Tag: incentives

  • UC System Reverses Decision to End Incentives for Postdocs

    UC System Reverses Decision to End Incentives for Postdocs

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    In a letter to system chancellors Tuesday, University of California system president James Milliken said he would not end financial support for hiring postdoctoral fellows out of the UC President’s Postdoctoral Fellowship Program. 

    A system spokesperson told Inside Higher Ed earlier this month that the UC office had decided to halt its $85,000 per fellow, per year, hiring incentives beginning with fellows hired as full-time faculty after summer 2025. 

    “Given the myriad challenges currently facing UC—including disruptions in billions of dollars in annual federal support, as well as uncertainty around the state budget—reasonable questions were raised in recent months about whether the University could maintain the commitment to current levels of incentive funding,” Milliken wrote in the Tuesday letter. 

    He said he considered a proposal to sunset the incentive program but ultimately decided against it. Still, he said, there may be some future changes to the program, including a potential cap on the number of incentives supported and changes to how they are distributed across system campuses. 

    “After learning more about the history and success of the program and weighing the thoughtful perspectives that have been shared, I have concluded that barring extraordinary financial setbacks, the PPFP faculty hiring incentive program will continue while the University continues to assess the program’s structure as well as its long-term financial sustainability.”

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  • Change the incentives to change the economy

    Change the incentives to change the economy

    Incentives are a delicate thing.

    As we learned from the former chief executive of UKRI, if you try to measure every single outcome, every pound spent, and direct every bit of the ecosystem toward something (whatever that something is) it’s possible to cause an enormous amount of damage. Get the input wrong, follow the wrong priority, or make a decision on a less than full picture amongst all of the complexities in an ecosystem and then enormous sums of money can be wasted.

    The underlying assumption in the public theory of research is that directing research toward a clearer end is desirable, possible, and value for money. Intuitively this makes sense. The central feature of modern economic thought is that firms should specialise within a market. In doing so they develop expertise, market advantage, and the wider economy benefits from the most innovative and efficient firms. Market competition then dictates who gets to be the most profitable firms until new firms come along and old firms die through a process of creative destruction.

    Advantages

    In business R&D forms part of the critical advantage. In theory, the firms that can make the most use of the right R&D assets (tangible and intangible) should be the most innovative, secure the greatest market share, and then grow their profits. R&D spending has natural constraints within business. A defence firm is not going to spend money on research outside of defence any more than a carpenter is going to spend money on hypersonic missiles.

    Universities do not face any such natural constraints. In fact, they have precisely the opposite incentive where to maximise income (not profitability) they should do as much research and research adjacent activity as possible. As long as a link between volume, income, and reputation exists, the rational seeking university should do as much as possible. As a secondary benefit is that it is also easier to tell staff, governments, funders, that universities will do more, not less.

    The three major constraints in universities are capital, capacity (staff and facilities), and the direction of funding bodies. If the funding incentive is toward doing more then if the government wishes to introduce greater specialisation in the sector, as set out in the post-16 white paper, it must therefore introduce some new incentives. In particular, as purely from an incentive perspective, it makes very little difference to universities whether their research is economically useful or not.

    The white paper sets out lots of things the government might do including moving teaching incentives through research, changing the REF, rewarding research potential, and encouraging universities to do fewer things better. Post white paper there have been two key research announcements that highlight the difficulty in setting out the right incentives. The funding allocations to UKRI which we will know more about in December and some mooted reforms of HEIF.

    The reform of HEIF promises to introduce new accountability statements tied to a reform of the funding formula over the next few years. The first part of the reform is that universities will be expected to demonstrate how HEIF funding is contributing to economic growth amongst other goals. There is very little knowledge exchange activity where if you squint hard enough it does not contribute to economic growth. This isn’t a strong incentive but a useful nudge toward what universities should be doing. Over time, it is possible to see how the new methodology with a greater focus on causal links and inputs could lead to a different kind of HEIF.

    Outcomes

    If the HEIF is going to be “outcomes focussed” this implies that HEIF should be more actively driving university activity toward specialisation within a local, national, and regional context. This would align closely with the white paper but HEIf is only a small portion of the overall funding research mix. Should the government think there needs to be more economic-growth align university activity, and it thinks HEIF is a tool to do that, it should consider whether it can improve the HEIF incentives with greater funding.

    The proof will be whether the changing accountability statements produce and new activity or whether universities simply account for their existing activity in a different way. Perhaps the more interesting reforms will come in 2027-28, at the earliest, where there will be a review to the funding formula to support contributions to economic growth.

    It would be an error if this was carried out in isolation and not as part of a wider look at the incentives in research. HEIF cannot move the sector toward more useful economic research ends alone and nor will it change the underlying unit of resource which encourages universities to do everything all of a time. HEIF can be a message, a guide, a statement, but without shifting funding it will not be a bigger enough incentive to move the sector.

    It would also be an error if HEIF’s accountability statements and any funding revisions flow to the same places to cover the same activity. Specialisation implies winners and losers but aggregate benefit across the sector and for the economy. The revision to funding formula could, for example, fund different kinds of economic activities differently, add regional multipliers, reward collaborations different, or any other number of useful economic objectives.

    The challenge is that however the incentives are constructed they must be coherent with the wider direction of travel set out in the white paper. The opportunity is to use research funding to reward the places doing economically interesting things that aren’t always recognised in traditional research metrics.

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  • The incentives don’t work they just make growth worse

    The incentives don’t work they just make growth worse

    The UK’s economy looks particularly bad at the moment.

    There is a Jeremy Hunt view of the world that while the UK is in a muddle with its money the foundations are strong. After all, the UK is still one of the world’s largest economies. There is the City AM view that the UK is in many ways fundamentally broken. And, there is the Resolution Foundation that predicts that many households will endure another decade of lost earnings.

    The UK’s particular malaise is manifold. The IFS talks about it as a result of “Low investment, policy mistakes, political instability, and Brexit,” (Covid didn’t help either). The result is what former LSE president and now advisor to Keir Starmer Minouche Shafik and founder of the Resolution Foundation Clive Cowdery have called a “toxic combination of low growth and high inequality.” Their view is stagnation is because of low records of investment in staff by business, regional inequalities, and the overplaying of the UK’s manufacturing strengths at the expense of its actual strengths in services.

    New advisor old problems

    As the country has ambled through its decade and more of low growth the university sector has expanded rapidly. As I wrote about in a paper for the Post-18 Project this presents a fundamental problem for people like me that believe in the economic utility of universities.

    The best version of the story is that universities have genuinely transformed the economic fortunes of some parts of the country, if not the entire country. A recent Centre for Cities report suggests there are some places that have become more prosperous through all the economic goods a university attracts to their place including students, knowledge workers, and some kinds of innovation.

    The second sunniest version is that the country would be in an even greater mess were it not for its universities. The gloomiest picture is that despite the enormous amount of additional public funding, increases in turnover, new research schemes, capital builds, and other fiscal levers, universities have not been able to get the country out of its fiscal funk.

    The rejoinder to this is that universities don’t just exist for reasons of economic utility. The problem is, as Jane Robinson has pointed out for Wonkhe, university’s social contract and the funding that flows to them is increasingly about how they choose to invest, the partnerships they build, the ways in which they grow their economies, and their role in regional development. Their ability to meet the challenges Shafik and Cowdery have set out is the bargain for further funding.

    This is fair enough. It is unreasonable for universities to expect more public funding in a tight economy without offering something in return. The problem is the things that universities are doing are often going under the radar and the things they might do better are often beyond their control.

    It’s not that universities don’t want to contribute to economic growth, it is that it is hard and government policy often makes it harder. To demonstrate, let’s consider Shafik’sand Cowdery’s triangle of growth; skills (as a key part of productivity), regions, and maximising the UK’s strengths.

    Start, stop, go

    Universities generally produce people with the skills the economy needs. They do not produce as many people with the skills the economy needs at pre-degree level, because the curriculum is usually built around undergraduate degree level qualification, but there is no other game in town when it comes to producing the graduate workers an economy requires.

    Universities will probably never provide all the sheet metal workers the country requires or fill the massive gaps in the care system but they will provide a good number of the nuclear physicists, programmers, engineers, lawyers, accountants, and managers the industrial strategy requires.

    The problem is that universities have almost no incentive to teach the things that the industrial strategy says the country needs. They may do so for academic reasons, civic good, inertia, research profile, specialism, or something else, but teaching the future home students in high-cost programmes is the exact opposite way any sensible university financial planner would arrange their portfolio of programmes. Programmes at pre-degree level have students for less time on them, with a less obvious market, and comparable individual unit costs. An even worse deal.

    To look at this another way the university which aimed solely to meet the needs of their local and national labour markets would have to ignore the financial reality they exist within. My own view is that on narrow economic terms it’s a good thing universities teach broad based curricula because the labour market is unpredictable and benefits from a range of skilled people to draw upon. The government view is that it’s not only necessary to entirely reform the skills pipeline but to provide more specific skills in AI, engineering, cyber, and other STEM related fields.

    The government has therefore created a misalignment between financial incentives and the labour market outcomes they are trying to achieve. To address this the government could increase university funding generally through strategic grants (probably not going to happen), boost other forms of income through relaxing visa regulations (absolutely not going to happen,) or improve incentives to teach home students in high cost programmes (we might get some inflationary fee increases).

    The alternative is to recognise that an entirely student demand led model is going to lead to some skills gaps. Various attempts to nudge students into certain qualifications (remember the adverts on cyber?) don’t seem to have made an awful lot of difference. Through the Post-18 project my co-authors and I argued that some HE provision could be commissioned:

    The Devolution Bill should make provision for mayoral combined authorities to convene a post-18 education and skills provision group with a diversity of provider and industry representation that can draw on the insight from regional growth insight centres to develop post-18 pathways, provision and partnerships. These groups could initially propose business cases for reprofiling of funding but over time could be given direct commissioning powers and/or direct injections of public funding to catalyse new provision aligned to national or regional economic growth priorities.

    The government can find ways of boosting or redirecting teaching resources or the country, in the long term, can have fewer graduates in high-cost degrees. There is no path to more students studying more expensive things in line with government priorities without resources to do so.

    Regions

    Regional growth is another area where the incentives make absolutely no sense. The UK is unusually imbalanced where second cities are comparably unproductive to many other large economies. One way in which to rebalance economies is to increase investment and the supply of skilled human capital.

    The single most important measure of skilled human capital in the university sector is Graduate Outcomes. Graduate Outcomes measure whether a student is in highly-skilled employment fifteen months after they graduate. Universities are regulated and placed in league tables based on this metric. The incentive for universities is to place their graduates where there are the highest number of available highly skilled jobs which is London. Even building a spin-out outside of London only gives a 6/10 chance the spin-out won’t migrate to the capital anyway.

    Universities do not have golden handcuffs to their places and the economic geography of London can too easily pull their economic goods away. Research excellence and impact is not measured on a regional footprint. Infrastructure investment does not follow where there is the greatest latent potential. There is astoundingly little policy that is place sensitive.

    In supporting the UK’s strengths universities are not often the primary beneficiaries of the economic growth they support. There is lots of stick for them to do good economic things but the carrots for supporting growth, particularly in local economies, tend to be the odd grant and bit of underspend like the Regional Innovation Fund. The government cannot be surprised about investment and talent flight where regional educational incentives are non-existent.

    Leave alone

    It can feel like the role of universities in the economy is both over- and understated. On the one hand they are not designed to, never will, and should not be expected to solve every problem with the economy.

    They will not bring back manufacturing, they will not rebalance regions on their own, and they will not fill all of the gaps in the labour market. At the same time they do a lot of good stuff as employers, innovators, anchors, coalition builders, contributing to clusters, attracting knowledge workers, and through educating students.

    The bit where the incentives do work is producing students for the knowledge economy. The part of the UK’s economy that has grown as manufacturing has declined. Universities have a reliable (if not predictable) income, their graduate outcomes are regulated (how well is a different question), and parts of the economy make good use of their graduate skills. If university marketing departments are to be believed this good employment is also one of their major selling points which through student recruitment then puts more funding back into the system. The incentives just line up a bit better.

    The problem is that universities are not only not always supported to get on with the job but they aren’t left alone to do so. It would perhaps be too much to hope for but welcome that the reshuffle leads to clear direction on what universities are expected (or maybe even regulated or incentivised to do) in the local economy, recognition for their national role and how they will continue to be supported to do so, and a clear sense of where they will be given a little boost but mostly left alone to keep doing the good things they are doing.

    Refiring the economy does not have to be about doing new things. It might be about doing old things in a more joined up, properly funded, and regionally focussed way. As growth goes to the top of the agenda, let’s not forget the work universities are already doing.

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  • Applications to ITE increase due to new incentives – Campus Review

    Applications to ITE increase due to new incentives – Campus Review

    Student teacher enrolments are bouncing back nationally after they dipped during the Covid-19 pandemic, fuelling positivity that the pipeline of graduates can ease the profession’s workforce shortage.

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