Tag: franchising

  • Podcast: Wales, Franchising, Graduate Jobs

    Podcast: Wales, Franchising, Graduate Jobs

    This week on the podcast we look at Wales’ emerging higher education settlement, as Universities Wales publishes its manifesto for the May 2026 Senedd elections amid polling that points to a potential Plaid-led administration.

    Plus we discuss new Office for Students’ data on subcontracted (franchised) provision showing weaker continuation, completion and progression outcomes relative to sector averages, and assess the Institute of Student Employers’ latest survey, with graduate hiring down overall but highly variable by sector amid persistently high applications per vacancy.

    With Debbie McVitty, Editor at Wonkhe, Sarah Cowan, Head of Policy (Higher Education and Research) at the British Academy, Sarah Stevens, Director of Strategy at the Russell Group and presented by Jim Dickinson, Associate Editor at Wonkhe.

    Universities Wales election manifesto

    Outcomes data for subcontracted provision

    Graduate jobs and recruitment reality

    You can subscribe to the podcast on Apple Podcasts, YouTube Music, Spotify, Acast, Amazon Music, Deezer, RadioPublic, Podchaser, Castbox, Player FM, Stitcher, TuneIn, Luminary or via your favourite app with the RSS feed.

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  • What the saga of Oxford Business College tells us about regulation and franchising

    What the saga of Oxford Business College tells us about regulation and franchising

    One of the basic expectations of a system of regulation is consistency.

    It shouldn’t matter how prestigious you are, how rich you are, or how long you’ve been operating: if you are active in a regulated market then the same rules should apply to all.

    Regulatory overreach can happen when there is public outrage over elements of what is happening in that particular market. The pressure a government feels to “do something” can override processes and requirements – attempting to reach the “right” (political or PR) answer rather than the “correct” (according to the rules) one.

    So when courses at Oxford Business College were de-designated by the Secretary of State for Education, there’s more to the tale than a provider where legitimate questions had been raised about the student experience getting just desserts. It is a cautionary tale, involving a fascinating high-court judgment and some interesting arguments about the limits of ministerial power, of what happens when political will gets ahead of regulatory processes.

    Business matters

    A splash in The Sunday Times back in the spring concerned the quality of franchised provision from – as it turned out – four Office for Students registered providers taught at Oxford Business College. The story came alongside tough language from Secretary of State for Education Bridget Phillipson:

    I know people across this country, across the world, feel a fierce pride for our universities. I do too. That’s why I am so outraged by these reports, and why I am acting so swiftly and so strongly today to put this right.

    And she was in no way alone in feeling that way. Let’s remind ourselves, the allegations made in The Sunday Times were dreadful. Four million pounds in fraudulent loans. Fake students, and students with no apparent interest in studying. Non-existent entry criteria. And, as we shall see, that’s not even as bad as the allegations got.

    De-designation – removing the eligibility of students at a provider to apply for SLC fee or maintenance loans – is one of the few levers government has to address “low quality” provision at an unregistered provider. Designation comes automatically when a course is franchised from a registered provider: a loophole in the regulatory framework that has caused concern over a number of years. Technically an awarding provider is responsible for maintaining academic quality and standards for its students studying elsewhere.

    The Office for Students didn’t have any regulatory jurisdiction other than pursuing the awarding institutions. OBC had, in fact, tried to register with OfS – withdrawing the application in the teeth of the media firestorm at the end of March.

    So everything depended on the Department for Education overturning precedent.

    Ministering

    It is “one of the biggest financial scandals universities have faced.” That’s what Bridget Phillipson said when presented with The Sunday Times’ findings. She announced that the Public Sector Fraud Authority would coordinate immediate action, and promised to empower the Office for Students to act in such cases.

    In fact, OBC was already under investigation by the Government Internal Audit Agency (GIAA) and had been since 2024. DfE had been notified by the Student Loans Company about trends in the data and other information that might indicate fraud at various points between November 2023 and February 2024 – notifications that we now know were summarised as a report detailing the concerns which was sent to DfE in January 2024. The eventual High Court judgement (the details of which we will get to shortly) outlined just a few of these allegations, which I take from from the court documents:

    • Students enrolled in the Business Management BA (Hons) course did not have basic English language skills.
    • Less than 50 per cent of students enrolled in the London campus participate, and the remainder instead pay staff to record them as in attendance.
    • Students have had bank details altered or new bank accounts opened in their name, to which their maintenance payments were redirected.
    • Staff are encouraging fraud through fake documents sent to SLC, fake diplomas, and fake references. Staff are charging students to draft their UCAS applications and personal statements. Senior staff are aware of this and are uninterested.
    • Students attending OBC do not live in the country. In one instance, a dead student was kept on the attendance list.
    • Students were receiving threats from agents demanding money and, if the students complained, their complaints were often dealt with by those same agents threatening the students.
    • Remote utilities were being used for English language tests where computers were controlled remotely to respond to the questions on behalf of prospective students.
    • At the Nottingham campus, employees and others were demanding money from students for assignments and to mark their attendance to avoid being kicked off their course.

    At the instigation of DfE, and with the cooperation of OBC, GIAA started its investigation on 19 September 2024, continuing to request information from and correspond with the college until 17 January 2025. An “interim report” detailing emerging findings went to DfE on 17 December 2024; the final report arrived on 30 January 2025. The final report made numerous recommendations about OBC processes and policies, but did not recommend de-designation. That recommendation came in a ministerial submission, prepared by civil servants, dated 18 March 2025.

    Process story

    OBC didn’t get sight of these reports until 20 March 2025, after the decisions were made. It got summaries of both the interim and final reports in a letter from DfE notifying it that Phillipson was “minded to” de-designate. The documentation tells us that GIAA reported that OBC had:

    • recruited students without the required experience and qualifications to successfully complete their courses
    • failed to ensure students met the English language proficiency as set out in OBC and lead provider policies
    • failed to ensure attendance is managed effectively
    • failed to withdraw or suspend students that fell below the required thresholds for performance and/or engagement;
    • failed to provide evidence that immigration documents, where required, are being adequately verified.

    The college had 14 days to respond to the summary and provide factual comment for consideration, during which period The Sunday Times published its story. OBC asked DfE for the underlying material that informed the findings and the subsequent decision, and for an extension (it didn’t get all the material, but it got a further five days) – and it submitted 68 pages of argument and evidence to DfE, on 7 April 2025. Another departmental ministerial submission (on 16 April 2025) recommended that the Secretary of State confirm the decision to de-designate.

    According to the OBC legal team, these emerging findings were not backed up by the full GIAA reports, and there were concerns about the way a small student sample had been used to generalise across an entire college. Most concerningly, the reports as eventually shared with the college did not support de-designation (though they supported a number of other concerns about OBC and its admission process). This was supported by a note from GIAA regarding OBC’s submission, which – although conceding that aspects of the report could have been expressed more clearly – concluded:

    The majority of the issues raised relate to interpretation rather than factual accuracy. Crucially, we are satisfied that none of the concerns identified have a material impact on our findings, conclusions or overall assessment.

    Phillipson’s decision to de-designate was sent to the college on 17 April 2025, and it was published as a Written Ministerial Statement. Importantly, in her letter, she noted that:

    The Secretary of State’s decisions have not been made solely on the basis of whether or not fraud has been detected. She has also addressed the issue of whether, on the balance of probabilities, the College has delivered these courses, particularly as regards the recruitment of students and the management of attendance, in such a way that gives her adequate assurance that the substantial amounts of public money it has received in respect of student fees, via its partners, have been managed to the standards she is entitled to expect.

    Appeal

    Oxford Business College appealed the Secretary of State’s decision. Four grounds of challenge were pursued with:

    • Ground 3: the Secretary of State had stepped beyond her powers in prohibiting OBC from receiving public funds from providing new franchised courses in the future.
    • Ground 1: the decision was procedurally unfair, with key materials used by the Secretary of State in making the decision not provided to the college, and the college never being told the criteria it was being assessed against
    • Ground 4: By de-designating courses, DfE breached OBCs rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions – in this case the courses themselves)
    • Ground 7: The decision by the Secretary of State had breached the public sector equality duty

    Of these, ground 3 was not determined, as the Secretary of State had clarified that no decision had been taken regarding future courses delivered by OBC. Ground 4 was deemed to be a “controversial” point of law regarding whether a course and its designation status could be a “possession” under ECHR, but could be proceeded with at a later date. Ground 7 was not decided.

    Ground 1 succeeded. The court found that OBC had been subject to an unfair process, where:

    OBC was prejudiced in its ability to understand and respond to the matters of the subject of investigation, including as to the appropriate sanction, and to understand the reasons for the decision.

    Judgement

    OBC itself, or the lawyers it engaged, have perhaps unwisely decided to put the judgement into the public domain – it has yet to be formally published. I say unwisely, because it also puts the initial allegations into the public domain and does not detail any meaningful rebuttal from the college – though The Telegraph has reported that the college now plans to sue the Secretary of State for “tens of millions of pounds.”

    The win, such as it is, was entirely procedural. The Secretary of State should have shared more detail of the findings of the GIAA investigation (at both “emerging” and “final” stages) in order that the college could make its own investigations and dispute any points of fact.

    Much of the judgement deals with the criteria by which a sample of 200 students were selected – OBC was not made aware that this was a sample comprising those “giving the greatest cause for suspicion” rather than a random sample, and the inability of OBC to identify students whose circumstances or behaviour were mentioned in the report. These were omissions, but nowhere is it argued by OBC that these were not real students with real experiences.

    Where allegations are made that students might be being threatened by agents and institutional staff, it is perhaps understandable that identifying details might be redacted – though DfE cited the “”pressure resulting from the attenuated timetable following the order for expedition, the evidence having been filed within 11 days of that order” for difficulties faced in redacting the report properly. On this point, DfE noted that OBC, using the materials provided, “had been able to make detailed representations running to 68 pages, which it had described as ‘comprehensive’ and which had been duly considered by the Secretary of State”.

    The Secretary of State, in evidence, rolled back from the idea that she could automatically de-designate future courses without specific reason, but this does not change the decisions she has made about the five existing courses delivered in partnership. Neither does it change the fact that OBC, having had five courses forcibly de-designated, and seen the specifics of the allegations underpinning this exceptional decision put into the public domain without any meaningful rebuttal, may struggle to find willing academic partners.

    The other chink of legal light came with an argument that a contract (or subcontract) could be deemed a “possession” under certain circumstances, and that article one section one of the European Convention on Human Rights permits the free enjoyment of possessions. The judgement admits that there could be grounds for debate here, but that debate has not yet happened.

    Rules

    Whatever your feelings about OBC, or franchising in general, the way in which DfE appears to have used a carefully redacted and summarised report to remove an institution from the sector is concerning. If the rules of the market permit behaviour that ministers do not like, then these rules need to be re-written. DfE can’t just regulate based on what it thinks the rules should be.

    The college issued a statement on 25 August, three days after the judgement was published – it claims to be engaging with “partner institutions” (named as Buckinghamshire New University, University of West London, Ravensbourne University London, and New College Durham – though all four had already ended their partnerships with the remaining students being “taught out”) about the future of the students affected by the designation decision – many had already transferred to other courses at other providers.

    In fact, the judgement tells us that of 5,000 students registered at OBC on 17 April 2025, around 4,700 had either withdrawn or transferred out of OBC to be taught out. We also learn that 1,500 new students, who had planned to start an OBC-delivered course after 2025, would no longer be doing so. Four lead providers had given notice to terminate franchise agreements between April 2024 and May of 2025. Franchise discussions with another provider – Southampton Solent University – underway shortly before the decision to de-designate, had ended.

    OBC currently offers one course itself (no partnership offers are listed) – a foundation programme covering academic skills and English language including specialisms in law, engineering, and business – which is designed to prepare students for the first year of an undergraduate degree course. It is not clear what award this course leads to, or how it is regulated. It is also expensive – a 6 month version (requiring IELTS 5.5 or above) costs an eyewatering £17,500. And there is no information as to how students might enroll on this course.

    OBC’s statement about the court case indicates that it “rigorously adheres to all regulatory requirements”, but it is not clear which (if any) regulator has jurisdiction over the one course it currently advertises.

    If there are concerns about the quality of teaching, or about academic standards, in any provider in receipt of public funds they clearly need to be addressed – and this is as true for Oxford Business College as it is for the University of Oxford. This should start with a clear plan for quality assurance (ideally one that reflects the current concerns of students) and a watertight process that can be used both to drive compliance and take action against those who don’t measure up. Ministerial legal innovation, it seems, doesn’t quite cut it.

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  • Higher Education franchising is not the problem. Rogue providers and regulatory gaps are

    Higher Education franchising is not the problem. Rogue providers and regulatory gaps are

    • By Charlie Tennant, Vice Principal at the London School of Science & Technology.

    Higher education franchising is once more in the limelight for the wrong reasons, as many in the sector again question its benefits, the risks it poses to public funds and the use of it by niche, emerging and/or for-profit higher education providers. However, the stories and discourse miss the key factors that have allowed for abuse of the franchise model. It is gaps in higher education regulation that have led to franchising being scapegoated for what is, at its core, abuse by rogue providers that do not represent the vast majority of those engaged in franchising.

    Franchising is a model through which UK universities have delivered higher education for over two decades. Internationally, this forms part of many forms of Transnational Education (TNE), that as seen in Universities UK International (UUKi)’s Scale of UK Higher Education Transnational Education reports, continues to grow in scale. Locally, providers have adopted the franchise model since the mid-2000s, although since then, the market for many of those providers has changed from international students to local students. This change meant the number of students at these providers who were eligible for Student Loans Company (SLC) funding has grown. The model allows institutions that have found new approaches, differentiated courses, or cold spots of higher education to develop and expand their provision, with a significant portion of them hoping to one day gain their own Degree Awarding Powers (DAPs).

    However, the regulation of domestic franchise provision has not been as robust as it could be. The onus has rightly been put on the universities that are franchising their courses to ensure academic quality and standards of the franchise delivery, although there is currently no direct regulation of higher education franchise providers. Therefore, while some blame can be apportioned to universities engaged in franchising, it can be argued that the Department for Education (DfE) and policymakers’ approach to regulating higher education franchises has led to gaps open to abuse by rogue providers. Furthermore, routes for franchise providers to gain DAPs have been prolonged and made complex by the pause in processing of registration applications by the Office for Students (OfS). Now, the abuse of SLC funding by particular providers of the franchise model, reported by the Sunday Times in an article on 22nd March 2025 and in several articles since then, has brought the reputation of all franchise providers into disrepute, and connected the abuse to use of recruitment agents and the settled Romanian population in the UK.

    In a January 2025 press release for their consultation on franchise provision regulations, the Government outlined the benefits of franchising when done right, and its intention to crack down on rogue higher education providers. Professor Nick Braisby’s HEPI blog published in response to the consultation, rightly welcomes the Government’s new proposals, but asks for the sector to remain critical. This blog therefore proposes three ways in which to ensure the Government and the OfS achieve what they hope to through the crackdown.

    Firstly, the DfE, policymakers and the OfS need to enable quicker routes for franchise providers to join the regulator’s Register. This will allow greater scrutiny at an earlier stage in the lifecycle of an emerging higher education provider (which make up the majority of providers delivering franchised courses) and introduce a focus on their governance structures. Since the set-up of the OfS Register, providers have experienced long lead times for joining the Register, and on top of this, from December 2024, the regulator paused applications for the Register, DAPs and changes of registration category, thus exacerbating the issue of missing opportunities to directly regulate more franchise providers. This is counterintuitive given the OfS’s remarks around the risks associated with an over-reliance by both universities and franchise providers on partnership provision in their Insight Brief regarding subcontractual arrangements in higher education published just two months prior to the pause. The OfS’ Register of providers has the potential to be a great tool for transparency, but the current lead times and design of the approach lead to gaps in regulation that can be exploited by rogue providers.

    Secondly, instead of considering an outright ban, the DfE should implement a robust quality framework for domestic student recruitment agents. As a blueprint, they should draw from the established Agent Quality Framework (AQF) developed by the British Council, Universities UK International (UUKi), and the UK Council for International Student Affairs (UKCISA). As with international student recruitment, the unregulated use of agents for domestic recruitment presents significant risks. By adopting a structured quality framework, the DfE and OfS can mitigate these risks and foster greater transparency and accountability. Agents, when operating under clear ethical guidelines and quality standards, can play a crucial role in widening participation, particularly by reaching communities historically underserved by traditional university outreach, for example, the UK’s settled Romanian population. A tailored framework can help to ensure transparency, effective governance and the establishment of professional standards of agents.

    Finally, the DfE, policymakers and the OfS need to engage more with franchise providers and their university partners jointly. So far, engagements have been disjointed, with either a university or one of their partner franchise providers engaged separately. This creates barriers to collaboration, which would otherwise aid in the pursuit of greater transparency, oversight and the maintenance of academic quality and standards. Bringing both universities and franchise providers together when engaging will enable the Government to find ways to both demonstrate the benefits of franchise provision, as well as develop regulatory approaches and guidance collaboratively with stakeholders. This joint engagement with universities and their partner franchise provider could pave the early steps towards a sector-wide code of practice, an idea discussed in HEPI and Buckinghamshire New University’s Debate Paper on franchising. This could then sit alongside collaboratively developed regulations that would ensure rogue providers cannot abuse regulatory gaps. It will also help to establish a more balanced burden of regulation between universities and their franchise provider partners, and safeguard the reputation of franchise provision.

    Ultimately, effective regulation of the broader higher education student journey, streamlined registration, and collaborative engagement are crucial. By addressing these systemic gaps and promoting transparency, the policymakers, DfE, OfS, and the higher education sector can restore faith in franchising and ensure its legitimate benefits are realised.

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  • Podcast: Sussex fine, franchising | Wonkhe

    Podcast: Sussex fine, franchising | Wonkhe

    This week on the podcast we’re discussing the Office for Students fine of £585,000 levied against the University of Sussex for breaches of free speech conditions, as vice chancellor Sasha Roseneil calls the process “Kafka-esque” and plans a legal challenge.

    Plus we examine what Bridget Phillipson has called “one of the biggest financial scandals universities have faced” – franchising. Does the scandal point towards a shift towards a more “planned” system?

    With Vivienne Stern, Chief Executive at Universities UK, Jonathan Simons, Partner and Head of the Education Practice at Public First, Debbie McVitty, Editor at Wonkhe and presented by Mark Leach, Editor-in-Chief at Wonkhe.

    Sussex fined almost £600k over free speech

    So are universities allowed to chill misogyny or not?

    The franchise problem may not have a quick answer

    Welcome to the walk-in degree

    What is the franchising boom doing to drop-out?

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