by CUPA-HR | June 5, 2025
On June 5, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that plaintiffs bringing employment discrimination claims under Title VII cannot be held to a higher evidentiary standard simply because they belong to a majority group. The decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services resolves a long-standing split among federal appeals courts over how such “reverse discrimination” claims should be evaluated.
Background
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, has worked at the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. In 2019, after being passed over for a promotion in favor of a lesbian woman and later demoted from her existing role, Ames filed suit alleging that both decisions were based on her sex and sexual orientation — protected characteristics under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Lower courts dismissed her claims. Applying a test used in the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and several others, they held that Ames, as a member of a majority group, was required to present additional “background circumstances” — such as evidence that the employer had a pattern of discriminating against majority-group employees — in order to move forward with her case.
The Court’s Reasoning
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson rejected that reasoning, emphasizing that Title VII’s protections apply equally to all individuals. She wrote that the law “draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs,” and instead “focuses on individuals rather than groups, barring discrimination against ‘any individual’ because of protected characteristics.”
The court found that the so-called “background circumstances” rule used by the lower courts added an impermissible hurdle for plaintiffs like Ames. In the ruling, the Supreme Court found that such an approach “cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents,” citing the court’s 1971 opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which held that “discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.”
The justices also noted that the rule adopted by the 6th Circuit conflicted with the court’s guidance to avoid rigid applications of Title VII’s burden-shifting framework, known as the McDonnell Douglas test. That framework is intended to provide a flexible method for proving discrimination based on circumstantial evidence — not to impose categorical rules based on a plaintiff’s demographic status.
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, wrote separately to question the broader use of the McDonnell Douglas framework altogether. He criticized the reliance on “judge-made rules and standards in the discrimination context” and suggested that the framework “lacks basis in the statutory text” of Title VII. While the court did not revisit that framework in the Ames decision, Justice Thomas’s opinion invites further litigation on its continued use.
What’s Next
The decision eliminates the requirement previously used in the 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th and D.C. Circuits that majority-group plaintiffs must meet an elevated evidentiary threshold to proceed with their claims. Instead, all Title VII plaintiffs must satisfy the same standard, regardless of their group status.
By aligning with the plain text of Title VII and affirming that its protections apply equally to all individuals, the decision in Ames may affect how courts approach other claims involving workplace diversity and inclusion efforts. CUPA-HR is continuing to review the decision and will provide additional updates as the implications for campus employers and HR professionals become clearer.
