figure 2: Total Operating Income by Source and Sector, Ontario Public Postsecondary Institutions, 2001-02 to 2028-29 (projected) in Billions of $2023

    Now, this is one of those cases where it helps to disaggregate what is going on in the system and look separately at what’s going on in the universities and colleges. Let’s start with colleges in Figure 3.

    Figure 3: Total Operating Income by Source, Ontario Colleges, 2001-02 to 2028-29 (projected) in Billions of $2023

    I’ve been writing about the big fall in college revenues for a few months now, but even I find this graph shocking. Total operating income to the college system is going to crash by about a third between 2023-24 and 2024-25 and then probably will start to recover thereafter. Basically, you should consider the period 2015-2025 as a huge fever dream that is now breaking and sending the system back to exactly where it was a decade ago, minus about 15% of its public funding and a similar drop in the number of students (domestic enrolment really crashed over the past decade).

    Figure 4 repeats the exercise for universities. This one might seem puzzling for many, because it appears to show very little drop in funding in the 2020s. I mean, yes, there’s a teeny dip in 2024, but absolutely nothing like what we see in the colleges—so why are universities screaming about their untenable financial positions?

    Figure 4: Total Operating Income by Source, Ontario Universities, 2001-02 to 2028-29 (projected) in Billions of $2023

    Well, the answer is that universities don’t have a revenue challenge so much as a cost challenge. Colleges have an enormous amount of freedom to rearrange or reduce staff. Universities, to put it mildly, do not, partly because of tenure and partly because collective agreements between universities and faculty contain clauses about layoffs and financial exigency which impose very high barriers and costs to any institution that tries to reduce academic headcount. This forces institutions to force as many cuts as possible on non-academic staff and services, but there are limits to how much you can do before students start turning away.

    Plus, of course, universities simply got in the habit of getting ever larger. Looke at what happened in the 18 years before the Ford government took power: 17 straight years where the average annual income growth after inflation was 5%. The internal political economy of Ontario universities simply evolved so that growth less than 5% was believed to be “austerity.” Since Ford came to power, annual growth has been effectively zero, even as institutions are dealing with the costs of accommodating the major shift in students from humanities to STEM. The gears inside universities are grinding to a halt and even going in reverse this year and next. And universities are—by design—poorly engineered to deal with a lack of growth.

    So, what can be done? Well, in the world we all wished we lived in, this situation would be attracting serious political attention. But it’s not. Ontarians quite like having world-class universities and colleges; they just don’t feel like paying for it. Had the cuts started a few weeks earlier, or had the election been called a few weeks later, the current Program Apocalypse (which seems more than on course to deliver the closure of over 1000 programs across the province) might have become what political animals call “a kitchen-table issue,” that is an issue so important than voters talk about it at the kitchen table. Kids not being able to get into the programs they want to get into because they have been shut due to budget cuts? Yeah, that’s a kitchen table issue. One that might yet have some impact on the election, though probably not a decisive one.

    Could institutions do more to make this a kitchen table issue? Yes, they could. At the university level, institutions could be more overt in saying they will no longer be able to support as many spots in expensive, high-demand programs. At the college level, institutions could be more aggressive about closing programs in the skilled trades. So far, they have been very reluctant to do this even though their high cost-per-student should probably lead a lot more of them to be on the chopping block if financial sustainability were a major issue. But institutions are reluctant to do this because it’s hard to play chicken with the government without seeming to play chicken with the general public. And the only way things could get worse for institutions right now is if they lose what’s left of the public sympathy they have. Which is to say: yes, they could be doing more, but it’s easy enough to explain their hesitation in doing so.

    Anyways, sorry to readers in the rest of the country for all the Ontario-centricity. If you’d like to know more about how the mess in Ontario—partly due to inept oversight by the Ford team and partly due to an inept response by federal immigration minister Marc Miller—affects the rest of the country (and it does), have a listen to my guest appearance on the Missing Middle podcast last week. Good fun.

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  • What nations have the strongest democracies?

    What nations have the strongest democracies?

    In my capacity as a globetrotting Asianist, I frequently encounter people from the United States who want to brag about democracy. They are often surprised to discover how healthy it is in many Asian countries.

    The United States as the world’s longest standing democracy stands in contrast with its great geopolitical rival, China, one of the world’s most authoritarian political regimes. The U.S. Constitution came into effect in 1789, and famously begins with “We the people…” affirming that a government must serve its citizens.

    What’s more, U.S. law declares the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms to be “principal” and “fundamental” goals of U.S. foreign policy. 

    But over the years, politics has evolved across both sides of the Pacific Ocean. By the measure of democracy set by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) the United States now falls short.

    The EIU considers it a “flawed democracy” and ranks it 29th out of the 167 jurisdictions surveyed. The demotion from “full democracy” to a “flawed democracy” came in 2016, the year Donald Trump was elected to his first term as president.

    The EIU assesses democracy worldwide based on five criteria: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties. In other words, there is a lot more to democracy than simply having elections.  

    Measuring democracy by world standards

    In this context, the United States scores poorly for its political culture. “The U.S. score is weighed down by intense political and cultural polarisation,” its report noted. “Social cohesion and consensus have collapsed in recent years as disagreements over an expanding list of issues have fuelled the country’s ‘culture wars’.” 

    Fault lines have deepened in particular over LGBTQ+ rights, climate policy and reproductive health. 

    Polarisation has long compromised the functioning of government in the United States and the country’s score for this category is also particularly low.  

    “Pluralism and competing alternatives are essential for a functioning democracy, but differences of opinion in the U.S. have hardened into political sectarianism and almost permanent institutional gridlock,” the EIU reported.

    Freedom House, a think tank which analyses freedom across the world, has also observed that democratic institutions in the United States have eroded. It cites: “Rising political polarisation and extremism, partisan pressure on the electoral process, mistreatment and dysfunction in the criminal justice and immigration systems and growing disparities in wealth, economic opportunity and political influence.”

    Democracy in Asia and the Pacific

    Across the Pacific, we find five “full democracies”: Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan, although the EIU’s report preceded the current political turmoil in South Korea. The region also has 10 “flawed democracies,” including Malaysia, India, The Philippines and Indonesia.

    Singapore, a country which is often criticised for its soft authoritarian political system, is also assessed to be a flawed democracy. But there can be little doubt about the government’s effectiveness in delivering services to its citizens. Singapore’s technocratic and managerial style governance have generated one of the world’s most prosperous and efficient economies. 

    Its GDP per capita, which is a way of measuring the economic wellbeing of a country, is $148,000 — among the very highest in the world, and ahead of the United States, Germany or Japan.  

    When it comes to economic freedom, Singapore leads the world according to the Heritage Foundation, while the United States ranks a mere 25th out of the 176 jurisdictions surveyed. Other Asia-Pacific economies which rank well are Taiwan (4th) New Zealand (6th), Australia (13th) and South Korea (14th). 

    Human capital has long been a key ingredient in Singapore’s economic success story. Singapore’s students topped the OECD’s 2022 Programme for Student Assessment which assessed the capabilities for 15-year-old students from 81 countries and economies for reading, science and maths. Indeed, Japan and South Korea are also ranked in the top 10 countries. The United States was ranked 34th with a similar score to Vietnam.

    Education is key to democracy.

    When it comes to universities, the United States is still the world leader, with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Princeton University, Stanford University, the California Institute of Technology, the University of California, Berkeley and Yale University all being ranked in the top 10 by Times Higher Education.  

    But Asian universities are now climbing the ladder, with China’s Tsinghua University now number 12, Peking University 13th, National University of Singapore 17th, the University of Tokyo 28th and Nanyang Technological University Singapore 30th.

    Asian citizens also enjoy much higher life expectancies than U.S. citizens or those of most other developed countries. Hong Kong tops the list of the world’s highest life expectancy at 86 years, with Japan, South Korea, Australia and Singapore all being in the top 10.  

    In comparison, the United States ranks just 48th in the world; Americans live on average some six years less than Hong Kongers. 

    And while Singapore and many other Asian countries are notorious for restrictions on personal freedoms, the trade-off is a safe society and an efficient economy. For example, Singapore is estimated by research group Numbeo to have a much better crime index and safety scale than the United States or France.  

    No monopoly on democratic values

    My American friends seem insistent that their open and free-wheeling society represents a unique source of creativity and innovation.  

    There is no doubt some truth in this perception — U.S. companies dominate Forbes list of the world’s most innovative companies. At the same time, companies from India, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, China and Japan are now climbing up the Forbes list.  

    And while Switzerland, Sweden and the United States might top the Global Innovation Index, Singapore, South Korea, China and Japan are not far behind.

    Comparing the quality of democracy and governance is a complex exercise, something that a short article like this cannot sufficiently tackle.  

    But it is clear, based on a number of factors, that many Asian countries are doing quite well in developing systems of democracy and governance. The United States faces many deep challenges in contrast and could draw lessons from its Asian friends across the ocean.


     

    Three questions to consider:

    1. What is one common measure of democracy?
    2. In what way does the United States fall short on measures of democratic strength?
    3. What do you think is the most important characteristic of a democracy?


     

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