Category: Regulation

  • The Harvard experience: could it happen here?

    The Harvard experience: could it happen here?

    by GR Evans

    On 1 May 2025 The Guardian headline read: ‘Trump administration exploits landmark civil rights act to fight universities’ diversity initiatives‘. What prevents a British King or Prime Minister from attempting to impose sanctions on universities?

    US higher education is exposed both to presidential and to state interference. Government powers to intervene in US HE reside in presidential control of federal funding, which may come with conditions. Trump cannot simply shut down the Department of Education by executive order but it seems he can direct that the Department’s grant- and loan-giving functions are taken on by another government department.

    As early as 2023 Donald Trump had said ‘We are going to choke off the money to schools that aid the Marxist assault on our American heritage and on Western civilization itself’. In response to campus protest he removed $400m of Columbia’s federal funding in March 2025 on the grounds that the University had failed to address the alleged ‘persistent harassment of Jewish students’. In April 2025 he gave orders to Ivy League universities, threatening withdrawal of funding if their teaching and research did not comply with Government policy as the President defined it and that their appointments should have regard to those expectations.

    On 8 April the Washington Examiner reported a planned attempt to counter such action by legislation, that is to prevent Trump’s directives taking effect by amending the Higher Education Act of 1965 ‘to prohibit political litmus tests in accreditation of institutions of higher education and for other purposes.  On 10 April the Chronicle of Higher Education foresaw an Executive Order.

    A letter to Harvard dated 11 April signed on behalf of the Department of Education and other federal agencies asserted that the United States had ‘invested in Harvard University’s operations’ because of ‘the value to the country’ of its work, but warned that ‘an investment is not an entitlement.’ This letter, if accepted, was to constitute ‘an agreement in principle’. Governance was to be ‘exclusively’ in the hands of those ‘tenured professors’ and ‘senior leadership’ who were ‘committed to the ‘changes indicated in this letter’. Its ‘hiring and related data’ and its student ‘admissions data’ were to be ‘shared with the federal Government’. International students ‘hostile to American values’ were not to be admitted and those already admitted  were to be reported to federal authorities. Policies on diversity, equity and inclusion were to end and student protest restricted.

    Harvard and other Ivy League Universities were indignant. Harvard in particular rode the headlines for some days, objecting to the Government demand that it immediately agree:

    to implement the Trump administration’s demands to overhaul the University’s governance and leadership, academic programs, admissions system, hiring process, and discipline system—with the promise of more demands to come

    and thus ‘overtly seek to impose on Harvard University political views and policy preferences advanced by the Trump administration and commit the University to punishing disfavored speech’. There were reports that US academics were seeking to escape to employment in Canada,  the UK or Europe.

    The American Association of Colleges and Universities(AACU), founded in 1915 as the Association of American Colleges, now has a wide-ranging  and international membership. It is a loose counterpart to the British Universities UK which also has a membership including an extensive range of higher education providers. The AACU issued a Call for Constructive Engagement on 22 April, 2025, but litigation was already in hand, with the President and Fellows of Harvard seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on 21 April. Harvard is listed as the plaintiff with a considerable list of defendants identified (paras 15-30). In its submission Harvard argued that:

    American institutions of higher learning have in common the essential freedom to determine, on academic grounds, whom to admit and what is taught, how, and by whom

    and that such ‘American institutions of higher learning’ were ‘essential to American prosperity’.

    It stressed a ‘longstanding collaboration between universities such as Harvard and the federal government dating back to the Second World War’. It pointed to Harvard’s success in using federal funding to achieving significant research outcomes. The recent ‘broad attack of Government’ on ‘universities across America’, not only on Harvard and the other Ivy League Universities listed, had affected the ‘critical funding partnerships’ that made this invaluable research possible.

    This case was being brought because, it was argued, the Government had been using ‘the withholding of federal funding as leverage to gain control of academic decision making at Harvard’. Harvard cited the Government’s letter of 11 April as demanding governance reform and a ‘third-party’ audit ‘of the viewpoints of Harvard’s student body, faculty, and staff’, followed by the hiring of new Faculty and admission of students whose views were satisfactory to the Government. It had asserted that teaching should be ‘to the Government’s satisfaction as determined in the Government’s sole discretion’ and to that end Harvard  should ‘terminate or reform its academic “programs” to the Government’s liking’. The Government had since ‘launched multiple investigations and other actions against Harvard’.  

    The Government had ‘within hours of the Freeze Order ‘ended ‘$2.2 billion in multiyear grants and $60M in multiyear contract value to Harvard University’ and Harvard began receiving ‘stop work orders’. In order to bring a case against the Government it was essential for Harvard to establish that the Government’s action constituted a breach of public law. To that end it stated that the ‘Court has jurisdiction over Harvard’s claims’ because the University did not ‘seek money damages or an order mandating specific performance of any contract’, but:

    an order declaring unlawful and setting aside sweeping agency action taken in violation of Harvard’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment and its rights guaranteed by statute and regulation.

    Harvard stressed that even though it is a private university its research is federally funded ‘through a grant process administered by federal agencies’. It cited Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which requires ‘a detailed and mandatory statutory framework’ of procedures to be followed. Harvard had its own procedures, added to or created in August, September and November 2024. Specifically in March 2025, Harvard released updated “Frequently Asked Questions” clarifying that both Jewish and Israeli identities are covered by the University’s Non-Discrimination Policy.

    Harvard explained that it had attempted ‘collaboration’ in the weeks following the government letter and the Federal Task Force’s press release announcing campus visits. It had sought to arrange a meeting on the campus and that was scheduled for late April 2025, yet on April 20 it was reported that the ‘Trump administration has grown so furious with Harvard University’ that ‘it is planning to pull an additional $1 billion of the school’s funding for health research.’

    Trump’s threatened sanctions concerned the future of Harvard’s funding. Harvard has endowments  of c$53 billion so any threat from Trump to reduce federal funding posed a limited risk to its future. However he made a further proposal on 18 April to remove Harvard’s exemption from Government tax on its income, which could have hit its normal operation harder.

    The US counterpart to HMRC is its Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS may grant tax-exempt status to a charitable, religious, scientific or literary organization, on condition that it refrains from campaigning or seeking to modify legislation. However, the President is not permitted to direct the IRS to conduct an investigation or audit. To that extent the counterbalancing of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the US seems to be holding.

    Harvard was making its challenge at a time when the balance between the executive and the judiciary in the US had come into question in a number of cases where Trump’s executive orders sought to override the courts. It claimed that ‘the Freeze Order is part of a broader effort by the Government to punish Harvard for protecting its constitutional rights. … multiple news outlets have reported that the Internal Revenue Service is considering revoking its recognition of Harvard’s tax exempt status’. Representing 86 universities, the Presidents’ Alliance has filed an Amicus brief supporting the litigation.

    Harvard sought in its litigation to have the Freeze Order declared unconstitutional and also the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ sought to be imposed  in the April 3 and April 11 and any action taken under it so far, also banning any future orders in the same vein. It pleaded six Counts, first a violation of the First Amendment in that the letters had targeted the ‘academic content that Harvard professors “teach students”’. Count 2 was that ‘even if the prerequisites of review under the Administrative Procedure Act were not satisfied, federal courts have the “equitable power” to “enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers.”’ Count 3 was that Title VI does not permit wholesale freezing of a recipient’s federal financial assistance. Instead, it requires that a “refusal to grant or to continue assistance” be “limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been so found.” Count 4 was the Government’s failure to ‘comply with their own regulations before freezing Harvard’s federal financial assistance’. Count 5 alleged that the action had been arbitrary and capricious and Count 6 that it had been ultra vires.

    At Indiana University a professor of Germanic studies was recently investigated under a state law after a student accused him of speech in support of Palestine.

    Could this happen in the UK?

    English higher education providers have their autonomy protected by the Higher Education and Research Act (2017)s.2 [HERA]. This legislation created the Office for Students, a non-departmental public body, whose nearest US counterpart is the Higher Learning Commission, an independent agency founded in 1895 which accredits higher education institutions. The University of Michigan, for example seeks, renewal of its accreditation from the Higher Learning Commission every ten years.

    The Office for Students is both regulator and funder, and distributes Government funding to higher education providers. This may take into account ‘particular policy areas and government priorities. Yet HERA outlaws any attempt by the OfS to impose the restrictions Trump sought to impose on the universities of the USA.  English higher education providers must be free:

    (i) to determine the content of particular courses and the manner in which they are taught, supervised and assessed,

    (ii) to determine the criteria for the selection, appointment and dismissal of academic staff and apply those criteria in particular cases, and

    (iii) to determine the criteria for the admission of students and apply those criteria in particular cases.

    Academic staff in England also enjoy ‘freedom within the law’:

    (i) to question and test received wisdom, and

    (ii) to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions,

    without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at the providers.

    There is some Government oversight. In protecting ‘the institutional autonomy of English higher e providers’, the Office for Students is subject to the ‘guidance’ of the Secretary of State, though Government requirements are held off by the legislative fencing.  The guidance of a higher education provider by the Office for Students:

    must not relate to—

    (a) particular parts of courses of study,

    (b) the content of such courses,

    (c) the manner in which they are taught, supervised or assessed,

    (d) the criteria for the selection, appointment or dismissal of academic staff, or how they are applied, or

    (e) the criteria for the admission of students, or how they are applied.

    The legislation adds that:

    guidance framed by reference to a particular course of study must not guide the OfS to perform a function in a way which prohibits or requires the provision of a particular course of study.

    This seems to place universities safely out of reach of the kind of restrictions Trump sought to impose on Harvard and other Ivy League Universities, but the Office for Students is potentially able not only to set its Government funding levels but also affect its students’ access to loans from the Student Loans Company. That can certainly be at risk, for example in the case of the Oxford Business College, whose funding (via franchise arrangements) was blocked in April 2025 when it was found to have abused the student loan system by admitting unqualified students. (US accreditors do hold a lot of power, because universities must be accredited by a federally recognized agency in order to access federal student aid.)

    Access to Government funding through the OfS requires listing by the Office for Students on its Register as an approved provider. The Office for Students did not impose its Conditions of Registration on pre-existing universities before including them in 2018 on its first Register under HERA. It simply treated them as proven acceptable providers of higher education. Each university duly publishes an account of its compliance (eg at Oxford) with the requirements which enable it to remain on the Office for Students Register. What might happen if they were found not to have done so? Short of removal from its Register the OfS has been known to impose fines, notably of more than £500,000 in the recent case of the University of Sussex when it was alleged to have failed to follow its own procedures designed to protect academic freedom.

    Government oversight of the work of HE providers may overlap with or sit uneasily beside forms of ‘accreditation’ and ’qualification’. The accreditation of qualifications in the UK may be the responsibility of a number of ‘agencies’ external to HE providers, some of which are bodies offering professional qualifications. For example the Solicitors Regulation Authority keeps its own register of qualified solicitors. A university degree may not constitute a ‘qualification’ without the completion of further recognised study, some of which may be provided by the university itself, for example the Postgraduate Certificate in Education.

    An area of ‘accreditation’ undergoing significant reform and expansion in the UK covers ‘skills’, including  apprenticeships. Not all universities offer their own apprenticeships, though they may recognise some of those available from other providers at Levels 4 and 5. Nevertheless ‘skills’ are potentially at risk of Government intervention. At the beginning of March 2025, the House of Lords was debating whether  ‘skills’ might benefit from the establishment of a ‘new executive agency’.

    It was recognised that there would need to be a report from the Secretary of State  ‘containing draft proposals’ for an agency, ‘to be known as “Skills England”. Ian Sollom MPobjected that that that would represent ‘a significant centralising of power in the hands of the Secretary of State, without providing proper mechanisms for parliamentary oversight or accountability.’ A ‘statutory, departmental body would have more clout’, he argued.

    An Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education (IfATE) already existed, but it was concerned with qualifications up to Level 5, short of degree-level 6. ‘Skills England’ was intended to begin work in April 2025. ‘When Skills England calls, will anybody answer the phone?’ asked HEPI, pointing to ‘limited autonomy, complex cross-departmental coordination, tensions between national and local priorities, and competing objectives between foundational and higher-level skills need’. Its ‘cross-departmental working’ with Government was unclear.

    It looks as though some universities, at least, are safe from any initiative to interfere from above with the right to self-government and to determine what to teach and research. Harvard records a ‘revenue base’ of $65billion, with ‘federal funding ‘ as its largest source of support for research. The research income of Oxford, for example, is £778m, with commercial research income of £148m. That cannot compare with Harvard, but at least Oxford and some others will remain free to choose how to use that income for its academic purposes.

    This is a modified version of an article first published by the Oxford Magazine No 477 in May 2025, republished with the permission of the editor and author.

    SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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  • A new regulatory framework is more than Medr by numbers

    A new regulatory framework is more than Medr by numbers

    Medr, the new-ish regulator of tertiary education in Wales, is consulting on its new regulatory system (including conditions of registration and funding, and a quality framework).

    You have until 5pm 18 July 2025 to offer comments on any of the many ideas or potential requirements contained within – there’s also two consultation events to look forward to in early June.

    Regulatory approach

    As we are already aware from the strategy, Medr intends to be a principles-based regulator (learning, collaboration, inclusion, excellence) but this has been finessed into a regulatory philosophy that:

    integrates the strengths of both rules-based (compliance) and outcome-based regulation (continuous improvement)

    As such we also get (in Annex A) a set of regulatory principles that can support this best-of-both-worlds position. The new regulator commits to providing clear guidance and resources, transparent communication, minimising burden, the collaborative development of regulations and processes, regular engagement, proactive monitoring, legal and directive enforcement action, the promotion of best practice, innovation and “responsiveness”, and resilience.

    That’s what the sector gets, but this is a two way thing. In return Medr expects you to offer a commitment to compliance and integrity, to engage with the guidance, act in a transparent way (regarding self-reporting of issues – a “no alarms and no surprises” approach), practice proactive risk management and continuous improvement, collaborate with stakeholders, and respect the authority of Medr and its interventions.

    It’s all nicely aspirational, and (with half an eye on a similar regulator just over Offa’s Dyke) one appropriately based on communication and collaboration. Whatever Medr ends up being, it clearly does not want an antagonistic or suspicious relationship with the sector it regulates.

    Getting stuck in

    The majority of the rest of Annex A deals directly with when and where Medr will intervene. Are you even a regulator if you can’t step in to sort out non-compliance and other outbreaks of outright foolishness? Medr will have conditions of registration and conditions of funding, both of which have statutory scope for intervention – plus other powers to deal with providers it neither registers nor funds (“external providers”, which include those involved in franchise and partnership activities, and are not limited to those in Wales).

    Some of these powers are hangovers from the Higher Education (Wales) 2015 Act, which are already in force – the intention is that the remaining (Tertiary Education and Research Act 2022) powers will largely kick off from 1 August 2026, alongside the new conditions of funding. At this point the TERA 22 powers will supersede the relevant remaining HEW 2015 provision.

    The spurs to intervention are familiar from TERA. The decision to intervene will be primarily based on six factors: seriousness, persistence, provider actions, context, risk, and statutory duties – there’s no set weight accorded to any of them, and the regulator reserves the right to use others as required.

    A range of actions is open in the event of an infraction – ranging from low-level intervention (advice and assistance) to removal from the register and withdrawal of funding. In between these you may see enhanced monitoring, action plans, commissioned reports and other examples of what is euphemistically termed “engagement”. A decision to intervene will be communicated “clearly” to a provider, and Medr “may decide” to publish details of interventions – balancing the potential risks to the provider against the need to promote compliance.

    Specific ongoing registration conditions are also a thing – for registered providers only, obviously – and all of these will be published, as will any variation to conditions. The consultation document bristles with flowcharts and diagrams, setting out clearly the scope for review and appeal for each type of appeal.

    One novelty for those familiar with the English system is the ability of the regulator to refer compliance issues to Welsh Ministers – this specifically applies to governance issues or where a provider is performing “significantly less well than it might in all the circumstances be reasonably expected to perform, or is failing or likely to fail to give an acceptable standard of education or training”. That’s a masterpiece of drafting which offers a lot of scope for government intervention.

    Regulatory framework

    Where would a regulator be without a regulatory framework? Despite a lot of other important aspects in this collection of documents, the statement of conditions of registration in Annex B will likely attract the most attention.

    Financial sustainability is front and centre, with governance and management following close behind. These two also attract supplemental guidance on financial management, financial commitment thresholds, estates management, and charity regulation. Other conditions include quality and continuous improvement, regard to advice and guidance, information provided to prospective students, fee limits, notifications of changes, and charitable status – and there’s further supplemental guidance on reportable events.

    Medr intends to be a risk-based regulator too – and we get an overview of the kinds of monitoring activity that might be in place to support these determinations of risk. There will be an annual assurance return for registered providers, which essentially assures the regulator that the provider’s governing body has done its own assurance of compliance. The rest of the returns are listed as options, but we can feel confident in seeing a financial assurance return, and various data returns, as core – with various other documentation requested on a more adhoc basis.

    And – yes – there will be reportable events: serious incidents that must be reported within five working days, notifiable (less serious) stuff on a “regular basis”. There’s a table in annex B (table 1) but this is broad and non-exhaustive.

    There’s honestly not much in the conditions of registration that is surprising. It is notable that Medr will still need to be told about new financial commitments, either based on a threshold or while in “increased engagement”, and a need to report when it uses assets acquired using public funds as security on financial commitments (it’s comforting to know that exchequer interest is still a thing, in Wales at least).

    The quality and continuous improvement condition is admirably broad – covering the involvement of students in quality assurance processes, with their views taken into account (including a requirement for representation on governing bodies). Responsibility for quality is expected to go all the way up to board level, and the provider is expected to actively engage with external quality assurance. Add in continuous improvement and an expectation of professional development for all staff involved in supporting students and you have an impressively robust framework.

    We need also to discuss the meaning of “guidance” within the Medr expanded universe – providers need to be clear about how they have responded to regulatory guidance and justify any deviation. There’s a specific condition of registration just for that.

    Quality framework

    Annex C provides a quality framework, which underpins and expands on the condition of registration. Medr has a duty to monitor and promote improvement in the quality and standards of quality in tertiary education, and the option in TERA 2022 to publish a framework like this one. It covers the design and delivery of the curriculum, the quality of support offered to learners, arrangements to promote active learner engagement (there’s a learner engagement code out for consultation in the autumn), and the promotion of wellbeing and welfare among learners.

    For now, existing monitoring and engagement plans (Estyn and the QAA) will continue, although Medr has indicated to both that it would like to see methodologies and approaches move closer together across the full regulatory ambit. But:

    In due course we will need to determine whether or not we should formally designate a quality body to assess higher education. Work on this will be carried out to inform the next cycle of external quality assessments. We will also consider whether to adopt a common cycle length for the assessment of all tertiary education.

    There is clarity that the UK Quality Code applies to higher education in Wales, and that internal quality assurance processes need to align to the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG) – external quality assurance arrangements currently do, and will continue to, align with ESG as well.

    To follow

    Phase two of this series of consultations will come in October 2025 – followed by registrations opening in the spring of 2026 with the register launched in August of that year. As we’ve seen, bits of the conditions of registration kick in from 1 August 2027 – at which point everything pre-Medr fades into the storied history of Welsh tertiary education.

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  • OfS continues to sound the alarm on the financial sustainability of English higher education

    OfS continues to sound the alarm on the financial sustainability of English higher education

    For the third year in a row, the English higher education sector’s collective financial performance is in decline.

    That is the conclusion of the latest annual assessment of the sector’s financial sustainability from the Office for Students (OfS), based on finance returns for 2023-24.

    Overall, after stiff warnings this time last year about the risks of system-wide provider deficits if projected student number growth failed to materialise, OfS says that many providers are taking steps to manage their finances, by reducing costs and downgrading recruitment growth projections. It remains unlikely, says OfS, that a large provider will become insolvent in the coming financial year.

    But 43 per cent of providers are forecasting a deficit for the current financial year 2024–25, and there is an overall decline in overall surplus and liquidity – albeit with the expectation of growth in the years ahead. While larger teaching-intensive and medium sized providers were more likely to report a deficit, there is also quite a lot of variation between providers in different groups – meaning that institution type is not a reliable guide to financial circumstances.

    Recruitment woes

    Student recruitment is the most material driver of financial pressure, specifically, a home and international student market that appears insufficient to fill the number of places institutions aspire to offer. The broad trend of institutions forecasting student number growth in hopes of offsetting rising costs – including national insurance and pension contributions – makes it unlikely that all will achieve their ambitions. There’s evidence that the sector has scaled back its expectations, with aggregate forecast growth until 2027–28 lower than previous forecasts. But OfS warns that the aggregate estimate of an increase of 26 per cent in UK entrants and 19.5 per cent in non-UK entrants between 2023–24 and 2027–28 remains too optimistic.

    Questioned further on this phenomenon, OfS Director of Regulation Philippa Pickford noted that there is significant variation in forecasts between different providers, and that given the wider volatility in student recruitment it can be really quite difficult to project future numbers. The important thing, she stressed, is that providers plan for a range of possible scenarios, and have a mitigation plan in place if projections are not achieved. She added that OfS is considering whether it might give more information to providers upfront about the range of scenarios it expects to see evidence of having been considered.

    Storing up trouble

    While the focus of the financial sustainability is always going to be on the institutional failure scenario, arguably an equally significant concern is the accumulation of underlying structural weaknesses caused by year-on-year financial pressures. OfS identifies risks around deferral of estates maintenance, suspension of planned physical or digital infrastructure investments, and a significant increase in subcontractual (franchising) arrangements that require robust governance.

    All this is manifesting in some low-key emergency finance measures such as relying on lending to support operating cashflow where there is low liquidity at points in the year, selling assets, renegotiation of terms of covenants with lenders, or seeking injections of cash from donors, benefactors or principal shareholders. Generally, and understandably, the finance lending terms available to the sector are much more limited than they have been in the past and the cost of borrowing has risen. The general increases in uncertainty are manifest in the increased work auditors are doing to be able to confirm that institutions remain a “going concern.” Such measures can address short-term financial challenges but in most cases they are not a viable long term strategy for sustainability.

    OfS reiterates the message that providers are obligated to be financially sustainable while delivering a high quality student learning experience and following through on all commitments made to students – but it’s clear that frontline services are in the frame for cuts and/or that there is a limit to the ability to reduce day-to-day spending or close courses even when they are loss-making if there is likely to be an impact on institutional mission and reputation. Discussions between OfS and directors of finance point to a range of wider challenges around increased need for student support, the difficulty of recruiting and retaining staff, the increasing costs of conducting research, and shifts in the student accommodation rental market. Some even pointed to the cost of investment in AI-detection software.

    The future is murky

    The bigger picture points to long term (albeit unpredictable) shifts in the underlying financial model for HE. Philippa Pickford’s view is that institutions may need to shift from taking a short-term view of financial risks to a longer-term horizon, and will need to grapple with what a sustainable long term future for the institution looks like if the market looks different from what they have been used to. Deferral of capital investment, for example, may keep things going for a year or two but it can’t be put off indefinitely. There’s a hint in the report that some institutions may need to invest in greater skills, expertise and capacity to understand and navigate this complicated financial territory – and OfS is taking an increased interest in multi-year trends in financial performance, estates data and capital investment horizons in its discussions with providers.

    The situation remains, however, that OfS is primarily empowered to monitor, discuss, convene and, if necessary, issue directives relating to student protection. Activity of this nature has ramped up considerably in the past year, but financial sustainability remains, at base, individual providers’ responsibility – and system-level intervention on things like changing patterns of provision, or management of the wider impact of institutional insolvency, nobody in particular’s. Government is, of course, aware of the problem but has not yet given a steer on whether its upcoming HE reform measures, expected to be published in the summer after the spending review, will grasp the nettle in delivering the support for transformation the sector hopes to see.

    OfS has now said that it is talking to government to put forward the view that there should be a special administration regime for higher education. This signals that while the immediate risks of institutional closure or “disorderly market exit” are low, the pressures on a small number of institutions remain considerable. On the assumption of little or very modest changes in the funding model in the upcoming spending review, and ongoing competitive pressures, there will almost inevitably be losers.

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  • What is a ‘governing document’ in the University of Sussex?

    What is a ‘governing document’ in the University of Sussex?

    by GR Evans

    The  Office for Students has found that the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement  of the University of Sussex involves breach of two of the relevant OfS Regulatory Requirements in late March 2025, and imposed an unprecedentedly substantial fine. The first of those criticised (OfS Condition E1) concerns the duty to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom:

    The provider’s governing documents must uphold the public interest governance principles that are applicable to the provider.

    A further OfS Condition (E2) requires that ‘the provider must have in place adequate and effective management and governance arrangements’ so as  to ‘operate in accordance with its governing documents’.

    On 9 April 2025 the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sussex published a fierce criticism of the unprecedented decision of Office for Students that it had failed to comply with one of its own ‘policies’. The Vice-Chancellor considered that the policy in question was:

    a really small statement, of which we have many dozens, if not hundreds, of similar policies and statements. Whereas the governing documents of the university  are its charter and statutes and regulations.

    There was press coverage about the ensuing uncertainty. UniversitiesUK, as the ‘collective voice’ of universities promised to write to the OfS to ask for clarity as its decision appears to find that it is a ‘failure to uphold freedom of speech and academic freedom’ if a university has ‘policies’ to prevent ‘abusive, bullying and harassing’ material or speech.

    The University has notified the OfS of its intention to apply for judicial review.  Among the grounds Sussex relies on is that the Office for Students did not have powers to treat ‘documents that are not a provider’s “governing documents”’ as creating the public interest governance condition necessary to permit the OfS to seek judicial review. The OfS defines ‘governing documents’ somewhat inadequately as ‘set out in’ its ‘Regulatory Framework’, where  ‘the provider’s governing documents must uphold the public interest governance principles that are applicable to the provider. In this case it held:

    that the University of Sussex breached ongoing condition of registration E2 because it failed to have adequate and effective management and governance arrangements in place to ensure that it operates in accordance with its governing documents.

    The definition of ‘governing documents’ is therefore of the first importance if a precedent is to be set by this OfS decision. The Higher Education and Research Act (2017) s.3(8)(a) protects the autonomy of higher education providers, defining it as ‘the freedom of English higher education providers within the law to conduct their day to day management in an effective and competent way’. Sussex was created among the batch of new universities of the 1960s.

    The Act created a new Regulator, the Office for Students, stating that the Regulator ‘must have regard to’ the ‘need to protect the institutional autonomy of English higher education providers’. This requires a fine balance if the OfS is to avoid intrusion upon a provider’s autonomy.

    The institutional autonomy of higher education providers gives them control of the drafting of their internal legislation. External authorities may insist on particular points in certain cases. For example medical qualifications set by a provider cannot constitute a qualification to be a doctor unless they are recognised by the General Medical Council.  But the right to create its own rules (within the law) largely lies with the provider, who may design them  and order them in its own preferred hierarchy.  The Office for Students may not interfere.

    Nevertheless the creation of ‘governing documents’ must carry certain implications about the source of the internal or external authority to create, review or amend them.  It is suggested that ‘Sussex contends that these are matters for our old friend the Visitor, a traditional legal role in UK university governance, who in Sussex’s case is the actual King’, and:

    cites longstanding legal authority confirming that the Visitor has exclusive jurisdiction over internal governance questions, including interpretation and application of the university’s own rules, and says that unless Parliament clearly removes or overrides that jurisdiction, external bodies like OfS can’t interfere.

    Where the Monarch is not the Visitor it is normally a Bishop.

    However a Visitor is not essential to the law-making of a higher education provider. ‘Alternative providers’ may not have Visitors. As eleemosynary bodies their Colleges normally have Visitors of their own but neither Oxford nor Cambridge has a Visitor. Under the Oxford and Cambridge Universities Act of 2023, both Universities create their own Statutes. In Oxford’s case those which are King-in-Council Statutes require the consent of the Privy Council on behalf of the King. In Cambridge all its Statutes require that consent to their creation or modification. Their subordinate legislation, most Regulations in Oxford (some of Oxford’s Regulations may be created by its Council) and Special Ordinances and Ordinances in Cambridge, simply require the consent of their governing bodies, Oxford’s Congregation of over 5000 and Cambridge’s Regent House of over 7000 members.

    The rules at the top of a provider’s hierarchies may constitute governing documents but it is far from clear how far down that status applies. For purposes of management ‘procedural or process documents’ explain the required ways of doing things and the processes which must be followed’. Among these are Codes of Practice and ‘Guidance documents’. This seems to be where the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement fits, as approved by the Executive Group in 2018, 2022, 2023 and 2024 and placed under the heading of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion(revised in 2022, 2023 and 2024).  Is it a governing document in this lowly position?

    Also found relevant by the Office for Students in the Sussex case was the exercise of powers of delegation. It identified ‘a pattern of decisions taken at the university to adopt and/or revise policies without proper delegated authority’, both that its:

    Prevent Steering Group approved and adopted the 2021 version of the University’s Freedom of Speech Code of Practice despite not having delegated authority to do so

    and also that ‘the 2023 version of the External Speakers Procedure was approved by the University Executive Group, despite that group not having delegated authority to do so’.

    Like similar universities Sussex has an Executive Team composed of a Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice-Chancellors, their deputies, Deans of Schools and Faculties, with senior academic-related staff headed by a University Secretary, a Financial Officer and various Directors. These are not directly responsible for framing its legislation but may have authority to apply it, though not necessarily powers to delegate its application.

    The Office for Students could turn to the University’s rules about delegation in framing its criticism. Sussex has given thought to that. Sussex’s Council approved a Scheme of Delegation in March 2018. ‘Responsibility’ may be delegated by the Council except for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor and President; ‘the variation, amendment or revocation of the Charter or Statutes’; and responsibility for approving the University’s annual audited accounts or the appointment of Auditors. The Scheme of Delegation clarifies where roles and responsibilities are allocated between Council and its Committees, among Committees, and between Council and Senate. The ‘Executive’ and a University Executive Group are described as exercising ‘leadership’ and there is also a University Leadership Team, though ‘leadership’ is undefined.

    Sussex has also given thought to overall responsibilities for supervision of the exercise of its internal rules. It has chosen to describe them collectively as ‘policies’. It is recognised to be ‘important that a clear and consistent approach is taken to drafting and updating policies across the institution’ details the requirements for the creation, approval, review, and updating of policies.  However it clarifies the difference between policies and other associated documents, sets out responsibilities relating to policies, and details the requirements for the creation, approval, review, and updating of policies. An overarching Policy on Policies has been agreed by the ‘University Executive Team and Council’. This consists in a Policy on the Creation and Management of University Policies (‘Policy Framework’).

    The aim of the University’s Policy Framework is to make clear what a policy is and what policies should be used for, to differentiate between policies and other types of documents (e.g. procedural documents, codes of practice, etc), and to outline the process that should be followed when drafting, reviewing, and updating policies. An outline of where responsibilities lie in relation to policies is also included.

    This suggests that if pressed Sussex might take all these to constitute its ‘governing documents’, while recognising distinctions among them.

    Nevertheless Sussex distinguishes governance and management. ‘A policy is a high-level statement of principles, requirements or behaviours that apply broadly across the University’ and ‘reflects institutional values’, thus supporting ‘the delivery of the University’s strategy’.  It  reflects ‘legal and regulatory obligations, sector standards, or high-level operational requirements’. These create obligations.

    Among them Sussex lists ‘Regulations’, which  must be made ‘pursuant to the Charter’. These contain detailed rules governing a wide variety of actions of, or on behalf of, the University falling under governance but extending into management: staffing procedures, student disciplinary and appeals procedures, the Students’ Union, the composition of Council and Senate, titles of degrees and Schools, roles of Heads of Schools, lists of collaborative institutions, academic titles and dress, the various degree courses awarded by the University, and general University regulations (library, ICT, administrative). These Regulations are updated annually and approved by Council and/or Senate. Next come written ‘Resolutions’ which Council members may choose to approve or not, ‘in accordance with procedures set out in the Regulations’, though amendments to the Charter and the Statutes and certain Regulations require ‘a three-fourths majority’.

    For purposes of management ‘procedural or process documents’ going beyond these categories explain the required ways of doing things at Sussex and ‘the processes which must be followed’. Among these are Codes of Practice and ‘Guidance documents’. This seems to be where the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement fits, as approved by the Executive Group in 2018, revised in 2022, 2023 and 2024. placed under the heading of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion.  Are they still among ‘governing documents’ with a constitutional role in the University’s  governance? An application for a judicial review will take a considerable time to produce a recommendation even if it supports Sussex’s argument

    SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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  • Communicate, repeat and compensate – OfS issues principles over industrial action

    Communicate, repeat and compensate – OfS issues principles over industrial action

    University and College Union (UCU) staged a national marking and assessment boycott (MAB) – delaying graduations, job starts, and transitions to postgraduate study.

    UCU members took the action to tackle disputes including headline pay, gender and minority ethnic pay gaps, staff workload and the casualisation across the sector.

    Whenever there’s industrial action, the hope in Carlow St is that students will see the bigger picture – but this time around, at least for some students in some universities, the impact was significant. At the time, UCU estimated that 30,000 students were unable to graduate on time or were affected in some other way.

    In the aftermath, the Commons Education Committee held a mini inquiry to investigate the impact – it wrote to the then Conservative government to raise concerns about the lack of data, the role of the Office for Students (OfS) and the lack of clarity over students’ rights, and the eventual (post election) reply was predictably weak.

    Now, two years on, OfS has published research that was commissioned to develop an understanding of what the impacts were from a student perspective – along with guidance for institutions on protecting the interests of students during industrial action, and a webinar event planned for mid-May on the regulator’s expectations on how providers should support students before, during and after industrial action.

    OfS first ran a text-based focus group via YouGov in July 2024 that discussed short- and long-term impacts, what information they got from their institutions, and how those institutions handled the situation. A quantitative survey followed that gathered 763 responses (279 undergrads, 284 postgrads, and 200 graduates) that had been studying at impacted institutions during the boycott. You’d not be diving into demographic splits on that sample size.

    The polling drilled into how the industrial action affected their academic lives – immediately and over time – along with the comms they received from their universities, and how they viewed their rights as students.

    On the top line

    In a “topline” results report and associated student insights brief, we learn that the industrial action caused delayed or unmarked coursework (53 per cent) and exams (46 per cent), reduced lecture time (68 per cent), and decreased contact with staff.

    Most impacted students reported negative effects on academic work quality (49 per cent) and grades (42 per cent). The MAB’s psychological impact was significant – with 41 per cent reporting increased stress, 32 per cent experiencing poorer mental health, and 15-18 per cent noting negative effects on their social lives.

    One student is quoted as follows:

    I was waiting for the result of a resit that the progression of my masters’ depended upon but it was delayed so much I had to pay for the next module and would not get the results until halfway through.

    International students faced particular challenges, with visa uncertainties arising from delayed results and qualifications. Some students couldn’t attend graduation ceremonies because their results came too late:

    I didn’t manage to get graduation tickets in time due to how late results were, so I didn’t have a graduation ceremony.

    Communication varied considerably across institutions – with most updates coming through emails (65 per cent) rather than during lectures (22 per cent). Students rated information from individual lecturers (78 per cent satisfaction) more highly than university-wide communications (64 per cent satisfaction).

    Many students in the focus group:

    …were not told which of their modules would be affected, or when they would get their marks and feedback.

    OfS says that the institutional response was inconsistent across the higher education sector. Students directly affected by the MAB expressed significantly higher dissatisfaction (54 per cent) with their university’s handling of the situation compared to unaffected students (18 per cent). Just 46 per cent of affected students received alternatives or compensation, primarily through “no detriment” policies adapted from those developed during the Covid era (26 per cent).

    Financial compensation and rights awareness was low – with only 30 per cent knowing they could request it, and a mere 9 per cent successfully receiving any. The boycott also negatively impacted perceptions of education quality (38 per cent reporting a decrease) and value for money (41 per cent reporting a decrease), with one student noting:

    I ended up with a [postgraduate diploma] instead of my MSc, and I came out with a merit instead of a distinction.

    The brief does note that universities employed various mitigation strategies, including awarding interim degree classifications, guaranteeing minimum classifications, improving mental health support, reallocating marking responsibilities, and engaging with employers to request flexibility for affected graduates.

    Were they OK? Some students felt their institutions responded well, others reported that the experience contributed to decisions not to pursue further studies or work in higher education, with 42 per cent reporting decreased trust in their universities.

    Behind the screams

    Much of that won’t come as a surprise – although the sheer scale of the suggested impacts, as well as their depth and breadth on individual students (esp rer mental health and international students) ought to invigorate debates about the morality of the tactic, and how universities handled it to limit legal or financial exposure.

    Arguably of more interest is the letter and “regulatory statement” that accompanies the publication from John Blake, Director for Fair Access and Participation.

    Re-stressing that it’s not OfS’ role to intervene in labour disputes, Blake expresses concern about how strikes and the MAB disrupted students’ academic experiences, notes inconsistencies in institutional responses, sets out an aim to establish clearer expectations for fair treatment for all students in any similar future scenarios.

    And there’s a fascinating section on compensation:

    We want to be clear that we don’t see compensation as a substitute for the holistic experience of intellectual, professional and personal development that a student should expect from their higher education. Institutions should continue to focus their efforts during industrial action on delivering the education that students expect. The inclusion of an expectation in relation to compensation does, though, reflect the rights students have under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

    Given that many students got neither, the clear implication is that a large number of students should have received both.

    Six principles

    The core of the guidance letter then manifests in six principles:

    1. Providers must remove contractual terms that inappropriately limit liability to students during staff industrial action or other circumstances within the provider’s control, as these breach consumer protection law.
    2. Effective contingency plans must be developed to minimise disruption to students during industrial action, ensuring plans are actionable, timely, and protect qualification integrity.
    3. When implementing contingency plans, providers should prioritise education delivery by: first avoiding impacts on students; if not possible, making minimal changes; and if necessary, providing timely repeat performance of missed teaching or assessment.
    4. Fair compensation must be paid when contingency plans fail to deliver promised aspects of student experience, particularly for missed teaching without timely replacement, delayed assessment marking, or delayed progression decisions affecting jobs or visa status.
    5. Clear communication with students is essential, including transparent information about rescheduled activities or compensation, with proactive identification of eligible students rather than requiring them to submit claims.
    6. Providers must submit reportable events about industrial action to the Office for Students (OfS) in accordance with established regulatory requirements.

    It’s an interesting list. The first one on the inclusion of industrial action in so-called “force majeure” clauses in student contracts – which limit liability for events that are outside of the predictability or control of of providers – is a long-running passive-aggressive row between the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and OfS on one side, and providers on the other.

    OfS has previously published a referral to National Trading Standards involving the University of Manchester’s contract – but my spreadsheet suggests that there’s a large number of providers that either haven’t seen that, or are digging in for a battle over it.

    That may be partly because those sorts of clauses – and CMA’s advice on them (which OfS requires providers to pay “due regard to”) – are a key point of dispute in the ongoing Student Group Claim, the UCL portion of which won’t get to court until early 2026.

    From a student point of view, if those clauses shouldn’t exist, the snail’s pace of enforcement on this is as baffling as it is frustrating.

    There won’t be many providers that weren’t developing contingency plans, notwithstanding that they can always be improved – and the one-two-three-four punch of avoid, adjust, repeat or compensate reflects (and translates) the position under consumer law.

    Of course some will argue that a legal duty to undertake any/all of those steps under consumer law depends on those force majeure clauses not existing or being unlawful – and as it stands there’s a major silent standoff that’s unhelpful.

    Even if you just look at compensation, the survey fails to differentiate between compensation paid for breach of contract, and “goodwill” payments where no such breach has been accepted by providers. As far as I’m aware, the former was vanishingly rare.

    The other issue, of course, is with punch three of four – where university managements satisfy themselves that once a dispute is over, teaching or support is rescheduled “because we told them to”, despite the fact that most heads of department find it hard to actually implement those instructions with UCU members.

    The “proactive identification of eligible students” for “repeat performance” or compensation is interesting too – especially over the latter, providers have long relied on students having to make complaints in order to get redress. This not only depends on the breach of contract or not issue being resolved, it also raises questions for universities’ legal advisors and insurers about the relative risks of doing as John Blake says, or waiting for students to raise concerns.

    But as well as all of that, there’s three things we ought to be surprised not to see.

    What’s missing?

    For a set of documents seeped in the translation of consumer protection to a higher education setting, there’s nothing on the extent to which any alternative arrangements in a MAB – especially alternative arrangements over marking – should still be carried out with reasonable skill and care. Academic judgement can’t be challenged, but only if that judgement has been carried out in the way we might expect it to be by people who know their onions. That was a major issue in the dispute for plenty of students, even if it wasn’t a big issue in the polling.

    The second is the lack of answer to the questions raised both in the polling and by the Commons Education Committee – which concern students’ understanding of what their rights are. If OfS thinks that it can vaguely pressure providers into proactively identifying students entitled to wads of cash, it’s misunderstanding the countervailing pressures on providers in similar ways to those identified by Mills and Reeve over provider collapse. And as I often say on the site, good regulatory design considers how individuals come to understand (or access information) on their rights should they need to use them without having to access a regulator or complaints adjudicator – there’s nothing on any of that here.

    But the third is the lack of a clear link to the regulatory framework, and the lack of any enforcement carried out over what must amount to failings. If the guidance is grounded in OfS’ rules, students might well say “well what action have you taken given that the problems were widespread?”

    If it’s not grounded in OfS’ powers, providers might well say “well notwithstanding that we like to look nice, why would we magnify the efficacy of an industrial action tactic if we don’t really have to”.

    It’s all very well for OfS to be “give them guidance” mode, but over this set of issues the financial impacts of compliance with something that sounds contested, and partly voluntary, could be huge both in an individual dispute and in the long-term. That all (still) needs bringing to a head.

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  • Regulating partnership provision can help everyone

    Regulating partnership provision can help everyone

    On a Monday morning in late March, ninety strangers sit down together at the base of one of the towering pillars of glass and steel that pierce the spring blue skies of the City of London to talk about collaboration.

    This was no ivory tower. At mixed tables across the room sat the emissaries of universities old and new, adult community colleges, specialist institutes and industry training centres – awarding providers, teaching providers, and sector bodies too.

    Partners for the day, they heard from sector experts about the latest developments in the policy and practice of academic partnerships and then translated what they learned into their own institutional context through lively and productive small group discussions.

    You might think that the previous day’s headlines would not have made for the most auspicious backdrop to proceedings, but if anything they instilled in the participants of IHE’s first annual Academic Partnerships Conference a clarity of purpose and an impassioned defence of the genuine importance and transformational value of high-quality collaborative provision.

    Not all partnerships! The silent cry went up. And not all franchises either.

    The value of partnership

    Let’s be absolutely clear: academic partnerships are nothing new in higher education. England’s oldest universities – Oxford, Cambridge, London – are themselves nothing less than partnerships in motion, organisational structures evolved to facilitate collaboration across a number of independent self-governing institutions. Academic partnerships have remained the irresistible engine for the expansion of the UK’s higher education sector, driving wider access, greater diversity and more innovation in provision even while the specific models have continued to adapt to changing contexts and circumstances.

    Today, fantastic examples of successful partnerships can be found everywhere you look and they can just as easily take the form of a validation agreement as a subcontractual relationship (aka franchise). While Degree Awarding Powers rightly remain a gold standard, many independent higher education providers would rather dedicate their precious time and focus towards the teaching, learning and industry knowledge exchange that forms the heart of their missions.

    Partnerships should be prized and protected for their essential role in delivering higher education provision which responds to local, national and sector-specific needs. Let’s not forget that different groups of students with different backgrounds and different learning goals benefit enormously from higher education delivered through partnerships. We ignore their needs at our peril.

    So everything is really fine? Move along, please, nothing to see here? Not quite. At IHE we are under no illusions that everyone in our sector has the same good intentions. It can be all too easy for those of us who work in higher education to believe that we are immune to some of the problems that rear their heads in other sectors. Sadly not. Education is a public good, a universal good, an elemental ingredient of civilisation, but this truth can make us naïve, obscuring the loopholes that still exist and the risks that operating in such an open system built on trust can create.

    Regulating partners

    IHE shares the Government’s ambition to strengthen oversight of subcontracted delivery that underpins DfE’s proposals but the proposals themselves miss the mark, as set out in our response to the consultation. If we are serious about doing this, then there are five areas of focus to which we must turn our collective attention – and fast:

    • due diligence on every provider’s suitability as a partner, and the fitness and propriety of their management and governance;
    • transparency on ownership and the terms of any contract for provision;
    • accountability which is clearly assigned between each partner for the critical aspects of provision;
    • quality and standards which are managed effectively by the relevant partner at the appropriate level; and
    • flexibility in any oversight process so that we continue to facilitate the full range of diverse providers with something different to offer the higher education sector.

    The absolute and non-negotiable starting point for an effective regulatory system must be that the regulator knows who is really in charge of every provider it regulates, and to be able to hold them to account. Ambitions aside, the OfS needs to be far more effective at identifying and keeping out individuals who are simply not fit and proper persons to share in the honour and responsibility of stewarding an English higher education institution.

    Thankfully, the OfS proposals under consultation to strengthen its conditions of registration in relation to governance and student protection signal a new seriousness in its approach to this challenge – and are long overdue. The regulator is on the right track with its plans to take a much closer look at ownership, and in trying to identify unfair and inappropriate practices in relation to student recruitment and admissions.

    Any institution in the business of academic partnerships should be taking a close look at these reforms. These are issues that are important to everyone with a stake in the success of the higher education sector. It is in the entire sector’s interest, in the public interest – and nobody’s more than students’ – that the regulator carves out a constructive and collaborative role for itself in this space, helping to facilitate the positive impact of partnerships while minimising the risk of criminal elements exploiting vulnerabilities in the system.

    Rethinking registration

    But could the OfS go further? What if there was a new approach to registration? A category explicitly intended for providers operating in partnership, designed to fill the gaps in oversight that universities cannot on their own, while letting them lead on the academic quality assurance that is their forte. A process built from the ground up to secure the most essential assurances, that can be proportionately applied to different sizes of institution, and efficiently delivered against clear timetables and stretching service standards.

    A paradigm shift towards expecting every would-be delivery partner to complete such a due diligence process could, at a stroke, drive up standards of transparency and ethical behaviours, and better protect genuine students and the public purse from the threat of academic predators. Only a statutory regulator can really achieve this, with its access to intelligence from other public authorities. There is no reason why an awarding institution would not require a potential delivery partner to undertake this process prior to approving their first course. Indeed a centralised due diligence process delivered efficiently at scale could be used to streamline and speed up a partner’s own institutional approval processes.

    At the same time we in the sector’s leadership should be working at pace with all stakeholders on the development of a better shared understanding and greater mutual agreement over what constitutes the most effective policies and practices in partnership provision. The absence of sector-wide standards or accepted best practice in this area, combined with higher education’s generally held principles of transparency being too often trumped by commercial sensitivities, are what has allowed pockets of poor practice and a risk of exploitation by bad actors to grow unchecked by effective regulation.

    Simply requiring providers of an arbitrary size to register with the OfS without any critical analysis of the proportionality or effectiveness of current regulation will not achieve our aims and could easily make matters worse. Even the failure of one significant delivery partner to pass the ill-fitting regulatory hurdles set under the current proposals – let alone, say, a dozen – would create extreme jeopardy for thousands of students and place the system as a whole under unbearable pressure. We will sleepwalk into this situation if we do not change course.

    It would be far better to make awarding institutions properly accountable for the policies, practices and performance of their delivery partners now, while giving them the regulatory tools to help them achieve more effective oversight, than to create a new Whitehall bureaucracy with a single point of predictable failure as DfE’s proposed designation gateway does. Far better to create a dedicated process focused on a deeper due diligence which properly accounts for the actual strengths, vulnerabilities and diversity of partnership models.

    Academic partnerships are here to stay. A flexible, proportionate and efficient process which applies regulatory scrutiny where it is most needed can offer a foundation for sector-led efforts to enhance the quality, transparency and consistency that students should expect.

    We all have a part to play. And we need to get this right. It is essential for the reputation of the higher education sector that we do. As partners in this collective endeavour, it is time for us to shine a light on this invaluable work that has spent too long in the shadows.

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  • It’s students that suffer when those supposed to protect them fail

    It’s students that suffer when those supposed to protect them fail

    24 hours after it published its (“summary”) report into the sudden closure of the Applied Business Academy (ABA), the Office for Students (OfS) published an insight brief on protecting the interests of students when universities and colleges close.

    When the regulator works with a closing provider, it says that it works with that provider and other bodies to try to reduce the impact on students.

    OfS’ report on ABA is notably quiet on the extent to which it has been successful there – we’ve no idea how many students were real, how many of those that were have successfully switched provider, how much (if any compensation) any of the impacted students have had, and so on.

    Nor has it talked about its success or otherwise in reducing the impact on students from the closure of ALRA drama school in 2022 or Schumacher College last Autumn.

    A number of campuses have closed in recent years – no idea on that, and if your course closes (or is cut or merged in a material way) OfS doesn’t even require providers to report that in, so it would neither know nor feature it on its “current closures” webpage (that plenty of students caught up in a closure will nevertheless find if they google “closed course office for students”).

    The other gap in knowledge thus far is the sorts of things that you might assume the regulator has noticed or done or considered in the run up to a closure. The learning is valuable – and so the new brief shares both its experience of closures and “near misses”, and the experiences of some of those directly involved.

    There’s helpful material on the impact on students, communication and record management, and how providers may be affected by the closure of subcontracted or validated delivery partners – and features anonymised quotes shared by senior managers and “a student” involved in institutional closures.

    Unexpected hits you between the eyes

    The note suggests that providers consistently underestimate the challenges and “resource-intensive nature” of closure processes – one contributor says:

    The challenge is underestimating the level of work and planning that are needed in different areas. Planning prior to a crisis developing can help the situation hugely.

    Financial complexities often catch institutions unprepared, with many discovering too late how their legal structure significantly impacts rescue options. OfS says that providers need to thoroughly understand their financial position, contractual obligations, and legal options well before any crisis occurs.

    Student data management are also a problem – incomplete or inadequate student records prove nearly useless when transfers become necessary, and data sharing agreements essential for transferring information to other institutions are often neglected until closure is imminent.

    The human impact on students is underestimated. Students face difficulties processing their options without timely information, and providers fail to recognise how closure disproportionately affects those with caring responsibilities, part-time employment, disabilities, or those on placements – all groups who cannot easily relocate. Accommodation arrangements create more complications, with some students locked into tenancy contracts.

    Communication challenges see providers struggling to balance early transparency against having finalised options – it says that many fail to develop clear, student-focused comms plans, resulting in confusion and poor decision-making among those affected.

    Validated and subcontractual partnerships demand special attention – with one leader admitting:

    Our mechanisms were too slow to identify the risks for those students.

    Many have failed to identify and plan for contingencies despite retaining significant responsibility for these students. And refunds and compensation frameworks are neglected too – the one student observes:

    We were told we could claim compensation for reasonable interim costs from our institution, but without clear or prompt guidance on what this could cover, it was hard to feel confident in making decisions.

    It also says that early stakeholder engagement with agencies like UCAS or the OIA (as well as proactive communication with OfS and any other relevant regulators) is critical – delays in those its seen until crisis is imminent miss valuable opportunities for support in protecting student interests.

    The benefits of hindsight

    Despite focusing on risks to study continuation of study and provider response planning and execution, astonishingly the brief never mentions Condition C3 – the core regulation governing these areas.

    Condition C4 (an enhanced version of C3) appears occasionally, but we learn nothing about its application in the cited cases, preventing assessment of the regulatory framework’s effectiveness.

    This all matters because OfS’s fundamental purpose is to assure those enrolling into the provision it regulates of a level baseline student interest protection – not merely offering advice.

    And the reality is that the evidence it presents reveals systematic failures across C3’s key requirements. Providers here demonstrated profound gaps in risk assessment and awareness. They “were not fully aware of the risks” from delivery partner failures, with early warning mechanisms that “should have kicked in earlier”, and seem to have failed to conduct the comprehensive risk assessments across all provision types that C3 explicitly requires.

    Mitigation planning fell similarly short of regulatory expectations. Institutions underestimated “the level of work and planning needed” while failing to properly identify alternative study options. Practical considerations like accommodation concerns with “third-party landlords” were overlooked entirely. And plans weren’t “produced in collaboration with students” as both C3 and pages like this promise:

    …we expect providers to collaborate with students to review and refresh the plan on a regular basis.

    Implementation and communication failures undermined student protection. When crises occurred, protection measures weren’t activated promptly, with students reporting “it was difficult to decide what to do next without having all the information in a timely manner.”

    Compensation processes generated confusion rather than clarity. Delivery partners neglected to inform lead institutions of closure risks, while information sharing was often restricted to “a smaller group of staff,” reducing planning capacity precisely when broad engagement was needed.

    And C3’s requirements regarding diverse student needs seem to have been unaddressed too. Support for students with additional needs proved inadequate in practice, while international students faced visa vulnerabilities that should have been anticipated.

    C3 also requires plans to be “published in a clear and accessible way” and “revised regularly” – requirements evidently unmet here, with evidence suggesting some providers maintained static protection measures that proved ineffective when actually needed.

    Has anyone been held to account for those failings? And for its own part, if OfS knew that ABA was in trouble (partly via Ofsted and partly via the DfE switching off the loans tap), even if C4 wasn’t applied, was C3 compliance scrutinised? Will other providers be held to account if they fail in similar ways? We are never told.

    The more the world is changing

    The questions pile up the further into the document you get. Given the changed financial circumstances in the sector and the filing cabinet that must be full of “at enhanced risk” of financial problems, why hasn’t OfS issued revised C3 guidance? If anyone’s reading inside the regulator, based on report I’ve had a go at the redraft that former OfS chair Michael Barber promised back in 2018 (and then never delivered) here – providers wishing to sleep at night should take a look too.

    You also have to wonder if OfS has demanded C3 rewrites of providers who have featured on the front of the Sunday Times, or who have announced redundancies. If it has, there’s not much evidence – there’s clearly a wild mismatch between the often years old, “very low risks here” statements in “live” SPPs that I always look for when a redundancy round is threatened, and I have a live list of those featured on Queen Mary UCU’s “HE Shrinking” webpage whose SPPs paint a picture of financial stability and infinitesimally small course closure risk despite many now teaching them out.

    I’ve posted before about the ways in which things like “teach out” sound great in practice, but almost always go wrong – with no attempt by OfS to evaluate, partly because it usually doesn’t know about them. I’m also, to be fair, aware that in multiple cases providers have submitted revised student protection plans to the regulator, only to hear nothing back for months on end.

    Of course in theory the need for a specific and dedicated SPP may disappear in the future – OfS is consulting on replacing them with related comprehensive information. But when that might apply to existing providers is unknown – and so for the time being, OfS’ own protection promises on its own website appear to be going unmet with impunity for those not meeting them:

    Student protection plans set out what students can expect to happen should a course, campus, or institution close. The purpose of a plan is to ensure that students can continue and complete their studies, or can be compensated if this is not possible.

    As such the brief reads like a mixture between a set of case studies and “best practice”, with even less regulatory force than a set of summaries from the OIA. The difference here – as the OIA regularly itself identifies – is that the upholding of a complaint against its “Good Practice Framework” won’t be much use if the provider is in administration.

    So whether it’s holes in the wording of C3, problems in predicting what C3’s requirements might mean, a lack of enforcement over what students are being promised now, a need for C3 to be revised and updated, a need for better guidance in light of cases surrounding it, or a need for all of these lessons to be built into its new proposed C5 (and then implemented across the existing regulated sector), what OfS has done is pretty much reveal that students should have no trust in the protection arrangements currently on offer.

    And for future students, wider lessons – on the nature of what is and isn’t being funded, and whether the risks can ever be meaningfully mitigated – are entirely absent here too.

    Amidst cuts that OfS itself is encouraging, from a course or campus closure point of view, a mixture of OfS consistently failing to define “material component” in the SPP guidance, and a breath of providers either having clauses that give them too much power to vary from what was promised, or pretending their clauses allow them to merge courses or slash options when they don’t, is bad enough – as is the tactic of telling students of changes a couple of weeks before the term starts when the “offer” of “you can always break the contract on your side” is a pretty pointless one.

    But from a provider collapse perspective, it’s unforgivable. Whatever is done in the future on franchising, you’d have to assume that many of the providers already look pretty precarious now – and will be even more so if investigations (either by the government or newspapers) reveal more issues, or if OfS makes them all register (where the fit and proper person test looks interesting), or if the government bans domestic agents.

    And anyone that thinks that it’s only franchised providers that look precarious right now really ought to get their head across the risk statements in this year’s crop of annual accounts.

    Back in 2017 when DfE consulted on the Regulatory Framework on behalf of the emerging OfS back, it promised that were there to be economic changes that dramatically affected the sustainability of many providers, the regulator would work with providers to improve their student protection plans so that they remained “strong” and “deliverable” in service of the student interest.

    So far they’ve proved to be weak and undeliverable. Whether that’s DfE’s fault for not getting the powers right, OfS’ for not using them, or ministers’ fault for freezing fees, taking the cap off recruitment and letting cowboys in to trouser wads of tuition fee loan money is an issue for another day. For now, someone either needs to warn students that promises on protection are nonsense, or providers, DfE and OfS need to act now to make good on the promises of protection that they’ve made.

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  • Mind the policy gaps: regulating quality and ethics in digitalised and privatised crossborder education

    Mind the policy gaps: regulating quality and ethics in digitalised and privatised crossborder education

    by Hans de Wit, Tessa DeLaquil, Ellen Hazelkorn and Hamish Coates

    Hans de Wit, Ellen Hazelkorn and Hamish Coates are editors and Tessa DeLaquil is associate editor of Policy Reviews in Higher Education. This blog is based on their editorial for issue 1, 2025.

    Transnational education (TNE), also referred to as crossborder education, is growing and morphing in all kinds of interesting ways which, while exciting for innovators, surface important policy, regulatory, quality and ethical concerns. It is therefore vital that these developments do not slip around or through policy gaps. This is especially true for on-line TNE which is less visible than traditional campus-based higher education. Thus, it is vital that governments take the necessary actions to regulate and quality assure such education and training expansion and to inform the sector and broader public. Correspondingly, there is a pressing need for more policy research into the massive transformations shaking global higher education.

    TNE and its online variants have been part of international higher education for a few decades. As Coates, Xie, and Hong (2020) foreshadowed, it has seen a rapid increase after the Covid-19 pandemic. In recent years, TNE operations have grown and diversified substantially. Wilkins and Huisman (2025) identify eleven types of TNE providers and propose the following definition to help handle this diversity: ‘Transnational education is a form of education that borrows or transfers elements of one country’s higher education, as well as that country’s culture and values, to another country.’

    International collaboration and networking have never been more important than at this time of geopolitical and geoeconomic disruption and a decline in multilateral mechanisms. But TNE’s expansion is matched by growing risks.

    International student mobility at risk

    International degree student mobility (when students pursue a bachelor, master and/or doctoral degree abroad) continues to be dominant, with over six million students studying abroad, double the number of 10 years ago. It is anticipated that this number will further increase in the coming decade to over 8 million, but its growth is decreasing, and its geographical path from the ‘global south’ to the ‘global north’ is shifting towards a more diverse direction. Geopolitical and nationalist forces as well as concerns about adequate academic services (accommodation in particular) in high-income countries in the global north are recent factors in the slowing down of the growth in student mobility to Australia, North America and Europe, the leading destinations. The increased availability and quality of higher education, primarily at the undergraduate level, in middle-income countries in Asia, Latin America and parts of the Middle East, also shape the decrease in student mobility towards the global north.

    Several ‘sending countries’, for instance, China, South Korea and Turkey, are also becoming receiving countries. Countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine (until the Russian invasion), Egypt and some of the Caribbean countries have also become study destinations for students from neighbouring low-income countries. These countries provide them with higher education and other forms of postsecondary education sometimes in their public sector but mostly in private institutions and by foreign providers.

    An alternative TNE model?

    Given the increased competition for international students and the resulting risks of falling numbers and related financial security for universities, TNE has emerged as an alternative source of revenue. According to Ilieva and Tsiligiris (2023), United Kingdom TNE topped more than 530,000 students in 2021. In the same year, its higher education institutions attracted approximately 680,000 international students. It is likely that TNE will surpass inward student mobility.

     As the United Kingdom case makes clear, TNE originally was primarily a ‘north-south’ phenomenon, in which universities from high-income and mostly Anglophone countries, offered degree programmes through branch campuses, franchise operations and articulation programmes. Asia was the recipient region of most TNE arrangements, followed by the Middle East. As in student mobility, TNE is more diverse globally both in provision and in reception.

    The big trend in TNE is the shift to online education with limited in-person teaching. A (2024) report of Studyportals found over 15,000 English-taught online programmes globally. And although 92 per cent of these programmes are supplied by the four big Anglophone countries – the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia – the number of programmes offered outside those four doubled since 2019 from 623–1212, primarily in Business and Management, Computer Sciences and IT.

    Private higher education institutions

    This global growth in online delivery of education goes hand in hand with the growth in various forms of private higher education. Over 50% of the institutions of higher education and over one-third of global enrolment are in private institutions, many of which are commercial in nature. Private higher education has become the dominant growth area in higher education, as a result of the lack of funding for public higher education as well as traditional HE’s sluggish response to diverse learner needs. Although most private higher education, in particular for-profit, is taking place in the global south, it is also present in high-income countries, and one can see a rise in private higher education recently in Western Europe, for instance, Germany and France.

    TNE is often a commercial activity. It is increasingly a way for public universities to support international and other operations as public funding wanes. Most for-profit private higher education targets particular fields and education services and tends to be more online than in person. There is an array of ownership and institutional structures, involving a range of players.

    Establishing regulations and standards

    TNE, especially online TNE, is likely to become the major form of international delivery of education for local and international students especially where growing demand cannot be met domestically. Growth is also increasingly motivated by an institution’s or country’s financial challenges or strategic priorities – situations that are likely to intensify. This shift could help overcome some of the inequities associated with mobility and address concerns associated with climate change but online TNE is significantly more difficult to regulate.

    A concerning feature of the global TNE market is how learners and countries can easily become victims. Fraud is associated with the exponential rise in the number of fake colleges and accreditors, and document falsification. This is partly due to different conceptions and regulatory approaches to accreditation/QA of TNE and the absence of trustworthy information. Indeed, the deficiency in comprehensive and accessible information is partly responsible for on-going interest in and use of global rankings as a proxy for quality.

    A need for clearer and stronger TNE and online quality assurance

    The trend in growth of private for-profit higher education, TNE and online delivery is clear and given its growing presence requires more policy attention by national, regional and global agencies. As mentioned, public universities are increasingly active in TNE and online education targeting countries and learners underserved in their home countries whilst  looking for other sources of income as a result of decreasing public support and other factors.

    The Global Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications makes clear the importance of ensuring there are no differences in quality or standards between learners in the home or host country regardless of whether the delivery of education programmes and learning activities is undertaken in a formal, non-formal or informal setting, in face-to-face, virtual or hybrid formats, traditional or non-traditional modes. Accordingly, there are growing concerns about insufficient regulation and the multilateral framework covering international education, and especially online TNE.

    In response, there is a need for clearer and stronger accreditation/quality assurance and standards by national regulators, regional networks and organisations such as UNESCO, INQAAHE, the International Association of Universities (IAU) with regards to public and private involvement in TNE, and online education. This is an emerging frontier for tertiary education, and much more research is required on this growing phenomenon.

    Professor Ellen Hazelkorn is Joint Managing Partner, BH Associates. She is Professor Emeritus, Technological University Dublin.

    Hamish Coates is professor of public policy, director of the Higher Education Futures Lab, and global tertiary education expert.

    Hans de Wit is Professor Emeritus and Distinguished Fellow of the Boston College Center for International Higher Education, Senior Fellow of the international Association of Universities.

    Tessa DeLaquil is postdoctoral research fellow at the School of Education at University College Dublin.

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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  • When tuition fee payments are suspended, what happens to students left behind?

    When tuition fee payments are suspended, what happens to students left behind?

    Whilst there may be good reasons for suspending tuition fee payments to “safeguard public funding and ensure students’ interests are protected”, decisions taken to safeguard the public purse often risk overlooking the individual students who are left behind.

    In April 2024 the Office for Students (OfS) opened an investigation in relation to Applied Business Academy (ABA) to consider whether it had complied with requirements to provide accurate information about its students, and whether it had effective management and governance arrangements in place.

    In September 2024, the Department for Education (DfE) instructed the Student Loans Company to suspend all tuition fee payments to ABA, until OfS had completed its investigation. On 27 September, ABA asked the OfS to remove it from the Register because it was no longer able to provide higher education. A decision to permanently close ABA was made on 22 October 2024 and liquidators were appointed.

    On 2 April 2025 OfS published a summary of its investigation. We understand around 300 current and prospective students were on courses partnered with universities who supported students through the closure and offered who were offered individual guidance sessions setting out options which included transfer to complete study as per the student protection plans.

    The other group of students

    However, there were also students who were studying for a Level 5 Diploma in Education and Training (DET) awarded by City and Guilds and some awarded by Organisation for Hospitality and Tourism Management (OTHM) – both at the time eligible for student loan finance. According to the OfS investigation this number looks to be just over 2,000.

    The route to raise complaints and seek redress for these students is different to the route for students on courses partnered with universities. As set out in the section of our Good Practice Framework that covers partnership arrangements, awarding universities and delivery partners will both be members of the OIA, so that students can benefit from a route to independent review of both party’s responsibilities. Where only one partner is a member of the OIA, our remit to review issues of concern to students is more limited.

    As the shape of the HE sector has changed, our legislation has been amended several times to bring as many delivery bodies and awarding institutions accessing public money as possible within our membership, to ensure that all students have access to an independent review of their complaints. But not all Awarding Organisations are currently OIA members, even where these courses are eligible for student finance.

    Access and risk

    There are clearly benefits to students of having access to student finance to access non- universities-awarded courses such as HND, HNC and level 4 or 5 courses with a Higher Technical Qualification approval. But we are concerned that the current arrangements may be inequitable, given that some students cannot seek an independent review of some awarding organisations’ acts or omissions.

    We have sought to close this gap by agreeing with Ofqual that awarding organisations being in membership of the OIA Scheme is compatible with Ofqual regulation and opening our Non-Qualifying membership up for awarding organisations.

    The impact on students of the different arrangements materialises further in cases of provider closure. In previous provider closure cases either the university has proactively put in place appropriate options or if they wanted to raise a complaint, the OIA could look at what the university’s role is in resolving this.

    As things stand, students at a delivery partner that ceases to operate at short notice, on courses awarded by an organisation that is not an OIA member, may find themselves with no clear independent route for complaints and redress. In our experience, students studying at HE level via a non-university awarded route and accessing higher education student finance, have no real understanding of this difference from those on a university awarded course.

    In the case of ABA, we have received a small number of complaints from students on the DET course, who are not able to access any financial remedy since ABA has gone into liquidation and the only option is for the students to become an unsecured creditor against ABA.

    We understand that where City and Guilds has received the work of students, there was not sufficient evidence for them to confirm the qualification requirements had been met for any student. This has been particularly difficult news for some students, many of whom believed that they had passed the course and were simply awaiting receipt of their certificate. They are unable to access further funding to re-take the year, compensation or travel costs to complete their studies.

    In the current financial climate and where franchise provision is coming under more scrutiny, it’s hard to imagine there will not be more students in this situation at a provider impacted by a closure. Alongside this the Lifelong Learning Entitlement (LLE) will potentially open more level 4 and 5 “non university” awarded courses where students may be unable to seek independent redress.

    Whilst we completely agree that protecting public funds is important, we mustn’t forget that there is a real and significant human cost for the genuine students, sometimes with few sources of personal support to help them navigate their limited options, left behind.

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  • The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme has sector-specific implications

    The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme has sector-specific implications

    The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) emerged out of the National Security Act 2023.

    The idea was that, by way of the mandatory registration of activities broadly defined as involving “foreign influence” on the UK, both the UK’s political system and wider civil society would be made both more transparent and, in the case of certain countries’ actions, less of a national security risk.

    The government published light-touch draft guidance for FIRS in September 2023, promising further detail ahead of implementation – including sector-specific guidance for research, academia and higher education.

    FIRS trap

    Nothing happened for a while, and then following the general election news emerged of a delay to the scheme, seemingly tied up with the question of Labour’s (still ongoing) “China audit” and a (hotly contested) claim that guidance wasn’t ready to go live.

    One particular sticking point has become whether China would be put on the “enhanced tier” of the scheme, a development which would enormously increase the scrutiny faced by all organisations – including universities – involved in partnerships or collaborations with Chinese institutions. The Conservatives were rumoured to have been considering it while in power, and more recently Labour has reportedly been “resisting” such a move.

    Fast forward to today, and there is still no decision over China – but the government has laid draft regulations placing Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier, announced that FIRS will come into operation from 1 July, and published sector-specific guidance for academia and research.

    The additional wrinkle for higher education is that when the Department for Education announced that the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act would go ahead in revised form, it decided that the overseas funding measures in section 9 would be “kept under review” while FIRS was implemented and the interaction between the two was assessed.

    Tiers for FIRS

    You will be glad to learn that FIRS is not “a register of foreign spies” – we even get a short section in a fact sheet to make this clear. It is, however, a register of arrangements – and the individual or power who makes an arrangement with a foreign power (or controlled entity) has to let the Home Office know.

    At heart, FIRS is structured around two tiers: the “political influence tier” and the “enhanced tier”. All countries – except the Republic of Ireland – will be put in one or the other. And the difference between the two is vast.

    Political influence is restricted to specific “directions” from other countries to influence the UK’s political domain. So this involves things like elections and referenda (perish the thought), ministerial or departmental decision-making, political parties’ activities, or the actions of parliamentarians (including in the devolved nations). There’s also the wider concept of influencing “public life”, which includes certain kinds of communications and the disbursement of money.

    Where the Secretary of State deems it necessary to keep the UK safe or protect its interests, they will designate a foreign power (or part thereof) as being subject to the “enhanced tier”. This additionally requires the wider registration of “arrangements to carry out activities at the direction of a foreign power”, or activities carried out in the UK by specified entities controlled by a foreign power. In this case there is the possibility of a tailored approach to address particular risks.

    At each level, the requirement is that you register the activities to be carried out, their nature, their purpose, any intended outcomes – plus start dates, end dates, and frequencies where relevant. Of course registration will include passing on details of who is carrying out the activities, and which foreign power is directing them. Some of this information will be published – but this will be limited to what is needed to achieve the transparency aims of FIRS. Personal details, information that would prejudice personal safety or national security, and commercially sensitive information will not be published.

    Designating a country as being subject to the enhanced tier requires parliamentary approval – and as above this is currently being sought for Iran and Russia. How about China? As will be clear when we turn to some examples below, this is the big question when it comes to FIRS for UK higher education – China being moved up into the advanced tier would greatly complicate all kinds of educational and research initiatives.

    The Conservatives in opposition are pushing strongly for it, though they never bit the bullet while in power. Speaking in the House of Commons today, security minister Dan Jarvis said:

    For reasons that I completely understand, the shadow Home Secretary asked about China. He will recall the remarks I made to this House on 4 March, where I was very clear that countries will be considered separately and decisions will be taken by this Government based on the evidence. I said then, as I say again now, that I will not speculate on which countries may or may not be specified in future. That is the right way to proceed, and I hope he understands that.

    It’s likely the question will continue to recur, every time an issue involving national security and China (or other countries) rears its heads – we should expect calls in Parliament and in the press for a country seen as a national security threat to be moved over to the enhanced tier.

    Direction and production

    For the purposes of FIRS, “direction” implies a power relationship – a contract or conditional payment on the one hand, coercion or the promise of future benefits on the other. So for our purposes a genuine collaboration, or a very generic request, would not count as direction. Neither is something “direction” simply because it is funded by a foreign power.

    The actual registration and publication will be done by a special unit within the Home Office. This will also be the means by which the Secretary of State can issue “information notices” to get more information, or remind you to register activity should you be doing something that it is felt you should tell the Home Office about.

    FIRS is an information gathering tool – it doesn’t restrict anyone’s ability to do anything in and of itself, it simply requires that activity is registered appropriately. And it only applies where you are directed by a foreign power – anything else you do or say on your own behalf is not covered by these requirements.

    At FIRS I was afraid

    The meat of the higher education and research guidance (framed oddly as the “academia and research sector”) is a series of 34 examples, illustrating where registration is required and where it would not be. There’s a potential impact in every area of university and related activity – but rather than go through every example here it would make sense to pick out a handful of points to illustrate some key impacts on research, teaching, and SUs – both for enhanced and political tiers. If this stuff is your job, or becomes your job, chances are you’ll be getting to know these examples very quickly anyway.

    Teaching and recruitment

    Let’s start at the beginning (example 1) – the education department of country A (not subject to the enhanced tier) wants to build a relationship with a UK university: the university gets more students via promotion and enticements within country A, but it also has to lobby the UK government about a short-term visa study programme for students from country A.

    Clearly this is registerable – there’s an arrangement with country A, it is directed, and requires the use of political influence.

    A lot of the concerns that led to the requirements that went into the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act were about the potential for foreign powers to influence what is taught at universities. In example 6, a student from country G (enhanced tier) is studying a human rights course at a UK university, which includes material on the oppression of an ethnic group in country G by its government. The country G embassy contacts the students, and requires them to change course – threatening to force them to leave the UK if they don’t.

    Here it is the student that is obliged to register – they have been obliged, with coercion used, by a foreign power, to change their course. What’s not at all clear is what would convince said student that this would be a good idea, or what protections would be available to them when they reported their own government to UK authorities.

    But what about universities reporting back to an enhanced tier government on student behaviour? Examples 15, 16, and 17 all deal with reporting back to country V: we learn that a student reporting back on their progress, or a university reporting back on results, is not registerable. However, where the student is coerced into organising a protest about a speaker critical of country V, this is registerable (again, by the student).

    Elsewhere on the enhanced tier regulations, there’s been an important concession (following consultation responses) regarding scholarships, which are now exempt from being registered. And importantly, activities carried out wholly at overseas universities – such as transnational education – will not require registration either.

    A Swiss cheese of foreign influence

    The more tedious and public end of the free speech debate has been concerned with otherwise low-profile, little known, escaping the public attention student activity. Student societies, students getting together in their own time, and reasonable debate. Almost entirely absent from the public but not policy discourse has been the regulation of research activity. Put bluntly, the ways in which other countries influence research into lethal weapons has had less political attention than which culture issue The Telegraph is upset about this week.

    The new guidance provides that agents of specified foreign powers will have to register under the enhanced scheme where they are “undertaking a research project directed by a specified foreign power or specified foreign power-controlled entity.” As we learn from the Minister of State for Security Dan Jarvis the current specified countries under the enhanced tier are Iran and Russia.

    This means that individuals directed by Iran, Russia, and whoever else comes under the future ambit of the scheme, would be required to register that they are being directed by these states and declare they are undertaking state directed activity. Somehow, this seems extremely unlikely to capture the full range of state directed activity even with the threat of a five year custodial sentence.

    The scheme is narrowly applied and broadly defined as to avoid capturing a broad swathe of activities. Under the political tier

    Registration would only be required under the political tier if the research formed part of an intentional effort by a foreign power to influence the UK’s democracy, for example, a specific area of government policy.

    This is a really high bar to clear. As we learn further in the guidance activity which is funded and directed by a foreign power will not necessarily count as political influencing activity if researchers are free to arrive at their own recommendations. In other words, it is possible to influence the terms of the debate but not its conclusions and remain outside the scope of the scheme.

    One of the oddities of the regulation is that “activity is only registerable where carried out in the UK.” This would seem to mean that where there are campuses abroad which included UK researchers, researchers from other countries, and researchers who would be a specified power within the UK, activity would be outside of this scheme.

    The political influence tier of activity is designed to capture activities which are directly aimed toward parliamentary mechanisms and procedures. Aside from any debate on whether the specified countries are broad enough this means that political but not parliamentary political activities are not covered either. The guidance specifically states that

    …any published research which intended to influence a political process would not require registration under the political influence tier, if it was clear on the research report that it was completed as part of an arrangement with a foreign power.

    The scope of the research element of the scheme feels very narrow. The examples make clear that a UK provider would need to register under the political scheme where they are lobbying the UK government to further the interests of a foreign power as part of a funding arrangement. An individual would need to register under the political tier where they are acting as an intermediary for selling the technologies of a foreign power. And under the enhanced tier UK universities cannot rely on the ambiguity of a relationship and would seemingly have to register where there are future potential income opportunities.

    It is also made clear that just because activities clear these schemes they do not get a clean slate for other legislation like the National Security and Investment Act. As long as a provider is not taking funding from a foreign power, and especially specific foreign powers, to direct research, funding, and influencing outcomes, they should not be impacted by FIRS. This does not mean they will not be impacted by the bureaucracy of every other scheme.

    FIRS is helpful in setting an obvious floor for what is in scope but the ceiling is cavernous. There is significant latitude for influencing UK politics outside of parliamentary procedures and without directing research outcomes. The participants in the research ecosystem will on the one hand favour the flexibility but will rue the potential for being personally liable for another addition to an increasingly complicated web of international research rules.

    Societies, SUs and CSSAs

    One of the major concerns floating around the press coverage and the think tanks has been the activities of student societies on campus – specifically (but not exclusively), Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs).

    Last year a Henry Jackson Society report, Studying Abroad to Serve China, alleged that CSSAs are closely tied to and influenced by the Chinese government, presenting themselves as cultural organisations while actually being integral to China’s “United Front Work” strategy.

    Meanwhile, the Telegraph has published allegations of Chinese students facing serious repercussions, including detention and interrogation in China, after participating in protests or making critical comments about the Chinese government while studying in the UK – which involve CSSAs locally and nationally.

    Like plenty of religious, political and sporting groups on campus, societies of this sort will say that they affiliate to a national body. Many rarely discuss or disclose the ways in which overt or covert control or influence may be placed on their activities.

    The sector-specific guidance covers “student bodies, societies or associations” – but there’s a problem. It appears from the guidance that Home Office officials think that student societies are legally separate bodies from their students’ union. But in the vast majority of cases, they have no separate legal personality – they are part of the SU. That matters because it impacts who has the legal duty to register.

    For example, in a section designed to reassure universities about their own liability to register, the guidance says:

    Where a registerable arrangement is made by a student society of a university: the society is required to register.

    And across three case studies discussing different types of activity, there’s the same issue. So where one describes a society being directed by the government of a country to sign a petition and campaign against a UK government decision, the guidance says:

    The student society is required to register as they are in an arrangement with the government of Country P (foreign power) from whom they receive funding (direction) to undertake campaigning activities to influence a government decision (political influence activities).

    But legally, in most universities the student society doesn’t exist. It’s a part of the SU – placing the onus on the SU to register – and so places duties on underfunded student activities staff to risk assess and probe the activities of societies in ways that many will object to.

    Separate guidance for charities then puts onerous duties on the trustees in the usual way.

    The upshot is that CSSAs – and any other international society undertaking activity of this sort – will soon clock that they themselves are under no legal duty to register. Universities will also take comfort in guidance that makes clear “societies” are separate and have their own reporting duties.

    The buck lands on the SU – who will be thinking hard about disproportionate scrutiny over a group of students that share protected characteristics, and who may object to their treatment by the SU to the university under OfS’ new harassment expectations.

    Not only will the SU not have experience of what amounts to a whole new type of complex risk assessment, it will all happen in a way that actually discourages joined-up risk assessment and sensible concern over the sorts of things the HJS and the Telegraph alleges. You really couldn’t make it up.

    If you believe the allegations that swirl around CSSAs, there are major student welfare concerns here – both for students who might be “under surveillance” from their colleagues, and for students who might be being coerced into watching others and reporting them. If you’re less sure that what the Telegraph or the HSJ say is widespread or even real, then there’s welfare and harassment concerns that surround poking around and applying heavy scrutiny to a particular group of students. And in England, the moment you start to think about potential interactions with free speech requirements and OfS’ new harassment requirements a headache ensues given both seem to cover SUs and societies without directly regulating them.

    If nothing else, the guidance repeatedly states that it’s not that the activity is per se illegal – and if not, is it “free speech within the law” or does the influence chill free speech, and so on and so on and so on.

    It would certainly seem like a good time to consider whether those straight-line cuts to the SU’s already tight budget are wise if junior staff are about to start to have to offer training on these complexities – and front out difficult conversations with those running international student societies.

    Upshots

    All of these new duties kick in on July 1st – so there’s very little time to understand the implications and get houses in order. The question on China and its tier allocation will be one to watch – the allegations are unlikely to go away.

    There are several “foreign influence” offences, including a failure to register a foreign influence arrangement, and carrying out political influence activity where the overarching arrangement is not registered and the person knows that the activity is being directed by a foreign principal. The maximum penalty for failure to comply with the requirements of the political influence tier is 2 years imprisonment – and the maximum penalty in the enhanced tier is 5 years imprisonment.

    If there are those who are carrying out what is currently covert activity who are under pressure to keep it that way – whether through incentives, or threats, or both, there is a real question about the way in which those individuals might evaluate that against any rules put in by a university (or so) in pursuit of the scheme.

    More broadly, it’s yet another thing in terms of regulatory burden – and another one of those things where a duty is being placed on a public authority to do what many would argue is not their job to do at all, that they’re not sufficiently funded to do, and have not even been properly consulted on.

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