A Teach for America teacher works with a student. Teach for AmericaTeach For America has partnered with the Aspen Institute’s Policy Academy to expand leadership training for rural educators.
The collaboration adds a four-part policy impact series to TFA’s Rural School Leadership Academy, a yearlong fellowship now in its 13th year. The new curriculum aims to help rural educators influence education policy at the state and national levels while addressing challenges in their local schools.
Seventy fellows will participate in the policy training this year, learning to connect classroom issues to district and state-level decision-making. Past participants requested more tools to influence the systems affecting rural students, according to TFA.
“RSLA was created to walk alongside those leaders—helping them grow, connect, and see what’s possible,” said Casey DeFord, managing director of alumni career advancement and field integration at Teach For America. “Our partnership with the Aspen Institute will deepen RSLA’s impact by equipping fellows with the policy skills needed to drive lasting change.”
The Rural School Leadership Academy selects a cohort of educators annually to receive career development through virtual learning, in-person gatherings, school visits and personalized coaching. The program serves educators at various career stages, from aspiring leaders to experienced principals.
Betsy Cooper, director of the Aspen Policy Academy, said rural educators bring valuable expertise to policymaking.
“This partnership will enable educators to address unique challenges in their schools through policy entrepreneurship,” Cooper said.
Participants who complete the program will receive a co-branded certificate from both organizations.
Texas Christian University Texas Christian University will shutter its women and gender studies department and comparative race and ethnic studies department at the end of this academic year, folding both programs into the English department in a move faculty members say reflects the institution’s response to political pressure.
The decision, announced earlier this month, comes as higher education institutions nationwide face mounting scrutiny over programs related to diversity, equity and inclusion—particularly those focusing on gender and race. TCU officials cited low enrollment as the primary rationale, though faculty members say the timing suggests otherwise.
Discussions about restructuring or renaming the departments began in February. Those conversations centered on how to address external pressure against anything perceived as related to DEI initiatives—pressure that has intensified since the Trump administration began efforts to eliminate such programs.
Faculty members report that university messaging has been inconsistent. Last spring, they were told the two departments would merge but could not include “race” or “gender” in the combined department’s name. By August, officials indicated the merged department could retain those terms. The October announcement revealed all three units would be absorbed into the English department, which will retain its original name.
University data shows undergraduate enrollment in both departments remains minimal this fall: two seniors are majoring in women and gender studies, while nine students major in comparative race and ethnic studies—five seniors, three juniors and one sophomore.
Women and gender studies at TCU traces its roots to 1979, when professors Jean Giles-Sims and Priscilla Tate began advocating for such a program. The university formally launched it in 1994. The comparative race and ethnic studies program emerged in 2017 amid student concerns about campus climate, with its founding director telling media the program would help foster cultural change and attract a more diverse student body.
In his email to English faculty, Provost Floyd Wormley Jr.said that the restructuring aims to “ensure a more efficient and effective use of faculty and administrative resources” while maintaining fiscal sustainability.
More than 32,000 California community college students who earned transfer degrees never applied to California State University despite guaranteed admission, according to a new report that highlights critical gaps in the state’s higher education pipeline.
Marisol Cuellar MejiaThe Public Policy Institute of California study reveals that 21 percent of Associate Degree for Transfer recipients between 2018-19 and 2022-23 failed to apply to CSU. Most concerning, more than half of these students — 32,500 individuals — appear to have abandoned their pursuit of a bachelor’s degree altogether.
The findings come as California races to meet an ambitious goal of 40 percent baccalaureate completion among working-age residents by 2030, a target that depends heavily on improving transfer rates from community colleges.
“When the transfer pathway works, it works,” said Marisol Cuellar Mejia, co-author of the report. “The challenge lies in ensuring that more California community college students are able to get to the point of applying.”
The report identifies another significant loss point: nearly 63,000 students who were admitted to CSU but chose not to enroll never appeared at any four-year institution. This group represents what researchers call “the most immediate opportunity for enrollment gains” at the state university system.
Despite these gaps, the study found high success rates for students who complete the transfer process. Among community college applicants to CSU, 92 percent are eventually admitted to at least one campus, and 76 percent of fall 2020 transfer students graduated by spring 2024. Transfer applications and enrollment remain below pre-pandemic levels. Fall 2024 saw 50,259 new transfer students enroll at CSU, a 6 percent increase from the prior year but still 17 percent below the 2020 peak of 60,529 students. Applications are down 16.4 percent from 2020 levels.
The decline has not affected campuses equally. San Diego State, Cal State Los Angeles, and San Francisco State continued enrollment drops through fall 2024, with the latter two campuses seeing transfer enrollment more than 30 percent below 2020 peaks.
Meanwhile, five campuses — Fresno State, Fullerton, Sonoma State, Monterey Bay, and Chico State — have surpassed their 2020 transfer enrollment numbers. The report notes that CSU is the leading destination for California community college transfers, receiving about 58 percent of students who successfully transfer to four-year institutions. Another 17 percent transfer to University of California campuses, while 25 percent go to private or out-of-state schools.
The study found that the typical CSU applicant spends nine terms enrolled in the community college system before applying. However, students who reach key academic milestones during their first year can apply sooner. Three in ten applicants apply in more than one term, and almost half of these students had all applications denied initially but were admitted later. Among admitted students, 69 percent chose to enroll at CSU.
The California Community Colleges system serves more than 2.1 million students, with most expressing intent to transfer. However, only one in five actually transfers within four years of initial enrollment, meaning even modest improvements could substantially boost four-year college enrollment statewide.
CSU recently committed to increasing transfer enrollment by 15 percent over the next three years as part of its systemwide strategic plan. The move comes as high school graduate numbers are expected to plateau or decline, limiting the pool of first-time freshmen and making community college transfers increasingly important for maintaining enrollment.
Michigan State University has cut 99 positions as part of a comprehensive cost-reduction strategy aimed at addressing mounting financial pressures, President Kevin Guskiewicz announced in a recent letter to campus stakeholders.
The elimination of positions—spanning executive roles, support staff, faculty, and academic staff—represents the first phase of an $85 million budget reduction plan the institution unveiled in May. The cuts do not include non-renewed fixed-term appointments.
The predominantly white institution in East Lansing is targeting a 6% spending reduction this fiscal year, totaling $50 million, with plans to cut an additional $35 million—or 3%—in the following fiscal year.
Departments were directed to minimize personnel reductions during the initial year of cuts. Nearly two-thirds of this year’s $50 million reduction came from non-personnel expenses, including supplies and services, though layoffs proved unavoidable.
Beyond internal budget constraints, federal funding cuts eliminated an additional 83 positions at the university. In late July, 94 MSU Extension staff members lost their positions following the discontinuation of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program-Education (SNAP-Ed), which provided nutrition and physical activity programming to low-income families.
Combined, the reductions have impacted 1.3% of MSU’s workforce since March 1.
Guskiewicz attributed the budget crisis to multiple factors: double-digit increases in employee healthcare costs, federal funding reductions, and accumulated general fund deficits from previous years.
The financial challenges persist despite MSU reporting its second-largest fall enrollment of 51,838 students and receiving a modest 2.1% increase in state appropriations, totaling approximately $333.8 million.
“We have taken the first difficult and necessary steps to assure the university’s financial sustainability,” Guskiewicz wrote, thanking faculty and staff for their commitment to the institution’s mission.
The university will launch its next budgeting cycle shortly, with request letters scheduled for early November and submissions due Jan. 23. Guskiewicz pledged to share additional information as the fiscal year concludes.
MSU is providing outplacement services to eligible individuals affected by the cuts. The president acknowledged that some reductions continue to unfold through union and Human Resources processes.
“I appreciate the compassion our teams are showing one another during this period, as well as your patience in understanding that we are trying to share information transparently and in a timely manner,” he stated.
The university operates on a nearly $3.7 billion budget, with $1.7 billion allocated to the general fund.
Dartmouth CollegeFile photoDartmouth College has declined to sign the Trump administration’s “Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education,” becoming the latest prestigious institution to prioritize institutional autonomy over preferential federal funding access.
In a statement released Saturday, Dartmouth President Dr. Sian Beilock firmly articulated the college’s position ahead of Monday’s deadline, emphasizing that governmental oversight—regardless of political affiliation—represents an inappropriate mechanism for directing the mission of America’s top research universities.
“I do not believe that the involvement of the government through a compact—whether it is a Republican- or Democratic-led White House—is the right way to focus America’s leading colleges and universities on their teaching and research mission,” Beilock stated.
The compact, extended to nine select institutions, promised enhanced access to federal research dollars in return for compliance with several administration policy mandates. These requirements included adopting the administration’s gender definitions for campus facilities and athletics, eliminating consideration of race, gender and various demographic factors from admissions decisions, and restricting international student enrollment.
Despite rejecting the compact’s terms, Beilock expressed openness to dialogue, indicating her willingness to explore how to strengthen the traditional federal-university research partnership while maintaining higher education’s focus on academic excellence.
The decision followed significant campus pressure, with nearly 500 Dartmouth faculty members and graduate students signing a petition advocating for rejection, according to the Valley News.
In her statement, Beilock emphasized the fundamental principle at stake: “Universities have a responsibility to set our own academic and institutional policies, guided by our mission and values, our commitment to free expression, and our obligations under the law.”
She framed institutional independence as essential to rebuilding public confidence across political lines and preserving American higher education’s global preeminence.
Dartmouth’s decision aligns with rejections announced last week by peer institutions including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Brown University, the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Southern California, suggesting a coordinated defense of academic autonomy among elite research universities.
Manning Hall at University of North Carolina Chapel HillUNCThe University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill announced last week that it will merge the School of Information and Library Science and the School of Data Science and Society into a single, yet-to-be-named institution focused on applied technology, information science and artificial intelligence.
The merger, announced in a joint letter from Chancellor Lee H. Roberts and Interim Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost James W. Dean Jr., represents what administrators called “a bold step forward” in positioning Carolina as a national leader in data and AI education.
Dr. Stanley Ahalt, current dean of the School of Data Science and Society, will serve as inaugural dean of the new school. Dr. Jeffrey Bardzell, dean of the School of Information and Library Science, will continue leading SILS through the transition while also assuming a newly created secondary appointment as Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer and Vice Provost for AI.
“Information technologies, especially generative AI, are having a transformational impact,” the letter stated. “This new school is a bold step forward in our commitment to preparing students for a world increasingly shaped by data, information and artificial intelligence.”
The AI vice provost position, which will become full-time once the new school is operational, will coordinate the university’s response to artificial intelligence across all campus units.
“Dean Bardzell has been a key voice informing our thinking about AI campuswide,” Roberts and Dean wrote. “We are grateful to have his experience in the classroom, administration and research guiding our efforts.”
The announcement comes as universities nationwide grapple with integrating AI into curriculum and operations. UNC joins a growing number of institutions restructuring academic units to address what administrators describe as rapid technological change.
While the decision to merge has been finalized, administrators said that implementation plans remain under development. The university will establish a task force, advisory committee and multiple working groups to determine operational details.
“Faculty, staff and students will be engaged throughout,” the announcement stated. Both schools will maintain current academic programs during the transition, with administrators expressing hope the merger will support enrollment growth and expanded impact.
SILS, established in 1931, has approximately 600 students across bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral programs, with strengths in information ethics, library science and human-centered information design.
SDSS, founded in 2019, has grown to roughly 400 students and focuses on computational methods, statistical analysis and data science applications across disciplines.
“Both SILS and SDSS bring distinct strengths and areas of excellence to Carolina — technical expertise, humanistic inquiry and a deep understanding of the societal implications of emerging technologies,” administrators wrote.
The letter noted that the merger is “driven by long-term possibilities” rather than budget constraints, with a focus on growth and expanding both schools’ “powerhouse academic programs.”
University officials did not provide a timeline for completing the merger or naming the new school. They also did not specify budget details or projected enrollment targets.
The announcement marks the latest in a series of administrative restructuring efforts at UNC-Chapel Hill, which has seen several organizational changes in recent years as it responds to shifting academic priorities and funding models.
The economics of higher education are tricky. It’s a labour-intensive industry, and generally speaking the cost of producing labour-intensive goods will always increase faster than the price of producing capital intensive goods, because the latter have more scope for increasing productivity. That’s not a problem if you are a public institution in a country with bottomless pockets, or if you are a prestigious private institution with almost unlimited ability to raise prices. If you’re among the other 99 percent of the world’s institution, though, you have to find ways to balance rising costs with new sources of income. But every money-making scheme comes with problems…and costs! So which one to choose?
Today’s guest is Joshua Travis Brown, from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Education. He’s the author of a new book called Capitalizing on College: How Higher Education went From Mission-Driven to Margin-Obsessed, which follows the fortunes of a number of institutions who try out different strategies to try to keep themselves afloat. Some try to double-down on a historic place-based residential mission and charge higher fees; others try to find ways to generate revenue that can cross-subsidize their historic place-based activities. But what’s particularly intriguing about this book is that his subject institutions are all religious institutions. Not only does that mean no core public funding: it means that decisions about how to find new business lines all really have to pass a test of God vs. Mammon.
This really is one of the best higher education books of the year and I was so pleased we could get Josh on the show. I won’t spoil the fun any more: here’s Josh.
The World of Higher Education Podcast Episode 4.6 | Capitalizing on College: Mission, Money, and Survival in Higher Ed with Joshua Travis Brown
Transcript
Alex Usher (AU): Josh, your book is one of my favorite kinds of higher education books—lots of real, if disguised, institutional case studies. I get the impression that what you were trying to do was look at different financial strategies to cope with the phenomenon of ever-rising costs in higher education—Baumol’s disease, basically. How did you choose those eight institutions for your case studies? And why did you focus only on religious institutions, which I thought was a really intriguing choice?
Joshua Travis Brown (JTB): Thanks, Alex. That’s an excellent question to open with. I was looking around at the world, and a lot of what we in higher education base our norms on are the best practices maintained by elite institutions—those that accept only about five to nine percent of applicants. But then there’s the other ninety-one to ninety-five percent of institutions that don’t have those kinds of resources, and their world looks radically different.
One group I focused on are what we call tuition-driven institutions in the American sector. That’s actually a very diverse set of schools that, I’d argue, form the backbone of American higher education—at least in terms of its diversity. These include Hispanic-serving, minority-serving, HBCUs, predominantly Black, religious, women’s, Asian American, vocational, and regional colleges, among others.
Within that really rich and diverse group, the largest by far are the religious colleges and universities in the United States. There are roughly a thousand of them—Protestant, Catholic, some Buddhist, Mormon, Muslim, and Jewish institutions as well. I chose to sample primarily from the Protestant group. And the reason for that choice is that I was interested in behavior, not belief.
The perspective I argue is most valuable is one that looks at behavior that cuts across institutional types, rather than staying within silos and making what I’d call an erroneous assumption that, “This sector operates this way, and that sector operates that way.” I argue instead that everyone is in competition with one another—and to truly understand the sector, you have to look at behavior across all types.
AU: Based on your work at these institutions, you developed a four-part typology with four types of institutions. You call them those following a Traditional Strategy, a Pioneer Strategy, a Network Strategy, and an Accelerated Strategy. How did you come up with those four? Were they in the back of your mind when you selected the cases, or did they emerge organically from the research?
JTB: This is purely grounded theory—straight from the data. What I’m arguing here is that I’m looking within what I call the “missing middle.”
A lot of higher education research tends to focus on what I call the bookends—students on one end, and government or the state on the other. But we don’t do a great job, as researchers, of really diving in to hear the voices of those actually running and leading the institutions.
So as I started to look at the data, pull out themes, and group them into buckets, these four strategies emerged. There was even a fifth one beginning to appear, which I called Accelerated Networks—where the accelerated institution was trying to crack the code to move to the next level of market-oriented behavior. So yes, they surfaced organically from the research.
AU: Let’s talk about that Traditional Strategy. What does it entail? What kind of resources does it take to implement? And how easy is it to, you know, for lack of a better word, win using this strategy?
JTB: The Traditional Strategy is your typical higher education institution that values prestige. They’re constantly looking to the elites.
There’s a whole sector of “little Ivys,” “public Ivys,” and “mini Ivys” that sit just below the Ivy League institutions, and they’re really trying to leap forward into that group. These institutions not only value prestige, but they also operate under the assumption of an in-person education. As one president told me, “You come to a tradition.” He repeated that phrase several times. These institutions rely heavily on building their brand, climbing the rankings, ensuring their athletics are top-notch, and gaining national exposure through sports. They want to become household names.
The problem for traditional institutions—and really, for all institutions—is that the residential, on-campus, in-person model of higher education in the United States operates at a deficit. It must be subsidized.
For the traditional institutions, that subsidy comes primarily from endowments—the spinoff revenue that supports the residential model. And the key takeaway from the book, across all these strategies, is that everyone is trying to subsidize the residential core. What differs is how they do it.
The traditional model depends on philanthropists, wealthy donors, and the prestige that fills their sails. They can call on endowments of two, three, four, five, six, even eight hundred million dollars—and the revenues those spin off—to make their operations sustainable. Or at least, so they think.
AU: Tell us about the second strategy then. You’ve got a Pioneer Strategy. What does that mean—and where do those subsidies come from, if we can put it that way?
JTB: From this point forward in the book, everything turns entrepreneurial. These institutions no longer look to endowments—because they don’t have them. So, for the next six schools in the book, every president is basically saying, “I don’t have an endowment. I need to find margins—and I need to find them somewhere.”
And what they do is turn to students. That’s where they find their margins.
In the Traditional Strategy, as I mentioned earlier, the assumption was that you come to the institution for the tradition—to receive it, to be inculcated into it. The Pioneer Strategy turns that idea on its head. These institutions ask, what if we took the classroom to the students?
That’s the innovation here. Every one of the next strategies has some kind of innovation at its core. In many ways, this book is a story—or a playbook—of innovation. That’s what I hope readers take away: not just the strategies, but the innovative practices themselves.
So, these institutions took classrooms to hotels. They took classrooms to schools and high schools, to shopping malls, to military bases. They went to where the customer was. The classroom became reconceived—portable. And they picked a type.
I take readers through three different types in that chapter, and then show how they replicate it. Whatever region they’re in, what you end up seeing is a giant branch campus model built around that one specific type.
You’ve got multiple sites, but all following the same formula. And all of the revenue—say, a 20% profit margin—from those branch campuses flows back to the core institution. That’s how they rebuild the core.
Over the course of a decade, they can raise anywhere from two hundred to five hundred million dollars—and they use that money to physically transform and rebuild the residential campus.
AU: But all those markets you’re talking about—it’s really just mature students, right? Are there other pioneer markets you can go to besides mature students?
JTB: The principle here is that these institutions were first movers. They were the first movers in adult education at the time.
For readers today—if I’m a leader picking up this book and asking, “What’s the takeaway here?”—I’d say: think badgification, think microcredentials. Think of some new market that’s just about to spin off or is moments away from being spun off.
Anyone who goes all in on that kind of emerging market would be a pioneer institution. They’d be adopting the Pioneer Strategy for that new market—just as these institutions did about a decade ago.
AU: Does it work? I mean, it takes money to make money, right? You’ve got to rent the hotel rooms, pay the professor to go there and teach. It sounds like you have to be extremely margin-conscious—and at a certain point, it’s easy to overshoot, to overcommit to these kinds of things. So how many of the institutions you looked at actually managed to reinforce the residential core?
JTB: They did—but by the time I arrived on campus, the folks in the Traditional bucket were saying, “Oh my gosh, we need a new strategy.”
Meanwhile, the folks at the Pioneer institutions were saying, “Hey, this has worked for about five to seven years, but the competition is so intense it’s eating into our margins. Other institutions are moving into our space. It’s getting really hard to recruit. We need to add a new market.”
And that’s the principle behind the Network Strategy. Rather than having one type, they add multiple types. That’s the big difference between the two: the Pioneer Strategy has one type with multiple sites, while the Network Strategy has multiple types, multiple sites—and it’s global.
AU: Let’s talk now about that Network Strategy. Just as you were finishing there, I think you were saying the difference between the Pioneer and Network strategies is how many new markets you go after. Is it more than that, or is that really the key distinction between the two?
JTB: No, that’s the big difference—because again, what we’re really trying to figure out here is: how are you subsidizing your residential model? It never makes enough money on its own. So where are you finding those margins? And those margins always come from the periphery.
For the Network Strategy, one of the presidents I interviewed described what he called his tabletop strategy for running the institution. He said, “The residential core is the tabletop. All of my peripheral markets—whether online, international, transfer, or adult education—those are the legs. And I’m constantly looking for new legs, new sources of revenue, to support this tabletop.” He went on to say that the tabletop—the residential core—is what gives legitimacy to the entire model. You can’t do this without the tabletop.
And that’s the key difference between the Network Strategy and something like the University of Phoenix. Phoenix was essentially one giant leg. What they lacked—and what people criticized them for—was legitimacy. They didn’t look like a traditional college, and they weren’t serving typical students.
That’s why this book and this perspective are so valuable: when nonprofit institutions start going after the same students or adopting some of the same practices as for-profit institutions like Phoenix, the lines begin to blur. To really understand what’s happening, you have to look across types and sectors—and focus strategically on the behavior itself.
AU: Is that an easier strategy to pull off than the Pioneer one? I mean, it sounds harder to me—but it might also have bigger rewards, since it spreads the risk across different types of markets.
JTB: That’s absolutely key, Alex. One of the presidents I interviewed put it exactly that way. He said, “I’m trying to build a stock portfolio of enrollment. If one sector goes down, I still have another three or four sectors over here, so a drop in one leg isn’t going to sink the ship.” What they were striving for was balance. But both institutions, in their enthusiasm for adding new legs, made a critical mistake—they actually ended up creating a second tabletop.
They either absorbed another institution or built a massive campus overseas—in one case, in Asia. And instead of funneling all of their margins back to the residential core, they had to start directing them to these peripheries, to that second tabletop.
It became really complex. Morale declined. And by the time I arrived on campus, they were looking for a new kind of market—something they could take to scale. And that’s what the next school managed to crack.
AU: Let’s talk about that last strategy—the one you call the Accelerated Strategy. It’s an amazing case study, especially because it’s a religious institution. As you put it, it’s where God and Mammon really start to duke it out.
This is an institution that seems to have crossed the line from being merely margin-conscious to acting like a full-on for-profit college. And that’s wild for a faith-based organization. Tell us about this institution—and how going down this route changes a university.
JTB: You know, what’s crazy is that I changed all the names of the actual schools in the book—but when a school named its competitors, I left those in.
So as I’m interviewing the leaders at the accelerated institution, they’re saying, “Hey, we’re like ASU. We’re like Penn State. We’re like the Maryland system. We’re like Western Governors, UCF, Florida, Southern New Hampshire University.” And they viewed that entire group of schools as their competitors. The way they took their model to scale was through process and product innovation.
I was sitting across from the provost, and he told me, “I had a vision. I pictured an old country store. Down one side of the store was one product, and down the other side was another product—and that’s all we had to sell.” Those two products were an MBA and an interdisciplinary studies degree. At that time, if you wanted to earn a degree online from this institution, those were your only two options. But then he had this transformative idea. Over the course of a single summer, he took roughly 35 to 80 residential courses and converted them for online delivery. Within three to six months, that old store suddenly had 35 different products on the shelves.
And here’s the key innovation: everyone else at the time was selling online classes. This institution became one of the first—outside of Phoenix—to sell online degrees. They fundamentally shifted the product, and that move blew up their market. Virtually overnight, they went from 8% to 42% growth.
AU: Wow. But surely it changed the culture of the campus?
JTB: It did. People talked about the tension between the residential and online sides of the institution. The student population ballooned so dramatically that it went from being majority residential to, essentially, for every ten online students, there was one residential student. It radically transformed the institution. They were able to hold costs flat.
Now, the other entrepreneurial schools I studied were funneling their margins back into overhauling the residential campus. That’s what I call margin capitalization. Instead of looking for donors or venture capitalists, they turned to students.
This particular school made so much money—just north of two hundred million dollars a year—that they were not only able to completely rebuild their campus, but also to put hundreds of millions into their endowment.
What this institution effectively invented is a new form of philanthropy that I call margin philanthropy. Instead of relying on alumni—graduates who go out into the world and eventually give back—you’re leveraging the loans of students who are currently enrolled. They become your new philanthropists.
The risk of construction and the growth of the endowment aren’t borne by the institution anymore; they’re borne by the students themselves—who walk away with a degree in one hand and a student loan, anywhere from fifty to a hundred thousand dollars, in the other.
AU: The problem of ever-rising costs—Baumol’s disease, basically—is one that plagues every educational institution. Only by spending more money every year can you hope to stay in place. But achieving that means raising more money every year.
And I read your book as being fairly pessimistic about any institution’s ability to sustain that in the long run. Right? You can have all the strategies you want to increase revenue, but they all require hiring more staff, becoming more complicated—and then Baumol just reappears further down the line. Is that a fair summation? Do you think one of these strategies is actually more promising than the others? Or does Baumol’s law come for all of us eventually, no matter what?
JTB: I think one of the big takeaways from the book is that this sector is constantly marching upward in its market behavior.
When I arrived on these campuses, everyone was saying, “We’ve got to sustain. We need more. We need more revenue. We need more margins.”
Now, while Baumol, as an economist, has one way of looking at the world, I don’t think it’s entirely accurate. He was, after all, an economist from several generations ago. What’s spun out of economics since then is the field of strategy and management, which focuses more on the agency of actors within organizations.
Those working in strategy and management began to explore that agency—to explain the world in a more nuanced way. And that’s where this book differs from Baumol’s framework: it’s grounded in organizational theory, strategy, and management.
What you end up seeing—and what the book focuses on—is this: we often hear about public policies, particularly from the Federal Reserve in the U.S., that are based on the idea that if you increase competition and give students choice, the natural outcome will be higher quality. As institutions compete, quality should improve—at least in theory.
But what this book shows is that when you incentivize students to be more self-interested and to make market-based choices, you also incentivize institutions to be more self-interested.
That’s why we see institutions going after student loans and seeking margins from students—they’re also operating in a highly competitive market.
So, what this book illustrates are the trade-offs between mission and money that college leaders are forced to make when we choose to design a national education system based on market principles of competition. And that, I’d contend, is a challenge much bigger than Baumol himself.
AU: You’ve focused obviously on one group, the non–research-intensive private institutions, and a particular sub-sector within that. How much can you generalize from this book to other types of institutions—secular ones or public ones?
JTB: That’s a great question. The reason I narrowed the focus so tightly is that, in case studies, what you want to do is control for noise. So rather than mixing all types of tuition-driven institutions together, I chose one type and looked at the behavior across those cases.
But I would contend that because I’m really examining a single phenomenon—tuition—and specifically two questions: how do students get their money, and what do institutions do with it?—this framework is broadly applicable. And honestly, in the last six months especially, I think everyone is becoming tuition-driven.
We’re seeing decreases in research funding revenues, decreases in endowment revenues because of higher taxes. This morning’s headline from the Secretary of Commerce said they want to go after 50% of all patent revenue. And just yesterday, it was announced that all MSI funding would be decreased. The only stable thing left is tuition revenue.
What Capitalizing on College offers is a roadmap for how these institutions managed to survive in a highly competitive environment—and now everyone is entering that same space. So yes, I believe it’s highly generalizable, because this is the roadmap forward. This is the environment we’re heading into.
AU: Joshua Travis Brown, thank you so much for joining us today.
JTB: Thanks. A pleasure being here.
AU: And that just leaves me to thank our excellent producers, Sam Pufek and Tiffany MacLennan—and of course, you, our listeners and readers, for joining us.
If you have any comments or questions about today’s podcast, or suggestions for future episodes, please don’t hesitate to get in touch at [email protected].
Join us next week when our guest will be Luiz Augusto Campos, professor of sociology and political science at the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. He’s the co-author of a new book on the effects of racial quotas in Brazilian universities. Join us next week. Bye for now.
*This podcast transcript was generated using an AI transcription service with limited editing. Please forgive any errors made through this service.Please note, the views and opinions expressed in each episode are those of the individual contributors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the podcast host and team, or our sponsors.
Last week, The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) put out a discussion paper called Testing Times: Fending Off A Crisis in Post-Secondary Education, which in part is the outcome of a set of cross-country discussions held this summer by RBC, HESA, and the Business Higher Education Roundtable. (BHER). The paper, I think, sums up the current situation pretty well: the system is not at a starvation point but is heading in that direction pretty quickly and that needs to be rectified. On the other hand, there are some ways that institutions could be moving more quickly to respond to changing social and economic circumstances. What’s great about this paper is that it balances those two ideas pretty effectively.
I urge everyone to read it themselves because I think it sums up a lot of issues nicely – many of which we at HESA will be taking up at our Re: University conference in January (stay tuned! the nearly full conference line-up will be out in a couple of weeks, and it’s pretty exciting). But I want to draw everyone’s attention to section 4 of the report, in particular which I think is the sleeper issue of the year, and that is the regulation of post-secondary institutions. One of the things we heard a lot on the road was how universities were being hamstrung – not just by governments but by professional regulatory bodies – in terms of developing innovative programming. This is a subject I’ll return to in the next week or two, but I am really glad that this issue might be starting to get some real traction.
The timing of this release wasn’t accidental: it came just a few days before BHER had one of its annual high-level shindigs, and RBC’s CEO Dave MacKay is also BHER’s Board Chair, so the two go hand-in-hand to some extent. I was at the summit on Monday – a Chatham House rules session at RBC headquarters – which attracted a good number of university and college presidents, as well as CEOs – entitled Strategic Summit on Talent, Technology and a New Economic Order. The discussions took up the challenge in the RBC paper to look at where the country is going and where the post-secondary education sector can contribute to making a new and stronger Canada.
And boy, was it interesting.
I mean, partly it was some of the outright protectionist stuff being advocated by the corporate sector in the room. I haven’t heard stuff like that since I was a child. Basically, the sentiment in the room is that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is dead, the Americans aren’t playing by those rules anymore, so why should we? Security of supply > low-cost supply. Personally, I think that likely means that this “new economic order” is going to mean much more expensive wholesale prices, but hey, if that’s what we have to adapt to, that’s what we have to adapt to.
But, more pertinent to this blog were the ways the session dealt with the issue of what in higher education needs to change to meet the moment. And, for me, what was interesting was that once you get a group of business folks in a room and ask what higher education can do to help get the country on track, they actually don’t have much to say. They will talk a LOT about what government can do to help get the country on track. The stories they can tell about how much more ponderous and anti-innovation Canadian public procurement policies are compared to almost any other jurisdiction on earth would be entertaining if the implications were not so horrific. They will talk a LOT about how Canadian C-suites are risk-averse, almost as risk-averse as government, and how disappointing that is.
But when it comes to higher education? They don’t actually have all that much to say. And that’s both good and bad.
Now before I delve into this, let me say that it’s always a bit tricky to generalize what a sector believes based on a small group of CEOs who get drafted into a room like this one. I mean, to some degree these CEOs are there because they are interested in post-secondary education, so they aren’t necessarily very representative of the sector. But here’s what I learned:
CEOs are a bit ruffled by current underfunding of higher education. Not necessarily to the point where they would put any of their own political capital on the line, but they are sympathetic to institutions.
When they think about how higher education affects their business, CEOs seem to think primarily about human capital (i.e. graduates). They talk a lot less about research, which is mostly what universities want to talk about, so there is a bit of a mismatch there.
When they think about human capital, what they are usually thinking about is “can my business have access to skills at a price I want to pay?” Because the invitees are usually heads of successful fast-growing companies, the answer is usually no. Also, most say what they want are “skills” – something they, not unreasonably, equate with experience, which sets up another set of potential misunderstandings with universities because degrees ≠ experience (but it does mean everyone can agree on more work-integrated learning).
As a result – and this is important here – it’s best if CEOs think about post-secondary education in terms of firm growth, not in terms of economy-wide innovation.
Now, maybe that’s all right and proper – after all, isn’t it government’s business to look after the economy-wide stuff? Well, maybe, but here’s where it gets interesting. You can drive innovation either by encouraging the manufacture and circulation of ideas (i.e. research) or by diffusing skills through the economy (i.e. education/training). But our federal government seems to think that innovation only happens via the introduction of new products/technology (i.e., the product of research), and that to the extent there is an issue with post-secondary education, it is that university-based research doesn’t translate into new products fast enough – i.e. the issue is research commercialization. The idea that technological adoption might be the product of governments and firms not having enough people to use new technologies properly (e.g. artificial intelligence)? Not on anyone’s radar screen.
And that really is a problem. One I am not sure is easily fixed because I am not sure everyone realizes the degree to which they are talking past each other. But that said, the event was a promising one. It was good to be in a space where so many people cared about Canada, about innovation, and about post-secondary education. And the event itself – very well pulled-off by RBC and BHER – made people want to keep discussing higher education and the economy. Both business and higher education need to have events like this one, regularly, and not just nationally but locally as well. The two sides don’t know each other especially well, and yet their being more in sync is one of the things that could make the country work a lot better than it does. Let’s keep talking.
A federal judge delivered a sweeping victory for academic freedom Wednesday, ruling that the Trump administration’s freeze of $2.2 billion in federal grant funds to Harvard University was illegal and unconstitutional.
U.S. District Judge Allison Burroughs determined that the administration imposed the funding freeze in retaliation for Harvard’s refusal to comply with demands that would have violated First Amendment protections, including ending diversity, equity, and inclusion programs and screening international students for ideological biases.
The ruling vacates all freezing orders affecting Harvard and bars Trump administration officials from enforcing those orders going forward.
The administration froze Harvard’s federal grants on April 14, just hours after the university rejected a list of ten demands. While only one demand related to antisemitism concerns, six others targeted ideological and pedagogical issues, including restrictions on who could lead, teach, and be admitted to the university, as well as what could be taught.
Judge Burroughs noted that the “swift termination” of funding occurred before the administration had learned anything substantive about antisemitism on campus or Harvard’s response efforts, suggesting the antisemitism concerns were “at best arbitrary and, at worst, pretextual.”
The funding freeze halted work on critical research projects spanning multiple fields, including studies on tuberculosis, NASA astronauts’ radiation exposure, Lou Gehrig’s disease, and a predictive model to help Veterans Administration emergency room physicians assess suicidal veterans. Burroughs ruled that none of these affected projects had any connection to antisemitism.
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) celebrated the ruling as a landmark victory for higher education.
“This is a huge win for all of American higher education, for science, and for free and critical thought in this country,” said Dr. Todd Wolfson, National AAUP President. “Time and again, Trump has tried to restrict speech and cripple lifesaving university research. As today’s victory shows, Trump’s war on higher education is unconstitutional.”
Veena Dubal, National AAUP General Counsel, characterized the administration’s actions as “cynical and lawless, leveraging claims of discrimination to bludgeon critical research and debate.”
The Harvard AAUP chapter also praised the outcome. “This historic ruling underscores the importance of free inquiry, truth, and the rule of law in a democratic society,” said Kirsten Weld, AAUP-Harvard Faculty Chapter President.
Harvard President Dr. Alan Garber had previously stated that “no government — regardless of which party is in power — should dictate what private universities can teach, whom they can admit and hire, and which areas of study and inquiry they can pursue.”
The Education Department pushed back against the ruling through spokesperson Madi Biedermann, who criticized Burroughs as “the same Obama-appointed judge that ruled in favor of Harvard’s illegal race-based admissions practices” before the Supreme Court ultimately overturned those practices.
“Cleaning up our nation’s universities will be a long road, but worth it,” Biedermann said, suggesting the administration may continue its broader efforts to reshape higher education policies.
The ruling establishes important precedent for protecting academic freedom and research independence from political interference. Legal experts note that the decision reinforces constitutional limits on government retaliation against educational institutions for their speech, curriculum choices, and admissions policies.
AAUP leaders said that the victory demonstrates the importance of collective action in defending academic freedom, with faculty and administrators standing together against what they characterize as authoritarian overreach into university governance and research priorities.
Hi all. Today, HESA is releasing the eighth edition of The State of Postsecondary Education in Canada, co-authored by myself and HESA’s Jiwoo Jeon and Janet Balfour. Many thanks to our partners – Pearson, Studiosity, Duolingo, Capio, Element451 and Riipen – for supporting this year’s edition.
You probably don’t need to actually read this year’s edition to know that the state of postsecondary education in Canada is a bit perilous. And the reason for this, quite simply, is that public funding for higher education has been stagnant for well over a decade now.
At one level, of course, it is possible to look at public funding in Canada and proclaim that nothing is wrong. As Figure 1 shows, public spending on higher education has stayed relatively constant over the past fifteen years in inflation-adjusted dollars. Individual provinces may have seen swings up or down in their spending, but collectively the ten provinces have spent a collective $20 billion/year or so on higher education since about 2011-12 (excluding transfer payments from the federal government), and the federal government has spent about $10 billion/year.
Figure 1: Federal and Provincial Own-Source Expenditures in Respect of PSE Institutions, Canada, in $2023, 2007-08 to 2023-24, in Billions
So, at one level it is possible to shrug off the problem. But that requires eliminating a lot of context. Let’s see how Canadian funding looks when we put it into various types of contexts.
If we describe public funding in per-student terms, as in Figure 2, what you see is a mixed picture. Total public funding per full-time equivalent domestic student has dropped by about 6% since 2009, and for university students by about 15%. Complicating this figure is the fact that per-student funding for college students has risen somewhat, however, this is due not to extra funding but rather to a very significant drop in the number of domestic students enrolled in colleges. Whether this is due to a reduction of interest in college programs among Canadians, or a deliberate move away from Canadian to international students on the part of colleges is difficult to answer, but in either event, the rise in funding per college student is a function of fewer students rather than more funding.
Figure 2: Per-student Spending by Sector, Canada, in $2023, 2007-08 to 2023-24
If we describe public funding as a percentage of the country’s economy, the picture looks significantly worse. Prior to the recession of 2008-09, public funding on postsecondary education was about 1.3% of GDP, which was substantially above the level seen across other industrialized countries (about 1.0%, according to the OECD). Briefly, that number popped up during the Great Recession, partly because spending increased but also partly because GDP stagnated. Since then, however, spending has stayed constant while GDP has grown. The result is that public spending on postsecondary has fallen to the OECD average of 1% – and the financial advantage our system once held over competitor nations has largely disappeared.
Figure 3: Public Spending on Postsecondary Education as a Percentage of GDP, in $2023, 2007-08 to 2023-24
We can also look at these figures in per-inhabitant terms. There was a point in the late 00s where Canada had about 33 million inhabitants and public sources spent $30 billion per year on postsecondary education. Fifteen years and seven million new inhabitants later, we’re still spending $30 billion per year. That results in a 21% reduction in spending on universities and colleges per inhabitant from public sources, as shown in Figure 4. In Figure 5, we look at postsecondary spending as a percentage of government budgets. Again, we see a case of spending on postsecondary institutions falling consistently because overall government expenditure is rising quickly. In the past fifteen years, aggregate provincial spending on postsecondary has fallen as a percentage of total provincial expenditures from 5.4% to just 3.3%; for federal spending it has fallen from 1.6% to just 1%.
Figure 4: Public Spending on Post-Secondary Education Institutions Per Inhabitant, in $2023, 2007-08 to 2023-24
Figure 5: Public Spending on Postsecondary Education Institutions as a Percentage of Total Government Spending, Federal and Provincial Governments, in $2023, 2007-08 to 2023-24
In other words: we have been able – just — to keep our public investments in higher education level with inflation. But we have only been able to do so because our population is larger, and our economy has grown over the last fifteen years, and we can do so with less relative effort. Had we kept up funding on a domestic per-student level with where it was in the immediate aftermath of the Great Financial crisis, post-secondary education system would have an extra $2.1 billion. If we had kept funding on postsecondary education level with overall population growth we would have invested another $7.3 billion. If we’d had funding for postsecondary institutions level with GDP growth we would have invested another $13.6 billion. And if we had kept it level with the overall growth in program spending, we would have invested another $19.1 billion. So, depending on the measure chosen, we are anywhere from $2-20 billion short of where we would be had we kept our spending levels of the late 00s/early 10s.
But, you say, isn’t this true everywhere? And aren’t we at least better than the United States?
It is certainly true that Canada is in a pattern that would seem familiar both to residents of Australia and the United Kingdom. These three countries have all followed roughly the same path over the past decade and a half, combining stagnant public funding with slightly growing domestic numbers, paid for by an absolute free-for-all with respect to international students paying market tuition rates. All three countries looked like they had made a good deal at least for as long as the international student boom lasted.
But take a look at our biggest competitor, the United States. During the financial crisis of 2008-9, funding for postsecondary institutions tumbled by over 10%. But then, in just the eight years between 2012 and 2020, funding for higher education grew by a third – from about $150B (US) per year to over $200B/year. In fact, for all we hear about cuts to funding under Trump (not all of which may come true, as at the time of writing the Senate seems quite intent at least on reversing the billions of proposed cuts to the National Institutes of Health), even if all the proposed cuts were to come through, total US spending on higher education would be roughly 20% higher than it was in 2008-09, while Canada’s would be more or less unchanged. And of course, in the United States domestic enrolments are falling, meaning that in per- student terms, the gap is even more substantial.
Figure 6: Indexed Real Public Spending on Postsecondary Institutions, Canada vs. US, 2011-12 to 2023-24 (2011-12 = 100)
In sum: Canada is not alone in seeing significant falls in higher education spending, but few countries have seen declines in quite as an across-the-board fashion, for quite as long, as we have. Canada began the 2010s with one of the best-funded tertiary education systems in the world, but, quite simply, governments of every stripe at both the federal and provincial levels have been systematically squandering that advantage for the past 15 years. We had a genuine lead in something, an advantage over the rest of the world. But now it is gone.
So much for the past: what about the future? Well, it depends a bit on where you stand. The federal Liberals came back to power on a platform which was the least science-friendly since 1988. They promised money for postsecondary education, but most of it was either for apprenticeship grant programs which they themselves had deemed poor value for money just last year, or for programs to switch apprenticeship training from public colleges to union-led training centres – as crass a piece of cash-for-union endorsements as one can imagine. (The only saving grace? The losing Conservatives promised the unions even larger bribes). What they promised for science, for direct transfers to public universities and colleges, was a pittance in comparison.
Moreover, following the election, in the face of a set of tariff threats from the Trump Administration, the federal and provincial governments united in a program of “nation-building” which revolved entirely around the notion that national salvation was to be found in programs which “produced more goods” and “gets them to markets” (i.e. non-US markets, meaning ports) more quickly. The idea that the country might pivot to services, to a more knowledge-intensive economy in which university and college research efforts might be seen as useful, was apparently not even considered. Rather, the country rushed head-first into the familiar – but in the long-term disastrous – role being hewers of wood and drawers of water.
Now, hewing wood and drawing water has traditionally been Canada’s lot, and one could argue that historically have not fared so very badly by focusing on this core competence. But it is worth remembering the Biblical origin of this phrase, in the book of Joshua. A group of Canaanites known as the Gibeonites had not been entirely truthful when signing a treaty with the returning Israelites; claiming to be a nomadic people rather than a settled one (which would have led to them being exterminated). When the Israelites discovered the deception, many wanted the Gibeonites killed; instead, Joshua decided that they should hew wood and draw water for the Israelites instead. That is to say, they fell into bondage. The political analogies in today’s Trumpian world should be obvious.
To return to higher education: things look pretty bleak. Investment is falling. Governments are unwilling either to spend more on higher education, or to permit institutions to generate money on their own through tuition fees. Their idea of economic growth is, at best, out of the 1960s: sell more natural resources to foreigners. The idea of making our way in the world as a knowledge or science powerhouse, a spirit that infused policymaking at both the federal and provincial level in the early 2000s, has simply disappeared. Colleges might see some boosts in funding over the coming years for vocational programming, although it’s likely that they will need to scrap with private-sector unions for the money; the likelihood is that universities will see real decreases in funding. The fate of the promised increase in research spending in the 2024 budget seems especially at-risk.
The path to a better Canada does not lie in becoming better hewers of wood and drawers of water. It lies in developing new industries based on cutting-edge knowledge and science. Spending on postsecondary students, on its own, does not guarantee that these new industries will come into existence. But the absence of spending on postsecondary education certainly guarantees that they will not.
The country has a choice to make. And right now, we seem to be choosing poorly.
