Category: mergers

  • Donor Engagement in College Mergers – Edu Alliance Journal

    Donor Engagement in College Mergers – Edu Alliance Journal

    November 2, 2025, By Dean Hoke — When Sweet Briar College’s trustees voted to close in 2015, they framed the decision as a financial necessity. Alumnae mounted an extraordinary campaign—raising $28.5 million in 110 days—and, through a state-brokered settlement, the college reopened under new governance. By 2023, donors had contributed well over $133 million since the crisis. What looked like an inevitable failure became one of higher education’s most remarkable turnarounds.

    Sweet Briar is not only a story of crisis response; it exposes a recurring miscalculation in today’s merger conversations: the assumption that boardroom consensus equals donor legitimacy. Trustees speak for donors in a fiduciary sense—they hold legal responsibility for institutional assets—but not in the communal sense that captures sentiment, legacy, and trust. When colleges announce merger talks, headlines dwell on enrollment curves and debt ratios. Yet behind every deal stands a quieter, decisive constituency: major donors, family foundations, and planned-giving benefactors whose confidence (or loss of it) can determine whether the combined institution thrives—or limps forward under the weight of broken relationships.

    This article reframes mergers as philanthropic integration projects. The legal mechanics matter, but durable success is won in the design phase: early engagement with philanthropic stakeholders, explicit safeguards for identity and donor intent, transparent transition planning, and a mission-first case that invites continued—and new—investment. When leaders bring donors and alumni into the architecture of the merger rather than the press release, they convert anxiety into commitment and preserve the institutional DNA that constituents care about most.

    We’ll see this principle in contrasting cases: mission-advancing acquisitions that attracted significant philanthropic support, integrations that prioritized identity and donor intent from the outset, and lessons from failed or contested processes. The throughline is simple: treat philanthropy as a core workstream—not an afterthought—and the odds of a credible, sustainable merger rise dramatically.

    The stakes have never been higher. Survey data from Ruffalo Noel Levitz’s 2025 National Alumni Survey, which surveyed more than 50,000 alumni, reveals that donor relationships with higher education are already strained. While 81% of alumni report that being philanthropic is important to them personally and 77% make charitable donations, their connection to their alma mater has weakened dramatically. Only 31% of alumni who donate to any charity gave to their alma mater last year, dropping to just 19% among Millennials and 10% among Gen Z graduates.

    Even more troubling: 59% of alumni who never donate to their alma mater actively support other causes, as do 83% of lapsed donors. They have not stopped giving—they have simply redirected their philanthropy elsewhere. This suggests that alumni disengagement reflects institutional failure rather than generational selfishness.

    Satisfaction drives everything. Alumni who report being ‘very satisfied’ with their student experience are 18 times more likely to donate than neutral respondents and 73 times more likely than dissatisfied graduates. Yet only 42% of Gen Z alumni report feeling ‘very satisfied’ with their experience, compared to 72% of Silent Generation graduates.

    Mergers test already-fragile relationships. When institutions announce consolidation, donors who felt lukewarm about their undergraduate experience see confirmation that their alma mater is failing. A merger framed solely as a financial necessity will not inspire them. But a merger presented as advancing mission-driven impact—expanding access, strengthening programs that address social challenges, or preserving an educational model under threat—can mobilize support from the very alumni who have drifted away.

    As Millett (1976) noted, successful integrations often ‘show structure, not just sentiment’—for example, Case Western Reserve kept a distinct Case Institute identity, and Carnegie Mellon created a Carnegie Institute of Engineering and a Mellon Institute of Science to carry legacies forward.

    A half-century ago, John D. Millett’s 1976 analysis of U.S. college mergers examined a range of cases—from research institutes to liberal arts colleges—and distilled lessons that remain strikingly current. Four observations deserve renewed attention today:

    1. Endowments transfer; relationships do not. In many mergers, endowments and restricted funds move to successor institutions through standard legal pathways. The mechanics are manageable. The harder work is relational: ensuring donors can see how their original intent will be honored in the new configuration, and that the program or ethos they loved will not be erased.

    2. Alumni skepticism is predictable—and manageable. Leaders should not assume alumni approval, especially when the smaller institution is absorbed. Visible steps to cultivate and retain legacy alumni—keeping familiar staff contacts for a transitional period, acknowledging a distinct identity, and offering tangible ways to shape the merged future—go a long way.

    3. Governance approval is not donor legitimacy. Even when boards vote, state bodies concur, and presidents sign, philanthropic legitimacy remains a separate test. Communities expect to be consulted; they often oppose mergers if they learn about them too late. Participation must be planned early, not added later.

    4. Language and structure matter more than sentiment. Labels and explanations—federation versus absorption, mission expansion versus rescue—shape how alumni and donors interpret the outcome. Leaders who explain clear educational benefits and who visibly protect identity through formal structures earn trust faster.

    Historical Examples: Structure, Not Just Sentiment

    After the Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve University merger, the successor Case Western Reserve University continued the designation of Case Institute of Technology as an organizational component. At Carnegie Mellon University, leaders created a Carnegie Institute of Engineering and a Mellon Institute of Science—formal structures that carried legacy identities forward within the new entity.

    The Bellarmine-Ursuline (Louisville) merger (1968-1971) offers another instructive example. The combined institution briefly used the Bellarmine-Ursuline name before reverting to Bellarmine College in 1971, but Bellarmine has continued to honor Ursuline identity through durable structures—explicitly including Ursuline alumnae in alumni awards and honors and recognizing the Ursuline legacy through commemorations and alumni programming. These are structural signals that preserve identity even when the combined name does not persist.

    Millett also notes that successor institutions often made special effort to cultivate and retain alumni of the absorbed college, including keeping an alumni-relations officer from the legacy institution and providing a special alumni designation or status—practical ways to keep traditions and community intact during transition.

    Crisis-Reactive: What Not to Do

    Planning is done privately, the announcement is abrupt, and donors are asked to accept a fait accompli. Mills College’s merger with Northeastern University proceeded despite alumni resistance, prompting legal challenges over donor intent. The Alumnae Association spent hundreds of thousands in legal fees opposing the merger, and a class action lawsuit resulted in a $1.25 million settlement. The litigation divided alumnae and consumed resources that could have been invested in the merged institution’s success.

    Even when the legal mechanics are sound, the community verdict is that identity has been erased. The result: backlash, donor-intent disputes, and years of costly trust repair.

    Compliance-Only: Necessary but Insufficient

    Teams carefully inventory restricted funds, ensure transfers align with donor intent, and communicate the basics. This prevents disasters but rarely generates enthusiasm or new investment. Survey data reveals that 70% of alumni need to believe their gift amount matters, and 66% rate the ability to see how their gift is used as critical. When a college merges, donors worry their legacy has been erased—regardless of legal assurances that funds will be protected.

    The compliance model maintains existing donors but does not mobilize new support for the merged institution’s expanded mission. The message is ‘We will comply,’ not ‘Here is a better future you can help build.’

    Strategic Partnership: The Target State

    Donors and foundations are treated as co-creators from Day 0. Leaders conduct quiet briefings with major benefactors pre-announcement, frame the merger as mission expansion, and embed structural commitments to legacy preservation. This model doesn’t eliminate hard feelings, but it channels energy toward shared outcomes.

    Delaware State University–Wesley College (2020–21). DSU—an HBCU—acquired Wesley and framed the move as mission advancement, launching the Wesley College of Health & Behavioral Sciences to expand pathways in nursing and allied health for underserved students. Financing combined philanthropy and prudence: a $20M unrestricted gift from MacKenzie Scott (with a portion—reported as roughly one-third of the $15M total—applied to transition costs) and a $1M Longwood Foundation grant for the acquisition. The case shows how a mission-first narrative can catalyze major-donor and foundation support.

    By tying dollars to a new health‑workforce pipeline—rather than balance‑sheet triage—leaders converted donor anxiety into visible, restricted impact.

    Ursuline College–Gannon University (ongoing). From the outset, both institutions engaged stakeholders publicly and affirmed philanthropy principles: “Honoring donor intent is important to Gannon University,” and donors will be able to designate gifts to the Pepper Pike campus. Ursuline will retain its identity as the Ursuline College Campus of Gannon University after the transition, and the Ursuline Sisters of Cleveland have voiced support for the merger—signals aimed at preserving community trust and legacy while the integration proceeds through 2026. These commitments, paired with the HLC’s Change-of-Control approval, frame the merger as continuity-minded rather than absorptive.

    University of Tennessee Southern (formerly Martin Methodist College).

    University of Tennessee Southern (formerly Martin Methodist College)
    When Martin Methodist joined the University of Tennessee System in 2021, leaders prioritized transparent, compassionate communication—“a liminal space” requiring a strong plan, as President Mark La Branche put it. They also set aside portions of the legacy endowment (via the Martin Methodist College Foundation) to protect signature programs, showing that integration need not erase institutional identity.

    Public commitments to donor intent and the campus naming convention did early legitimacy work that legal filings can’t.

    When a stronger institution absorbs a struggling one, leaders often assume donor concerns belong primarily to the acquired institution. This is a strategic error. The acquiring institution’s donors also have a stake in the outcome—and their continued support is essential to merger success.

    Major donors to the acquiring institution may question why resources should be directed toward absorbing another college. They may worry that the acquired institution’s struggles will tarnish their alma mater’s reputation, or that merger costs will compete with planned campus improvements. These concerns are legitimate and require proactive engagement.

    Frame the Merger as a Strategic Opportunity

    The narrative for acquiring institution donors must emphasize strategic opportunity rather than charitable rescue. Several frames can be effective:

    Geographic expansion: The merger creates a presence in a new market, expanding the institution’s reach and visibility.

    Program complementarity: The acquired institution brings academic strengths that fill gaps in the acquiring institution’s portfolio.

    Mission advancement: The merger expands capacity to serve students and fulfill the educational mission on a greater scale.

    Competitive positioning: In an era of consolidation, the merger strengthens the institution’s competitive position and long-term sustainability.

    Rather than waiting for resistance to emerge, acquiring institution leaders should brief major donors before public announcement. These confidential conversations acknowledge donors’ legitimate interest in institutional strategy, allow leaders to address concerns directly, and create opportunities for donors to become merger advocates.

    Legal clarity: When restricted funds cannot be used as originally intended post‑merger, pursue a cy‑près modification early—advancement and counsel should partner on donor communication before any filing to preserve trust.

    You can brief a small set of major donors pre‑announcement under strict NDAs without privileging them over faculty governance or regulators. Use a defined rubric for who is briefed (e.g., top 10% of lifetime commitments and active pledgors), disclose no nonpublic counterparties’ terms, and limit to mission rationale, identity safeguards, and timeline. Record each briefing in counsel’s log.

    Before Announcement (Day 0 Work)

    Philanthropic due diligence—parallel to financial. Inventory endowed and restricted funds, bequests in the pipeline, and active foundation grants. Identify potential cy-près risks and draft stewardship language now. Treat this as a distinct workstream with advancement, finance, and counsel at the table from the start.

    Quiet briefings with top donors and foundations on both sides. Under confidentiality, preview the rationale, surface donor-intent questions, and invite advice. Ask for early champions willing to speak publicly when the time comes.

    Identity protections by design, not promise. Prepare a naming plan (e.g., ‘[Legacy] College at [Acquirer]’), preserve scholarship and reporting lines, and keep alumni-relations continuity for 12-24 months. Publish a short ‘Identity & Intent’ brief on day one that shows, in plain language, how donor purposes are carried forward.

    At Announcement

    Mission-driven case for support. Lead with the educational value only possible together: new academic pathways, access expansions, regional partnerships, research synergies. Avoid rescue framing. Make the case specific and concrete, tied to programs and outcomes donors care about.

    Dedicated ‘Legacy to Impact’ funds with challenge matches. Create visible vehicles that convert anxiety into investment—restricted funds for scholarships, program launches, and student success tied to the integrated entity.

    Community-benefit specificity. Spell out local benefits and stakeholder wins (clinics, teacher pipelines, innovation hubs). When people can ‘see’ the upside, they are likelier to invest in it.

    First 12-24 Months

    Quarterly transparency. Report enrollment in merged programs, first scholarship cohorts, renewed or new foundation grants, and capital milestones. Transparency reduces rumors and builds credibility.

    Recognition symmetry. Offer parity for legacy and acquirer donors—naming walls, digital honor rolls, endowed-fund dashboards, and joint stewardship events.

    Two-sided cultivation. Brief the acquirer’s major donors so they see strategic growth rather than a charitable drain. Ask two or three to seed a matching pool restricted to merger priorities; matches signal confidence and reduce perceived risk.

    Because reliable analytics on donor behavior in mergers are sparse, leaders should build their own lightweight evidence base. For each merger, track three years pre- and post-integration for: total private support; alumni participation (where available); number of $1M+ gifts; and the mix of restricted versus unrestricted giving.

    Pair quantitative metrics with a qualitative log: Was identity preserved in naming? Did a Legacy Alumni structure exist? Were there donor-intent disputes? Did the acquirer launch dedicated legacy funds? How soon were KPIs reported?

    Even a simple dashboard, updated quarterly, changes the conversation with trustees and donors. It shows momentum (or lack thereof), prompts targeted stewardship, and gives leaders permission to make mid-course corrections. It also validates the core claim of this article: philanthropy works best when it is built into planning, not bolted on after the fact.

    The most fundamental error in merger planning is treating donors as communications targets rather than strategic partners. Donors are not merely sources of revenue to be managed; they are partners whose investments reflect belief in institutional mission and values.

    Mergers that succeed treat donors, foundations, and alumni as planning inputs, not a downstream audience for PR. Millett’s 1976 study reminds us that while the legal mechanics of endowment transfers are straightforward, the human mechanics are not. Alumni skepticism is predictable; identity needs visible protection through formal structures, not just promises; language and framing carry unusual weight.

    When leaders internalize those lessons—and create structures that honor donor intent, invite co-creation, and make the mission upside measurable—legacy becomes leverage rather than liability. Higher education’s financial pressures are real, but so is the reservoir of goodwill that donors and alumni hold for institutions that respect them.

    The Sweet Briar alumnae who raised $133 million did not do so because they were told the college would comply with donor intent. They did so because they were invited to co-create a future worth investing in. That is the lesson for every merger: bring philanthropic stakeholders into the room early, build identity protections into the design, launch vehicles that convert anxiety into investment, and report steadily and transparently on what their support makes possible.

    That is how two proud legacies become one stronger future—and how the ‘silent stakeholders’ find their voice in shaping it.

    Sources (selected): institutional FAQs and press releases (Ursuline–Gannon; DSU–Wesley; UT Southern), RNL Alumni Giving Data 2025 (for participation/attitudes), and Millett, J.D. (1976) ED134105 on college mergers.

    Dean Hoke is Managing Partner of Edu Alliance Group, a higher education consultancy. He formerly served as President/CEO of the American Association of University Administrators (AAUA). Dean has worked with higher education institutions worldwide. With decades of experience in higher education leadership, consulting, and institutional strategy, he brings a wealth of knowledge on colleges’ challenges and opportunities. Dean is the Executive Producer and co-host for the podcast series Small College America.


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  • Edu Alliance Group Launches the Center for College Partnerships and Alliances – Edu Alliance Journal

    Edu Alliance Group Launches the Center for College Partnerships and Alliances – Edu Alliance Journal

    October 27, 2025, By Dean HokeAs many of you know, I am deeply committed to helping small and mid-sized colleges find sustainable paths forward. That’s why I’m proud to announce the launch of the Edu Alliance Group Center for College Partnerships and Alliances, dedicated to helping institutions explore partnerships, mergers, and strategic alliances that strengthen their mission and impact.

    The Center will be led by newly appointed partners Dr. Chet Haskell and Dr. Barry Ryan, two distinguished higher education leaders with deep experience in governance, accreditation, and institutional transformation. Together, they bring a wealth of expertise in guiding colleges and universities through complex transitions while preserving mission integrity and academic excellence.

    The Center’s framework draws on insights presented in A Guide to College Partnerships, Mergers, and Strategic Alliances for Boards and Leadership: From Awareness to Implementation,” authored by Dr. Chet Haskell, Dr. Barry Ryan, and Edu Alliance Managing Partner Dean Hoke. The guide outlines a five-stage model: Recognize, Assess, Explore, Negotiate, and Implement. It emphasizes mission integrity, transparency, and trust as the foundation for success.

    “Our goal is to help college leaders and boards move from awareness to action with clarity, confidence, and compassion,” said Dr. Haskell. “Partnerships and alliances can preserve institutional identity while creating new opportunities for students and communities.”

    “Edu Alliance has long supported institutions navigating change,” added Dean Hoke, Co-Founder and Managing Partner. “With the launch of the Center, we’re expanding our ability to help presidents and boards design solutions that are both visionary and pragmatic.”

    About the Leadership

    Dr. Chester (Chet) Haskell recently completed six and a half years as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University, where he played key roles in integrating the institution academically and structurally, as well as in creating the Coalition for the Common Good with Otterbein University, where he was Vice President for Graduate Programs. He previously held senior positions at Harvard University—including Associate Dean of the Kennedy School of Government—and later served as Dean of the College at Simmons College (Boston). Dr. Haskell went on to serve as President of both the Monterey Institute of International Studies (now part of Middlebury College) and Cogswell Polytechnical College, leading both institutions through successful mergers. He holds DPA and MPA degrees from the University of Southern California, an MA from the University of Virginia, and an AB cum laude from Harvard University.

    Dr. Barry Ryan has served as President of five universities and as Provost and Chief of Staff at three others, spanning state, private nonprofit, and private for-profit institutions. A Supreme Court Fellow in the chambers of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dr. Ryan is a member of several federal and state bars and has held two terms as Commissioner for WASC (WSCUC). He has led institutions through mergers, acquisitions, and affiliations that preserved academic quality, expanded access, and strengthened long-term viability. His leadership is characterized by transparency, shared governance, and a deep commitment to stakeholder engagement. Dr. Ryan earned his Ph.D. from the University of California, Santa Barbara, his J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, and a Dipl.GB in international business from the University of Oxford.

    Upcoming Webinar

    As part of the launch, Edu Alliance will host a free national webinar on December 3, 2025, at 1 PM Eastern time titled “Navigating Higher Education’s Existential Challenges: From Partnerships and Mergers to Reinvention.” To register, go to https://admissions.augustana.edu/register/?id=838202a3-c7a7-4ce0-8dc1-11c7979fe27c

    The session will feature a distinguished panel of experts discussing practical strategies for independent colleges and universities.
    Panelists include

    • Dr. Chet Haskell and Dr. Barry Ryan, Partners and Co-Directors of Edu Alliance’s Center for College Partnerships and Alliances;
    • A.J. Prager, Managing Director at Hilltop Securities, specializing in Higher Education Mergers & Acquisitions and Strategic Partnerships;
    • Stephanie Gold, Partner and Head of the Higher Education Practice at Hogan Lovells.

    The program will be moderated by Dean Hoke and Kent Barnds, co-hosts of Small College America.

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  • The higher education sector needs an honest broker to support structural change

    The higher education sector needs an honest broker to support structural change

    Of all the current headwinds faced by the higher education sector, one of the most challenging is a lack of expertise and experience in the area of structural change.

    In an environment where radical collaboration and merger are increasingly seen – rightly or wrongly – as a solution to the sector’s financial challenges, the expertise needed to broker and execute a successful merger or other collaboration seems to be patchy.

    As, arguably, are the somewhat different competences required to steward the longer term strategic integration of two or more distinct institutions, each with their own teaching and research portfolios and cultures. The answer to the question “who has done this before?” can only be answered in the affirmative by a handful of people.

    This issue was acknowledged in Mills & Reeve’s joint report with Wonkhe Connect More with the following insight from a one of the heads of institution we interviewed:

    We all have a skills matrix for boards and for courts and for councils. I think, increasingly, that needs to reflect people who’ve got some expertise and some background in this space…I don’t think there are many vice chancellors who would necessarily have the skills, the knowledge, and the background. Really, this is new territory, potentially, for us, it’s new turf.

    Of course, it wasn’t always thus. One of the ironies of the current dearth of experience is that large numbers of providers are themselves the product of historic mergers and collaborations. Taking the long view, the history of many providers is a complex genealogy, a narrative of mergers past and more recent.

    In part, the steady decline in institutional experience of these things was the natural result of a relatively benign financial environment. It’s easy to forget in the current climate but the period of low inflation and cheap borrowing meant that, at an institutional level, there was little impetus to challenge the operating model and, of course, the introduction of a marketised funding model meant that competition, rather than collaboration, was very much the order of the day.

    That marketised model was also accompanied by a marked shift in approach from the regulator. While HEFCE adopted a relatively low-key approach to mergers and collaboration – generally leaving the impetus to come together to institutions themselves – it did publish guidance on mergers and had a collaboration and restructuring fund to assist institutions to explore and implement structural change.

    Crucially, HEFCE was widely accepted to be a neutral broker who would help facilitate institutions coming together – and it had the funding to help smooth the path. By contrast, OfS, in its response to a question from the House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee, made it clear that it does not consider itself to have “the remit, powers or funding to intervene to prevent closure or to facilitate mergers or acquisitions.”

    Skills gap

    Where, then, does that leave providers? Typically, there is a reliance on the institution’s executive team, in particular, the vice chancellor, to steer the merger. But most higher education executives are not from the business world with experience in mergers and to a significant degree they have a conflict of interest. There is also a need to continue with their day jobs and manage business as usual in case the merger doesn’t happen.

    The next most obvious port of call is to look for expertise among their own governing bodies, and, specifically, their external members. After all, one of the main motivations of having lay external members is to draw upon their expertise and to fill gaps which (understandably enough) exist within the skill sets of senior management teams and the institution more widely.

    The problem, however, is that merger and radical collaboration require a very particular set of skills. It’s very easy for universities to get starry-eyed about a governor just because they happen to be an investment banker, an accountant, or have experience of public sector mergers in the NHS, for example. But the skills required in a university merger or a complex debt restructuring are very specific and even a governing body which is well-stocked with members from across different professional services and backgrounds cannot assume that its trustees have the requisite expertise to drive forward a merger of two institutions.

    Of course, an institution can buy in a certain level of expertise. But what perhaps can’t always be replicated by professional advice are the experience and war stories of those who have lived and breathed mergers and collaborations from the inside – particularly from the education and adjacent sectors. In Mills & Reeve’s joint report with KPMG UK – Radical collaboration: a playbook – we drew out some of those lived experiences in the form of case studies. However, written case studies need to be seasoned with real-life personal experience. What is really needed when scoping a potential merger or other kind of radical collaboration is access to a “hive mind” of critical friends.

    An HE Commissioner model

    Other sectors have taken a strategic approach to developing this expertise. The Further Education Commissioner is the most obvious parallel. Between 2015 and 2019 the FE sector saw 57 mergers, three federations, three joint FE and HE institutions and 23 academy conversions. If most of UK higher education no longer has institutional memory of mergers, FE has it in bucket loads.

    The FE Commissioner and their team offer a range of services to FE colleges – ranging from informal chats and financial health checks, through to more formal invention assessments. Their team – a mix of former leaders and finance professionals from within the sector – have genuinely seen and done it all before. Higher education deserves the same deep pool of knowledge to draw on, especially if the worst case scenario of institutional insolvency and/or disorderly market exit is to be avoided.

    For this to work successfully in HE there would need to be some level of funding and a decision as to whether a commissioner’s role might sit within DfE or OfS. Our sense – particularly given the size and complexity of universities and the involvement of key stakeholders such as banks and private placement bondholders – is that there will still be a large role played by private sector consultants, lawyers, and accountants. However, there is room for a more collegiate level of engagement from DfE and OfS than arguably exists at present.

    As well as pooling expertise on how to collaborate, placing an HE commissioner role on a formal footing might also allow it to broker conversations between providers seeking to work together more closely – something which, in our experience, is done very hesitantly at present, both because of the fear of breaching competition rules and, more generally, because every potential collaboration partner is, in a very real sense, also a competitor.

    What can’t be underestimated is how urgently this function is needed. Providers are capable of doing this alone, as recent examples such as the Anglia Ruskin/Writtle and St George’s/City mergers testify. However, how much better for the long-term future of the sector it would surely be if providers had ready access to some critical friends and some “protected” spaces to have conversations about how best to achieve and implement forms of radical collaboration.

    This article is published in association with Mills & Reeve. 

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  • Higher education mergers are a marathon not a sprint

    Higher education mergers are a marathon not a sprint

    When the announcement came last Wednesday that the universities of Kent and Greenwich are planning to merge, the two institutions did a fine job of anticipating all the obvious questions.

    In particular, announcing that the totemic decision has already been taken on who should lead the new institution – University of Greenwich vice chancellor Jane Harrington – was a pragmatic move that will save a great deal of gossip and speculation that could otherwise have derailed the discussions that will now commence on how to turn “intention to formally collaborate” to the “first-of-its-kind multi university group.”

    But even with that really tricky bit of business out of the way, there is still a lot to work through. Broadly those questions fall into two baskets: the strategic direction and the practical fine detail. Practicalities are important for giving reassurance that people’s lives aren’t about to radically change overnight; albeit there are inevitably lots of issues that are either formally unknown at this stage or which can only be tackled in light of the evolution of the final agreement and organisational structure.

    With that in mind, it is really worth emphasising that the notion of a “multi university group” is a brand new idea, given a conceptual shape in the very recent publication Radical collaboration: a playbook from KPMG and Mills & Reeve, produced under the auspices of the Universities UK transformation and efficiency taskforce. The idea of a “multi university trust” explored in that report, derived from the school sector, posits the creation of a single legal entity that can nevertheless “house” a range of distinct “trading entities” with unique “brands” each with an agreed level of local autonomy.

    It answers the question of how you take two (or more) institutions, each with their own histories and characteristics and find ways to create the strength and resilience that scale might offer, while retaining the local distinctive characteristics that staff, students, and local communities value and feel a sense of affinity to. It also, as has been noted in the coverage following the announcement, leaves an option open for other institutions to join the new structure, if there’s a case for them to do so.

    “It is very positive to see institutions taking proactive steps to finding new ways to work together,” says Sam Sanders, head of education, skills and productivity for KPMG in the UK. “The group structure proposed is a model we have seen be successful elsewhere, where brand identity is retained but you get economies of scale, meaning institutions can focus on their core activities while sharing the burden of the overheads. If it goes well it could act as a blueprint for other similar ventures.”

    Sam’s reflection is that establishing a new entity might be the most straightforward part of the process: “The complicated part is moving to a new model that simultaneously preserves the right culture in the right places while achieving the savings you might want to see in areas like IT, infrastructure, and estates. These are multi-year agendas so everyone involved needs to be prepared for that.”

    The long and winding road

    With lots to work through, it’s really important to step back, and give space to the institutions to work this out. Because the big picture is about mapping what that critical path looks like from single-institution vulnerabilities to strength in numbers – and that is a path that these institutions and their governing bodies are, to a large extent, carving out as they go, potentially doing the wider sector a service in the process as others may look to follow the same path in the future.

    “The sector response has been overwhelmingly positive,” says Jane Harrington, who is already fielding calls from heads of institution who are curious about the planned new model. Both Jane and University of Kent acting vice chancellor Georgina Randsley de Moura have experience with group structures in schools and further education, knowledge they drew on in thinking through the options for formal collaboration – starting with ten different possible models which were narrowed down to two that were explored in more depth.

    “We started with what we wanted to achieve, and then we looked for models,” says Georgina. “We kept going back to our principles: widening participation, education without boundaries, high quality teaching and research, and what will make sense for our regions. Inevitably there is some focus in the news around finances and that is an important part of the context, but this would not work if our universities didn’t have values and mission alignment.”

    “We also had examples in mind of where we don’t want to end up,” adds Jane. “You see mergers where the brand identity is lost and it takes a decade to get it back. We have, right now, two student-facing brands that are strong in their own right. And in five or ten years time it might be that we have four or five institutions that are part of this structure – we don’t think it would make sense for them to become part of one amorphous brand.”

    It’s frequently observed that bringing together two or more institutions that are facing difficult financial headwinds may simply create a larger institution with correspondingly larger challenges. So having a very clear sense strategically of where the strengths and opportunities lie, as well as the where risks and weaknesses might also be subject to force-multiplier effects, is pretty important at the outset.

    It’s clear that there is an efficiency agenda in play in the sense that merging allows for the adoption of a single set of systems and processes – an area where Jane is especially interested in curating creative thinking. But the wider opportunities afforded by scale are also compelling, especially in being more strategic about the collective skills and innovation offer to the region.

    Kent and Medway local councils and MPs have also responded enthusiastically to the universities’ proposal, the two heads of institution tell me – not least because navigating politics around different HE providers can be a headache for regional actors who want to engage higher education institutions in key regional agendas.

    “There are cold spots in our region where nobody is offering what is needed,” says Jane. “But developing new provision is much harder when you are acting alone. This region has pockets of multiple forms of deprivation: rural, urban and coastal. The capacity and scale afforded by combining means we can think strategically about how to do the regional growth work, and what our combined offer should be, including to support reskilling and upskilling.”

    Georgina makes a similar case for combining research strengths. “Our shared research areas, like health, food sustainability, and creative industries, play to regional strengths,” she says. “When research resources are constrained, by combining we can do more.”

    We can work it out

    The multi university group is not, in theory, a million miles from a federation in structure in that in federations generally there is a degree of autonomy ceded by the constituent elements to a single governing body – but in a federation each entity retains its individual legal status. A critical difference is the extent to which a sharing economy among the entities would have to be painstakingly negotiated for a federation, which could erode the value that is created in collaborating. It could also raise tricky questions around things like VAT.

    But the sheer novelty of the multi university group also raises a bunch of regulatory questions, covered in all the depth you’d expect by DK elsewhere on the site – to give a flavour, can you use the word “university” for your trading entity without that existing as a legal entity with its own degree awarding powers?

    The supportive noises from DfE and OfS at the time of the initial announcement should give Kent and Greenwich some degree of comfort as they work through some of these questions. The sector has been making the argument for some time now that if the government and regulator want to see institutions seizing the initiative on innovative forms of collaboration, there will need to be some legal and regulatory quarter given, up to and including making active provision for forms of collaboration that emerge without a legal playbook.

    Aside from the formal conditions for collaboration, how OfS conducts itself in this period will be watched closely by others considering similar moves. While nobody would suggest that changing structure offers an excuse for dropping the ball on quality or student experience – and both heads of institution are very clear there is no expectation of that happening – OfS now has a choice. It can choose to be highly activist in requesting reams of documentation and evidence in response to events as they unfold, from institutions already grappling with a highly complex landscape. Or it can work out an approach that offers a degree of advance clarity to the institutions what their accountabilities are in this time of transition, and how they can/should keep the regulator informed of any material risks arising to students from the process.

    Despite the generally positive response, there is no shortage of scepticism about whether a plan like the one proposed can work. The answer, of course, depends on what you think success looks like. Certainly, anyone expecting a sudden and material shrinkage in costs is bound to be disappointed. Decisions will be made along the way with which some disagree, perhaps profoundly.

    But I think what is often forgotten in these discussions is that the alternative to the decision to pursue a new structure is not to carry on in broadly the same way as before, but to pursue a different but equally radical and equally contentious course of action. If the status quo was satisfactory then there would be no case for the change. In that sense, being as useful as possible in helping these two institutions make the very best fist that they can of their new venture is the right thing for everyone to do, from government downwards.

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  • Super-universities and human sized art schools

    Super-universities and human sized art schools

    The creation of a new super university in South East England, through the merger of Kent and Greenwich, signals both a turning point and a warning.

    Advocates see consolidation as the promise of scale and resilience.

    Critics fear homogenisation, loss of identity, and narrowing of choice.

    Both could be right.

    What matters most is not the merger itself but the logic that underpins it. In the absence of a shared national mission for higher education, mergers are now framed as solutions: a form of market rationalisation presented as vision.

    The vacuum where mission should be

    Since the 2012 funding reforms, higher education has been treated less as civic infrastructure and more as a competitive market. Public investment was replaced by loans. Students were told to think like investors. Degrees became receipts.

    Into the gap left by an absence of national purpose rushed hyper-regulation: metrics, thresholds, and questions of fiscal viability. Within this narrowed frame, mergers appear logical. Bigger looks cheaper. Consolidation looks like progress. But without a shared mission, the deeper questions go unanswered.

    The long contraction

    For much of the last century, almost every town in Britain had its own art school: civic in origin, modest in scale, and rooted in place. In the 1960s there were over 150 across England. Over time, that dispersed civic network was redrawn. Some schools were absorbed into polytechnics, some federated into new structures, many disappeared.

    From this history, four models emerged: the consolidated metropolitan brand, uniting multiple colleges under one identity; the regional federation spread across towns and cities; the specialist regional provider rooted in place; and the art school absorbed into a larger university. All four persist, but history shows how quickly the civic and regional variants were erased in the pursuit of scale. That remains the risk.

    The limits of consolidation

    Super universities are most often justified through promises of efficiency and resilience. The patterns of merger and acquisition are familiar, exercised through cuts, closures, and the stripping back of provision. Contraction is presented as progress.

    And what follows: a merger into an “Ultra Super University”, a “Mega University”? The logic of consolidation always points in that direction. Fewer institutions. The illusion that size solves structural problems.

    But what if the future of universities is regional, hybrid and networked? Do mergers enable this? Or do they reduce it, by erasing local presence in the pursuit of efficiency?

    The risk is not only that provision shrinks, but that our regional and civic anchors are lost. A university’s resilience lies not in the absence of difference but in its presence: in the tolerance of variety, the recognition of locality, and the capacity to sustain attachment.

    Federation of art schools

    UCA grew from a federation of art schools, distributed rather than centralised, holding to a civic model of place. This has been hard to sustain in today’s free market. However, our University has become a place for those who find belonging in community, for outliers and outsiders at home in the intimacy of a civic setting, rather than the intensity of the metropolis. Our resilience shows how creative specialist schools can generate strength from vulnerability. Our story also foreshadows the systemic pressures now confronting universities everywhere.

    The Kent–Greenwich merger now brings new possibilities for Medway, positioned between Greenwich and Kent and home to a university campus for them both. If approached with care, it could restore creative presence to a place long on the periphery.

    Our civic project persists at Canterbury School of Art, Architecture and Design. Our founder, Sidney Cooper, a local painter, established Canterbury’s School of Art in 1868 as a gift to the city. It has survived every reform since. In the 1960s it moved into a modernist building, future-facing yet rooted in the Garden of England.

    That identity carried it through polytechnic consolidation, university expansion, and marketisation. It remains its strength now: an art school for the city, of the city, and in the city. Creativity is lived as much as it is taught.

    A human-sized proposition

    For us at UCA Canterbury, the alternative is clear. Ours is a human-sized proposition: intimate, civic, distinctive. A place where students are known by name, where teaching is close, and where creativity is inseparable from civic life.

    We intend that our graduates remain in creative professions for life, not because of economies of scale but because of the depth of their formation. Small institutions enable what scale cannot: intimacy, belonging, and the tolerance of difference. They cultivate attachment to place, the character of community, and the fragile conditions in which nuture and trust can grow. These are not marginal gains. They are the essence of education itself. Vulnerability, when named and advocated for, becomes strength.

    This is the measure against which any super university must be judged: not whether it scales, but whether it sustains the human scale within it. The crisis in higher education is not only financial but cultural. It is about whether universities can still act as places of meaning, attachment, and public need.

    Our founder, Sidney Cooper, understood in 1868 that education was not about scale but about purpose. That mission still speaks. In the shadow of consolidation and the spectre of Artificial Intelligence, what must endure is the human scale of learning and belonging.

    To sustain it is a choice we must keep making.

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  • How to do the perfect merger

    How to do the perfect merger

    As we reported on Wednesday, the University of Greenwich and the University of Kent have announced their intention to create a new “super-university” – tentatively called the London and South East University Group (LSEUG).

    It’s worth getting the terminology together. Also styled as a “multi-university group” (a clear nod, if not a direct parallel, to the “multi academy trust”) there will be one unified governing body, one academic board, one executive team, and one vice chancellor (which will be Jane Harrington, currently vice chancellor at Greenwich).

    Despite the “super-university” framing in press statements there is intended to be no changes for students and applicants – people will still apply to, and graduate from, either Kent or Greenwich. For all other purposes – regulation, funding, employment – the idea is of a single entity, but there is still a lot to be worked out.

    Further work on the details of the merger (and it does look like a merger, even though neither university uses that language) will lead to a decision on an implementation around the end of the calendar year. If everything goes to plan, the new structure and entity will be in place in time for the 2026–27 academic year.

    So staff at both universities are in for what will be a busy 12 months in quite a condensed timeframe.

    Everybody else

    And not just them. A university with dual identities but a single structure is not exactly an anomaly – the University of Coventry and its “CU” sub-brand, the University of South Wales and the Royal Welsh College of Music and Drama, the various FE groups (like Cornwall College) – but the degree to which we are looking at two trading names rather than two institutions will determine a lot of regulatory and funding decisions.

    For instance – how would Research England determine eligibility for the REF? Both constituent parts of the new entity entered the previous exercise, and both have developed an impact and publication profile in the years since. But it is very likely that Greenwich and Kent have two very different “research cultures”, even though scores for “environment” were similar in REF2021.

    The REF rules point, in England, to OfS Approved (fee cap) status plus research degree awarding powers (unless specific permission is granted) as the price of participation and access to QR funding.

    So would the new entity be able to maintain two OfS registrations and two sets of degree awarding powers? A “merger” is, as you might expect, a reportable event – and would lead to a reassessment of the financial sustainability and governance arrangements of both providers involved (as per section 144 of the Regulatory Framework).

    There would also need to be a reassessment of quality and standards – here OfS is clear that it would use the compliance history of previously registered provider(s) in assessing what would potentially be a new application for registration (para 372 here). All of this, of course, is subject to the usual vagaries of OfS judgement in an individual case.

    Beware of the leopard

    You’d have to be au fait with the footnotes to the analysis of responses to the 2022 consultation on quality and standards conditions(!) to know that:

    A merger or acquisition is a reportable event, and we would make a judgement about whether such an event resulted in any increased risk for any condition of registration for any of the providers involved. A merger or acquisition of two registered providers also requires a decision to deregister the dissolving entity – a decision to deregister a provider in these circumstances also means we consider whether any regulatory benefits or regulatory protection for students in relation to the deregistering provider transfer to the lead provider. Therefore, the relevance of any compliance history will be considered and, if appropriate, a new risk assessment will be completed as part of this process.

    There is not a playbook or a process for two universities merging – despite what feels like three years of Wonkhe articles suggesting that something like this could be on the cards – and despite the actual example of City St George’s University of London (which makes things a little easier by using only one, albeit unwieldy, trading name) there is no evidence of work being done in advance of what could well be a rush of other examples.

    I mention this not to take a pop at the Office for Students, but to suggest that this absence of a clearly defined regulatory path may be discouraging other registered providers from making similar decisions. If mergers are the financial stable future of the sector, there needs to be a simple process to allow them to happen.

    Compare, for example, the clear and straightforward guidance (and checklist) available from HESA.

    Outside privy

    Paragraph 306 of the current regulatory framework suggests that there are circumstances in mergers where university title is up for debate too. Both the University of Kent and the University of Greenwich have university title (you can tell that because they can both use the word “university” in their names) – Kent via a Royal Charter in 1965, Greenwich via a 1992 Order of the Privy Council.

    From what we know so far the London and South East University Group (name not yet confirmed) will bring the two current institutions (the University of Kent, the University of Greenwich) under one structure. If the name of the overall structure contains the word “university” it will need to have approval for its new use of the word university in a company name.

    I’d love to draw a parallel with City St George’s but that one is just weird – City didn’t use its 1966 university title after 2006 (it used City, University of London), St George’s Hospital Medical School never used its 2022 university title, it was St George’s, University of London), but the combined provider uses the 1966 City title despite still being a member of the University of London, because as of the 2022 University of London Act you can now have university title within the University of London.

    It isn’t made clear in any of the guidance, but generally only a legal entity can hold university title. A lot depends on the chosen company structure of the new body – if we are reversing two existing companies into a new entity then I’d honestly be surprised if it wasn’t the new entity that needs university title: and the existing ones (referring as they do, to existing names) wouldn’t be enough.

    Could we have one entity with two university titles? Generally not, but to offer consistency to students and applicants you’d hope some arrangement could be made, at least over the short to medium term.

    Though OfS nominally gets to determine university status these days, in legal reality it issues a recommendation to the Department for Education that it can offer a response of “non-objection” to the Registrar of Companies (at Companies House) who makes the final determination. That’s a lot of people to get to agree.

    Sandbox

    The mere act of doing something that hasn’t quite been done this way before causes administrative problems. For all the OfS’ processes aim to provide the legendary “level playing field”, in practice it has been helpful if your provider looks quite a lot like existing providers. LSEUG, with its Greenwich and Kent sub-brands, does not look like any current provider and as such it could face a bumpy ride – via a series of exceptions and special cases – into good standing with OfS.

    A special case should not be a worry, and if – as many predict – this merger is the first of many there will be a number of precedents set that should make it easier for future providers in a similar situation. That’s great for them, but not much comfort for the team across Kent and Greenwich that will be arguing the case with OfS, DfE, and others on a number of rules and requirements.

    At its best, regulation should apply reliably and equally to everyone. But there is a case, where regulation needs to evolve, to establish a sandbox where new ways to assure against the various OfS and DfE concerns can be developed and deployed. And perhaps that could help make regulation less onerous for everyone.

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  • Europe’s cautionary merger tales through student eyes

    Europe’s cautionary merger tales through student eyes

    I can’t be the only person who, on reading the press releases, was confused about what Kent and Greenwich are actually planning.

    The releases call it a “trailblazing” collaboration that will “bring both institutions under one structure” – with one unified governing body, academic board and executive team, and one vice chancellor.

    At the same time, students will continue to apply to, study at and graduate from their chosen university, and Kent’s FAQ reassures that “nothing will change for the foreseeable future” and that the “day-to-day experience will remain the same.”

    So which is it – one provider with two brands, or two universities with some shared services? And will change be felt on the ground, or just in the cloud?

    The messaging is a masterclass in cakeism – implying all the efficiency benefits of merger with none of the disruption costs, all the scale advantages of integration with none of the identity losses, and all the governance streamlining of unification with none of the democratic deficits.

    Maybe the most positive spin possible is inevitable when at least one of the partners is in financial strife.

    But the apparent contradictions matter – because while a “single spine, shared standards, separate shopfronts” model may be novel in UK terms, it’s one of many hybrid approaches that plenty of European universities have been experimenting with for over a decade.

    Frustratingly, there’s never been much research that might help us learn lessons from the seemingly constant process of group consolidation and (sometimes quasi-)merger in UK further education since incorporation in the 1990s.

    There’s not even been much analysis on the reshaping of Welsh HE in the last decade following then Welsh Education Minister Leighton Andrews’ “urge to merge” – at least not that’s focussed on the upsides or otherwise for students.

    But on the wider continent, the last two decades have witnessed what Pedro Teixeira from the University of Porto describes as a “surge” in university mergers – close to 130 cases since 2000, according to the European University Association’s comprehensive merger tool.

    Many of these have involved the kind of complex institutional arrangements Kent and Greenwich seem to be proposing – shared governance with retained identities, unified back-office functions with separate student-facing brands, promises of continuity alongside fundamental structural change.

    For all the grand pronouncements about “trailblazing models” and “world-class institutions”, the European experience repeatedly tells a more mundane story – one where student consultation means performative surveys that don’t produce policy changes, where staff meetings devolve into ideological standoffs over academic direction, and where promised synergies dissolve into territorial disputes between competing institutional cultures and administrative hierarchies.

    So the good news is that Kent-Greenwich, and all the others that may follow, can potentially learn from them all.

    Et s’il fallait le faire

    What happens when political ambition meets student reality? France’s merger programme (2009-2020) aimed to create globally competitive “super-universities” capable of challenging MIT and Stanford. The result was students describing a “loss of soul” during extended integration periods.

    The University of Paris-Saclay (2018-2020) – Emmanuel Macron’s flagship answer to MIT – united 19 institutions covering 15 per cent of France’s research output. Students at UVSQ linked their opposition to wider concerns about precarity and democracy.

    Student organiser Tristan Peglion argued that the university’s board should be “on the side of students rather than international rankings,” while protesters complained that “things aren’t clear.” Even the French National Assembly acknowledged that student consultation was “far from smooth”.

    Students experienced administrative confusion creating parallel systems that operated simultaneously for years, while the emphasis on research excellence meant undergraduate teaching quality became secondary to international profile development.

    And at Aix-Marseille University (2012), students faced tougher academic rules as the university standardised policies by adopting the most restrictive options from across departments, while student support services were cut through mergers and downsizing.

    The HCERES (Council for the Evaluation of Research and Higher Education) assessments systematically documented that undergraduate student experience deteriorated while research infrastructure received priority investment.

    When institutional transformation prioritises external prestige over internal community welfare, it looks like students pay the price – through reduced support, increased confusion, and weakened engagement and participation.

    Hard rock hallelujah

    Even the celebrated success stories leave students struggling with fragmentation and volatility. Finland’s Aalto University (2010) is probably the country’s most celebrated merger, backed by substantial government funding and political commitment.

    But students experienced years of uncertainty about curriculum changes, administrative confusion as three different systems were gradually integrated, and campus integration challenges.

    After more than a decade, student satisfaction remained volatile throughout integration, and cultural integration remained incomplete years after formal merger.

    The University of Tampere merger (2019) offers up some more recent evidence. Students described a sense of institutional disconnection during the process, more administrative confusion with parallel systems operating simultaneously, and faced inconsistent treatment between students from different legacy institutions.

    The University of Eastern Finland suggests that mergers can create:

    …a site of contestation where different organisational identities, values and histories collided, leaving the new university struggling to define itself.

    The Finnish experience contains some uncomfortable truths – merger benefits are not automatic, cultural integration can’t be forced through administrative restructuring, and student experience can suffer for years during transition periods.

    If the Finns – with their additional funding, careful planning, and institutional commitment – struggled with these challenges, what does that suggest for UK mergers driven by financial pressures?

    Like a satellite

    If you were planning a merger, you’d want to avoid students being left orbiting inefficiently around duplicated services, never quite connecting.

    The creation of the University of Duisburg-Essen tells a story of efficiency-focused consolidation that can create persistent practical problems for students. Rather than streamlined admin, the merger created duplicated services requiring constant coordination between sites.

    Student support services, IT help desks, and academic administration operated in parallel, creating confusion about procedures and reducing overall responsiveness. Academic staff spent significant time travelling between campuses, reducing their availability for tutorials, office hours, and research supervision.

    Students studying identical programmes experienced different levels of access to laboratories, specialist software, and research equipment depending on their campus location. Library resources and study spaces required duplication, straining budgets and reducing overall provision quality.

    Graduate employment suffered from employer confusion about degree equivalence and institutional reputation, while professional accreditation processes became more complex across multiple sites. And twenty years later, student satisfaction consistently remains below sector averages – while admin costs exceed initial projections.

    It seems that efficiency-focused consolidation often creates complexity rather than simplification, with students bearing the cost through reduced support and service quality.

    Fly on the wings of love

    Let’s try to avoid students becoming casualties of administrative chaos when comprehensive reform creates systematic disruption.

    Denmark’s 2007 reforms reduced 12 universities to 8 while simultaneously integrating government research institutes. The scale and speed created chaos in student-facing services that persisted for years.

    Multiple exam registration systems operated simultaneously, while student records and transcripts became scattered across different databases. Online learning platforms remained inconsistent between campuses and faculties, with digital resource access unreliable. Students faced years of uncertainty about academic regulations, with different rules on extensions and appeals persisting in parallel.

    After an initial period, students were forced to travel between campuses for different programme elements, with accommodation and living costs increasing given housing market disruption.

    Especially concerning was the marginalisation of student voice during implementation. Student representative structures were disrupted by constant organisational change, while administrative focus on merger implementation diverted attention from student concerns.

    General assurances about “no student disadvantage” proved meaningless in practice.

    This comprehensive, rapid merger programme created problems too complex for institutional management to handle effectively – and often, students became casualties of administrative chaos.

    We were the rock ‘n’ roll kids

    Federal structures often promise innovation – but if you’re not careful, can also reproduce old hierarchies and inequality.

    New Technological Universities (TUs) in Ireland are higher education institutions formed by the merging Institutes of Technology under the Technological Universities Act 2018. TUs were established to strengthen Ireland’s higher education sector, address regional disparities, and improve alignment with social and economic needs.

    TU Dublin’s experience merging three institutions initially appeared promising, with campus-level autonomy preserved while creating unified strategic direction. But Quality and Qualifications Ireland reviews document persistent inequalities between campuses.

    Timetabling systems remained inconsistent and student support services varied significantly across different sites. Professional placement coordination remained uneven between programmes, while staff expertise distribution being uneven across campuses affected programme quality and academic support availability.

    Student representation structures needed a complete redesign for multi-campus operation, and campus-level student voice was weakened by centralisation pressures. The students’ union faced particular challenges coordinating activity across geographic separation – with representation structures favouring larger campuses through practical accessibility advantages.

    Despite regulatory oversight emphasising student equality and equivalence, resource allocation formulas continued favouring established campuses, and services remained inconsistent between sites. Transport and accessibility issues also created lasting barriers for some student populations.

    It looks like federal governance models can work – but require sustained attention to equality and democratic participation. And explicit equivalence commitments clearly need robust monitoring arrangements to prevent campus hierarchies from emerging.

    J’entends la voix

    Geography can silence the voice that should be heard. Nordic merger experiences in recent decades suggest that geographic dispersion can exclude students on peripheral campuses from institutional decision-making and identity formation.

    In Norway’s 00s and 10s mergers, students on rural and smaller campuses consistently felt excluded, with geographic barriers creating social and academic isolation, while cultural differences became marginalised by “urban-dominated” institutional culture.

    Student participation suffered through geographic barriers limiting effective participation in democratic structures. Travel funding proved inadequate for equal representation across all sites, and administrative complexity overwhelmed student representative capacity.

    Meanwhile in Sweden, students on peripheral campuses faced systematic disadvantage unless specific measures addressed transport, accommodation, and coordination costs. The research suggests that merger processes accidentally recreated “colonial” relationships between central and peripheral locations.

    Research concluded that when mergers are implemented to achieve political or financial rather than educational goals, student welfare can become secondary to policy success metrics, with rapid integration timelines preventing the gradual relationship building that’s necessary for successful multi-campus cooperation.

    It looks like geographic integration requires explicit investment in coordination infrastructure – and can’t rely on efficiency assumptions that may prove false in practice.

    Sanomi

    When institutions can’t speak the same language, students can pay the price through communication breakdown.

    The University of Antwerp’s three-institution merger in the late 2010s required efficiency-focused implementation that affected student support services, with different institutional cultures requiring extended integration periods. Students experienced particular difficulties during the harmonisation of academic regulations, which created all sorts of inconsistencies in assessment and progression requirements.

    And in Lisbon in 2013, the University of Lisbon (ULisboa) was formed through the merger of two institutions – the original University of Lisbon and the Technical University of Lisbon (Universidade Técnica de Lisboa). The unification combined their academic resources, faculties, and research centers to create a single, larger university under the name ULisboa.

    University records and official notices show a prolonged drive to integrate legacy academic IT platforms – culminating in a project to implement a single system across the institution – and a staggered programme of regulation updates across schools. For a time, undergraduates encountered baffling parallel systems and non-uniform rules while harmonisation proceeded.

    Success clearly requires sustained attention to student experience throughout extended integration periods – rather than assuming that formal merger completion resolves underlying tensions all on its own.

    Come on, everybody, let’s sing along

    Tallinn University’s integration of over ten institutions through multiple phases over an extended timeline created constant uncertainty for students, with academic programme rationalisation affecting diverse disciplines over many years.

    Students experienced academic regulations that remained inconsistent across different institutional components, creating confusion about progression requirements and appeal procedures. Support services varied significantly in quality and accessibility between legacy units, with standardisation efforts often reducing rather than enhancing service levels. Nobody signs up for “levelling down”.

    It looks like extended merger processes can create prolonged uncertainty that undermines student experience and institutional effectiveness. Ongoing organisational change can prevent participation structures from stabilising, and reduces student capacity for effective advocacy and representation.

    Students can, in other words, become casualties of perpetual transition – with normal institutional development suspended during extended integration periods. Extended uncertainty seems to serve neither student interests nor institutional development – and ongoing change can prevent effective quality assurance and democratic accountability from functioning properly.

    Nothing about us without us

    So what does all this European evidence mean for Kent and Greenwich students, and anyone else in the coming months and years facing their own institutional transformation?

    The fundamental test of merged institutions’ democratic credentials lies not in reassuring rhetoric about consultation, “retention” of existing experiences, or “improvements” to the student experience, but in a willingness to resource meaningful student participation – involvement in decisions that will reshape the student experience for tens of thousands of people.

    European evidence demonstrates repeatedly that mergers done “to” students rather than “with” them establish patterns of institutional authoritarianism that persist long after the initial transformation. When student voices are marginalised during merger negotiations – dismissed as lacking technical expertise or operating on inappropriate timescales – the resulting institutions embed democratic deficits from their foundation.

    Much of merger planning is indeed complex, often presented as confidential and beyond student representative capacity. But that framing is itself political.

    The instinct to exclude students reflects familiar institutional prejudices – “they won’t be around long enough to engage as genuine partners,” “they’re not sophisticated enough to understand complex governance,” “they can’t be trusted with confidential information.” Each assumption reveals more about institutional mindset than the actual capacity of student representatives or their organisations.

    Students at Aalto University required years of advocacy – including formal complaints to Finland’s Chancellor of Justice – to secure basic language rights that should have been protected from the outset. In other examples, the failure wasn’t procedural but practical – student representatives were denied information and resources to engage meaningfully with complex negotiations.

    To learn the lessons in any future mergers in the UK, universities should establish dedicated funding to support enhanced SU capacity during transition – enabling SUs to gather and synthesise student input effectively. More importantly, SUs need actual power – not consultative status – on all merger-related governance bodies, with access to documentation and independent legal advice.

    Students will inevitably demand that all policies, services, and facilities be “levelled up” to the highest standard of either institution rather than harmonised to a convenient middle ground. It’ll be wise to factor that in early – enabling honest and early conversations about what will be standardised, what will be bespoked, when, and why.

    Regulators will need to both play, and be seen to play, an active role in student protection. In England, students “getting what they were promised” is both something it knows students are concerned about, but something it consistently appears to sideline at the altar of institutional survival. That will need to change.

    For student representation itself, there’s three obvious structural options. One approach would dissolve existing SUs to create an entirely new organisation. Another would preserve existing identities while creating coordination mechanisms. The conservative option would be to sustain separate SUs with coordination only on shared concerns.

    But in many ways, none of these structural options adequately addresses the real problem – which goes wider than the SUs themselves.

    These are the heroes of our time

    All the evidence from our study tours in Europe suggests that successful student communities depend on small-scale structures that build belonging and peer support – precisely what institutional merger threatens to destroy.

    Even in the largest universities on the continent, good systems consistently implement shallow ends – where students are organised into associative school or faculty structures that are capable of taking peer-responsibility for aspects of the student experience.

    In some ways, it’s the fundamental contradiction of mega-mergers – and of massified higher education more broadly. Institutions grow ever larger in pursuit of efficiency and status, while students and their staff require ever smaller communities to thrive academically and socially.

    Whatever SU structure emerges will need to embed small-scale structures within whatever governance arrangements are necessary for institutional advocacy.

    The tone set during merger will likely echo through decades of institutional culture. European failures teach us that consultation without power becomes performance, and performance without genuine partnership breeds cynicism. In other words, invest in democratic participation now, or explain democratic exclusion later.

    But as well as that, successful participation at institutional level can’t substitute for the daily experience of belonging that comes from knowing the people in your lecture hall rather than facing five hundred strangers.

    That requires a different kind of investment – in academic societies, peer mentoring, and the patient work of building academic communities at human scale within institutional structures designed for bureaucratic efficiency. After all, nine out of ten broadway musicals fail – but school plays sell out.

    If any set of managers embarking on a merger are serious about creating institutions that engage rather than merely process students, they’ll need to embrace the principle that there should be nothing about us without us.

    And they need to recognise that “us” means both the collective student body requiring effective institutional representation – and the individual students requiring small communities where they can learn, belong, thrive, and take responsibility for their own experience.

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  • The first multi-university group arrives

    The first multi-university group arrives

    The University of Greenwich and the University of Kent have this morning announced the intention to form a multi-university group.

    The aim is for the London and South East University Group – as it’s provisionally to be known, though this will be subject to consultation – to be established in time for the 2026–27 academic year.

    The plan on the student-facing side is for each university’s identity to be preserved – with applications, and degree awards, kept separate – behind the scenes, the “super-university” (as the press release puts it) will have a unified governing body, academic board, and executive team, and a single vice chancellor: Greenwich’s Jane Harrington. Staff at both universities are expected to transfer across to the newly merged university – legally, there will be one entity, but the two “brands” will still exist as trading arms.

    Merger by numbers

    Going by 2023–24 student numbers, the new “super-university” would have 46,885 registered students (29,695 at Greenwich, 17,190 at Kent), around the same size as the University of Manchester. It would employ 2,550 academic staff (currently 1,245 at Greenwich, 1,305 at Kent), roughly equivalent in size to Manchester Metropolitan University.

    It would offer, based on the current UCAS database, an astonishing 442 full time undergraduate courses (281 at Greenwich, 171 at Kent) – 70  more than the University of Manchester. A glance across portfolios sees some interesting congruences. Kent has a medical school, Greenwich has a nursing school and a teacher training offer. Both are strong in law, computer science, business, engineering, and psychology. Greenwich has more of an offer in the arts and tourism, Kent in the hard sciences.

    [full screen]

    The University of Kent has an established reputation for research in social policy and social work, and in law – although the largest single concentration of research active staff is in business and management studies. Greenwich also has a research concentration in business, but overall it has a less strong research portfolio.

    Financially speaking, we’re talking about a “super-university” with nearly £598m of income (Greenwich £329m, Kent £268m): that’s a little less than Newcastle University. Expenditure of £569m (Greenwich £302m, Kent £266m) is in the University of Warwick ballpark.

    While there have been a number of recent higher education mergers – ARU with Writtle, and City St George’s, in particular – the size and scale, along with the much-anticipated deployment of a multi-university model for the first time, mark this news as something of a watershed moment for the English sector.

    Universities UK’s efficiency and transformation taskforce has been for some time highlighting the sector’s interest in something comparable to multi-academy trust structures in schools – while also noting the “relatively limited experience” that the sector possesses in navigating such arrangements. This is about to change – the two universities’ description of the intended union as “a blueprint for other institutions to follow” is likely prescient.

    Two become one

    We might also note here that such a model is by no means limited to only two universities operating under one umbrella. The conversations behind the scenes over the last couple of years have been for groups spanning multiple universities and it’s not hard to see how others in the region might want to – or somehow be compelled to – join this group once it’s up and running. Starting with two, however, is a logical choice given the scale and complexity of that exercise alone. The government will be watching closely and hoping it works, so that they can propose the model elsewhere, particularly if it staves off the risk of institutional failure. Local politicians will also be watching closely as a potentially massive new institution emerges, which could have far-reaching local consequences for better and worse.

    One of the eye-catching aspects of today’s announcement is that of leadership – it has already been settled that there is to be one vice chancellor, one board and one senior team. Most mergers and collaborations in HE in recent times have failed before they have even started because of disagreement about which person should sit in the big chair. Being able to embrace this merger process free of that thorny question gives the exercise a much greater chance of success from the outset.

    Of course, collaboration between the University of Greenwich and the University of Kent is not new. Since 2004 the two universities have jointly run the Medway School of Pharmacy in Chatham Dockyard, a joint endeavour that has grown into a multi-disciplinary campus shared between the Greenwich, Kent, and Canterbury Christ Church University. These two decades of practical experience will be an invaluable resource to draw on as these plans move closer to implementation.

    Just the beginning?

    Aside from the potential for other institutions to join the group, the announcement is clearly the start of a long-term process. Despite staff and students coming together into the newly merged university, student pathways and decision-making processes will inevitably be tied to the old institutions and subject areas – and this is difficult to change midstream. If the merger is successful, then these identities could eventually end up disappearing or at least moving to the background, as natural opportunities for integration and efficiencies are sought to be realised by the board and leadership team.

    Such talk will no doubt be unsettling for staff at both Kent and Greenwich, who will wonder for how long their jobs will be needed, particularly where they have a like-for-like counterpart on the other side. The consultations about their futures will need to be thorough and sensitive.

    And enormous questions of REF submissions, TEF awards, data, DAPs and more will now also need to be worked through.

    For now we watch as a new institution takes shape.

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  • Is There a Collaborative Middle Ground Between Mergers and Consortia for the Sustainability of Small Independent Institutions?

    Is There a Collaborative Middle Ground Between Mergers and Consortia for the Sustainability of Small Independent Institutions?

    July 28, 2025, by Dr. Chet Haskell: The headlines are full of uncertainty for American higher education. “Crisis” is a common descriptor. Federal investigations of major institutions are underway. Severe cuts to university research funding have been announced. The elimination of the Department of Education is moving ahead. Revisions to accreditation processes are being floated. Reductions in student support for educational grants and loans are now law. International students are being restricted.

    These uncertainties and pressures affect all higher education, not just targeted elite institutions. In particular, they are likely to exacerbate the fragility of smaller, independent non-profit institutions already under enormous stress. Such institutions, some well-known, others known only locally, will be hard hit particularly hard by the combination of Trump Administration pressures and the developing national demographic decline for traditional-age students.(https://www.highereddive.com/news/decline-high-school-graduates-demographic-cliff-wiche-charts/738281/) These small colleges have been a key element of the American higher education scene, as well as for numerous local communities, for many decades.

    It is widely understood that the vibrancy of American higher education comes, in part, from the diversity of its institutions and educational goals. The rich mixture of American colleges and universities is a strength that many other nations lack. Students have opportunities to start and stop their educations, to change directions and academic goals, to move among different types of institutions.

    Smaller undergraduate colleges play important roles in this non-systemic system. They provide focused educational opportunities for younger adults, where they can build their lives on broad principles. Impressively large percentages of small college graduates go on to graduate education for various professions. Small colleges provide large numbers of graduates who enter PhD programs and eventually enter the professorate.

    There are approximately 1179 accredited private institutions with enrollments of fewer than 3000 students. Of these, 185 have between 3000 and 2000 students. Another 329 have enrollments below 2000 but above 1000. A final 650 institutions have enrollments below 1000. These 1179 institutions students include few wealthy colleges such as Williams, Amherst, Carleton or Pomona, as well as numerous struggling, relatively unknowns.

    A basic problem is one of scale. In the absence of significant endowments or other external support, it is very difficult to manage small institutions in a cost effective manner. Institutions with enrollments below 1000 are particularly challenged in this regard. The fundamental economics of small institutions are always challenging, as most are almost completely dependent on student enrollments, a situation getting worse with the coming decline of traditional college age students. There are limited options available to offset this decline. Renewed attention to student retention is one. Another is adding limited graduate programs. However, both take investment, appropriate faculty and staff capacity and time, all of which are often scarce.

    These institutions have small endowments measured either in total or per student value. Of the 1179. There are only 80 with total endowments in excess of $200 million. While a handful have per student endowments that rival the largest private universities, (Williams, Amherst and Pomona all have per student endowments in excess of $1.8 million), the vast majority have per student endowments in the $40,000 range and many far less.

    Most of these schools have high tuition discount rates, often over 50%, so their net tuition revenue is a fraction of posted expense.  They are all limited by size – economies of scale are difficult to achieve. And most operate in highly competitive markets, where the competition is not only other small schools, but also a range of public institutions.

    So, what is the underendowed, under resourced small college to do?

    The most common initiatives designed to address these sorts of challenges are consortia, collaborative arrangements among institutions designed to increase student options and to share expenses. There are numerous such arrangements, examples being the Colleges of the Fenway in Boston, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, the Washington DC Metropolitan Area Consortium, and the Claremont Colleges in California, among others.

    The particulars of each of these groups differ, but there are commonalities. Most are geographically oriented, seeking to take advantage from being near each other. Typically, these groups want to provide more opportunities for students through allowing cross-registrations, sharing certain academic programs or joint student activities. They usually have arrangements for cost-sharing or cost reductions through shared services  for costs like security services, IT, HR, risk management options, pooled purchasing and the like. In other cases (like the Claremont Consortium) they may share libraries or student athletic facilities. Done well, these arrangements can indeed reduce costs while also attracting potential students through wider access to academic options.

    However, it is unlikely that such initiatives, no matter how successful, can fundamentally change the basic financial situation of an independent small college. Such shared services savings are necessary and useful, but usually not sufficient to offset the basic enrollment challenge. The financial impact of most consortia is at the margins.

    Furthermore, participating institutions have to be on a solid enough financial basis to take part in the first place. Indeed, a consortium like Claremont is based on financial strength. Two of the members have endowments in excess of $1.2 billion (Pomona’s is $2.8 billion.) The endowments of the others range from a low of $67 million (Keck Graduate with 617 students) to Scripps with $460 million for 1100 students.) The Consortium is of clear value to its members, but none of these institutions is on the brink of failure. Rather, all have strong reputations, a fact that provides another important enrollment advantage.

    One important factor in these consortia arrangements is that the participating institutions do not have to give up their independence or modify their missions. Their finances, alumni and accreditation are separate.  And while the nature of the arrangement indicates certain levels of compromise and collaboration, their governance remains basically unchanged with independent fiduciary boards.

    At the other end of the spectrum are two radically different situations. One is merging with or being acquired by another institution. Prep Scholar counts 33 such events since 2015. (https://blog.prepscholar.com/permanently-closed-colleges-list). Lacking the resources for financial sustainability, many colleges have had no choice but to take such steps.

    Merging or being acquired by a financially stronger institution has many advantages. Faculty and staff jobs may be protected. Students can continue with their studies. The institution being acquired may be able to provide continuity in some fashion within the care of the new owner. Endowed funds may continue. The institution’s name may continue as part of an “institute” or “center” within the new owner’s structure. Alumni records can be maintained. Real estate can be transferred. Debts may be paid off and so forth. There are multiple examples of the acquiring institution doing everything possible along these lines.

    But some things end. Independent governance and accreditation cease as those functions are subsumed by the acquiring institution. Administrative and admissions staffs are integrated and some programs, people and activities are shed. Operational leadership changes. And over time, what was once a beloved independent institution may well fade away.

    The second situation is, bluntly, oblivion. While there are cases of loyal alumni trying to keep an institution alive with new funding, the landscape is replete with institutions that have failed to be financially sustainable.https://www.insidehighered.com/news/governance/executive-leadership/2025/03/27/how-sweet-briar-college-defied-odds-closure. At least 170 smaller institutions have closed in the past two decades. Significantly, it looks like the rate of closure is increasing, in part because of pressures experienced during the pandemic and in part because of continuing enrollment declines.(https://www.highereddive.com/news/how-many-colleges-and-universities-have-closed-since-2016/539379/)

    The end of a college is a very sad thing for all involved and, indeed, for society in general. Often a college is an anchor institution in a small community and the loss is felt widely. The closure of a college is akin to the closure of a local factory. As Dean Hoke and others have noted, this is a particular problem for rural communities.

    Are there other possible avenues, something between a consortium and a merger or outright closure?

    One relatively new model has been organized by two quite different independent institutions, Otterbein University and Antioch University, that came together in 2022 to create the Coalition for the Common Good. Designed to be more than a simple bilateral partnership, the vision of the Coalition is eventually to include several institutions in different locations linked by a common mission and the capacity to grow collective enrollments.

    At its core, the Coalition is based on academic symbiosis. Otterbein is a good example of the high-quality traditional undergraduate residential liberal arts institution. It has been well-run and has modest financial resources. Facing the demographic challenges noted earlier (in a state like Ohio that boasts dozens of such institutions), it developed a set of well-regarded graduate programs, notably in nursing and health-related fields, along with locally based teacher education programs and an MBA. However, despite modest success, they faced the limitations of adult programs largely offered in an on-campus model. Regardless of quality, they lacked the capacity to expand such programs beyond Central Ohio.

    Antioch University, originally based in Ohio, had evolved over the past 40 years into a more national institution with locations in California, Washington State and New Hampshire offering a set of graduate professional programs to older adults mostly through distance modalities in hybrid or low-residency forms. Antioch, however, was hampered by limited resources including a very small endowment. It had demonstrated the capacity to offer new programs in different areas and fields but lacked the funds necessary for investment to do so.

    Within the Coalition, the fundamental arrangement is for Antioch to take over Otterbein’s graduate programs and, with Otterbein financial support, to expand them in other parts of the country. The goal is significant aggregate enrollment growth and sharing of new revenues. While they plan a shared services operation to improve efficiencies and organizational effectiveness, their primary objective is growth. Antioch seeks to build on Otterbein’s successes, particularly with nursing programs. It already has considerable experience in managing academic programs at a distance, a fact that will be central as it develops the Otterbein nursing and health care programs in a new Antioch Graduate School of Nursing and Health Professions.

    It is assumed that additional new members of the Coalition will resemble Otterbein in form, thus further increasing opportunities for growth through enhanced reach and greater scale. New members in other geographic locations will provide additional opportunities for expansion. One early success of the Coalition has been the capacity to offer existing Antioch programs in Central Ohio, including joint partnerships with local organizations, health care and educational systems. Crucially, both institutions remain separately accredited with separate governance and leadership under a Coalition joint  “umbrella” structure.

    This is not to assert that this model would work for many other institutions. First, many schools with limited graduate programs will be reluctant to “give up” some or all these programs to another partner in the same fashion as Otterbein has with Antioch. Others may not fit geographically, being too remote for expansion of existing programs. Still others may not wish to join a group with an avowed social justice mission.  Finally, as with some consortia, the Coalition arrangement assumes a certain degree of institutional financial stability – it cannot work for institutions on the brink of financial disaster, lest the weakest institution drag down the others.

    Are there other organizational variants that are more integrated than consortia, but allow the retention of their independence in ways impossible in a merger or acquisition model? What can be learned from the Coalition initiative that might help others? How might such middle-ground collaboration models be encouraged and supported?

    How can philanthropy help?

    This is an opportunity for the segments of the philanthropic world to consider possible new initiatives to support the small college elements of the education sector. While there will always be efforts to gain foundation support for individual colleges, there will never be enough money to buttress even a small portion of deserving institutions that face the financial troubles discussed above

    Philanthropy should take a sectoral perspective. One key goal should be to find ways to support  smaller institutions in general. Instead of focusing on gifts to particular institutions, those interested in supporting higher education should look at the multiple opportunities for forms of collaborative or collective action. Central to this effort should be exploration of ways of supporting diverse collaborative initiatives. One example would be to provide sufficient backing to a struggling HBCU or women’s college to enable it to be sufficiently stable to participate in a multi-institutional partnership.

    As noted, institutional consortia are well established as one avenue for such collaboration. Consortia have existed for many years. There are consortia-based associations that encourage and support consortia efforts. However, every consortium is unique in its own ways, as participating institutions have crafted a specific initiative of a general model to meet their particular situations and need. Consortia can be important structures for many institutions and should be encouraged.

    But there is a large middle ground between consortia arrangements and mergers and acquisitions. The Coalition for the Common Good is but one such arrangement and it is still in its early stages. What has been learned from the experience thus far that might be of use to other institutions and groups? How might this middle ground be explored further for the benefit of other institutions?

    One thing learned from the Coalition is the complexity of developing a new model for collective action.  Antioch and Otterbein separately pursued individual explorations of options for two or more years before determining that their partnership together should move forward. It then took a full year to get to the point of announcing their plans and another year to complete negotiations and sign completed legal documents and to obtain the necessary accreditor, regulator and Department of Education approvals. The actual implementation of their plans is still in a relatively early stage. In short, it takes time.

    It also takes tremendous effort by leadership on both sides, as they must work closely together while continuing to address the daily challenges of their separate institutions. Everyone ends up with at least two major jobs. Communication is vital. Boards must continue to be supportive. The engagement of faculty and staff takes time and can be costly.

    What is often referred to as “fit” – the melding of cultures and attitudes at both the institutional and individual levels – is essential. People must be able to work together for shared goals. The burdens of accreditation, while necessary, are time-consuming and multifaceted. There are many things that can go wrong. Indeed, there are examples of planned and announced mergers or collaborations that fall apart before completion.

    Philanthropic institutions could support this work in numerous ways, first for specific initiatives and then for the sector, by providing funding and expertise to facilitate new forms of coalitions. These could include:

    • Providing financial support for the collaborative entity. While participating institutions eventually share the costs of creating the new arrangement, modest dedicated support funding could be immensely useful for mitigating the impact of legal expenses, due diligence requirements, initial management of shared efforts and expanded websites.
    • Providing support for expert advice. The leaders of two institutions seeking partnership need objective counsel on matters financial, legal, organizational, accreditation and more. Provision of expertise for distance education models is often a high priority, since many small colleges have limited experience with these.
    • Funding research. There are multiple opportunities for research and its dissemination. What works? What does not? How can lessons learned by disseminated?
    • Supporting communication through publications, workshops, conferences and other venues.
    • Developing training workshops for boards, leadership, staff and faculty in institutions considering collaborations.
    • Crafting a series of institutional incentives through seed grant awards to provide support for institutions just beginning to consider these options.
    • These types of initiatives might be separate, or they might be clustered into a national center to support and promote collaboration.

    These and other ideas could be most helpful to many institutions exploring collaboration. Above all, it is important to undertake such explorations before it is too late, before the financial situation becomes so dire that there are few, if any, choices.

    Conclusions

    This middle ground is not a panacea. The harsh reality is that not all institutions can be saved. It takes a certain degree of stability and a sufficient financial base to even consider consortia or middle ground arrangements like the Coalition for the Common Good. Merging with or being acquired by stronger institutions is not a worst-case scenario – there are often plenty of reasons, not just financial, that this form of change makes great sense for a smaller, weaker institution.

    It is also important for almost all institutions, even those with significant endowment resources, to be thinking about possible options. The stronger the institution, the stronger the resistance to such perspectives is likely to be. There are examples of wealthy undergraduate institutions with $1 billion endowments that are losing significant sums annually in their operating budgets. Such endowments often act like a giant pillow, absorbing the institutional challenges and preventing boards and leaders from facing difficult decisions until it may be too late. Every board should be considering possible future options.

    In the face of likely government rollbacks of support, the ongoing demographic challenges for smaller institutions and the general uncertainties in some circle about the importance of higher education itself, independent private higher education must be more creative and assertive about its future. Also, it is essential to remember that the existential financial challenges facing these institutions predate the current Presidential Administration and certainly will remain once it has passed into history.

    Just trying to compete more effectively for enrollments will not be sufficient. Neither will simply reducing expense budgets. New collaborative models are needed. Consortia have roles to play. The example of the Coalition for the Common Good may show new directions forward. Anyone who supports the diversity of American higher education institutions should work to find new ways of assuring financial stability while adhering to academic principles and core missions.


    Chet Haskell is an independent higher education consultant. Most recently, he was Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and University Provost at Antioch University and Vice President for Graduate Programs of the Coalition for the Common Good.

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  • The possibilities for radical collaboration in HE go far beyond mergers

    The possibilities for radical collaboration in HE go far beyond mergers

    2024-25 has been quite a year for collaboration in higher education. A year on from the election of the Labour government two things are pretty clear: there will be no significant injection of public funds into the sector in the current parliament; and the guiding lens for this government’s post-16 education policy will be regional.

    Instead of a highly competitive national higher education market the current policy landscape speaks to finding more ways to pool resources between institutions – so much so that Universities UK announced the formation of its taskforce on efficiency and transformation with the announcement of a “new era of collaboration” in higher education.

    Early in the year as the reality of the fiscal situation became clearer the sector saw a renewal of interest in coordinated efficiency models, including shared services, joint procurement, and up to and including mergers and acquisitions. There was only one problem: anyone who had experience of these kinds of initiatives, whether in higher education or another sector, would quickly warn that they require a great deal of upfront investment of time and energy, and the intended efficiency savings rarely materialise in the short term.

    No institution whose sole objective was to save money would look to collaboration as the best solution. But when we have explored themes of collaboration with the sector – through our radical efficiency article series with KPMG UK and our Connect More report with Mills & Reeve – we have found that despite the competitive pressures on the sector there is an appetite to explore where greater coordination between institutions could enhance value for students, employers, research funders and communities and regions.

    Play by play

    That sense of strategic potential for new ways of realising value is the starting point for a new publication from KPMG UK and Mills & Reeve. Titled Radical collaboration: a playbook, the report sets out the strategic context and considerations for boards and executives considering the range of options for structural collaboration, and the legal implications for the different kinds of possible models for structural collaboration.

    “If structural collaboration is framed as a short term fix for immediate financial sustainability then it’s the wrong answer to a bad question,” says Justine Andrew, partner at KPMG UK, and one of the authors of the playbook. “I think this is the moment, looking at the medium to long term, to say ‘is there a more joined-up way of fulfilling the purposes of what universities are for which is delivering world class teaching and research with impact in our places?’”

    It is often assumed that “structural collaboration” is a euphemism for merger – which itself is a euphemism for acquisition of one education provider by another. But this is far from accurate. One of the intents of the playbook is to explore the breadth of possible collaborations available to higher education providers on a spectrum from the softer to harder forms, including contractual alliance models, federation, group structures, and even the concept of a “multi-university trust.”

    “The multi-university trust is a concept that doesn’t exist yet,” says Poppy Short, partner at Mills & Reeve, and playbook author. “But in the school sector we have multi-academy trusts where all the institutions combine into one charitable company but the legacy institutions operate out of a separate academic division within that corporate vehicle, with some localised autonomy and branding. I think we will see one or more of those in higher education in the not too distant future.”

    Better the hurdle you know

    A further, highly practical, intent of the playbook is to help institutions to navigate some of the initial barriers to thinking through those different possibilities. Where higher education providers have merged – something that, while not especially common in higher education, is hardly beyond the bounds of accepted practice – they have been surprised to discover a lack of formal guidance that sets out the legal and regulatory requirements to help two organisations become one. There is even a degree of murkiness about the extent to which organisations are allowed to start conversations about collaboration under competition law – something which, under pressure from the sector, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has said it will look into.

    To tackle this lack of guidance, for each of the collaborative entities explored the playbook sets out the corporate structure and governance, and the implications for brand identity, management of finances and delivery of services, and the impact on staff and students, including a real-world example where one exists. The playbook then sets out a worked example of a hypothetical scenario of a group of providers in a place working through options for structural collaboration, thinking through what the strategic drivers and risks for individual institutions might be, and the legal, financial and regulatory implications for a new corporate group entity.

    “We really hope the playbook can move the conversation from the theoretical into a really practical one,” says Justine. “We’re using the fictional example of a place called Newtown that has a diverse range of FE and HE providers, and looking through a regional lens, if I’m a student, if I’m an employer, if I’m a combined authority, an industrial partner is the way that the sector I’m interfacing with set up the best for me from a curriculum, a research, a delivery point of view. So we’re not only thinking through the impact on the institutions themselves but flipping the lens a bit and asking whether, from the end user point of view, there is a better way of doing this.”

    Why wait for government

    Traditionally, the sector might have looked to the government to set out an agenda or framework where policy gaps are identified – but it’s also fair to say that few in the sector want the government to start putting pressure on institutions to work together or combine forces when the strategic rationale for doing so is undercooked. Far better for the impetus to come from institutions themselves, underpinned by a shared idea of the kinds of value that can be created through collaboration and a common commitment to achieving those ends.

    That doesn’t mean there is no role for government, not least in reducing the barriers to collaboration and potentially setting out some kind of brokerage framework or regulatory support service to encourage and support exploration of options. There are also some obvious tweaks to be made to the tax system to, at the very least, ensure structural collaborations do not incur a tax penalty.

    “I think the Department for Education is in listening mode,” says Poppy. “I think they are looking for the sector to come forward with ideas, for these conversations to start happening, and for the asks to fall out of that. Obviously there are funding challenges but there are other asks as well, such as could the department broker conversations with the CMA or give some additional regulatory guidance? Also it would be helpful to work on joining up the different forms of education provision across FE and HE so you’re not constantly finding hurdles – just as you get over one issue in your sector, you’re in another sector. I think there are many things the department could do to help universities navigate their way through some of the decision-making and planning and considering what their options are.”

    None of this looks like the kind of funding investment in transformation the sector might hope to see, but it’s worth noting that in some cases a benefit of scale can be to unlock opportunities for private investment. The playbook works through the circumstances under which private investment could be a sensible option and points to some existing public/private partnerships already in place in the sector.

    Radical collaboration may not be the answer for all or even most higher education institutions in England. But both the sector and government have to answer the fundamental policy question of how to organise the post-16 education sector in such a way as to support the provision of the kinds of diversity of qualifications, subjects and modes of delivery that will enable the largest possible numbers to benefit from the opportunity to enhance their life chances.

    If there is a chance that broader and deeper structural collaborations across further and higher education can help to deliver that agenda, then at the very least boards and executive teams have to give those options meaningful consideration – and this playbook just radically lowered the bar to starting that process.

    This article is published in association with KPMG UK and Mills & Reeve. You can view and download Radical collaboration: a playbook here.

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