Tag: groups

FIRE along with the National Coalition Against Censorship, The Rutherford Institute, PEN America, and First Amendment Lawyers Association today filed a “friend of the court” brief arguing that the jailing of Mahmoud Khalil violates the First Amendment. What follows is the brief’s summary of argument.

America’s founding principle, core to who and what we are as a Nation, is that liberty comes not from the benevolent hand of a king, but is an inherent right of every man, woman, and child. That includes “the opportunity for free political discussion” as “a basic tenet of our constitutional democracy.” (Cox v. Louisiana). And “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” (Terminiello v. City of Chicago). For these reasons, along with all citizens, “freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.” (Bridges v. Wixon).

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, however, is attempting to deport a permanent resident, Mahmoud Khalil, not because the government claims he committed a crime or other deportable offense, but for the seemingly sole reason that his expression stirred the Trump administration to anger. The Secretary claims he can deport Mr. Khalil under a Cold War–era statute giving the secretary of state the power to deport anyone he “personally determines” is contrary to America’s “foreign policy interest.” And he argues this power extends even to deporting permanent residents for protected speech. It does not.

The First Amendment’s protection for free speech trumps a federal statute. (United States v. Robel). Accepting Secretary Rubio’s position would irreparably damage free expression in the United States, particularly on college campuses. Foreign students would (with good reason) fear criticizing the American government during classroom debates, in term papers, and on social media, lest they risk deportation. That result is utterly incompatible with the longstanding recognition that “[t]he essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident,” and that “students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.” (Sweezy v. New Hampshire).

Secretary Rubio claims (as do all censors) that this time is different, that the supposed repulsiveness of Mr. Khalil’s pro-Palestine (and, as Secretary Rubio alleges, pro-Hamas) views cannot be tolerated. But “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive.” (Texas v. Johnson) (holding the First Amendment protects burning the American flag in protest); see also (Snyder v. Phelps) (holding the First Amendment protects displaying “God Hates Fags” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” posters outside a military funeral).

Allowing the Secretary of State to deport any non-citizen whose views, in his subjective judgment, are against America’s foreign policy interests places free expression in mortal peril. China’s Constitution, for example, provides that “when exercising their freedoms and rights, citizens . . . shall not undermine the interests of the state.” As China’s experience shows, allowing the government to step in as censor when it believes speech threatens the government’s interests is a loophole with infinite diameter. It has no place in America’s tradition of individual liberty.

The only court to address the deportation provision Secretary Rubio relies upon to deport Mr. Khalil reached a similar conclusion, holding the law unconstitutional. As that court explained, “If the Constitution was adopted to protect individuals against anything, it was the abuses made possible through just this type of unbounded executive authority.” (Massieu v. Reno).

The “First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.” (Bridges v. California) (invalidating criminal convictions, including of a non-citizen, based on protected speech). Our “liberty-loving society” does not permit deportation as a punishment solely based on expression the government disfavors. The Court should grant Mr. Khalil’s motion.