Tag: foundations

  • Policy and Practice Foundations and Building Blocks

    Policy and Practice Foundations and Building Blocks

    Two weeks ago Chris Buonocore, Alex Humphreys, Martin Kurzweil and Emily Tichenor (all of the nonprofit organization Ithaka, and part of the Articulation of Credit Transfer Project) posted in this blog the happy news that Transfer Explorer (a website, modeled after CUNY T-Rex, that shows everyone how prior learning experiences will count toward a college’s academic requirements) has been launched containing information from three South Carolina colleges. Information from dozens of additional colleges in Connecticut, New York, South Carolina and Washington will be added in the coming months. 

    A cartoon Tyrannosaurus rex wearing a CUNY T-shirt

    Because this information is now public and usable, students and advisers will be able to make better plans for transfer, students will discover and choose transfer destinations that are a good fit for them, and institutions will be better able to align their programs and equivalencies to facilitate transfer. Transfer Explorer will also reduce the burden on students, advisers and admissions staff to locate and make sense of relevant information across disparate sources, allowing them to focus on higher-value tasks. The evidence from CUNY T-Rex suggests these benefits are already being realized in that context. 

    The advent of Transfer Explorer and other similar efforts to make transparent the rules on credit transfer and degree applicability raises an important question: Which policies and practices are desirable for institutions to have in place to make their credit mobility information public?

    Let’s assume that a public website, such as Transfer Explorer, is available for displaying credit mobility information, and that an institution has the appropriate financial and staff resources to put its information on the website. Now what course credit and program requirement policies and practices must be in place, and which additional ones would be useful to have? This post describes some of these policies and practices.

    Necessary Policies and Practices

    Absolutely essential is that transfer credit rules stating how an institution will treat all types of prior learning experiences (e.g., course A at Institution X will count as equivalent to course B at Institution Y), as well as the program and degree requirements (for majors, concentrations, general education, etc.), must be systematically and consistently stored, recorded and updated in the institution’s software system(s), with the credit mobility website reflecting any changes in any of these rules and requirements in a timely manner. These practices are essential for the website to function as a trusted source of information.

    There should be policies regarding who can change the transfer credit rules and degree requirements recorded in this software and under what conditions. This will reduce the likelihood of erratic, capricious or frequent changes, while ensuring that all students are subject to the same rules and requirements, without prejudice.

    Any additional rules, requirements, restrictions or qualifications related to the conditions for granting credit for prior learning (such as a minimum grade in a prior course or a residency requirement at the destination college) should apply equally to all students and be explicitly and publicly stated. This ensures that all students have access to the same information, again promoting equitable treatment.

    There should be administrative oversight of the above policies and practices, and that oversight should ideally be provided by people who would be unaffected by the rules’ consequences (i.e., conflicts of interest should be minimized). Oversight by people not acting in their own interest is necessary to ensure that policies and practices are appropriately instituted and maintained.

    Additional Desirable Policies and Practices

    It will be helpful to have policies regarding how course equivalencies for prior learning are decided in the first place—who decides and based on what information. This will promote efficient and effective decision-making regarding prior learning assessments.

    There should also be specific, agreed-upon criteria for giving credit for prior learning. It has been effectively argued that transfer credit should be based entirely on learning outcomes, and not on, e.g., a course’s prerequisites, textbook or modality (in-person, online or hybrid); the degree the student may or may not have; the student’s major; etc. AACRAO’s recommended criterion for course equivalency is 70 percent “matching of content.” Such a policy ensures that credit for prior learning is based on only that—prior learning.

    Any characteristics of prior learning, in addition to credits, that would satisfy an institution’s requirements, characteristics such as a course being writing intensive or including material on information literacy, should be recorded and considered for transfer. Students and those who support them need this information to be able to plan students’ complete academic trajectories.

    An explicit appeals procedure that allows students to challenge transfer credit decisions can help in identifying errors and inadequacies in what is shown on the website, as well as promoting equitable treatment of all students (an example of the CUNY appeals procedure is here). Students can more effectively use such a procedure if the website keeps a record of when transfer credit rules and program and degree requirements have changed and how.

    All courses from institutions accredited by what were formerly referred to as regional accreditors (along with, upon review, some other forms of prior learning) should be given at least elective credit. In addition to providing transfer students with predictable transfer credit, such a policy within the CUNY system greatly facilitated the establishment of CUNY T-Rex. For the courses of the 20 CUNY undergraduate colleges, developers had only to reflect on the website existing transfer credit rules (all 1.6 million of them); they did not have to determine what to do with courses that would receive no transfer credit.

    Also highly desirable is that a student should be allowed to use any credit transfer rule in place at College B between when the student first matriculated in College A and subsequently transferred to College B (perhaps within a specified number of years since matriculation at College A). Such a policy is particularly useful for students who first matriculate at a community college and later transfer to a bachelor’s college within the same system. This policy would enable students and those who support them to plan a student’s entire academic trajectory.

    Finally, in developing Transfer Explorer as well as CUNY T-Rex, the engineers had to first parse and deconstruct the colleges’ major and other requirements before programming them for the website. Many of the majors’ diagrams look like a tangled ball of yarn or a Super Bowl football play (diagrams that go way beyond just a sequence of major courses). Faculty and others may not realize how complex they are making requirements until they see them diagrammed. Such requirements can be very difficult to program and so should be simplified, if possible, as well as recorded in systematic, consistent ways.

    Each of the preceding items is useful for constructing an excellent website that will show how an institution will treat a student’s prior learning. However, there are many additional benefits from these policies and practices. For example, concerning the last bullet, keeping the requirements of majors simple and straightforward will not only help the website’s programmers, but will make it easier for students and those who support them to understand and conform to a major’s requirements.

    A basic principle of ACT, Transfer Explorer and CUNY T-Rex is that all of us in higher education benefit by obtaining good information and making it public. We hope that this blog post helps institutions do just that.

    We thank the members of AACRAO, ACT, the Beyond Transfer Advisory Group, the Gates Foundation, Ithaka, the LEARN Commission and SOVA for ideas contributing to this blog post.

    Alexandra W. Logue is professor emerita at the Center for Advanced Study in Education, Graduate Center, CUNY. From 2008 to 2014 she served as executive vice chancellor and university provost of the CUNY system, and she is a founder of CUNY T-Rex.

    Chris Buonocore is the product manager of Transfer Explorer at Ithaka, as well as a founder and the former manager of CUNY T-Rex.

    Christopher Vickery is professor emeritus of computer science at Queens College CUNY, as well as a founder and the creator of CUNY T-Rex.

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  • Trump’s attack on law firms threatens the foundations of our justice system

    Trump’s attack on law firms threatens the foundations of our justice system

    Atticus Finch is remembered as one of literature’s greatest heroes for his willingness to defend an unpopular client despite great professional and personal cost. I was reminded of Atticus when the Trump administration recently retaliated against attorneys explicitly because they represented clients and causes the president dislikes.

    On March 6, President Trump issued an executive order targeting a law firm, Perkins Coie, for activities that are protected by the First Amendment. The order cites the firm for “representing failed Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton” and commissioning opposition research into the Trump campaign. Trump also critiqued Perkins Coie for bringing a lawsuit to challenge election laws Trump supports, “including those requiring voter identification.”

    This order came after the president revoked the security clearances of attorneys at another firm for representing a client the president dislikes: former Department of Justice Special Counsel Jack Smith, who had led the government’s investigations into Trump’s role on January 6 and his handling of classified documents.

    In yet another order, Trump also singled out attorneys at a third firm, Paul Weiss, for bringing a lawsuit against individuals who protested at the Capitol on January 6, and for hiring an attorney who had investigated Trump while in government service. Trump’s orders against Perkins Coie and Paul Weiss not only barred federal agencies from engaging the firms’ services but also suspended the security clearances of its attorneys and restricted their access to federal buildings. These sanctions cripple the attorneys’ ability to represent clients in disputes with the federal government. The administration points to no evidence that these firms are a genuine security risk, and expressly targets these firms for their client selection and speech. 

    This is deeply troubling regardless of where one stands on the activities or firms affected. The process of defending constitutional rights relies heavily on the ability of private attorneys to bring lawsuits against the government. This requires lawyers to be free from official government pressure when choosing which clients and causes to represent. If lawyers are put in fear of federal government retaliation for representing clients who challenge the government or stand for unpopular causes, many injustices will never be challenged. 

    The administration’s actions represent a direct assault on this freedom. Punishing firms for their choice of clients or the nature of their legal work cannot help but intimidate the legal community, discouraging attorneys from taking on cases that may be politically unpopular or present a challenge to those in power. 

    History is repeating itself with Trump’s latest efforts. What is at stake here is nothing less than the legal profession’s capacity to fulfill its role in a democratic society.

    It also sets an ominous precedent for future presidents to exploit. If the Trump administration can target specific firms on this basis, what prevents future administrations from blacklisting firms that represent, say, gun-rights groups? This concern is hardly theoretical: just last year, the Supreme Court had to slap down a New York state official for trying to punish a third party for doing business with the NRA. Could religious organizations be next? Or animal-rights activists? Could the next Democratic president ban from federal buildings any attorneys that represented Republican candidates? What is the limiting principle?

    Furthermore, how can a lawyer who is considering representing a politically controversial client know that she will not be targeted the next time control of the White House changes hands? The safest course of action will be to avoid representing clients of any political salience, right or left, even if their cause is just. 

    Even before Trump’s latest actions on this front, a number of law firms have already shown their willingness to run from controversial causes, such as when Kirkland & Ellis withdrew from its representation of the NRA because the NRA advocates for gun rights. Supreme Court litigator Paul Clement, one of the firm’s most famous attorneys, had to leave the firm entirely simply so he could continue to represent his gun-related clients. Clement could afford to do this precisely because he was so well-known. But if the government can punish an entire law firm over the nature of the work of one of its attorneys, less influential attorneys will face enormous pressure from colleagues to avoid taking controversial cases and clients.

    These actions also directly violate the First Amendment. They explicitly target these firms for the clients they have represented and the legal positions they have taken on election law matters. The Supreme Court has recognized the First Amendment right of lawyers “to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights.” By officially punishing lawyers on the basis of these associations, the executive order therefore is unconstitutional viewpoint-based retaliation and violates the right of freedom of association. For this reason, a federal judge this week issued a temporary restraining order blocking the order against Perkins Coie.

    There is a long, troubling history of trying to silence advocacy through fear and intimidation of the advocates. Attorneys who fought for abolition and civil rights were frequently harassed, or even subjected to threats and violence such as when Thurgood Marshall barely escaped a lynch mob while arguing civil rights cases in the South before Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Many other civil rights attorneys, including those working for the NAACP, were investigated by the FBI, accused of communist sympathies, and faced professional blacklisting. More recently, government officials pressured the firms that represented Guantanamo Bay detainees in the 2000s to drop the cases.

    History is repeating itself with Trump’s latest efforts. What is at stake here is nothing less than the legal profession’s capacity to fulfill its role in a democratic society. As the judge in Perkins Coie’s lawsuit warned, the administration’s decision “threatens to significantly undermine our entire legal system and the ability of all people to access justice.”

    Public interest organizations like FIRE understand this principle well. Because we are committed to the nonpartisan defense of free speech, we are routinely accused of being “right-wing hacks” or “left-wing radicals,” often during the same week. But defending the rights of the unpopular is not about political allegiance — it’s about ensuring that fundamental freedoms apply to everyone. Civil rights groups must be able to defend speech and causes that challenge those in power, regardless of who holds office.

    Atticus Finch understood how crucial vigorous representation is. In his impassioned speech to the jury, he explained, “In this country our courts are great levelers, and in our courts all men are created equal.” If lawyers fear retaliation for simply doing their jobs, then the courts can no longer serve as the “great levelers” as unpopular or politically powerless individuals and causes are unable to get their day in court. We’re all better off when even “bad people” can get a good lawyer — whoever those in power have deemed “bad people” today.

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