Category: International

  • These teens can do incredible math in their heads but fail in a classroom

    These teens can do incredible math in their heads but fail in a classroom

    When I was 12, my family lived adjacent to a small farm. Though I was not old enough to work, the farm’s owner, Mr. Hall, hired me to man his roadside stand on weekends. Mr. Hall had one rule: no calculators. Technology wasn’t his vibe. 

    Math was my strong suit in school, but I struggled to tally the sums in my head. I weighed odd amounts of tomatoes, zucchini and peppers on a scale and frantically scribbled calculations on a notepad. When it got busy, customers lined up waiting for me to multiply and add. I’m sure I mischarged them.

    I was thinking about my old job as I read a quirky math study published this month in the journal Nature. Nobel Prize winning economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, a husband and wife research team at MIT, documented how teenage street sellers who were excellent at mental arithmetic weren’t good at rudimentary classroom math. Meanwhile, strong math students their same age couldn’t calculate nearly as well as impoverished street sellers.

    “When you spend a lot of time in India, what is striking is that these market kids seem to be able to count very well,” said Duflo, whose primary work in India involves alleviating poverty and raising the educational achievement of poor children.  “But they are really not able to go from street math to formal math and vice versa.”

    Related: Our free weekly newsletter alerts you to what research says about schools and classrooms.

    In a series of experiments, Duflo’s field staff in India pretended to be ordinary shoppers and purposely bought unusual quantities of items from more than 1,400 child street sellers in Delhi and Kolkata. A purchase might be 800 grams of potatoes at 20 rupees per kilogram and 1.4 kilograms of onions at 15 rupees per kilogram. Most of the child sellers quoted the correct price of 37 rupees and gave the correct change from a 200 rupee note without using a calculator or pencil and paper. The odd quantities were to make sure the children hadn’t simply memorized the price of common purchases. They were actually making calculations. 

    However, these same children, the majority of whom were 14 or 15 years old, struggled to solve much simpler school math problems, such as basic division. (After making the purchases, the undercover shoppers revealed their identities and asked the sellers to participate in the study and complete a set of abstract math exercises.)

    The market sellers had some formal education. Most were attending school part time, or had previously been in school for years.

    Duflo doesn’t know how the young street sellers learned to calculate so quickly in their heads. That would take a longer anthropological study to observe them over time. But Duflo was able to glean some of their strategies, such as rounding. For example, instead of multiplying 490 by 20, the street sellers might multiply 500 by 20 and then remove 10 of the 20s, or 200. Schoolchildren, by contrast, are prone to making lengthy pencil and paper calculations using an algorithm for multiplication. They often don’t see a more efficient way to solve a problem.

    Lessons from this research on the other side of the world might be relevant here in the United States. Some cognitive psychologists theorize that learning math in a real-world context can help children absorb abstract math and apply it in different situations. However, this Indian study shows that this type of knowledge transfer probably won’t happen automatically or easily for most students. Educators need to figure out how to better leverage the math skills that students already have, Duflo said. Easier said than done, I suspect.  

    Related: Do math drills help children learn?

    Duflo says her study is not an argument for either applied or abstract math.  “It would be a mistake to conclude that we should switch to doing only concrete problems because we also see that kids who are extremely good at concrete problems are unable to solve an abstract problem,” she said. “And in life, at least in school life, you’re going to need both.” Many of the market children ultimately drop out of school altogether.

    Back at my neighborhood farmstand, I remember how I magically got the hang of it and rarely needed pencil and paper after a few months. Sadly, the Hall farm is no longer there for the town’s children to practice mental math. It’s now been replaced by a suburban subdivision of fancy houses. 

    Contact staff writer Jill Barshay at 212-678-3595 or barshay@hechingerreport.org.

    This story about applied math was written by Jill Barshay and produced by The Hechinger Report, a nonprofit, independent news organization focused on inequality and innovation in education. Sign up for Proof Points and other Hechinger newsletters.

    The Hechinger Report provides in-depth, fact-based, unbiased reporting on education that is free to all readers. But that doesn’t mean it’s free to produce. Our work keeps educators and the public informed about pressing issues at schools and on campuses throughout the country. We tell the whole story, even when the details are inconvenient. Help us keep doing that.

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  • How China Can Respond to America’s Tariffs (Michael Hudson)

    How China Can Respond to America’s Tariffs (Michael Hudson)

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  • The US Will Lose To China If It Doesn’t Stop (Rogue Rocket)

    The US Will Lose To China If It Doesn’t Stop (Rogue Rocket)

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  • UK universities and the war in Gaza

    UK universities and the war in Gaza

    2024 was a difficult year for UK higher education, particularly in the international arena.

    Universities from all parts of the sector struggled to meet their overseas student recruitment targets in an increasingly competitive global market. Some international research collaborations – once encouraged by governments and funding councils – came under tighter scrutiny.

    And many campuses were rocked by protests over the conflict in the Middle East. I have touched on the last of these issues in a previous Wonkhe article – but it is worth revisiting in the light of ongoing tensions.

    Campus protests

    There are wars underway in diverse parts of the world – last year saw serious loss of life in Ukraine, Sudan, Myanmar and Yemen, to name only a few. However, nowhere attracts the attention of staff and students like the invasion of the Gaza Strip which followed the 7 October attack on Israel and the abduction of hundreds of civilian hostages.

    Some argue that this is unfair or, at least, disproportionate – why has Israel faced so much criticism when other regimes have committed atrocities against civilian populations with no demonstrations on British campuses? While that is undeniable, it is also true that the Palestinian people in Gaza are enduring a horrendous situation; despite the recent ceasefire, tens of thousands of innocent lives have been lost and hundreds of thousands are still denied access to basic essentials. The anguish and concern expressed by staff and students in response to their plight are surely justified.

    During 2024, that concern manifested itself in encampments across 30 or so universities. There were numerous marches, often organised in combination with civic gatherings. The public events tended to focus on demands that the government condemn the Israeli military action and use its influence to stop the war.

    On campus, the centre of attention was slightly different, with pressure on university administrations not only to provide financial support for Palestinian scholars but also to disinvest in companies which supplied arms to Israel. This drew on a longer running campaign which argued that any investment in the arms trade is fundamentally immoral. The incoming Labour government’s withdrawal of some export licences has not changed the situation – the issue has become a rallying point for those who feel powerless to alleviate the suffering of innocent people in the war zone.

    Formulating a response

    The protests have put university managers under considerable pressure. Initially, administrators were reluctant to say anything, being anxious to avoid alienating different groups or to make individuals who had an affiliation with Israel feel under attack. UK senior managers were also aware of the deep divisions on some American campuses – several heads of institutions resigned after making infelicitous statements while navigating between radical student opinion and aggrieved benefactors.

    Even so, quite quickly senior managers in British universities began to share ideas and formulate a common position. This generally involved voicing support for academic freedom and freedom of expression while calling on protestors to respect the position of others. There were nuances – some institutions banned flags or outlawed certain contentious slogans; several announced that they would not talk to activists until camps were disbanded. In the face of prolonged disruption, a few resorted to legal interventions to remove tented villages.

    For the most part, though, UK universities engaged with all shades of opinion, facilitated peaceful protest and sought to foster rather than stifle debate. The monthly colloquies at meetings organised by Universities UK were supplemented by occasional reflective discussions at events elsewhere.

    Like others, the University of Glasgow’s senior management and university court (the governing body) considered the ethical position as well as the politics of the situation. We communicated regularly with the wider community, reached out to activists and met with faith groups, student representatives, civic leaders and national bodies.

    A key concern was to ensure that students (especially, in this instance, Jewish and Muslim students and staff) always felt welcome and safe on campus. We were one of the first institutions to call for the release of the hostages and a humanitarian ceasefire. The university issued regular reminders about good conduct but did not rush to take disciplinary action against individuals. When students occupied a building, senior managers met with the leaders; we permitted a peaceful demonstration outside the door of the governing body meeting. In response to Students’ Representative Council (SRC) and trade union demands, we undertook a widespread consultation on disinvestment in the arms trade.

    Despite vociferous calls from students and trade unions, Glasgow’s Court voted two-to-one against disinvestment; following a thoughtful discussion, a majority agreed with senior managers that it was morally right for the UK to have a defence sector and that this should be distinguished both from the conflict in the Middle East and from the question of which countries the UK sold arms to. In essence, the Court’s position was unchanged from 2020, when officers were instructed to write to government ministers calling for tighter restrictions on sales to countries which breached international law, or which had poor human rights records.

    Towards reconstruction

    The decision on disinvestment does not constitute the sum of our response to the situation in the Middle East. Alongside this, we have sought to build on Glasgow’s status as a University of Sanctuary through practical action in support of those suffering in Gaza and other conflict zones.

    A key aspect of this was the conference we organised in December, in conjunction with Professor Sultan Barakat of Hamad Bin Khalifa University, on the post-war reconstruction of higher education in Gaza.  With most university campuses in the area reduced to rubble, reconstruction might seem like a momentous task, but the event attracted nearly 200 registrations. It drew strong support from UK universities and significant engagement from colleagues based in the Middle East.

    The conference delegates heard directly from victims of the conflict. They learned of its disastrous impact and considered academic analyses of aid interventions (often meagre and inadequate) as well as efforts to support students and academics to continue their studies. The attendees engaged in the difficult task of identifying how UK higher education can best support universities in the region to rebuild.

    Key messages included the undying hunger of Palestinians in Gaza for higher education, their determination to create a better future and the belief that, with international support, all obstacles to reconstruction can be overcome. Scotland’s former First Minister Humza Yousaf (who gave a moving address in the main Glasgow synagogue following the 7 October attack on Israel) told the conference: “this is not about taking sides – it’s about being pro-humanity.”

    The conversation will not cease – we intend to reconvene in Qatar and online in the spring, and to strengthen links with colleagues in key agencies, such as the Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA), who attended the conference. We will continue to draw support from a coalition of interests, including the UCU, whose local representatives actively supported the event.

    In the coming semester, we anticipate further protest and vigorous debate at Glasgow over the correct response to the war in Gaza and its aftermath.  The situation there remains desperate and the prospects for a lasting peace – for Palestinians, Israelis and Lebanese alike – are still very uncertain. But the events of the past few days should give us hope, and we in the higher education sector should do everything we can to advance the cause of peace and reconstruction. By identifying solutions to age-old problems, sharing our resources and giving practical assistance to colleagues in need, we can help make hope a reality.

    The author is writing in a personal capacity.

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  • UKVI is tightening the rules on international student attendance

    UKVI is tightening the rules on international student attendance

    Back in April you’ll recall that UKVI shared a draft “remote delivery” policy with higher education providers for consultation.

    That process is complete – and now it’s written to providers to confirm the detail of the new arrangements.

    Little has changed in the proposal from last Spring – there are some clarifications on how it will apply, but the main impact is going to be on providers and students who depend, one way or another, on some of their teaching not being accessed “in person”.

    The backstory here is that technically, all teaching for international students right now is supposed to be in-person. That was relaxed during the pandemic for obvious reasons – and since, the rapid innovations in students being able to access types of teaching (either synchronously or asynchronously) has raised questions about how realistic and desirable that position remains.

    Politics swirls around this too – the worry/allegation is that students arrive and then disappear, and with a mixture of relaxed attendance regulation (UKVI stopped demanding a specific number of contact points a few years ago for universities) and a worry that some students are faking or bypassing some of the attendance systems that are in place, the time has come, it seems, to tighten a little – “formalising the boundaries in which institutions can use online teaching methods to deliver courses to international students”, as UKVI puts it.

    Its recent burst of compliance monitoring (with now public naming and shaming of universities “subject to an action plan”) seems to have been a factor too – with tales reaching us of officials asking often quite difficult questions about both how many students a provider thinks are on campus, and then how many actually are, on a given day or across a week.

    The balance being struck is designed, says UKVI, to “empower the sector to utilise advances in education technology” by delivering elements of courses remotely whilst setting “necessary thresholds” to provide clarity and ensure there is “no compromise” of immigration control.

    Remote or “optional”?

    The policy that will be introduced is broadly as described back in April – first, that two types of “teaching delivery” are to be defined as follows:

    • Remote delivery is defined as “timetabled delivery of learning where there is no need for the student to attend the premises of the student sponsor or partner institution which would otherwise take place live in-person at the sponsor or partner institution site.
    • Face-to-face delivery is defined as “timetabled learning that takes place in-person and on the premises of the student sponsor or a partner institution.

    You’ll see that that difference isn’t (necessarily) between teaching designed as in-person or designed as remote – it’s between hours that a student is required to be on campus for, and hours that they either specifically aren’t expected to come in for, or have the option to not come in for. That’s an important distinction:

    Where the student has an option of online or in-person learning, this should count as a remote element for this purpose.

    Then with those definitions set, we get a ratio.

    As a baseline, providers (with a track record of compliance) will be allowed to deliver up to 20 per cent of the taught elements of any degree level and above course remotely.

    Then if a provider is able to demonstrate how the higher usage is consistent with the requirements of the relevant educational quality standards body (OfS in England, QAA in Wales and Scotland) and remains consistent with the principles of the student route, they’ll be able to have a different ratio – up to 40 per cent of the teaching will be allowed to be in that “remote” category.

    Providers keen to use that higher limit will need to apply to do so via the annual CAS allocation process – and almost by definition will attract additional scrutiny as a result, if only to monitor how the policy is panning out. They’ll also have to list all courses provided to sponsored students that include remote delivery within that higher band – and provide justification for the higher proportion of remote learning based on educational value.

    (For those not immersed in immigration compliance, a CAS (Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies) is an electronic document issued by a UK provider to an international student that serves as proof of admission, and is required when applying for a student visa. The CAS includes a unique reference number, details of the course, tuition fees, and the institution’s sponsorship license information – and will soon have to detail if an international agent is involved too.)

    One question plenty of people have asked is whether this changes things for disabled students – UKVI makes clear that by exception, remote delivery can permitted on courses of any academic level studied at a student sponsor in circumstances where requiring face to face delivery would constitute discrimination on the basis of a student’s protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010.

    A concern about that was that providers might not know if a student needs that exception in advance – UKVI says that it will trust providers to judge individual student circumstances in cases of extenuating circumstances and justify them during audits. The requirement to state protected characteristics on the CAS will be withdrawn.

    Oh – and sponsors will also be permitted to use remote delivery where continuity of education provision would otherwise be interrupted by unforeseen circumstances – things like industrial action, extreme weather, periods of travel restriction and so on.

    Notably, courses at levels 4 and 5 won’t be able to offer “remote delivery” at all – UKVI reckons they are “more vulnerable to abuse” from “non-genuine students”, so it’s resolved to link the more limited freedoms provided by Band 1 of the existing academic engagement policy to this provision of “remote” elements – degree level and above.

    Yes but what is teaching?

    A head-scratcher when the draft went out for consultation was what “counts” as teaching. Some will still raise questions with the answer – but UKVI says that activities like writing dissertations, conducting research, undertaking fieldwork, carrying out work placements and sitting exams are not “taught elements” – and are not therefore in scope.

    Another way of looking at that is basically – if it’s timetabled, it probably counts.

    Some providers have also been confused about modules – given that students on most courses are able to routinely choose elective modules (which themselves might contain different percentages of teaching in the two categories) after the CAS is assigned.

    UKVI says that sponsors should calculate the remote delivery percentage on the assumption that the student will elect to attend all possible remote elements online. So where elective modules form part of the course delivery, the highest possible remote delivery percentage will have to be stated (!) And where hours in the timetable are optional, providers will have to calculate remote delivery by assuming that students will participate in all optional remote elements online.

    The good news when managing all of that is that the percentage won’t have to be calculated on the basis of module or year – it’s the entire course that counts. And where the course is a joint programme with a partner institution based overseas, only elements of the course taking place in the UK will be taken into account.

    What’s next

    There’s no specific date yet on implementation – IT changes to the sponsor management system are required, and new fields will be added to the CAS and annual CAS allocation request forms first. The “spring” is the target, and there’s also a commitment to reviewing the policy after 12 months.

    In any event, any university intending to utilise (any) remote delivery will need to have updated their internal academic engagement (ie attendance) policy ahead of submitting their next annual CAS allocation request – and UKVI may even require the policy to be submitted before deciding on the next CAS allocation request, and definitely by September 2025.

    During the consultation, a number of providers raised the issue of equity – how would one justify international and home students being treated differently? UKVI says that distinctions are reasonable because international students require permission to attend a course in the UK:

    If attendance is no longer necessary, the validity of holding such permission must be reassessed.

    There’s no doubt that – notwithstanding that providers are also under pressure to produce (in many cases for the first time) home student attendance policies because of concerns about attendance and student loan entitlements – the new policy will cause some equity issues between home and international students.

    In some cases those will be no different to the issues that exist now – some providers in some departments simply harmonise their requirements, some apply different regs by visa status, and some apply different rules for home students to different dept/courses depending on the relative proportion of international students in that basket. That may all have to be revisited.

    The big change – for some providers, but not all – is those definitions. The idea of a student never turning up for anything until they “cram” for their “finals” is built into many an apocryphal student life tale – that definitely won’t be allowed for international students, and it’s hard to see a provider getting away with that in their SFE/SFW/SAAS demanded home student policy either.

    Some providers won’t be keen to admit as such, but the idea of 100 per cent attendance to hours of teaching in that 80 per cent basket is going to cause a capacity problem in some lecture theatres and teaching spaces that will now need to be resolved. Module choice (and design) is also likely to need a careful look.

    And the wider questions of the way in which students use “optional” attendance and/or recorded lectures to manage their health and time – with all the challenges relating to part-time work and commuting/travelling in the mix – may result in a need to accelerate timetable reform to reduce the overall number of now very-much “required” visits to campus.

    One other thing not mentioned in here is the reality that UKVI is setting a percentage of a number of hours that is not specified – some providers could engage in reducing the number of taught hours altogether to make the percentages add up. Neither in the domestic version of this agenda nor in this international version do we have an attempt at defining what “full-time” really means in terms of overall taught hours – perhaps necessarily given programme diversity – but it’ll be a worry for some.

    Add all of this up – mixing in UKVI stepping up compliance monitoring and stories of students sharing QR codes for teaching rooms on WhatsApp to evade attendance monitoring systems – and for some providers and some students, the change will be quite dramatic.

    The consultation on the arrangements has been carried out quite confidentially so far – I’d tentatively suggest here that any revision to arrangements implemented locally should very much aim to switch that trend away from “UKVI said so” towards detailed discussion with (international) student representatives, with a consideration of wider timetabling, housing, travel and other support arrangements in the mix.

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  • UK universities can support Gaza’s immediate education needs

    UK universities can support Gaza’s immediate education needs

    Since the conflict began in 2023, I have interviewed numerous higher education students and academics, both in Gaza and those displaced elsewhere.

    Their stories are profoundly inspiring and speak to the resilience and determination of a community that refuses to let adversity extinguish its aspirations. For students in Gaza, education is far more than a pathway to personal advancement – it is a fragile lifeline, a stabilising force in the midst of chaos, and a source of hope for the future.

    For academics, their passion for teaching and inspiring the next generation endures, even as universities lie in ruins and teaching becomes a voluntary effort.

    Education cannot wait

    In a region devastated by conflict, young Palestinians – particularly those pursuing critical fields such as medicine, pharmacy, and engineering – demonstrate extraordinary resilience as they strive to continue their education under unimaginable circumstances. For these students, education is not merely a personal milestone; it is a transformative force for the public good, equipping them with the skills needed to rebuild their society and economy. UK universities are uniquely positioned to play a pivotal role in addressing these challenges. Having recently supported Ukrainian students and academics during a time of crisis, they have developed valuable experience and insights into providing meaningful and structured support. The need to act now is pressing, as education cannot wait.

    The immediate priority is access to online resources – lecture recordings, virtual labs, digital textbooks, and open-access courses – that can sustain continuity in education for Gaza’s students, particularly those in fields like medicine and pharmacy. For instance, final-year medical students in Gaza have been unable to graduate due to the ongoing conflict, creating an urgent need for virtual alternatives to traditional clinical training. Palestinian academics have stressed the importance of accessible online lecture materials and virtual labs to ensure these students can complete their education and serve their communities where they are desperately needed.

    For UK universities, supporting these students is not just an act of compassion but a reinforcement of the broader mission of education: to empower, rebuild, and promote peace and stability. Given the logistical and security challenges that make physical attendance in schools and universities nearly impossible, the solution must be digital. UK universities could, for example, create licenses to share lecture materials such as recordings, slides, and lab simulations with students in Gaza.

    Virtual mentorship, remote internships

    Virtual mentorship programmes could also be established, enabling UK healthcare professionals to guide Palestinian medical students through remote internships and online training modules, equipping them with vital knowledge and practical skills. Collaborating with technology partners to provide devices, software, and secure internet access could further bridge the digital divide, ensuring that students can continue their education even amidst displacement.

    This approach could extend to pharmacy and engineering students, who face similar challenges. Pharmacy students could benefit from virtual labs and training programmes, while engineering students could access workshops on sustainable design, structural engineering, and public works – fields critical to Gaza’s rebuilding efforts. These initiatives would not only address immediate educational needs but also help create a pipeline of skilled professionals prepared to contribute to their communities’ recovery.

    Beyond individual training, research partnerships between UK universities and Palestinian institutions could provide both short- and long-term educational support. Establishing an interdisciplinary Centre for Palestine Studies within UK universities, for instance, would create a platform for collaborative research on pressing issues such as public health, environmental sustainability, and renewable energy. These partnerships could amplify Palestinian academics’ voices through joint publications, international conferences, and shared funding opportunities, while providing mentorship and resources that are otherwise inaccessible in Gaza.

    Our educators could also support the economic recovery in Gaza, which requires more than just rebuilding physical infrastructure; it necessitates cultivating an entrepreneurial spirit. UK universities with strong business and social entrepreneurship programmes could offer virtual training, mentorship, and incubator partnerships for Gaza’s students. Skills workshops on sustainable finance, small business management, and social entrepreneurship could empower young Palestinians to rebuild their economy, fostering resilience and independence.

    Beyond education

    However, significant challenges remain, including the reconstruction of homes, schools, and infrastructure. For now, support can only reach those students with access to the internet and devices, such as laptops. In the long term, UK universities should partner with charities, NGOs, and funding bodies such as the Wellcome Trust and the Royal Society to help rebuild Gaza’s educational and healthcare infrastructures. Dialogue with Palestinian colleagues is essential to developing a strategic framework for digitisation and reconstruction that is both practical and impactful.

    Imagine British universities collaborating with Palestinian institutions to create start-up incubators focused on renewable energy, healthcare technology, or sustainable agriculture. These ventures could foster economic independence, create jobs, and lay the foundation for a stronger and more resilient Gaza. Students in Gaza don’t just want access to education – they want the tools to contribute actively to their communities, creating a sustainable future for themselves and their families.

    UK universities now stand at a critical juncture. By extending support to students and academics in conflict zones, they have the opportunity to reaffirm the transformative power of education. Young Palestinians, who continue their studies amidst tremendous adversity, exemplify education’s potential to not only uplift individuals but to rebuild communities.

    The UK’s academic community has long championed education as a force for peace, progress, and the public good. By sharing resources, expertise, and a commitment to equity, UK universities can help rebuild Gaza—not just in physical terms, but in spirit, knowledge, and skill.

    This is a moment for UK universities to step up – for Gaza’s students, for the future of Gaza, and for the enduring promise of education as a beacon of hope and resilience.

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  • One country wants to close math achievement gaps by ending academic tracking

    One country wants to close math achievement gaps by ending academic tracking

    CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — Many students in New Zealand have a story to tell about “streaming” — being grouped into separate math classes based on their perceived ability to master the subject.

    Manaaki Waretini-Beaumont, now 18 and an environmental science major at the University of Canterbury, learned about the downside of streaming when she enrolled in Avonside Girls’, a 1,000-student high school in Christchurch.

    Avonside starts at Year 9, equivalent to eighth grade in the United States, and ends at Year 13, equivalent to 12th grade. Before the start of her Year 9 term, Waretini-Beaumont and her fellow students were divided up into groups to take tests in “maths,” reading comprehension, and patterns and shapes.

    Afterward, the students were separated into lettered groups that spelled out the word B-I-N-O-C-U-L-A-R-S. Waretini-Beaumont was a “9-N” student in mathematics — as she describes it, “the top of the middle block.”

    But she said she didn’t feel comfortable as one of the few Māori students in the class.

    “I felt like I wasn’t good enough to be in that space,” said Waretini-Beaumont, whose iwi, or tribal affiliations, are Te Āti Haunui-A-Pāpārangi, Ngāti Rangi, Ngāti Apa, Ngāti Paoa. “If there was something I wasn’t understanding, I felt like I wasn’t able to say that, because I’m supposed to be in the smart class with all these smart people.”

    So she shifted to another mathematics class with her Māori friends, who were in the “S” classes. 

    “Being in two different spaces, I could really see the change,” Waretini-Beaumont said. “At the top classes, the teachers’ language towards the students was always positive and it was always encouraging. And they really wanted students to learn and were trying to help them.”

    Manaaki Waretini-Beaumont experienced the effects of “streaming,” or academic ability tracking, during her time as a high school student at Avonside Girls’ School in Christchurch, New Zealand. Credit: Image provided by Richie Mills/Ngāi Tahu

    In the classroom where her friends were assigned, in contrast, the mathematics work mostly amounted to simple worksheets — “coloring pages and word find,” Waretini-Beaumont said.

    Related: Sign up for a limited-run newsletter that walks you through some of the most promising solutions for helping students conquer math.

    For years, much like in the United States, New Zealand has worried about sliding student proficiency in mathematics, as captured by both national and international test scores. Later this month — the beginning of the New Zealand school year — the country is launching an overhaul of mathematics instruction that education leaders hope will reverse the trend.

    But other groups in the country have been trying to approach the problem of academic achievement from a different angle. They believe that streaming is driving achievement gaps in the country, including in mathematics. Tokona te Raki/Māori Futures Collective, a think tank focused on youth, has been working since 2019 to persuade schools to voluntarily end the practice by 2030. The initiative is called “Kōkirihia”— Māori for “take action.”

    Streaming is just one of many ways that schools group students by academic ability. Ability grouping can include separating students into vocational or university tracks at different schools as early as age 10, as is common in Germany and other Western European countries. But it could also include teachers creating informal and non-permanent groupings within their own classrooms to provide enrichment or extra support to students who need it.

    In New Zealand, critics say streaming pushes two groups into so-called “cabbage,” or lower-level mathematics, at a disproportionate rate: Māori students, who are indigenous to New Zealand, and students who are Pasifika, the New Zealand term for people from Samoa, Tonga and other nations in the Pacific Islands.

    In the 14th century, the Polynesian ancestors of today’s Māori migrated thousands of miles by canoe to what they called Aotearoa, the land of the long white cloud. Hundreds of years later, English settlers came to engage in trade and now represent the majority ethnic group in New Zealand. In 1840, the two groups signed the Treaty of Waitangi that established New Zealand’s bicultural identity.

    Many youth with Pacific Island backgrounds are descended from people who were encouraged to move to New Zealand after World War II to address a labor shortage.

    Both Māori and Pasifika are a fast-growing, and young, population. By the 2040s, more than a third of children in the country are expected to identify as Māori, according to Stats NZ, the country’s official data agency.

    Related: Eliminating advanced math ‘tracks’ often prompts outrage. Some districts buck the trend

    The New Zealand Ministry of Education’s official stance discourages streaming, but the country’s more than 2,500 schools operate with a great deal of independence: Principals have similar powers and responsibilities as school superintendents in the United States, and each school has an elected board that sets policy and manages budgets.

    New Zealand does not track streaming or ability grouping by race or ethnicity, but surveys show it is common: Eighty percent of students are in schools that group students by ability level in mathematics, according to a 2022 survey conducted by the Program for International Student Assessment.

    Other data shows a wide academic gap among students of different ethnicities in New Zealand.

    Students at May Road School in Auckland, New Zealand, work through a lesson on fractions. Credit: Becki Moss for The Hechinger Report

    In the Auckland region, the country’s most densely populated of 16 regions in all, 76 percent of Asian students left secondary school with the highest of three levels on the country’s National Certificate of Educational Achievement in 2022. Like a high school diploma, the NCEA Level 3 is a minimum qualification to enter college in New Zealand.

    About 66 percent of Pākehā, or white, students left school with that credential. About 46 percent of Pasifika students and 40 percent of Māori students did the same.

    In comparison, the high school graduation rate by race and ethnicity in the United States in the 2021-22 school year was 94 percent for Asian American/Pacific Islander students, 90 percent for white students, 83 percent for Hispanic students, 81 percent for Black students and 74 percent for American Indian/Alaskan Native students.

    Misbah Sadat, the newly appointed principal at Kuranui College, a high school 50 miles northeast of the capital of Wellington, began actively working to “destream” mathematics courses soon after emigrating to New Zealand in 2009 and becoming a teacher there.

    As head of mathematics at a high school called Horowhenua College, she started by identifying promising Māori students on her own, moving them to higher level classes, and mentoring them, as described in a Ministry of Education newsletter.

    Related: OPINION: As a middle-class Black student, I was tracked into lower-level math classes that kept me back

    Eventually she convinced her colleagues at Horowhenua to create mixed-ability classes rather than dividing the students. She continued the same work as deputy principal at Onslow College in suburban Wellington, where she worked before her new appointment.

    The streaming practice comes from a patronizing mindset, said Sadat, who was also a math teacher in Montgomery County, Maryland.

    Schools are telling parents that their children might be lost and overwhelmed in a more rigorous class. In actuality, “We have demoted some students to learn crap,” she said. “And then we are saying that at age 16, ‘You are dumb at maths.’ How dare we decide what a young person is capable of or not capable of?” 

    Students at Kaiapoi North School in suburban Christchurch, New Zealand, work through a multiplication problem in chalk on the playground blacktop. Credit: Becki Moss for The Hechinger Report

    Both of New Zealand’s unions for elementary and secondary teachers signed onto the pledge to end streaming by 2030. In a newsletter to members, the elementary teachers union noted that its members have noticed “a sense of ingrained hopelessness that comes with being in the ‘cabbage’ classes.”

    But in the same newsletter, another teacher said educators struggle with the mix of abilities in one classroom, along with managing behavior challenges.

    David Pomeroy, a senior lecturer in education at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, is studying schools that have committed to reducing their reliance on streaming.

    It’s a difficult task, he said. So many teachers are accustomed to the practice, since they went through it in school themselves. Parents of students in high-level classes are worried their children will be shortchanged. Teachers also say that it is easier to work with students who are all roughly on the same skill level.

    And then there is an emotional connection to the practice, Pomeroy said. Unlike in the United States, lower-level mathematics classes are often taught by teachers who have a lot of classroom experience and who express real fondness for their students, he said. Pushing students too hard is seen as setting them up for repeated failure, which teachers were reluctant to do.

    Abby Zonneveld’s bulletin board at St. Clair School in Dunedin, New Zealand, asked students to describe their “tūrangawaewae,” or place where they feel a special connection. Credit: Becki Moss for The Hechinger Report

    “Even if they accepted streaming wasn’t the right next step, they wanted to protect them from anything that could damage their confidence,” Pomeroy said.

    For schools that have made a commitment to reducing or ending streaming, he said, one useful tool has been to bring mathematics teachers in different schools together so they can work through challenges, such as lesson planning, and share successes.

    Related: Racial gaps in math have grown. Could detracking help?

    The research into the benefits or harms of academic tracking or streaming show mixed results. In 2016, a group of researchers compiled all the best U.S-based research on ability grouping and acceleration at that point, going back for a century. They found certain kinds of ability grouping, such as placing highly gifted students together, was a benefit to those students. But grouping students in high- or low-performing classes did not show any benefit or detriment for students.

    The New Zealand Initiative, a right-of-center think tank, said that the country should conduct its own research on the effects of streaming in the country, rather than relying primarily on research done elsewhere and on qualitative reports that primarily capture feelings about the practice. “Research suggests that lowerstream students are often taught less engaging content by less experienced teachers. So, it may not be streaming itself that increases gaps in achievement but streaming done poorly,” the initiative said in a report.

    But the efforts to reduce streaming voluntarily seem to be catching on.

    When looking at all academic subjects, not just mathematics, principals on a 2022 PISA survey said 67 percent of students in New Zealand are grouped by ability into different classes for at least some subjects. That’s a drop from 2015, when 90 percent of principals reported that students were grouped into different classes in their schools.

    The change is welcome, said Waretini-Beaumont, who works on social media for Tokona te Raki. Streaming “has more impact than just cutting off some opportunities and stopping someone from doing calculus,” she said. “Our grandparents have been streamed and they don’t know it was even a thing. They just thought they were dumb.”

    Contact Christina A. Samuels at 212-678-3635 or samuels@hechingereport.org.

    This story was produced with support from the Education Writers Association Reporting Fellowship program.

    This story about academic tracking was produced by The Hechinger Report, a nonprofit, independent news organization focused on inequality and innovation in education. Sign up for the Hechinger newsletter.

    The Hechinger Report provides in-depth, fact-based, unbiased reporting on education that is free to all readers. But that doesn’t mean it’s free to produce. Our work keeps educators and the public informed about pressing issues at schools and on campuses throughout the country. We tell the whole story, even when the details are inconvenient. Help us keep doing that.

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  • Your 2025 higher education policy almanac

    Your 2025 higher education policy almanac

    Well, it’s January again.

    The early months of last year were dominated by the Conservatives’ slow swan dive into electoral oblivion, and then we got a general election that saw little serious discussion of the sector’s future, aside from the trotting out of a few old canards.

    And since Labour took power in July, there have been two broad phases: an initial “these things take time” framing in which universities – as well as many other groups and industries – were asked to be patient. In November we got the tuition fee uplift in England (in cash terms, for one year) and news of a bigger reform plan due next summer. A little movement, but in grand terms it was still can-kicking. Even the concrete announcements we’ve had, such as on level 7 apprenticeships, have not been accompanied by detailed policy papers or formal consultations.

    There’s reason to think that 2025 will have more for wonks to get their teeth into. There’s plenty pending, promised, or otherwise pretty damn urgent. So the below is an attempt to reckon with absolutely everything we know is on its way that matters for HE. Please charitably ascribe any oversights to a post-holidays sugar crash on my part rather than wilfully turning a blind eye, and let me know what I’ve missed in the comments.

    Big ticket items

    In Westminster politics, the first half of next year is going to be completely dominated by the spending review, which will set departmental budgets for three financial years (2026–29) as well as lay out a five-year programme of capital spending. It has always been described as being “in the spring”, but recent reports suggest that Labour will fly as close to the summer solstice as they can with this definition, so make sure you’ve got some free time in June to deal with the fallout.

    If what we read in the papers is to be believed, what is – counterintuitively – the default policy of inflation-linked tuition fees will be confirmed for England at this point, taking us up over £10,000 a year by the end of the Parliament.

    This is also when we’ll hear more about the government’s plans for ten-year R&D budgets. Attendees of the 2023 Labour conference may recall science secretary Peter Kyle promising a decade of confirmed funding for UKRI and ARIA – this commitment has been repeatedly qualified since then, partly due to issues of practicality (given that it’s not a ten-year spending review) and partly due to a question mark over whether fixing research spending in this way is really a good idea. It’s likely to be restricted now to “specific R&D activities” – the (much) bigger question will be around levels of investment in R&D. Plus we’ll see to what extent the government really wants to commit to linking research and its missions – last autumn brought only a small pot of cash for this in 2025–26.

    Also due alongside the spending review is “further detail and plans for delivery” for the Lifelong Learning Entitlement – so don’t expect to hear much more before then, though the delayed commencement in 2027 makes the need for information marginally less pressing. And the finalised industrial strategy will also arrive, “aligned with” (and likely published together with) the spending review, laying out specific sector plans for areas like the creative industries, the life sciences, and professional services. Once complete, the idea is that these plans can then inform Skills England’s work, and potentially migration policy – it’s all very ambitious.

    The HE reform announcement in England that we’ve been promised for “the summer” will land – it appears – fairly hot on the heels of the spending review settlements, and any money needed for it will need to have been allocated already, or at least tucked in to Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) projections in some way. On the topic of the OBR, its spring forecast is due on 26 March – there are rumblings that its revised projections could spell fiscal trouble for the government.

    There are also clear indications that the HE reform statement will be preceded, or possibly accompanied, by a review of some kind. There have been rumours of a panel in place, and the indications are that this will fly under the radar somewhat and happen quickly – think Becky Francis’ curriculum review or Lord Darzi’s NHS audit, rather than a grand commission in the traditional “major review” style we have become used to.

    Around the sector

    Part of the Westminster government’s reform agenda is predicated on the sector coming up with ideas itself, which may end up drawing quite a lot on Universities UK’s blueprint from back in September. UUK’s own “efficiency and transformation taskforce” will be busy putting out recommendations on business models and collaboration, with the endorsement of education secretary Bridget Phillipson – “all options are on the table,” we are told, with plenty of policy debate likely to ensue once publications begin to appear.

    With many universities in poor financial shape, the search for longer-term sustainability will likely be derailed at regular intervals by news of redundancies and course closures. National industrial action is a possibility, though there are real questions around the willingness of struggling union members to take action on pay at this point. Local disputes will continue to flare up. Alongside this we have a renewed push for newer English universities to be exempted from the Teachers’ Pension Scheme due to the massively increased costs it is now carrying, a move which would substantially inflame industrial relations if it came to pass.

    And looming over all of this is the possibility of a disorderly market exit, and the question of whether the government has a viable plan in place to step in if a large institution were to hit the wall. All the other policy developments we are highlighting here could be hugely complicated by a sudden shock to the system and what is likely to be a political rather than a strategic response.

    The world of regulation

    There’s a lot to look out for from the Office for Students, from the appointment of a new permanent chair down (interviews are being held this month).

    There’s the ongoing consultation on a new strategy, the continuing fallout from the temporary closure of the register (this should supposedly also bring new proposals on improvements to the registration process), whispers of a more “integrated approach” to quality and whatever that means for the TEF, and a greater regional focus to access and participation.

    We should start getting assessment reports for the second round of quality investigations (where franchising and foundation years will be a focus) as well as the belated release of those grade inflation investigations that were announced on 2 September 2022. We’re waiting for consultation responses on a new approach to public grant funding and even on LLE regulation, though you can’t blame them for waiting to see what exactly the government is planning with this one.

    According to last summer’s business plan, there should also be consultations of potential new initial conditions of registration on both management and governance, and consumer protection. And this year’s National Student Survey will have a sexual misconduct questionnaire appended – though it’s not clear at time of writing to what extent the results will be made public.

    Over in Wales, Medr is taking shape, with a finalised strategic plan due to have been submitted to the Welsh government for approval just before the Christmas break – we should hear more of this soon, along with the consultation response.

    And if all that sounds like a lot, in Scotland we are due a Post-School Education Reform Bill at some point in the 2024–25 parliamentary session, which will make big changes to how the Scottish Funding Council (SFC) and Student Awards Agency Scotland operate. A consultation which closed in September asked stakeholders for thoughts on what the funding agency landscape should look like – we haven’t heard much since then. The sector is keen to stress the importance of universities retaining their autonomy, whatever happens – legislative passage could see MSPs push for new duties on the SFC.

    We’ve been aware for a long time that the Office for National Statistics is undertaking a review into whether higher education should be seen as “public sector” in the national accounts – it’s now been slightly rejigged into a review of the statistical classification of “the transactions in which UK universities engage.” For what is a very technical definition, an eye over the recent travails of the FE sector suggest that there are potential implications for everything from procurement to senior staff pay. The long delayed work will kick off early in 2025.

    The research agenda

    What little research policy we’ve seen come out of the new government so far has been limited to haggling over budgets and science minister Patrick Vallance stressing that ministers should not meddle in university research. There’s no reason to think we will get big policy pronouncements out of the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, which feels more interested in the tech and digital side of its remit, both legislatively and aesthetically. But there’s lots going on around the margins that could end up being quite consequential.

    First up we have the appointment of a new UKRI chief executive, where there’s already evidence the new minister has been having a think about longer term strategic direction. While the new roleholder won’t take up office until June, we should get news of the appointment fairly soon.

    In the Research Excellence Framework world, the “modular” approach to releasing different policies on a staggered timetable will see the release of the volume measure policy (imminently) and the contribution to knowledge and understanding policy (scheduled for the summer). The more contentious people, culture and environment pilot will continue throughout the year, with criteria and definitions due for the winter – any slippage on this will likely provoke controversy.

    At UKRI, January will bring an update on its work reviewing how PGR stipends are set (as well as the stipend level for 2025–26). Elsewhere, the ongoing National Audit Office work looking at UKRI grants and loans could be a wildcard – it’s due to report in spring 2025 – and at the very least is a moment where the government will need to comment on how the research funding system is operating. Research England is also thinking about the current state of research infrastructure, via its condition of the estate survey, and how the sector’s financial challenges are affecting research – for both of these pieces of ongoing work, it’s doubtful that much will be shared publicly.

    Further afield, a European Commission proposal for the successor to Horizon Europe is due midway through the year, preceded by an interim evaluation of the current funding programme which will likely give an indication of its plans. We will also get regulations for the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme in the new year – the measures, which will speak to research security, are now expected to come into effect in the summer. It’s been reported that the government is resisting calls to put China on the “enhanced tier” of the scheme, a move that would have greatly complicated UK-China academic partnerships. On a related note, the government has quietly been conducting a “China audit” – this will be released in the coming months, and in theory will spell out the policy areas where closer ties will be permitted.

    Finally, the House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee will be conducting a timely inquiry into regional R&D, which should be a good opportunity for some more insight into how the government’s English devolution-related plans for more mayoral involvement in the research system will come together.

    International

    If you had to pick a policy area that will have the biggest macro impacts on the sector in 2025, you could do a lot worse than opt for international recruitment (you would arguably have been proved right if you’d chosen it in any of the last few years).

    Two big policy items are on their way here: a legal migration white paper, spelling out how the government will fulfil its electoral promise to bring net migration down. And a revised international education strategy (IES), which we’re told is coming “early spring” – whether it will appear before, after, or alongside the white paper remains to be seen, but could be significant.

    The big questions here are whether the government will put a recruitment target on the face of the strategy – the aspiration for 600,000 students in the last one ended up coming back to haunt the Conservatives among their own base – and what the plan for education exports targets might be. But there are other areas we could see movement, such as on post-study work, where some in the sector seem hopeful that a little improvement could be on offer, despite the enormous political pushback the Graduate route has faced over the last couple of years. It feels like an outside bet.

    More important to keep an eye on will be whether some kind of arrangement is arrived at with net migration statistics – we know that the Office for National Statistics is looking at how estimates excluding students could be arrived at, and it’s been on the higher education sector’s wishlist for years.

    If it did come to pass, the devil would very much be in the detail – the Migration Advisory Committee annual report has already been noting the contribution that students make to long-term net migration, and Starmerite think tank Labour Together’s recent proposal is for visa routes such as Skilled Worker and Graduate to have multi-year targets, even if the Student visa does not. Put like that, it sounds like a recipe for universities to recruit pretty freely but for students’ post-study options to remain a political football – the seeming lack of student involvement in the IES review would appear all the more glaring in this case. The Universities UK blueprint did promise a kind of quid pro quo on responsible international recruitment, and it has been notable that government ministers have stressed the importance of housing availability when the question has come up in Parliament recently.

    Whatever comes out of it, it looks clear that the Home Office will continue to toe a careful line on student visas, and continue to implement the last government’s Graduate route review response. The use of “action plans” by UKVI for certain providers will continue, even if there is no substantive public comment from the Home Office about what these are and why they are being imposed. And there will also be a review of English language self-assessment policies over the next few months, “driven by growing concern around underlying reasons for reports of students being picked up at the border or entering UKHE with low levels of English” (in UUKi’s words). It’s unlikely much will be shared publicly about these, but they are items to watch, especially in the event that there is further negative publicity about international students in the media.

    It’s worth stressing that developments in migration and visa policy do not only affect students – the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee is next week highlighting the interplay between visas and international researchers, and there are ongoing issues such as the future of the family visa income threshold where the government will eventually need to take a position.

    And despite all this policy in play, the three most significant factors for future international recruitment with likely be the Australian federal election – where the incumbent government’s attempts to impose number caps have been thwarted by an opposition that wants bigger caps – the Canadian election – which could happen at any minute if Justin Trudeau is forced out, and where the Conservatives are strongly favoured to take power – and the impact of Donald Trump on the USA, where universities are already reportedly asking international students to return before he takes office. All these things have the potential to greatly benefit the UK “market”.

    Skills, skills, skills

    Before we get any HE reform news out of Westminster, there’s going to be policy elsewhere in the post-compulsory system, with Skills England gearing up for action – we’ll learn the appointments of chief executive and permanent chair pretty soon – and various policy pronouncements at this end of the tertiary sector are overdue.

    Probably the most impactful for higher education is confirmation about exactly what is happening with the apprenticeship levy, both in wider terms of the planned additional flexibility for non-apprentice courses (this will be less than the 50 per cent originally proposed… at least probably), and for the “defunding” of level 7 apprenticeships.

    Many universities are big operators in this space, and it appears that most if not all of these programmes will be removed from the levy’s scope (“a significant number” is the most recent framing from the government). Over Christmas the Telegraph reported that the much-feted doctor apprenticeship is now “paused in perpetuity”. We should get the full picture very soon, as well as the much-awaited post-16 strategy, which you would hope would give a decent insight into the government’s wider vision for tertiary education. Though it may not.

    The defunding of level 7 apprenticeships is also relevant for those higher education institutions that have been spending their levy contributions on such courses for their staff as part of their professional development offer. DfE assures us all that employers are more than welcome to pay for them using different funds, “where they feel they provide a good return on their investment.”

    Our world in data

    We’re getting the outcome of the Data Futures review soon! There may be some lessons to learn about programme management and platform delivery, which could play out as a shared commitment to improving processes or as an unedifying multi-agency row. Whatever the case, this year’s HESA Student data will arrive later than usual – “in the spring, earlier than last year’s August publication but later than the January release date achieved in previous years.” Whether this is spring as in daffodils, or spring as in spending review, remains to be seen – but the delay (and issues with data quality as we saw last year) will have a knock on effect on data releases elsewhere, once again.

    At the end of this month we are getting HESA Staff data for 2023–24. The headline figures from last year’s release did get quoted the odd time by the previous government – in answer to questions about the impact of redundancies and cuts, it would occasionally be pointed out by ministers that (academic) staff numbers were still rising when you look at the sector as a whole. These figures won’t show the impact of this academic year’s cuts, however.

    Of course, elsewhere we have the usual releases which make up the HE wonk’s annual working rhythm. UCAS end-of-cycle numbers, at provider level, are due out at the end of January, and further down the line (probably around spending review time!) we have HESA Finance data and the Office for Students’ accompanying financial sustainability report, which will likely once again be a moment of maximum attention for higher education’s bottom line.

    One other piece of data we are getting this spring is a new ONS release on student suicides. This will come alongside the independent review commissioned by the last government, and whatever the findings is likely to generate a lot of press coverage and renewed pushes from campaign groups and opposition parties for a statutory duty of care. Early indications from the current government is that they are happy with the voluntary, sector-led approach to mental health – but things can change.

    Elsewhere in government

    It’s amazing it’s taken us this long to get to it, but probably the biggest, most controversial item on DfE’s to-do list is a decision on the fate of the free speech act and its associated provisions and complaints scheme. The Free Speech Union has its day in court on 23 January as part of a legal challenge over the pausing of the bill’s commencement – it’s just possible that the government will try to get a decision out before then. Or it could all drag on intractably for several more months, very much in keeping with the legislation’s passage through Parliament.

    Another hugely consequential move which we may see from DfE this month is the launch of a consultation on proposals to “strengthen oversight of partnership delivery in higher education” in conjunction with OfS. The department “will be developing options for legislative change, if required,” the Public Accounts Committee was told back in September, with a target date of January 2025 for an update.

    We’re due impact assessments and regulations for the tuition fee and maintenance “increases”, which should also involve a government pronouncement on how much the national insurance increase will cost the sector. And while it’s not higher education business, the soon-to-appear curriculum review (covering the curriculum in England from key stage 1 to key stage 5) will have long-term consequences for the wider education system – as well as likely sparking further backlash among those worried about it recklessly promoting diversity and risking PISA scores.

    Elsewhere in Westminster, the ongoing parliamentary passage of massive pieces of legislation will have big consequences for universities and students. The Employment Rights Bill and the Renters’ Rights Bill will both likely see some amendments, and we’re still awaiting the text of the English Devolution Bill and the promised “Hillsborough” bill. The government’s NHS plan for change – again, due at some point in the spring – and proposed updates to the NHS Long-Term Workforce Plan are important to keep an eye on as well.

    Up in Scotland, one day we may see the fruits of the ongoing review of student maintenance for part-time students. Negotiations over the 2025–26 budget will dominate the parliamentary agenda in the early part of the year, with ministers appearing in front of committees to get into the details of what exactly will be funded and what will not – and then the countdown to 2026 elections begins (all of this sentence is also true in Wales).

    It’s dangerous to go alone – take this

    If you’ve made it this far, congratulations. It feels like there is currently a huge number of moving parts in play in policy-land, all of which will contribute to the future shape and operations of the UK higher education sector in various, often hard-to-predict ways. Some are pretty immediate, others are issues that should have been tackled long ago, and then there are long-term policy changes that will be massive news in the 2030s.

    Here at Wonkhe we try to cover every single policy development that affects the sector, especially in our Daily Briefings (which restart on Tuesday 7 January – my alarm is already set).

    So if you’re interested in following even a fraction of the stuff that’s set out above, do join us for the ride this year. And fair warning, it’s likely that a good number of the most important developments that 2025 has in store for us are not even on this list. We’ll cover those as well, the moment they arrive.

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  • The Migration Advisory Committee thinks about skills and long term net migration

    The Migration Advisory Committee thinks about skills and long term net migration

    The Migration Advisory Committee’s annual report for 2023 ended up being one of the publications with most policy influence on the subsequent year.

    Though it was released the week after then Home Secretary James Cleverly announced a review of the Graduate route, it clearly reflected ongoing Whitehall discussions and concerns over the post-study work visa, and much of its conclusions ended up being quoted incessantly through the subsequent debate around the MAC review – especially by those in favour of the route’s abolition or restriction:

    The graduate route may not be attracting the global talent anticipated, with many students likely entering low-wage roles.

    Our concern that the graduate visa would incentivise demand for short Master’s degrees based on the temporary right to work in the UK, rather than primarily on the value of qualification, may well be borne out in the trends that we have observed.

    As we have already shown, the rise in student numbers is almost entirely focused on taught Master’s degrees, and the growth has been fastest in less selective and lower cost universities. The rise in the share of dependants is also consistent with this.

    Given all that, it’s probably a relief to all concerned that the 2024 edition of the MAC annual report doesn’t go in depth on any international student-related issue, reflecting what feels like a (welcome) period of stasis in visa policy affecting higher education under the new government.

    Nevertheless, the MAC has a beefed up role under Labour – additional civil servant resource, plus we now learn that chair Brian Bell’s role will move from two to five days a week – and this time around the questions percolating away are worthy of some long-term thinking, even if they are not going to lead to knee-jerk policy decisions.

    Staying or going

    The annual review kicks off with consideration of long-term net migration trends, noting that the general election saw all main parties commit to bringing headline figures down.

    Thinking ahead, it notes:

    In the long run, work routes will have a greater impact on net migration compared to study routes as a greater percentage of those on the work route stay in the UK, whilst students are more likely to emigrate when they finish their course. Put simply, whilst students increase net migration in the year they arrive, they will reduce it by the same amount if and when they leave.

    This is a helpful soundbite for the sector, after last month’s ONS figures started to make clear what has been evident for a while – that historic claims around the “vast majority” of international students leaving the UK after completing their courses no longer hold much water. The ONS net migration stats estimated that the proportion of those on student visas who had transitioned to another visa three years after arriving was 48 per cent for those who arrived in year ending June 2021. This was up from nine per cent for those who arrived in June 2019, largely driven by introduction of the Graduate route.

    But the detail is still uncertain, as the MAC goes on to acknowledge. It cites recent Migration Observatory modelling (director Madeleine Sumption is now the MAC deputy chair) which estimates that the “stay rate” after eight years is around 26 per cent for those on study visas, compared to 56 per cent for those on work visas. The consequence of this is that – again, according to the Migration Observatory’s heavily caveated modelling – is that student visas contribute to 19 per cent of long-term net migration.

    (The modelling also lets you adjust the assumptions around stay rate and annual international student numbers – the baseline is rather simplistically 250,000 new student visas every year from 2024 to 2032, though to be fair recent volatility means that putting a firm prediction on international recruitment is a brave bet in itself.)

    All in all the MAC notes that stay rates are “highly uncertain” – but it’s an issue that will continue to inform the wider political debate, especially as the post-pandemic bulge is gradually smoothed out of net numbers. It’s notable in this context that think tank Labour Together – which typically has the ear of the government – has just put out a proposal for a “national migration plan” based on nationally set targets for different routes. Student visas, it says, would only be included in the analysis “to the extent that they have an impact on long-run net migration” through the Graduate and Skilled Worker visa routes.

    The skills puzzle

    The central piece of this year’s review is driven by the observation that the new government’s intention is “to more closely link migration and skills policy.” Given that starting point, the MAC carefully explores to what extent this can work. It’s of course written in the careful language you would expect of a government-sponsored committee with a Home Office secretariat, but reading between the lines there’s a cautionary note to it all (and not just in the observation that “skills” is an “ambiguous term both conceptually and empirically” – don’t tell Jacqui Smith).

    “In theory”, MAC observes, skills shortages lead employers to recruit using the immigration system. “If this were true,” the government can bring down work-related immigration via the reduction of skills shortages.

    In practice, there are some complications. Most obviously, skills investments take a long time to translate to the labour market – the last government repeatedly took the quicker route of facilitating international recruitment, especially in the health and care sectors, but also in not insignificant ways in areas like filling teacher vacancies.

    The MAC also stresses how employers will not deliberately make choices around whether to hire UK-based workers or those from overseas (speaking to The Times, Brian Bell specifically points to academic recruitment as an area where employers – universities – would not change their hiring practices if the domestic labour force had better qualifications). We are also told that labour demand and supply are not independent (“employers look for what they think they can get, and employees try to match what employers want”), and that skills aside there are other differences between domestic and international recruits.

    For the construction industry, this latter point was vividly illustrated by the Financial Times last week, which argued that many businesses in this field prefer “pay-by-the-day” labour and self-employed staff, and hence hire internationally and typically not via skilled worker routes – another consequence of this is that they are unlikely to commit to training apprentices. (The article also cites Brian Bell saying that high net migration leads to “real strains on our ability to manage housing and infrastructure,” in case anyone was thinking the MAC will take a more dovish approach under Labour.)

    All in all, bringing about a join-up between the skills and migration systems is a tough ask – or, more cynically, an unrealistic policy goal. It’s clear that the MAC is trying to temper expectations about what can be achieved:

    Linking immigration and skills policy is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and it is important to consider the individual circumstances within sectors and occupations, including diagnosing whether shortages are genuinely driven by a lack of skills or are due to poor pay and conditions of certain roles.

    And the elephant in the room is pay. In the care sector, the MAC has repeatedly stressed that wages need a significant uplift for other visa-related tinkering to have an impact. It stresses this again here, and makes the point that a large proportion of work visas go to public sector workers.

    This is a point for Skills England to take on board as well, you would hope. Its initial report was notably incurious about the role of low pay (especially in the public sector) in driving “skills mismatches”, rather presenting employment more as a simple supply and demand relationship between skills available and skills needed. The MAC annual report has some more persuasive analysis here, showing a lack of correlation between so-called “skills shortage vacancies” (SSVs) and skilled worker visa usage. That is to say, it’s by no means a given that those industries facing skills shortages are the ones more likely to sponsor workers from overseas. There are all kinds of factors at play.

    Quad to the rescue

    You get the sense that the team of economists who make up the Migration Advisory Committee are being careful about the government’s plans to link up skills and migration in a coherent way (it’s also noted at one point that skills is devolved and immigration is not – another challenge).

    What we’re getting to make this all fit together is a new “Quad framework” (I believe this is the first time it’s publicly been referred to in this way). As promised in Labour’s manifesto, the strengthened MAC will be working with the newly launched Industrial Strategy Council, the Department for Work and Pensions, and Skills England – the manifesto in fact promised “skills bodies across the UK”, but this hasn’t been fleshed out yet.

    This Quad will cooperate “to address systemic long-term issues that have led to reliance from certain sectors on international recruitment, and where appropriate, to reduce that reliance.” The MAC anticipates that the Quad will help identify priority sectors (following the industrial strategy, when ready) and determine which have a high reliance on migration, after which the MAC will – if it sees fit – recommend policy levers the government might pull, while Skills England will be drawing up workforce and skills plans, of some sort.

    It’s all a recipe for an incredibly complicated set of moving parts, and given Skills England’s involvement and the importance of overseas staff and student recruitment, one that the English higher education sector would be wise to keep an eye on and work out how it can contribute to.

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