Tag: Challenge

  • Solving the continuation challenge with engagement analytics

    Solving the continuation challenge with engagement analytics

    • By Rachel Maxwell, Principal Advisor at Kortext.

    Since the adjustments to the Office for Students’ (OfS) Condition B3: Student outcomes, published continuation rates have dropped from 91.1% in 2022 to 89.5% in 2024 for full-time students on their first degree.

    This drop is most evident for students in four key areas: (1) foundation year courses; (2) sub-contracted and franchised courses; (3) those with lower or unknown qualifications on entry; and (4) those studying particular subjects including Business and Management, and Computing.

    Universities utilising student engagement analytics are bucking this downward trend. Yet, surprisingly, engagement analytics are not mentioned in either the evaluation report or the accompanying Theory of Change document.

    Ignoring the impact of analytics is a mistake: universities with real-time actionable information on student engagement can effectively target those areas where risks to continuation are evident – whether at the programme or cohort level, or defined by protected characteristics or risks to equality of opportunity.

    The [engagement analytics] data you see today is next year’s continuation data.

    Dr Caroline Reid, former Associate Dean at the University of Bedfordshire

    A more complete view of student learning

    The digital footprints generated by students offer deep insights into their learning behaviours, enabling early interventions that maximise the opportunity for students to access the right support before any issues escalate. While data can never explain why a student is disengaging from their learning, it provides the starting point for a supportive outreach conversation. What happens thereafter would depend on what the conversation revealed – what kind of intervention would be most appropriate for the student? Examples include academic skills development, health and wellbeing support or financial help. The precise nature of the intervention would depend on the ecosystem of (typically) the professional services success and support expertise available within each institution.

    Analysing engagement activity at the cohort level, alongside the consequent demand on student services teams, further enables universities to design cohort or institution-wide interventions to target increasingly stretched resources where and when they are needed most.

    [With engagement analytics we have] a holistic view of student engagement … We have moved away from attendance at teaching as the sole measure of engagement and now take a broader view to enable us to target support and interventions.

    Richard Stock, Academic Registrar, University of Essex

    In 2018–19, 88% of students at the University of Essex identified as having low engagement at week six went on to withdraw by the end of the academic year. By 2021–22, this had reduced to approximately 20%. Staff reported more streamlined referral processes and effective targeted support thanks to engagement data.

    Bucking the trend at Keele

    The OfS continuation dashboard shows that the Integrated Foundation Year at Keele University sits 8% above the 80% threshold. Director of the Keele Foundation Year, Simon Rimmington, puts this down to how they are using student engagement data to support student success through early identification of risk.

    The enhanced data analysis undertaken by Simon and colleagues demonstrates the importance of working with students to build the right kind of academically purposeful behaviours in those first few weeks at university.

    • Withdrawal rates decreased from 21% to 9% for new students in 2023–24.
    • The success rate of students repeating a year has improved by nearly 10%.
    • Empowering staff and students with better engagement insights has fostered a more supportive and proactive learning environment.

    Moreover, by identifying students at risk of non-continuation, Keele has protected over £100K in fee income in their foundation year alone, which has been reinvested in student support services.

    Teesside University, Nottingham Trent University (NTU) and the University of the West of England (UWE) all referred explicitly to engagement analytics in their successful provider statements for TEF 2023.

    The Panel Statements for all three institutions identified the ‘very high rates of continuation’ as a ‘very high quality’ feature of their submissions.

    • Teesside’s learning environment was rated ‘outstanding’, based on their use of ‘a learner analytics system to make informed improvements’.
    • NTU cited learning analytics as the enabler for providing targeted support to students, with reduced withdrawals due to the resulting interventions.
    • UWE included ‘taking actions … to improve continuation and completion rates by proactively using learning analytics’ to evidence their approach.

    The OfS continuation dashboard backs up these claims. Table 1 highlights data for areas of concern identified by the OfS. Other areas flagged as key drivers for HEIs are also included. There is no data on entry qualifications. All figures where data is available, apart from one[1], are significantly above the 80% threshold.

    Table 1: Selected continuation figures (%) for OfS-identified areas of concern (taught, full-time first degree 2018–19 to 2021–22 entrants)

    The Tees Valley is the second most deprived of 38 English Local Enterprise Partnership areas, with a high proportion of localities among the 10% most deprived nationally. The need to support student success within this context has strongly informed Teesside University’s Access and Participation Plan.

    Engagement analytics, central to their data-led approach, ‘increases the visibility of students who need additional support with key staff members and facilitates seamless referrals and monitoring of individual student cases.’ Engagement data insights are integral to supporting students ‘on the cusp of academic failure or those with additional barriers to learning’.

    The NTU student caller team reaches out to students identified by its engagement dashboard as being at risk. They acknowledge that the intervention isn’t a panacea, but the check-in calls are appreciated by most students.

    Despite everything happening in the world, I wasn’t forgotten about or abandoned by the University.
    NTU student

    By starting with the highest risk categories, NTU has been able to focus on those most likely to benefit from additional support. And even false positives are no bad thing – better to have contact and not need it, than need it and not have it.

    What can we learn from these examples?

    Continuation rates are under threat across the sector resulting from a combination of missed or disrupted learning through Covid, followed by a cost-of-living crisis necessitating the prioritisation of work over study.

    In this messy world, data helps universities – equally challenged by rising costs and a fall in fee income – build good practice around student success activity that supports retention and continuation. These universities can take targeted action, whether individually, at cohort level or in terms of resource allocation, because they know what their real-time engagement data is showing.

    All universities cited in this blog are users of the StREAM student engagement analytics platform available from Kortext. Find out more about how your university can use StREAM to support improvements in continuation.

    [1] The Teesside University Integrated Foundation Year performs above the OfS-defined institutional benchmark value of 78.9%.

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  • Rethinking the Financial Challenge of English Universities

    Rethinking the Financial Challenge of English Universities

    By Adam Habib, Vice-Chancellor at SOAS University of London, and Lord Dr. Michael Hastings of Scarisbrick CBE, Chair of the Board of Trustees at SOAS.

    The business model of English higher education is broken. We are not sure that this simple fact is sufficiently understood by all stakeholders in higher education. Do not mistake us: we all recognise the serious financial crises that most English universities are confronting. But this is not the same as understanding its causal features and what to do about it. The latest financial report from the Office for Students (OfS), released in mid-November, suggests 72% of English universities will be in deficit by the end of the academic year if they continue as is. It does not suggest much about how to address it. In fact, it does not even ask why the other 28% of universities are not in deficit. Is this because of their historical endowments or their specific student profile, or are they doing something the others are not?

    But the OfS is not the only stakeholder reluctant to ask the hard questions: how we got here and what to do about it. This malady afflicts almost all other stakeholders. Let’s begin with the basics. Almost three decades ago, the British government committed to massifying education and ensuring that at least 50% of their school-leaving population had the privilege of going to university. The challenge was how to pay for it. They introduced fees, first as a small proportion of the actual cost in 2006, and then to cover the entire cost in 2012 (at least for Business degrees, Humanities and the Social Sciences). The popular backlash this generated, especially since almost all universities rushed to implement the maximum permitted fee, led the politicians to subsequently avoid increasing fees in line with inflation. The net effect was that within a few years, the actual cost of university education outstripped the fees.

    The solution followed by most universities was to increase international fees and their intakes of foreign students. To attract more of these students, universities borrowed heavily, built shiny new facilities, expanded their pastoral services and grew their student numbers. This was assisted in part by the removal of student number caps on home students. Costs increased, and to cover these, more income was required, which led to even higher international fees and more foreign students.

    All higher education stakeholders were complicit in this. The Government initially supported this solution because it obviated the need for more government subsidies and enabled foreign currency earnings. Vice-chancellors and higher education executives deluded themselves in thinking that the international postgraduate masters students came to the UK universities because of their institutions’ research reputations, even though survey after survey demonstrated that these students were increasingly attracted by the prospect of employment prospects and the post-study visa. Unions, both academic and professional service ones, acquiesced given that these international fees enabled higher salaries and subsidised greater research time for academics. There was even broader public support as it contained the fees for domestic students.

    Until of course, a new breed of ethnically oriented right-wing politicians mobilised on the chauvinistic instinct of there being too many foreigners in Britain. This first manifested in Brexit, then China and subsequently all foreigner-bashing, and finally visa restrictions on dependents. The net effect was a dramatic fall in applications and enrolment of international students, with the ensuing financial crisis of universities in the UK. A positive spin-off of this state of affairs is that almost all stakeholders now recognise the flimsy fiscal foundation of universities. The negative feature is that it still has not generated an honest reflection and behaviour on the part of all stakeholders or a sufficiently deep deliberation on the business model of higher education in the UK and what to do about it.

    Take, for instance, the stance of government. The Secretary of State for Education announced in the House of Commons on 4 November 2024 the first university fee increase for undergraduate students in eight years. Yet the Chancellor had increased the Employer National insurance a few days before from 13.8 to 15 percent. The net effect is a further loss of £59 million for universities in the UK from the 2025/26 academic year.

    Neither is the debate in universities more imaginative on what to do about the financial crisis and the business model of higher education. University vice-chancellors and Universities UK have recognised the need to revert to greater public funding for higher education, although there is a broad recognition that this is an unlikely solution in the near future given the fiscal crisis of the state. They have suggested through individual vice-chancellor advocacies that universities would require the financial equivalence of £12,000 fees, but again, almost all recognise the political challenge of achieving this during a cost-of-living crisis. The reluctant fallback back? A retreat to international student fees by retracting or reforming the visa restrictions, thereby allowing for further increases in income from foreign students.

    But this is just not a feasible solution for the long term. Higher education in the UK has priced itself out for ordinary international students looking solely for a higher education qualification. The only rationales for postgraduate master’s students accessing UK universities, given their high-cost structure, are either post-study employment or the learning of a specific qualification not available in alternative higher education settings. The former is increasingly becoming politically unfeasible, and the latter is not a sufficiently large market to financially sustain British universities.

    This is in addition to the moral and commercial challenges of this business model. As we have suggested elsewhere, there should be serious objections to this model, which is effectively directed towards sucking out resources from countries far more impoverished than the UK, to essentially cross-subsidise domestic citizens. Moreover, it accelerates the brain drain, weakening institutional capacities and human capabilities in the majoritarian world at precisely the moment when such societies require an enhancement of capabilities to address the local manifestations of transnational challenges like climate change, pandemics, food insecurity and war.

    Where to go from here, then? First, there is an urgent need for an honest conversation led by government without any smoke and mirrors on the fiscal latitude available to it and the consequences thereof for the financing of higher education. Second, there is a need for a thorough reflection on what has fiscally worked, and what has not in the recent past on the management and executive stewardship of universities in the UK. Third, there is a need for an honest discussion in universities on the fiscal viability of excessively small classes and unduly low staff-student ratios, 40% research time for all teaching and research contracts, and the importance of institutional differentiation in mandates and how these should speak to the former two elements. Finally, we need to think through the limits of cross-subsidising from international student fees and what new opportunities are opening up globally for fulfilling our institutional mandates.

    One opportunity, that has not been sufficiently explored by British universities, is how to assist in the education and training of hundreds of millions of young people in the majoritarian world. This is an urgent necessity not only for the economic development of these societies but also for enabling societies across the world to manage the transnational challenges of our time, without which we may not survive as a human species. Obviously, this will not be possible on the existing cost structures or business models of higher education. But partnering with universities in the Global South, involving the joint development of curricula, co-teaching and co-assessment, could bring down cost structures of higher education. This could then feed into more reasonable fees being charged, thereby opening up new higher education markets for British universities. Cost structures could also be reconsidered in relation to scale. The more students there are within a program, limited to pedagogical requirements, the more cost per student is reduced, and the more competitive fees can become. New technologies involving online teaching and global classrooms, many of which were pioneered for our own students during the Covid-19 Pandemic, can make this equitable transnational teaching even more feasible.

    Some forms of transnational teaching are already underway in UK universities. But these often take the form of online learning, overseas campuses and franchise models of higher education, all of which are only directed at obviating the financial challenges of British universities. While we would be reluctant to take rigid positions against these models – they may indeed be relevant in certain contextual circumstances – we do hold that the equitable partnership model identified above holds the pedagogical benefit of enabling learning that is both globally grounded and locally relevant. It also does not pit the financial security of British universities against that of universities of the majoritarian world. Essentially, these equitable teaching partnerships can pioneer one element of a new business model that enhances collaboration and mutual benefit for universities in the UK and the majoritarian world.

    Such a model of higher education could also become part of the soft power arsenal of the UK. Increasingly, government has broached the idea of a global Britain. This would be a Britain recognised as a collaborative partner of other nations, enabling them to achieve their national objectives, while enabling itself to be economically competitive and socially responsive to both its own citizens and its international obligations. An equitable orientation to its higher education system would assist this strategic national agenda.

    We are by no means suggesting that equitable transnational learning should replace all other forms of teaching in UK higher education. This would be unrealistic and, frankly, would violate the responsibility of British universities to be nationally responsive. Instead, we recommend that in the pursuit of a financially sustainable higher education system, a diverse set of income strategies – subsidy, domestic fees, international fees, ODL, executive education and equitable transnational educational partnerships – is required. This final strategy not only opens up a new higher education student market at a different price point but also enables us to square our imperative to be financially sustainable with our commitment to be socially and globally responsive.

    The strategic challenge of managing higher education institutions in the contemporary era is the management of tensions between competing imperatives. It also requires thinking outside the box, innovating and finding new markets, and servicing these at new price points, while continuing to meet the social obligations implicit in the mandate of universities. This is what we believe is sometimes missing from the deliberations on making British universities financially sustainable. The debate can only be enriched and the recommendations made more robust if we are prepared to think beyond what we are comfortable with.

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