Tag: missed

  • Five regulatory process points you may have missed from the University of Sussex decision

    Five regulatory process points you may have missed from the University of Sussex decision

    We’ve covered elsewhere the implications for policy related to academic freedom and freedom of speech stemming from the Office for Students’ decision to fine the University of Sussex for breaches of ongoing registration conditions E1 and E2.

    The publication of a detailed regulatory report also allows us insight into the way in which OfS is likely to respond to future breaches of registration conditions. It is, effectively, case law on the way OfS deals with concerns about higher education providers in England – and while parts of your university will be digesting what the findings mean for academic freedom policies, others will be thinking more widely about the implications for regulation.

    The University of Sussex, perhaps unsurprisingly, wishes to challenge the findings. It is able to challenge both the regulatory decisions and the amount of the fines at a first tier tribunal.

    As always, appeals are supposed to be process based rather than just a general complaint, so the university would have to demonstrate that the application of the registration conditions was incorrect, or the calculation of the fine was incorrect, or both. As above, there is no meaningful defence of the way the fines were calculated or discounted within the judgement so that would feel like the most immediately fertile ground for argument.

    Here’s some of the points that stood out:

    How and why was the decision to investigate made?

    We are told that, on 7 October 2021, the OfS identified reports about an incident at the University of Sussex. This followed the launch of a student campaign at the University of Sussex the previous day – which involved a poster campaign, a masked demonstrator holding a sign, and a hashtag on social media – calling for Kathleen Stock (a professor in the philosophy department) to lose her job.

    This was widely covered in the media at the time, and sparked commentary from interest groups including the Safe Schools Alliance UK and the Free Speech Union. The OfS subsequently contacted the university seeking further information, before starting a full investigation on 22 October 2021. However, despite significant public interest, the decision to start an investigation was not made public until a statement by an education minister in the House of Lords on 16 November (when we were told that the Department for Education was notified on 11 November).

    Kathleen Stock resigned from her role at the university on 28 October – six days after the start of the investigation, and substantially before the public announcement. She noted that “the leadership’s approach more recently had been admirable and decent”, while the university claimed to have “vigorously and unequivocally defended Prof Kathleen Stock’s right to exercise her academic freedom and lawful freedom of speech, free from bullying and harassment of any kind”.

    What’s not clear from this timeline is the nature of the notification on which the Office for Students was acting: the regulatory framework in place at the time suggested OfS would take action on the basis of lead indicators, reportable events, and other intelligence and sources of information. There are no metrics involved in this decision, and we are told the provider did not notify the OfS so there was no reportable event notification.

    We are left with the understanding that “other sources of information” were used – these could be “volunteered by providers and others, including whistleblowers”. Perhaps it was the same “source of information” that caused then Minister Michelle Donelan to shift from backing the university response on 8 October to calling for action on 10 October?

    We also know that – despite OfS’ insistence that it “does not currently have a role to act on behalf of any individual” – it appears that the only person to submit a “witness statement” to OfS was Stock. If OfS was concerned generally about the potential for a chilling effect on academic speech, would it not want to speak to multiple academics to confirm these suspicions? Doesn’t speaking to just one affected individual feel a little like acting “on behalf” of that individual?

    Finally – sorry to bang on – we don’t know who at OfS made the decision to conduct an investigation or on what basis. Can, say, the director of regulation just decide (based on a story in the press, or general vibes) to investigate a university – or is there a process involving sign-off by other senior staff, ideally involving some kind of assessment of the likelihood of a problem being identified within a reasonable period of time? If I were an internal auditor I would also want to be very clear that the decision was made using due process and free from political or ideological influence (for instance I’d be alarmed that someone was content for then-chair James Wharton to posit an absolutist definition of free speech in the Telegraph) shortly after the investigation started.

    Why did it take so long to investigate and make a decision?

    The only clue we are given in the regulatory report is that this is a “complex area”. OfS requested a substantial amount of documentation from Sussex – it even used a “compliance order” to make sure that no evidence was destroyed. However, it does not appear that OfS ever visited the provider to speak to staff and students – in other regulatory investigation reports, OfS has been assiduous in logging each visit and contact. There is none of that here – we don’t know how many interactions OfS had with Sussex, or on how many occasions information was requested. Indeed, OfS appears not to have visited Sussex at all. Arif Ahmed told us:

    “There may have been occasions where the university wanted to meet in person and communication was done in writing instead

    Various points of law are referred to in the regulatory report : it is notable that none of this is new law requiring additional interpretation or investigation (the new Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act had not even left the House of Commons committee stage at this point). It shouldn’t really take a competent lawyer that knows the sector more than a few weeks to summarise the law as it then stood and present options for action.

    The investigation into the University of Sussex was mentioned in the Chief Executive’s report from the 2 December 2021 Board meeting, and it turned up (often just as an indication that the investigation was ongoing)

    If OfS was able to fine a university for a breach of an ongoing registration relating to academic freedom, why do we need the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act?

    Well, quite. On our reckoning, the Act would have made no difference to the entire affair, save potentially for a slight chilling effect on students being empowered to exercise their own freedom of speech, and a requirement for both providers and OfS to promote free speech. The ability of the OfS to reach the conclusion it reached, and to instigate regulatory consequences, suggests that further powers were not necessary to uphold freedom of speech on campus – despite the arguments made by many at the time. There is nothing OfS could have done better, or quicker, or more effectively had the Act been in force. Sussex, in fact, had a freedom of speech policy at the time, something that the regulatory report fails to mention or take account of.

    It is curious that the announcement of the investigation came at the start of a long pause in parliamentary activity on the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act – at that time we were keenly anticipating a report from the House of Commons committee stage, but we got no action at all on the bill until it was carried forward into the next session of parliament.

    How was the amount of the fine arrived at?

    There is a detailed account of the process by which it was decided to fine Sussex £360,000 for a breach of registration condition E1, and £225,000 for a breach of registration condition E2. It appears thorough and convincing, right until the point that you read it.

    OfS appears to be using a sliding scale (0.9 per cent of qualifying income for “failing to uphold the freedom of speech and academic freedom governance principle”, 0.5 per cent of qualifying income for “a failure to have adequate and effective management and governance arrangements in place”, an additional 0.2 per cent for not reporting the breach, a 0.2 per cent reduction for taking mitigating action…) and although Regulatory Notice 19 takes us through the process in broad terms we don’t get any rationale for why those proportions apply to those things.

    It’s all a bit “vibes based regulation” in truth.

    It is to be welcomed that OfS reduced its initial calculation of a £3.7m (1.6 per cent of qualifying income) fine to a more manageable £585,000 – but why reduce to that amount (by a hair under 85 per cent) purely because it is the first fine ever issued for this particular offence? What reduction will be applied to the next fines issued under registration conditions E1 and E2? If none, why not – surely “sufficient deterrence” is possible at that amount so why go higher?

    The documentation covers none of this – it is very hard to shake the impression that OfS is pulling numbers out of the air. When you compare the £57,000 (0.1 per cent) fine issued to the University of Buckingham for not providing audited accounts for two years (something which would have yielded something altogether nastier from Companies House you do have to ask whether the Sussex infractions were 1.5 percentage points more severe at the initial reckoning?

    Are the wider implications as the regulator intends?

    There are so many questions raised that will now be hurriedly posed at universities and higher education all over England – and my colleague Jim Dickinson has raised many of them elsewhere on the site. He’s had enough material for four pieces and I’m sure there will be many more questions that could be explored. Why – for example – should the regulator have a problem with “prohibiting the harmful use of stereotypes”? Is there a plausible situation where we would want to encourage the harmful use of stereotypes?

    It would also be worth noting the many changes to the policy that appears to have caused the initial concern (the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement) between 2018 and 2024. Perhaps these changes demonstrated the university dealing with a rapidly shifting public debate (conducted, in part, by people with the political power to influence culture more generally) as seemed appropriate at each point? So why is OfS not able to sign off on the current iteration of this policy? Why is it hanging a hefty fine on a single iteration on what is clearly a living document?

    There’s also a burden issue.Is it the position of the regulator that every policy of each university needs to be signed off by the academic council or governing bodies? Or are there any examples of policies where decisions can be delegated to a competent body or individual? A list would be helpful, if only to avoid a burdensome “gold plating” of provider-level decision making.

    Beyond the freedom of speech arguments

    There are 24 ongoing conditions of registration currently in force at the Office for Students – a regulatory report and a fine (or other sanctions) could come about through an inadvertent breach of any one of them. Many of these conditions don’t just apply to students studying on your campus – they have an applicability for students involved in franchised (and in some cases validated) provision around the world.

    We should be in a position where the sector can be competently and reliably regulated, where providers can understand the basis, process, and outcomes of any investigation, and that these are communicated promptly and clearly to the wider public. On the evidence of this report, we are a long way off.



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  • Excluding Level 7 modules from the LLE is a huge, missed opportunity

    Excluding Level 7 modules from the LLE is a huge, missed opportunity

    Ahead of a House of Lords debate on the topic of lifelong learning later this week, today’s blog features two posts on the topic.

    Elsewhere on the site, Professor Harriet Dunbar-Morris, Pro Vice-Chancellor Academic and Provost at The University of Buckingham, highlights what is, in her view, a critical flaw in the LLE: the unfair funding gap facing students on accelerated two-year degree programmes, despite their clear benefits for employability and skills development. You can read that piece here.

    And below, Dr. Michelle Morgan explores the gaps in the Government’s Lifelong Learning Entitlement (LLE), questioning why postgraduate taught courses have been left out and what this means for students, universities, and businesses.

    So the Government has announced that the Lifelong Learning Entitlement (LLE) will come into effect in September 2026.

    The government is arguing that the LLE will allow people to develop new skills and gain new qualifications at a time that is right for them. The LLE will focus on:

    • full courses at level 4 to 6, such as degrees, technical qualifications, and designated distance learning and online courses
    • modules of high-value technical courses at levels 4 to 5.

    It is argued that it will help drive sustained economic growth, break down barriers to opportunity broaden access to high-quality, flexible education and training, and support greater learner mobility between institutions.

    However, yet again the sector’s postgraduate taught (PGT) provision has been ignored. By excluding this level of study, the ambitions of the Government will not be as great as they could be, and it is a huge, missed opportunity for higher education and this is why.

    The first problem: Declining PGT participation of UK-domiciled students

    In the past 10 years, the higher education sector has increasingly relied on international master’s students to fund itself.  EU and non-EU PGT students are nearly all undertaking master’s degrees, whereas for UK-domiciled students, a master’s degree only constitutes around 55% of those on PGT courses. Taught courses include master’s, postgraduate certificates, diplomas, and institutional credits and postgraduate certificates in education.

    For Master’s participation, 2019/20 was a pivotal year as non-EU participation surpassed UK-domiciled for the first time. In each year since 2021/22, UK-domiciled Master’s enrolments have declined (see Table 1). Although we do not have Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) return data to view for 2022/23 and 2023/24, there is a strong sense across the sector that we will see a decline in master’s participation, especially among international students.

    Source: Who’s studying in HE? | HESA

    The decline is the same pattern that occurred leading up to 2010/11. The only reason why master’s participation continued to increase then was due to non-EU enrolments. The response by the Government to re-energise the UK-domiciled market after the Higher Funding Council for England’s (HEFCE, which was then the regulator) Phase 1 and 2 of the Postgraduate Support Scheme was to bring in the Postgraduate Loan. As soon as this happened, you could hear an audible sigh of relief across the sector, and there was an attitude of ‘that will solve the problem so let’s just focus on growing the master’s market’. The sector did not consider the demand for master’s qualifications by business and industry, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

    Employer demand for Master’s graduates

    There are disciplines where a master’s is required for career progression such as professional accreditation. However, as the 11 University Postgraduate Experience Project found, which was one of 20 projects funded as part of the HEFCE Phase 1 Postgraduate Support Scheme, many SMEs did not need master’s graduates. Most useful to them was for higher education to provide short courses and modules that provided their staff with advanced skills in key areas such as Business and IT and emerging ones such as Generative AI. According to the Department for Business and Trade’s report on Business population estimates for the UK and regions in 2024, there were 5.6 million UK businesses in 2024 of which 5.5 million were SMEs, accounting for 99.8% of all businesses. By ignoring the needs of business and industry, we are losing an opportunity to engage with a critical market.

    Funding and repayment

    As soon as the Postgraduate Loan was introduced, most universities immediately raised their fees. The aim of the £10,000 loan was to cover fees and some maintenance. Although the loan for September 2024 English starters is now £12,471, for many this will not come close to covering their costs. What is also not factored into any discussion is that someone who has both an undergraduate and a postgraduate loan must pay them back concurrently. This equates to 9% for the undergraduate loan and 6% for the postgraduate, or 15% of someone’s salary on top of tax, National Insurance and any other employee-related costs. Although employers’ national insurance contributions are increasing next year, if there is any tax or National Insurance increase for the individual next year, this will further reduce their disposable income.

    The Postgraduate Loan also differs between UK countries. In England, the loan does not cover stand-alone postgraduate certificates and diplomas, unlike in Scotland, where non-master’s postgraduate taught course participation is 56% compared to 44% in England. If they were included, then maybe the LLE as it stands would not be quite as restricted. The English loan system is not agile enough to support engagement in short or non-master’s courses, and English universities plan their finances for master’s enrolments and anticipated completions. A student should not have to register and enrol on a master’s if they only want or need to do a postgraduate certificate or diploma. If an individual needs a master’s for professional accreditation, this will not stop them from doing a master’s. In fact, we may see an increase in integrated degrees being undertaken where a master’s is incorporated into the undergraduate degree as a result.

    Additionally, we have just had the announcement that undergraduate loans are slightly increasing, but no announcement has been made for postgraduate loans. The current system hinders engagement. It also adopts a deficit model approach, as these qualifications are deemed exit qualifications if someone fails to achieve the Master’s.

    Ability to participate in master’s study

    What is also overlooked in discussions are the debt levels of undergraduate alumni and how this could explain the decreasing number of UK-domiciled 21-24-year-old participants. The majority of PGT enrolments are for the age group of 30 years and over.

    table visualization

    Source: Who’s studying in HE? | HESA

    When the Postgraduate Loan was introduced in 2016, only one cohort had graduated under the £9,000 a year fee regime introduced in 2012.  We now have 10 cohorts who graduated under that regime. It is maybe not a surprise therefore that the largest group investing in postgraduate taught study are those with the smallest amount of undergraduate debt.

    Last year, I got the results of a Freedom of Information request from the Student Loan Company regarding the debt levels for English-domiciled recipients entering postgraduate Master’s study in 2021/22 (see Figure 1). Of the 72,618, 74.8% had debt in excess of £40,000 and 11.9% over £70,000. This debt will include any repeated years as well as longer length undergraduate courses such as integrated degrees with placements. With the recent announcement that fee levels will rise by £285 to £9,535 in 2025/26, this will increase individual debt.

    Figure 1: Debt levels of 72,618 English-domiciled master’s students who also have an undergraduate loan (fee and maintenance) in 2021/22 only 

    The recent Times and Sunday Times showed how parental financial support differs by student groups and universities. The universities where parents pay the most – up to £30,000 – are mainly Russell Groups. And when you explore postgraduate taught participation by ethnicity,  66% are White. How will the factors highlighted above enable widening participation at the postgraduate level which delivers advanced skills, competencies and knowledge?

    We need a rethink

    The LLE that will be introduced will not super-proof the pipeline for longevity of postgraduate taught study nor provide the advanced skills that are accessible, meaningful and needed for the individual, society or business and industry.

    So we need to start thinking now about the long-term implications of student debt, and social and economic needs so we can develop policy, strategy and practice. To do this though, the sector needs to start thinking about how we can reimagine and do things differently, Government needs to listen to key stakeholders, and we must proactively work together and not against one another.

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  • In Case You Missed Them – Inspiring Reads of 2022 and Can’t-Miss CUPA-HR Resources – CUPA-HR

    In Case You Missed Them – Inspiring Reads of 2022 and Can’t-Miss CUPA-HR Resources – CUPA-HR

    by CUPA-HR | January 4, 2023

    Throughout the year, the Higher Ed Workplace Blog and Higher Ed HR Magazine feature HR innovations and success stories from the CUPA-HR community. In case you missed them, we’ve listed several great blog posts and articles of 2022 that will leave you feeling inspired and ready to take action at your institution.

    The Higher Ed Workplace Blog

    Higher Ed HR Magazine

    • While there’s a time and place to maintain a more serious demeanor, there’s a case to be made for incorporating humor into the workplace — especially for HR professionals who are often viewed as the enforcers of an organization. Read how HR can use the powerful tool of humor to its advantage: Dear HR, It’s OK to Laugh — Incorporating Humor Into the HR Workplace
    • Kansas State University’s Human Capital Services (HCS) knew their remote work policy was in need of a major overhaul. When COVID-19 entered the scene, HCS had to overcome multiple obstacles and a major time crunch to build a comprehensive remote work program and strategy for faculty and staff. Learn how they did it in their article A Consultative Approach: Kansas State University’s Framework for HR Success
    • Did you know that 47 percent of chief academic officers (CAOs) have been in their position three years or less? While there is limited data regarding why CAOs consider staying or leaving their positions, CUPA-HR CEO Andy Brantley conducted interviews with 13 CAOs to gain a deeper understanding of what motivates them to stay or leave. Read the full article Chief Academic Officer Transition: Opportunity, Chaos or Something In Between?
    • Many institutions collect data from their employees on engagement, climate and satisfaction, but don’t always take specific steps to improve those factors. Learn best practices for developing an engagement, satisfaction, or climate survey that will produce actionable results: Employee Engagement/Satisfaction/Climate Assessment: Producing Actionable Results

    Don’t Miss These CUPA-HR Resources!

    Okay, so you’re feeling inspired after reading these HR success stories, but now you’re wondering how you can get to work at your institution. These CUPA-HR resources can help you take that next step!

    • Understanding Higher Education is an e-learning series designed to help all employees be more effective in their roles by developing a deeper understanding of institutional structure and culture. Take Course 1 now.
    • Knowledge Center toolkits are designed with higher ed in mind. Toolkits are added and updated often, so stop by often to see what’s new.
    • From new research publications to annual workforce data, the Research Center is the central hub for all things CUPA-HR research.



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