Tag: lines

  • Reading Between the Lines on Compact Responses

    Reading Between the Lines on Compact Responses

    Multiple universities have rejected President Trump’s proposed Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education, but they have taken different approaches to turning down the commander in chief. Some have declined pointedly, while others struck a more delicate balancing act.

    To be sure, leaders of the institutions invited to sign the compact have found themselves squeezed by both internal and external forces, under pressure from the federal government to approve the deal and from faculty and other campus constituents to reject it. Both public and private universities have also faced political pressure from state lawmakers, who in some cases urged them to sign and in others have threatened to strip funding if they do.

    Most of the nine universities originally invited to join the compact rejected it on or before the Oct. 20 deadline to provide feedback—well ahead of Nov. 21, the final date for making a decision. Their responses, released to the public, ranged from pointed to demure; in some cases, institutional leaders emphasized their core values in rebutting the proposal, which promised to grant preferential treatment in exchange for freezing tuition, capping international enrollment and suppressing criticism of conservatives, among other demands from the U.S. Department of Education.

    The Road to ‘No’

    Here are links to each institution’s response, in the order in which they were posted publicly:

    Together these statements offer insights into how institutions are responding to an unprecedented demand from the federal government: that they subscribe to President Trump’s culturally conservative vision of higher education in exchange for financial gain.

    Key Themes

    Experts note that while most institutions declined the deal, some statements stood out more than others.

    Brian Rosenberg, president emeritus of Macalester College, highlighted the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s statement as the clearest rejection. Unlike some of the other responses, it doesn’t promise future engagement on the federal government’s concerns and is a clear, resounding no based on MIT’s principles, he said.

    The first to reject the compact, MIT president Sally Kornbluth highlighted areas of agreement, such as an emphasis on merit in hiring, admissions and more, but she also argued that the proposal was “inconsistent with our core belief that scientific funding should be based on scientific merit alone.”

    Lisa Corrigan, a communications professor at the University of Arkansas and an expert on rhetoric and political communication, flagged the University of Southern California’s statement as a notable response. She pointed out that while USC highlighted its commitment to promoting civil discourse, as many others did, it also emphasized its “commitment to ROTC and veterans.” (Brown and Arizona were the only other institutions to mention veterans in their responses.)

    “I thought USC really did a strong job in articulating exactly what values they are using to guide their decision-making in rejecting the compact,” Corrigan told Inside Higher Ed.

    Erin Hennessy, vice president at TVP Communications, flagged both the Dartmouth and Penn statements as notable for different reasons. With Dartmouth, Hennessy said she was struck by the brevity of the statement, which clocked in at about 230 words. And for Penn, she pointed out that it was the only university that did not share the rejection letter it sent to Education Secretary Linda McMahon along with its public statement. Every other institution that rejected the deal posted both a statement and the letter.

    (Asked for a copy of its response to the Department of Education, Penn declined to provide it.)

    Experts noted a number of other observations from the collective letters and accompanying statements—including how many presidents emphasized merit, which is mentioned in every response except Dartmouth’s. Altogether the word “merit” appears 15 times in the nine published university responses, and “meritocracy” is cited once.

    Hennessy posited that the focus on that specific word is an attempt to “push back on the perception of certain folks in the MAGA sphere that believe any program, or any consideration of race or class or ethnic background, is diametrically in conflict with the concept of merit.”

    Rosenberg suggested that universities are trying to turn the government’s argument against it. By emphasizing merit, universities are seizing on a “logical inconsistency in the position of the federal government,” he said. While the Trump administration is demanding merit in admissions, hiring and other areas, it also has signaled a willingness to provide preferential treatment on federal research funding based not on merit but a willingness to conform to political priorities.

    Many of the responses also mentioned institutional neutrality policies.

    USC, Virginia, Vanderbilt and WashU all cited the concept, though only USC and Virginia submitted clear rejections; WashU sent a mixed message, and Vanderbilt has committed only to offering feedback on the proposal. Dartmouth, which also has an institutional neutrality policy, did not mention it.

    Both Arizona and Virginia used a similar turn of phrase to reject the compact’s promise of preferential status in exchange for signing, with officials writing, “We seek no special treatment” in connection to advancing their missions.

    One word, however, is notably absent among all the responses: Trump. And only Dartmouth referenced political affiliation in its response to the federal government. President Sian Beilock wrote that she did not believe “the involvement of the government through a compact—whether it is a Republican- or Democratic-led White House—is the right way to focus America’s leading colleges and universities on their teaching and research mission.”

    WashU’s Muddled Messaging

    Though Washington University in St. Louis agreed to provide feedback to the federal government, administrators also appeared to tacitly reject the compact proposal. The university’s initial statement on Monday noted concerns about the compact but stopped short of an outright rejection; Chancellor Andrew Martin wrote that providing feedback does not mean “we have endorsed or signed on” to the proposal.

    But in a Tuesday email to faculty members, Martin wrote he “can confirm that we won’t sign the proposed Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education … or any document that undermines our mission or our core values.” Martin added WashU will provide feedback, emphasizing the importance of “having our voice at the table for these potentially consequential conversations.”

    WashU, however, has been reluctant to publicly call that a rejection.

    Asked by Inside Higher Ed about the authenticity of the email, first published by another news outlet, and whether it amounts to a rejection, a university spokesperson only confirmed it was official.

    Corrigan suggested that both WashU and Vanderbilt are trying to buy time “to see which universities are going to be in the next round, if any.” She added, “They want the opportunity to return to the conversation when there’s more political cover for them to potentially say no.”

    Institutional Silence

    While most universities invited to join the compact responded publicly by the deadline, both the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Kansas have remained silent on the matter.

    Neither has issued publicly shared feedback or other statements about the compact, though University of Texas system board leadership initially responded positively to the invitation to join.

    “For institutions that haven’t responded publicly yet, the questions I would be asking are, is there division between the president and the board on how to move forward on this? Is there division between the president and the faculty on how to move forward on this?” Hennessy said.

    To her, that silence signals that internal negotiations are likely at play, potentially involving debates over strategy, language and other points. She believes nonresponders are more likely to sign the compact and may be “trying to figure out how to make a yes more palatable” to critics.

    Rosenberg suggests there are likely legal concerns being discussed.

    “Like virtually everything else coming out of the government right now, it’s going to face a legal challenge once someone signs, because the limitations on free speech for members of the community are pretty severe,” he said. “Once someone signs, it’s going to end up in the courts.”

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  • Blurred lines: Has OfS misunderstood freedom of speech?

    Blurred lines: Has OfS misunderstood freedom of speech?

    Academic year 2013-14 was an interesting one.

    I’d started work at UEA’s students’ union – and in the slipstream of national work on harassment and sexual misconduct and “lad culture”, I’d attracted considerable opprobrium from some working in the campus venue because I’d resolved that we wouldn’t be playing Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines”.

    This apparent PC-gone-mad crackdown on our DJs’ “freedom of expression” (described as “whining” by Spiked!) was difficult to stomach in an SU that had historically often opposed NUS’ “No Platform” policies – but having seen with my own eyes what happened in the LCR when it came on, I thought I was justified regardless of whether there had been a referendum on the issue.

    I’ve often mused on whether these days, someone would be able to use the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act to block that sort of ban – or at least get a complaint into the Office for Students (OfS) over it.

    Just before Easter that year I took a few days off to get away to Denmark – where I watched Austria win the Eurovision Song Contest in a former shipyard in Copenhagen. Little did I know that the fallout from that win would end up being central to a brewing controversy over freedom of speech regulation in England some 11 years later.

    The winner that year was Conchita Wurst (the drag persona of Thomas Neuwirth) with the song “Rise Like a Phoenix” – a result that was controversial in some Eastern European countries given her “bearded” gender-nonconforming appearance.

    A few days after the contest, two members of the Armenian Jury gave a press conference, explaining that they had given Conchita the fewest points because “of their internal revulsion” at her appearance. They specifically stated:

    …like the mental patient causes repulsion, so does this phenomena.

    Participants at the press conference called out the judges on their discriminatory and offensive remarks – but the following day, Armenian newspaper Iravunk piled on by publishing an article titled:

    They serve the interests of international homosexual lobbying: The blacklist of enemies of state and nation.

    The article included a list of 60 activists and supporters of LGBTI rights, encouraging readers, employers, and public bodies to discriminate against them.

    Neighbors say we’re trouble

    Having first attempted to resolve the issue informally – only to have the paper double down – a group of them tried the Armenian courts, which dismissed the activists’ claims, ruling that the articles did not aim to insult them but simply contained:

    ….an element of exaggeration and provocation, in the exercise of the journalist’s right to free speech.

    And so they filed their case with the European Court of Human Rights – which handed down its judgement in January of this year.

    Armenia’s courts had viewed the newspaper’s tirade as lawful – robust, if unpleasant, political commentary – and so protected by Article 10(1):

    A10(1): Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

    But Strasbourg said that when deciding whether expression is “within the law”, you can’t just stop at a domestic statute book’s explicit offences.

    You also have to factor in the built-in brakes of Article 10(2) – which insist that speech rights are limited by respect for the rights and freedoms of others and by what is necessary in a democratic society:

    A10(2): The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

    In other words, once you’ve worked out if there’s an explicit law that restricts some speech, 10(2) then causes you to think about whether speech tramples on someone’s Article 8 dignity, or discriminates under Article 14, or engages any other of the rights in the Convention.

    If otherwise legal speech stirs up hostility or encourages discrimination, depending on the context, it slides towards a zone where Article 10 protection shrinks – or even disappears under Article 17’s “abuse of rights” clause.

    The Court ruled in favour of the activists, finding that Armenia had violated their rights. It held that the newspaper articles went beyond legitimate political discourse and constituted hate speech that could incite violence and discrimination.

    Acknowledging the importance of press freedom, Strasbourg emphasised that the articles’ call for readers, employers, and public bodies to discriminate against named individuals crossed the line from protected speech into harm. And the Armenian courts’ failure to provide any protection against this targeting represented a breach of the state’s positive obligations under the Convention.

    The competing rights – in the Armenia case of speech on the one hand, and privacy and equality on the other – do still have to be seen through the lens of necessity and proportionality. But it’s the two stage process taken together that sets out what is “within the law”.

    Walking over glass

    This all matters because when the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill was being debated in the Lords, this question of the meaning of “freedom of speech within the law” came up. Lord Hope of Craighead wanted to know what it meant:

    I should explain that the way the Bill expresses the idea of freedom of speech is to encompass it as freedom of speech within the law. It seemed to me that the words “within the law” beg the question of what exactly that expression means.

    He initially proposed an amendment defining freedom of speech directly by reference to Article 10(1), but Lord Moylan worried that omitting Article 10(2) would create confusion.

    The government eventually proposed a compromise, defining freedom of speech as referring to Article 10(1) “as it has effect for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

    Lord Hope ultimately accepted that formulation, noting that the phrase “as it has effect” implicitly imports the whole balancing test from the Human Rights Act – including Article 10(2)’s limitations.

    But it’s not immediately clear that the Office for Students (OfS) noticed.

    Go about your business

    In its consultation on Regulatory advice 24: Guidance related to freedom of speech, restrictions on freedom of speech are treated as binary (lawful/unlawful) rather than explaining that Article 10 requires a nuanced balancing exercise.

    It listed specific legal restrictions (harassment, discrimination, anti-terrorism laws) but doesn’t frame these within the broader Article 10(2) framework that Parliament apparently intended to incorporate.

    The Armenia case shows why this matters – speech that doesn’t violate domestic criminal law can still lose Article 10 protection if it unnecessarily tramples on others’ rights.

    In their response to the consultation, Naomi Waltham-Smith, Julius Grower, and James Murray argued that advice could mislead providers and SUs because insufficient consideration was given – in either the guidance or the worked examples – to the balancing acts that would need to be undertaken in difficult cases.

    They also specifically criticised OfS for failing to explain how Article 10(2) operates, noting that:

    …while Article 10(2) is quoted in the guidance, its operation is neither explained nor applied in either the guidance or the examples.

    That omission, they warned, risked universities thinking they only needed to check whether speech violated explicit legal provisions, rather than conducting the fuller proportionality assessment that both the European Convention and Parliament’s incorporation of it into the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act required.

    So they proposed a four step test:

    Step 1: Is the speech completely beyond the pale? (Article 17 ECHR)

    Does the speech abuse human rights to destroy human rights themselves – like promoting terrorism or calling for genocide? Article 17 of the ECHR says such extreme speech gets no protection at all. If yes, the university’s duty under the HEFoSA doesn’t apply. If no, move to step 2.

    Step 2: Does the speech break UK law?

    Is what they’re saying illegal under any UK statute or common law (like hate speech, harassment, inciting violence, or defamation)? If yes, the university’s duty doesn’t apply. If no, move to step 3.

    Step 3: Can the university restrict this speech? (Article 10(2) ECHR)

    Article 10(2) of the ECHR allows some limits on free speech for things like national security, public safety, or protecting others’ reputation. BUT – in academic contexts this is extremely hard to justify because academic freedom is so important. If the university can show a restriction is necessary under Article 10(2), their duty doesn’t apply or is satisfied. If not, move to step 4.

    In this step, there’s a proportionality test:

    1. Is the objective important enough? – The reason for restricting speech must be sufficiently weighty to justify limiting a fundamental right.
    2. Is the restriction rationally connected? – The measure must actually help achieve the objective, not just be vaguely related to it.
    3. Is this the least restrictive option? – Could you achieve the same goal with less impact on free speech? If yes, you must use the less intrusive approach.
    4. Does the benefit outweigh the harm? – Even if the first three tests are met, you must still balance the severity of restricting speech against how much the restriction actually helps achieve your objective. The restriction fails if the damage to free expression outweighs the benefit gained.

    Step 4: Has the university taken “reasonably practicable steps”?

    Has the university done what’s realistically possible to enable the speech (like providing security, booking suitable venues, managing protests)? If yes, they’ve discharged their duty. If no, they’ve breached it.

    The London Universities Council for Academic Freedom (LUCAF) disagreed with that approach. They argued that the European Convention on Human Rights sets the minimum level of free speech protection – but that UK law can (and does) give you more protection than the minimum.

    They argued that Article 10(2) lists when speech can be limited (like for public safety), but it doesn’t require limits. And given the legislation says universities must protect speech unless it’s actually illegal or violates someone’s human rights, in their view Article 10(2) doesn’t add any new reasons to restrict speech beyond what’s already in UK law.

    For them, the guidance extensively discussed protecting people from discrimination and harassment, didn’t force universities to allow “vicious, sustained and personal attacks”, and that universities could still have rules about behaviour – as long as they applied equally regardless of viewpoint.

    For them, all the draft did was ensure that universities can’t use vague concerns about “harm” to shut down legitimate debate and academic discussion.

    Act as if you’re free

    In the final version of the guidance, OfS adopts a three-stage process that then runs underneath its examples:

    Step 1 asks simply whether speech is “within the law” – defined as speech not prohibited by primary legislation, legal precedent, or secondary legislation. Crucially, university regulations and contracts don’t count as “law” here. If not, don’t allow it. If it is, move to Step 2.

    Step 2 considers whether there are “reasonably practicable steps” to enable the speech. Universities should consider factors like legal requirements (including any formal duties), maintaining essential functions, and physical safety – but explicitly cannot consider the viewpoint expressed, whether it’s controversial, or reputational impact. If steps can be taken, take them. If not, move to Step 3.

    Step 3 – only reached if no reasonably practicable steps exist – then asks whether any restrictions are “prescribed by law” and proportionate under the European Convention. This involves checking if there’s a specific legal rule authorising the restriction, and runs through that same four-part proportionality test weighing the importance of the objective against the severity of limiting the right.

    In other words, OfS has gone with AFAF’s interpretation – which is a key architectural difference.

    OfS’ process treats Article 10(2) considerations as a final backstop – something you only reach after exhausting practical options. But the Armenia case suggests these considerations should infuse the entire analysis from the start.

    When Strasbourg said speech must be “within the law,” it meant not just checking against explicit prohibitions, but understanding that Article 10 protection can shrink or disappear when speech unnecessarily tramples on others’ dignity or encourages discrimination.

    That matters because universities following the OfS guidance might think they’re obliged to host speakers who, while not technically breaking actual laws, are using their platform to create hit lists of activists or stir up discrimination – “permissive environments”.

    The guidance’s linear process could lead institutions to conclude they must exhaust all “reasonably practicable steps” before even considering whether the speech itself has already lost its Article 10 protection by targeting individuals for harassment.

    That’s not just a theoretical concern – it’s precisely what happened in Armenia, where domestic courts protected speech that Strasbourg found had crossed the line from legitimate discourse into unprotected speech.

    And for Waltham-Smith, Grower, and Murray, this leaves universities in an impossible position.

    No one could have witnessed

    They argue that the final OfS guidance seems to be confused about Article 17 (the “abuse of rights” clause). While it mentions Holocaust denial as an example, it then suggests universities still have duties to take “reasonably practicable steps” even for Article 17 speech.

    For Waltham-Smith, Grower, and Murray, this makes no sense – Parliament explicitly defined “freedom of speech” by reference to the Convention standard, which includes Article 17. You can’t cherry-pick which bits of the Convention apply.

    They note that OfS seems to have ignored the idea raised during the Lords debate that incorporating Article 10(2) was “axiomatically required” by the statutory definition. They suggest OfS has misunderstood that Article 10(2) isn’t just about defining what’s “within the law” – it’s baked into the very definition of “freedom of speech” that Parliament adopted.

    Their key criticism is that the guidance requires universities to exhaust all “reasonably practicable steps” before even considering proportionality and competing rights like Article 8 (privacy/dignity) or property rights. But for them, that gets the analysis backwards – you need to consider whether speech tramples on others’ Article 8 rights from the start, not as an afterthought.

    Crucially, in Minasyan v Armenia, Strasbourg struck down Armenia’s approach precisely because it over-privileged Article 10 without properly balancing Article 8 rights. OfS’ guidance arguably puts universities in exactly the same position – following an analytical framework that’s already been ruled non-Convention compliant.

    Put another way, universities following OfS guidance could find themselves breaching the Human Rights Act 1998 by using an approach that Strasbourg has explicitly rejected – OfS’ linear, checkbox approach misses the fundamental point that human rights require holistic balancing from the outset, not sequential consideration.

    And that takes us back where the see-saw all started – holocaust denial.

    Cause you wouldn’t know me today

    Back in 2021 on the day that the then universities minister Michelle Donelan appeared on PM, the exchange with presenter Evan Davies went as follows:

    Michelle: What this Bill is designed to do is ensure that we protect and we promote free speech that is lawful so any free speech that is lawful…

    Evan: It is lawful, Holocaust denial is in this country lawful isn’t it? So Holocaust denial is okay, you would defend a holocaust denier being invited to campus because that is part of the free speech argument?

    Michelle: Obviously it would depend on exactly what they were saying, whether they were straying into racism, whether they were straying into hate crimes, but a lot of these things that we would be standing up for would be hugely offensive and would be hugely hurtful…

    Less than 24 hours later, both her boss Gavin Williamson and PM Boris Johnson had flat out contradicted her – Donelan herself issued a panicky 10.15pm tweet thread making clear her view that antisemitism is abhorrent “and will not be tolerated at our universities”, and met with Charlotte Nicholls MP to:

    …confirm that she had misspoken and it was not the intention of the government that the new bill be used to defend Holocaust denial.

    Presumably to assuage critics, the final guidance simply declares that OfS “will not protect Holocaust denial” – full stop. But it doesn’t really say why – all the consultation response does is try to justify this by saying it’s because Holocaust denial would:

    …likely amount to incitement to racial hatred and harassment.

    That suggests a fundamental confusion about why Holocaust denial isn’t protected. In European human rights jurisprudence, Holocaust denial is the paradigmatic example of Article 17 speech – speech that abuses rights to destroy rights and therefore gets no protection whatsoever. You don’t need to prove it amounts to incitement or harassment – it’s simply outside the scope of protected speech from the start.

    By trying to shoehorn Holocaust denial into UK criminal law categories (incitement) or civil wrongs (harassment), OfS decides that it’s not properly engaging with the Convention framework that Parliament explicitly incorporated. It’s treating it as just another form of potentially illegal speech – rather than recognising it as categorically unprotected under Article 17.

    And that opens the door to all sorts of chaos.

    • We might imagine a speaker or campus group publishing lists of “woke professors undermining British values” or “Marxist students infiltrating the university” with names, photos, and course details. While not explicitly illegal, that would mirror the Armenian newspaper’s tactics and could encourage targeting and harassment.
    • A speaker systematically and deliberately misgenders trans students or staff, encouraging audiences to do the same. While potentially not reaching the threshold for harassment (which requires a “course of conduct”), it could violate dignity rights under Article 8.
    • A rugby club hosting a speaker to give a talk on “team bonding traditions” that promotes hazing rituals targeting women – like “sharking”, “seal clubbing”, or scoring systems for sexual conquests. While not directly instructing assault, it creates a culture where such behaviour is normalised and encouraged.
    • Student societies booking speakers who promote “player culture” – teaching tactics like getting women drunk to “lower resistance,” how to “neg” women to undermine confidence, or running “bootcamps” on manipulating “7s into thinking they’re 4s.” Carefully avoiding anything that could be construed as inciting assault while creating predatory environments.
    • SU comedy events featuring performers whose acts revolve around rape jokes, domestic violence “humor,” and audience participation segments where female students are singled out for sexual humiliation. Defended as “edgy comedy” but designed to normalize violence against women.
    • Student societies hosting speakers who argue that rape statistics are “feminist propaganda,” that most accusations are false, and encouraging male students to “protect themselves” by recording all sexual encounters or avoiding being alone with women. Creating an atmosphere where victims are pre-emptively discredited.
    • Academic presentations arguing certain racial groups are genetically less intelligent, complete with “scientific” graphs and data. While framed as academic discourse and not explicitly inciting violence, such content could encourage discrimination and lose Article 10 protection.
    • A speaker singling out specific LGBTQ+ students by name as “abominations” who will “burn in hell,” while stopping just short of calling for action against them. The speech might not meet the threshold for incitement but could constitute degrading treatment.
    • Presentations warning that specific ethnic groups are “replacing” the native population, using university demographic data to identify departments or residences with high numbers of international students. Technically discussing statistics but designed to stir hostility.
    • A staff member argues that disabled students are a “drain on university resources” and promoting selective admission policies based on genetic screening. Not explicitly calling for discrimination but creating an environment where it’s encouraged.
    • A society running workshops teaching young men that women are “inherently inferior,” should be “controlled,” and are “property” once in relationships might use pseudo-evolutionary psychology to argue women “want to be dominated” and teach tactics for emotional manipulation. While carefully avoiding explicit incitement to violence, the content systematically degrades women’s dignity.
    • A student club encouraging male students to publicly rate and shame female students based on their sexual history, creating websites or social media campaigns to track and expose women’s private lives. Not quite reaching the legal threshold for harassment but creating a fairly hostile environment.
    • Alumni speakers at formal dinners celebrating historical drinking society chants about “consensual non-consent” or sharing “conquest walls” where women’s photos were displayed as trophies. Framed as “preserving tradition” but perpetuating degrading treatment.
    • Presentations arguing women in higher education are “destroying society,” that female students should be “preparing for motherhood not careers,” and encouraging male students to “put women in their place.” Framed as cultural commentary, but intimidating women from participating in university life.

    Under the OfS framework, universities might think they need to find “reasonably practicable steps” to allow all of that – perhaps with security, protests managed at a distance, etc. But following the Armenia logic, all of the above could already lack Article 10 protection because it:

    • Systematically undermines other HRA rights
    • Encourages discrimination based on a protected characteristic
    • Creates an environment hostile to equal participation in education
    • Goes beyond legitimate discourse into targeted degradation

    The real danger is that content is specifically designed to stay just within legal boundaries while maximising harm – exactly the kind of speech that requires the full Article 10 balancing act from the start, not as an afterthought.

    Which is why, I suspect, that while OfS consistently says that it won’t protect holocaust denial, it can never quite bring itself to say that it would be OK to ban holocaust deniers.  

    Universities now face an impossible choice – follow OfS guidance and risk breaching the Human Rights Act, or properly apply Article 10 and risk regulatory action.

    What started as an attempt to protect academic freedom has morphed into a framework that could protect the worst forms of “permissive environments” to promote or condone stuff they’ve been making progress on tackling for years.

    The solution isn’t complex – OfS simply needs to align its guidance with the Convention framework that Parliament explicitly incorporated. Until then, every controversial speaker booking, every protest, every difficult decision will be made in the shadow of guidance that looks like it misunderstands what “freedom of speech within the law” actually means.

    And it’s students – particularly those with protected characteristics who that activity so often targets – who will pay the price.

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  • The blurred lines of higher education in South Korea: when colleges look like universities

    The blurred lines of higher education in South Korea: when colleges look like universities

    Edward Choi and Young Jae Kim

    South Korea has become an attractive destination for international students, boasting a strong higher education system with internationally recognised universities. A complication, however, is emerging with some foreign students enrolling in what they believe are universities, only to later discover that they are attending junior colleges, Korea’s flagship vocational institutions.

    This phenomenon may be linked to changes in institutional marketing (identity branding) and key organizational characteristics at junior colleges and universities alike. Many colleges have removed words like “technical” or “vocational” from their names and are now called universities in both Korean and English. They have also expanded their degree offerings to include bachelor’s and, in some cases, even graduate programs.

    The blurring of identities (and institutional traits) and the implications thereof are a focus of our study, Confusion in the Marketplace: A Study of Institutional Isomorphism and Organisational Identity in South Korea (Choi and Kim, 2024). Through a national, statistical overview and the content analysis of select institutional websites, we examined the dimensions along which South Korean colleges and universities are organizationally isomorphic, a concept that describes how organizations begin to resemble each other as a result of external pressures (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Importantly, we discuss in our article the market implications for this type of institutional convergence.

    Key changes or dimensions of likeness

    Nearly all colleges (95%) have rebranded themselves with the term “university” in their Korean names, and 61% have done so in English. Colleges now offer bachelor’s-equivalent degrees, with 92% providing such programs, and some even offering graduate degrees (11%). Both colleges and universities emphasise similar disciplines, including Business Administration, Family & Social Welfare, and Mechanical Engineering, reflecting shared market demands.

    Institutional websites suggest colleges and universities adopt similar marketing strategies, emphasising employment outcomes and industry-academic collaboration. Less selective universities resemble colleges in focusing on job-market relevance in research and academic programming. Both institution types operate in local, national, and international spheres with internationalisation efforts at both types.

    There are key differences to note. Some universities, particularly elite ones, highlight intellectual growth and social development as a societal role in vision and other identity statements. Research at especially elite universities is both applied and humanities-focused, while this is not true in the case of colleges and lower-tier universities. Furthermore, internationalisation at universities is mostly about citizenship and cultural development while the same is less cultural but utilitarian at colleges (eg career development through international field placements).

    Why are junior colleges becoming more like universities?

    We discuss several key reasons behind the organisational sameness among Korea’s colleges and universities. One key factor is South Korea’s shrinking student population. With birth rates at record lows, the number of high school graduates has plummeted, creating a crisis for universities and junior colleges alike (Lee, 2024) and forcing these institutions to compete directly for a shrinking pool of students. The offering of baccalaureate degrees and graduate programming, among other organizational changes, may serve as primary examples of survival strategies amid the changing demographics. The same may be said of universities where there is a strong vocational dimension in academic offerings, much like what we see at colleges.

    Government policies (both historical and contemporaneous) have also played a major role in the Korean case of institutional isomorphism. Such policy directions have pushed both universities and junior colleges to align their offerings with workforce demands (Ministry of Education, 2023d, 2024a). In 2008 the government approved bachelor’s-equivalent degrees for junior colleges, allowing them to offer advanced major courses. In 2022, junior colleges were even permitted to introduce graduate programs, further blurring the distinction between these institutions and universities.

    Additionally, South Korea’s push for internationalisation amid globalisation has encouraged universities and junior colleges alike to aggressively market themselves to international students. The country has set ambitious national goals for attracting students from abroad (ICEF, 2023); as a result, both institutional types are using similar branding strategies. Words like “world-class,” “global,” and “innovative” appear frequently on websites, even in the case of junior colleges like Kyung-in Women’s University, an institution with virtually negligible global recognition or research excellence.

    The risks of blurred identities

    A key concern with blurred identities and institutional characteristics (including social roles) is that they can create confusion for international students who are increasingly looking to Korea as an attractive education destination. For students seeking a traditional university experience, this can lead to disappointment and even financial and academic setbacks, not to mention reputational damages to Korea and its higher education system.

    There is also the issue of mission creep, where junior colleges in their efforts to emulate universities, risk losing sight of their normative societal function. Junior colleges have historically complemented universities in increasing access to education and providing job training for students who might not otherwise pursue higher education (see Brint and Karabel, 1989; Dougherty, 1994; Lee, 1992). This mission is at stake. The accretion and expansion of new and existing programs and services, respectively, require invariably additional resources, which might drive up educational costs. Many prospective students may not be able to afford these fee hikes.

    What to make of institutional isomorphism?

    At the end of the day, students want a quality education and meaningful career opportunities. It is important for them to clearly understand what they are signing up for – given how important higher education is to shaping their career trajectories. Policy discussions at the national level must now consider the global character of Korea’s junior colleges, whose cosmetic and organisational changes can impact international mobility patterns. Clearer differentiation from a policy perspective is needed in this regard.

    We must not ignore the positive implications of institutional isomorphism, whose market advantages have not been fully explored by scholars. We argue that institutional isomorphism – particularly where college and university programs converge – can be strategically utilised as a policy lever to address market challenges. Rather than viewing institutional homogenization as inherently problematic, policymakers could use it to correct market inefficiencies like supply and demand challenges. The shortage of nurses in Korea (see Lee, 2023), for example, is likely being addressed through the joint efforts of colleges and universities in training and producing nurses with similar qualifications.

    Unchecked isomorphism, however, has its challenges, as pointed out earlier (ie confusion in the international student marketplace). We are also concerned about a skills mismatch where colleges and universities are pumping out graduates with homogenised skillsets. This type of sub-optimisation can result in high youth unemployment rates and students working in careers unrelated to their academic majors, which are already concerns in Korea (see Sungmin and Lee, 2023).

    To conclude, our study notes that institutional isomorphism is a global phenomenon, with similar trends observed in countries such as China, the US, and Australia (see Bae, Grimm, and Kim, 2023; Bük, Atakan-Duman, and Paşamehmetoğlu, 2017; Hartley and Morphew, 2008; Saichaie and Morphew, 2014; Taylor and Morphew, 2010). Further research is needed to assess whether isomorphism in higher education lends to competitive market advantages beyond Korea.

    Edward Choi is an Assistant Professor at Underwood International College, Yonsei University. His research interests centre on a range of topics: Korean higher education, traditional Korean education, the internationalisation of higher education, and the global phenomenon of family-owned universities. 

    Young Jae Kim was a student at Underwood International College, Yonsei University.

    Author: SRHE News Blog

    An international learned society, concerned with supporting research and researchers into Higher Education

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