Tag: road

  • A government running out of road still sets the economic weather for higher education

    A government running out of road still sets the economic weather for higher education

    For a party that it’s become fashionable to criticise for failing to have prepared for power, Labour has in fact set an awful lot of ambitious policy machinery into motion over the last 16 months.

    There’s barely been a month go by without some large-scale reform to how the country is governed, organised, and understood as a sum of diverse parts and competing pressures, and we’ve had our work cut out thinking through the implications of each for the higher education sector: from devolution to industrial strategy, from health reform to an explicit tying together of skills and migration (which has barely got started yet), from a new communities strategy to belatedly moving skills policy to the Department for Work and Pensions.

    Whatever your views on the merits and mechanics of these, and the many other initiatives that different departments have launched, they are all downright interesting – and pose a plethora of questions for how higher education fits in and demonstrates value.

    But all need time. The overall ambitions of devolution are still on their starting blocks as councils pitch their ideas for new geographies; the industrial strategy was explicitly badged as bearing fruit in 2035; the NHS workforce plan that should really have been alongside the 10-year health plan has been delayed to the spring – and so on and so on. No-one involved in pulling together all these long-term reforms did so under the assumption that all the pieces would be in place within one parliamentary term.

    Yet here we now are, with the commentariat consensus being that both Keir Starmer and Rachel Reeves are toast, and public sentiment pointing emphatically in that direction as well – though this is not to say the party cannot regain momentum under a new leader. The sector is already asking questions about how to prepare for a Reform government (as discussed in the most recent instalment of our new HE Influence newsletter, I should mention).

    The post-16 white paper presented a somewhat upbeat vision of what the government would like higher education’s role to feel like across the country, but was weaker on any kind of immediate reform, proposing instead that traditionally glacial changes to research funding, a piece-by-piece strengthening of the Office for Students’ remit, and putting FE, HE and business in the same room would do much of the heavy lifting, given time and goodwill.

    All this feels like a recipe for the sector to retreat to more comfortable home territory over the next few years, fighting battles over the international student levy, the size of teaching grants, and the shape of the REF, and gradually giving up on pushing for a central role in the government’s overall vision for the country, given the increasing probability that dreams like a planned and unswerving industrial strategy will all be swept away in 2029.

    Quite what’s to be done about all this is a question for another day – with the Budget looming on Wednesday, and admittedly still three and a half years in office remaining for Labour, the other thing that’s worth reflecting on is quite how much the choices the Chancellor makes around tax, public spending, debt, and general macroeconomics will determine the success – or otherwise – of higher education institutions in England over the next few years. These big tickets items all impact the sector deeply, however much the temptation might be to throw one’s hands up in the air, snipe about a “tax” on overseas recruitment, and start looking at what opposition parties can be convinced of.

    Labour on labour

    There’s a pretty strong case to be made for the most consequential policy decision for universities since Labour came to power being the decision to hike employer national insurance contributions in last autumn’s budget. Clearly it has cost universities a small fortune, and the move also sucked up a sizeable slice of the government’s various funding “boosts” for schools and FE colleges – and the NHS and elsewhere – leaving less putative generosity to go around.

    But perhaps most importantly of all, the ENICs rise has decimated the labour market for young people – in the court of public opinion at least – by making new hires and part-time workers more expensive, all while AI is supposedly making them obsolete.

    The result is that university graduates – and the institutions ever more judged on those graduates’ success – are seen to be in a right old state. The Guardian was the latest to take a run at this last week, with tales of qualified grads banging their heads against the job application wall, accompanied by analysis from the paper demonstrating that almost half of all jobs lost since Labour came to power were among the under-25s. Down in the small print we see that this is driven almost entirely via reduced employment of 16- and 17-year-olds, but the vibes aren’t good, even if less hyperbolic analysis from the likes of the Institute of Student Employers and Prospects Luminate paints merely a concerning, rather than cataclysmic, picture.

    The sad fact is that, longer term, this deluge of negative publicity about the value of a degree – alongside a necessary tailing off of the supposed “graduate premium” as a viable sector talking point as the minimum wage heads ever up – will inevitably move from being fodder for anti-HE journalists to actually driving changes in young people’s decision-making (even if a tight jobs market in the short-term often pushes graduates back towards postgraduate study) and scar the sector’s ability to make its case for its value.

    The result is that keeping a watchful eye on Labour’s economic moves around the costs associated with employment – both on Wednesday and beyond – has become a matter of some importance for higher education. Further increases in the national living wage over the next few years, lower-profile changes to business taxation, and even wildcards like any surprise revenue-raising changes to the growth and skills levy, all hold the possibility of making this problem worse. All while leading to higher costs for universities and making it harder for students to work alongside their studies, despite this being ever more necessary.

    Pound in pocket

    Rachel Reeves finally taking the plunge with an income tax rise, as a good proportion of the Labour backbenches were calling for, seems to have definitively fallen off the table for the Budget – with a handful of consequences worth noting for the sector.

    First, it will almost certainly mean that future spring and autumn statements will be equally fraught, as the Treasury fails to leave clear blue water between its spending plans and its spending rules. By not maintaining a sensible “headroom”, public finances will remain permanently at the mercy of external shocks and OBR downgrades, and we’ll probably be back here in less than six months’ time wondering what levers will need to be pulled. At least at some point in the Parliament, said levers will end up being haircuts to departmental budgets rather than new taxes or further borrowing.

    Following on from this, the use of a basket of smaller revenue-raising measures to partially fill the gap left by not raising income tax increases the likelihood that this shortfall gets filled by employment-related measures – that is, all the issues we’ve been over above, which have serious consequences for universities as large employers who are not quite in the public sector (as may be the case this week if rumoured changes to salary sacrifice rules go ahead).

    And the other effect that an income tax rise would have achieved, which the “smorgasbord” approach will not to the same extent, is bringing down inflation.

    Inflation is arguably the most serious financial threat that higher education institutions face. Even if many within the sector, both in internal conversations and public pronouncements, are often quite happy to let audiences believe that measures like the dependants ban are what’s most responsible for blowing a hole in HE finances, the fundamentals weren’t sound even before the post-pandemic recruitment glut.

    While tuition fees and maintenance loans in England (and, at least for one year, Wales) are now linked to inflation, or more precisely to inflation forecasts – Office for Budget Responsibility predictions on Wednesday will set the levels for 2026–27 – the idea of any measures to compensate for all the shortfalls baked in over several years of rocketing price rises appears to have been permanently nixed.

    And it’s worth bearing in mind that the index link does not mean that either student maintenance or teaching funding will actually keep pace with inflation in the coming years. For one thing, OBR forecasts have repeatedly underestimated inflation, and there’s no corrective mechanism in the system. For student maintenance, even if predictions come true, other features of the system mean that the average, rather than maximum, maintenance loan continues to be worth less each year.

    For teaching funding, it’s important to stress that Labour has in no way committed to keeping the overall package inflation-proofed. While tuition fees are the major part here, other elements such as high-cost subject funding took a real-terms tumble this year, and no-one is predicting that the reforming the Strategic Priorities Grant means upward movement on how much it’s worth – the reverse is far likelier, given DfE’s commitments elsewhere.

    University staff have had a decade or more of below inflation pay rises, and there doesn’t seem any serious capacity or appetite among higher education employers to do fundamental work here – the year-on-year squabbles will continue, and high levels of inflation over the coming years will eat further into staff remuneration and the attractiveness of higher education careers.

    And inflation-linked rises in tuition fees will also change applicant behaviour. One thing we’ll start getting a sense of on Wednesday will be the likelihood of when fees will cross the (supposedly) psychologically important barrier of £10,000. Back in March, the OBR was expecting RPIX to run at 2.7 per cent in Q1 2027, and 2.8 per cent in Q1 2028, which would lead to tuition fee caps of around £9,790 in 2026–27 and around £10,065 in 2027–28. We won’t know for certain until autumn 2026, but the picture will start to come into focus.

    Now the significance of fees being materially above, rather than roughly equal to, £10k is perhaps overstated. But DfE isn’t really sure – it has reportedly commissioned modelling on how students will respond to rises, but the results aren’t due until the spring.

    All in all, there’s a whole host of reasons why Budget decisions and their effect on inflation, as well as the OBR forecasts themselves, have become heavily intertwined with the future behaviour and wellbeing of higher education staff and students.

    Gilt trips

    Perhaps the most overlooked publication of the last few years for really understanding how the Treasury thinks about higher education is the Institute for Fiscal Studies analysis of how the interplay between interest rates and Treasury gilts affect the cost of student loans.

    In a nutshell, it costs far more for the government to borrow than it used to (the 15-year gilt yield has continued to rise since the IFS did its sums in January 2024), and so it’s very reluctant to allow for too much expansion in the student loan book – it’s a far cry from when the broad strokes of student finance were put in place by the coalition government, and this was basically thought of as free money.

    This goes a long way to explain why the government is so reticent to use the student loan book in any radical way – and thus we see things like a real-terms freeze in tuition fees being presented as if it’s an almost saint-like act of generosity to the sector, or the foundering of DfE’s tepid-but-probably-genuine desire to properly boost maintenance loans.

    We’re waiting for the specifics (hopefully) of maintenance grant implementation on Wednesday, but the cost of government borrowing feels like it has played a role in the last year of behind-the-scenes policy deliberations here. In the run-up to last autumn’s Budget, there was plenty of speculation, and government nods to the press, about the potential for movement on the overall maintenance package and grants in particular. Clearly the battle with the Treasury was lost, and DfE was told to come up with an alternate source of funding – hence the international student levy. What we don’t yet know is to what extent grants will replace, rather than supplement, loans – if what we see is a switch from one to the other, the expense to the public purse of borrowing is a likely primary driver, especially given the hidden costs associated with annual tuition fee rises. While the sector isn’t really getting any more money in real terms, this isn’t to say that the government’s finances are not being stretched by indexing fees.

    What this all means is that, unfortunately, the sector needs to keep an eye on the gilts market. The supposed flip-flop on raising income tax has already done some damage here, and the government repeatedly needing to borrow more than it expected to is another issue. There’s a wider question of perceived government competence around balancing the books that drives behaviour too – confidence is in short supply as it is, and it will get worse if the Starmer era implodes. This all equates to longer-term uncertainty about the use of the student loan book.

    Even if you’ve given up on the Labour government in its current form, and are pinning hopes on a future government being more receptive to calls for support and investment in both universities and students, Number 10 and the current Treasury team are still setting the economic weather. While much of the sector will be waiting for the moment Rachel Reeves stops speaking on Wednesday to see the fee levy policy paper – assuming there is one, and the can doesn’t get kicked – there are many reasons to think the wider public finances are a much more important determinant of the future of higher education. And it’s one that isn’t painting a particularly cheery picture at the moment.

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  • Here we are, at another fork in the road.

    Here we are, at another fork in the road.

    “The
    worst-case scenario is that colleges are involved on both sides of a
    Second US Civil War between Christian Fundamentalists and neoliberals.
    Working families will take the largest hit.”

    It’s
    a stark and provocative warning, but one grounded in decades of
    neoliberal policy, predatory capitalism, and ideological warfare. From our perspective at the Higher Education Inquirer, the College Meltdown is not a future risk—it’s a
    slow-moving catastrophe already unfolding.

    Two Fronts in a Cultural and Economic War

    On one side of this looming conflict are Christian fundamentalists
    who seek to remake public education in their own image: purging
    curricula of critical perspectives, defunding public universities, and
    promoting ideological orthodoxy over inquiry.

    On the other side are neoliberal technocrats,
    who have transformed higher education into a marketplace of
    credentials, debt, and precarious labor. Under their regime, colleges
    prioritize growth, branding, and profit over education, equity, and
    labor rights.

    Both groups, while
    ideologically different, are willing to use colleges as instruments of
    power. In doing so, they turn institutions of higher learning into
    ideological battlegrounds, undermining their civic purpose.

    The Educated Underclass: Evidence of Collapse

    One of the most visible outcomes of this dysfunction is the rise of the educated underclass.
    These are people who did what they were told: they went to college,
    took on debt, and earned degrees. Yet instead of opportunity, they found
    instability.

    “A large proportion of
    those who have attended colleges have become part of a growing educated
    underclass,” Shaulis noted in his interview with Stocker.

    This includes:

    • Adjunct instructors working multiple jobs without benefits

    • Degree holders underemployed in gig work

    • Students lured into expensive, low-return programs at subprime colleges

    These
    individuals are too educated for social support but too broke for
    economic stability. They are the byproduct of a system that treats
    education as a private investment rather than a public good.

    Colleges in Crisis: A Systemic Failure

    At the Higher Education Inquirer, our concept of the College Meltdown
    describes a long-term decline marked by falling enrollment, rising
    costs, debt peonage, and declining academic labor conditions:

    • Enrollment has been falling since 2011, with sharp declines in community colleges and regional publics.

    • Student debt has exploded, with minimal returns for many graduates.

    • Academic labor is being deskilled, with “robocolleges” relying on underpaid, non-tenure-track staff or automated instruction.

    • State funding is shrinking, as aging populations drive up Medicaid costs and crowd out investment in public higher education.

    Enter the Trump Administration (2025)

    The
    return of Donald Trump to the presidency in 2025 has further
    accelerated the higher ed crisis. His administration is now actively
    contributing to the system’s unraveling:

    Deregulation and Predatory Practices

    Trump’s
    Department of Education is dismantling federal oversight of for-profit
    colleges, weakening gainful employment protections and allowing
    discredited institutions back into the federal aid system. This benefits
    subprime colleges that trap students in cycles of debt.

    Political Weaponization of Higher Ed

    Trump-aligned
    state governments and federal agencies are targeting DEI initiatives,
    restricting academic freedom, and enforcing ideological conformity.
    Public colleges are increasingly being used to wage cultural wars.

    Funding Cuts and Favoritism

    Funding
    is being diverted from public institutions toward private religious
    colleges and corporate-friendly training programs. Meanwhile, community
    colleges and regional universities are being left to die on the vine.

    Undermining Debt Relief

    Efforts
    to reform or forgive student loans have been stalled or reversed.
    Borrowers are left stranded in opaque systems, while private loans surge
    in popularity—often with worse terms and even less accountability.

    A Best-Case vs. Worst-Case Future

    When asked what the next few years could look like, I offered a fork in the road:

    Best case:
    Colleges become transparent, accountable, and aligned with the public
    good, confronting crises like climate change, inequality, and
    authoritarianism.

    Worst case:
    Colleges become entrenched ideological battlegrounds, deepening
    inequality and social fragmentation. The educated underclass grows, and
    higher education becomes an engine of despair rather than mobility.

    Conclusion

    The
    College Meltdown is not a singular event—it is a long-term systemic
    crisis. Under the combined forces of privatization, political
    polarization, and demographic stress, U.S. higher education is being
    hollowed out.

    As colleges pick sides in a broader
    culture war, the public mission of higher education is being sacrificed.
    The working class and the educated underclass are the casualties of a
    system that promised prosperity but delivered precarity.

    In
    this volatile moment, the future of American higher education may well
    mirror the broader American crisis: one defined by deepening divides,
    fraying institutions, and a desperate need for accountability, justice,
    and reinvention.

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  • DfE and OfS are running out of road on regulating a “free market” effectively

    DfE and OfS are running out of road on regulating a “free market” effectively

    On The Wonkhe Show, Public First’s Jonathan Simons offers up a critique of the way the higher education sector has been organised in recent years.

    He says that despite being more pro-market than most, he’s increasingly come to the view that the sector needs greater stewardship.

    He says that the theory of change embedded in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 – that we should have more providers, and that greater choice and contestability and composition will raise standards – has worked in some instances.

    But he adds that it is now “reasonably clear” that the deleterious side effects of it, particularly at a time of fiscal stringency, are “now not worth a candle”:

    If we as a sector don’t start to take action on this, then the risk is that somebody who is less informed, just makes a judgment? And at the stroke of a ministerial pen, we have no franchising, or we have a profit cap, or we have student number controls. Like that is a really, really bad outcome here, but that is also the outcome we are hurtling towards, because at some point government is going to say we don’t like this and we’re just going to stop it overnight.

    Some critiques of marketisation are really just critiques of massification – and some assume that we don’t have to worry about whether students actually want to study something at all. I don’t think those are helpful.

    But it does seem to be true that the dominant civil service mindset defaults to regulated markets with light stewardship as the only way to organise things.

    Civil servants often assume that new regulatory mechanisms and contractual models can be fine-tuned to deliver better outcomes over time. But the constant tweaking of market structures leads to instability and policy churn – and bad actors nip around the complexity.

    Much of Simons’ critique was about the Sunday Times and the franchising scandal. But meanwhile, across the sector, something else is happening.

    Another one

    Underneath daily announcements on redundancies, senior managers and governing bodies are increasingly turning to data analytics firms to inform their academic portfolios.

    The advice is relatively consistent – close courses with low market share and poor demand projections, maintain and grow those showing high share or significant growth potential.

    But when every university independently follows that supposedly rational strategy, there’s a risk of stumbling into a classic economic trap – a prisoner’s dilemma where individual optimisation leads to collective failure.

    The prisoner’s dilemma, a staple of economic game theory, runs like this. Two prisoners, unable to communicate, have to decide whether to cooperate with each other or defect. Each makes the decision that seems best for their individual circumstance – but the outcome is worse for both than if they had cooperated.

    I witnessed it unfold a couple of weeks ago. On a Zoom call, I watched four SU officers (under the Chatham House rule, obvs) from the same region simultaneously share that their university was planning to expand their computer science provision while quietly admitting they were “reviewing the viability” of their modern languages departments.

    It did sound like, on probing, that their universities were all responding to the same market intelligence, provided by the same consultancies, using the same metrics.

    Each university, acting independently and rationally to maximise its own market position, makes decisions that seem optimal when viewed in isolation. Close the underperforming philosophy department. Expand the business school. Withdraw from modern languages. Double down on computer science.

    But when every university follows the same market-share playbook, the collective result risks the sector becoming a monoculture, with some subjects vanishing from entire regions or parts of the tariff tables – despite their broader societal value.

    The implications of coordination failure aren’t just theoretical – they are reshaping the physical and intellectual geography of education in real time.

    Let’s imagine three post-92 universities in the North East and Yorkshire each offered degrees in East Asian languages, all with modest enrolment. Each institution, following market share analysis, determines that the subject falls below their viability threshold of 40 students per cohort. Acting independently, all three close their departments, creating a subject desert that now forces students in the region to relocate hundreds of miles to pursue their interest.

    The spatial mismatch of Hotelling’s Location Model means students having to travel further or relocate entirely – disproportionately affecting those from lower-income backgrounds.

    And once a subject disappears from a region, bringing it back becomes extraordinarily difficult. Unlike a coffee shop that can quickly return to a high street when demand reappears, universities face significant barriers to re-entry. The sunk costs of hiring specialist staff, establishing facilities, securing accreditation, and rebuilding reputation create path dependencies that lock in those decisions for generations.

    The Matthew effect and blind spots

    Market-driven restructuring doesn’t affect all providers equally. Higher education in the UK operates as a form of monopolistic competition, with stratified tiers of universities differentiated by reputation, research intensity, and selectivity.

    The Matthew effect – where advantages accumulate to those already advantaged – means that elite universities with strong brands and secure finances can maintain niche subjects even with smaller cohorts.

    Meanwhile universities lower in the prestige hierarchy – often serving more diverse and less privileged student populations – find themselves disproportionately pressured to cut anything deemed financially marginal.

    Elite concentration means higher-ranking universities are likely to become regional monopolists in certain subjects – reducing accessibility for students who can’t meet their entry requirements.

    Are we really comfortable with a system where studying philosophy becomes the preserve of those with the highest A-level results, while those with more modest prior attainment are funnelled exclusively toward subjects deemed to have immediate market value?

    Markets are remarkable mechanisms for allocating resources efficiently in many contexts. But higher education generates significant positive externalities – benefits that extend beyond the individual student to society at large. Knowledge spillovers, regional economic development, civic engagement, and cultural enrichment represent value that market signals alone fail to capture.

    Market failure is especially acute for subjects with high social utility but lower immediate market demand. Philosophy develops critical thinking capabilities essential for a functioning democracy. Modern languages facilitate international cooperation. Area studies provide crucial cultural competence for diplomacy and global business. And so on.

    When market share becomes a dominant decision criterion, broader societal benefits remain invisible on the balance sheet. The market doesn’t price in what we collectively lose when the last medieval history department in a region closes, or when the study of non-European languages becomes accessible only to those in London and Oxbridge.

    And market analysis often assumes static demand curves – failing to account for latent demand – students who might have applied had a subject remained available in their region.

    Demand for higher education isn’t exogenous – it’s endogenously shaped by availability itself. You can’t desire what you don’t know exists. Hence the huge growth in franchised Business Degrees pushed by domestic agents.

    Collective irrationality

    What’s rational for an individual university becomes irrational for the system as a whole. Demand and share advice makes perfect sense for a single institution seeking to optimise its portfolio. But when universally applied, it creates what economists call aggregate coordination failure – local optimisations generating system-wide inefficiencies.

    The long-term consequences extend beyond subject availability. Regional labour markets may face skill shortages in key areas. Cultural and intellectual diversity diminishes. Social mobility narrows as subject access becomes increasingly determined by prior academic advantage. The public good function of universities – to serve society broadly, not just commercially viable market segments – erodes.

    But the consequences of market-driven strategies extend beyond immediate subject availability. If we look at long-term societal impacts, we end up with a diminished talent pool in crucial but less popular fields – from rare languages to theoretical physics – creating intellectual gaps that can take generations to refill.

    An innovative economy – which thrives on unexpected connections between diverse knowledge domains – suffers when some disciplines disappear from regions or become accessible only to the most privileged students.

    Imagine your small but vibrant Slavic studies department closes following the kind of market share analysis I’ve explained – you lose not just courses but cross-disciplinary collaborations that generate innovative research projects. Your political science colleagues suddenly lacked crucial language expertise during the Ukraine crisis. Your business school’s Eastern European initiatives withered. A national “Languages and Security” project will boot you out as a partner.

    Universities don’t compete on price but on quality, reputation, and differentiation. It creates a market structure where elite institutions can maintain prestige by offering subjects regardless of immediate profitability, while less prestigious universities face intense pressure to focus only on high-demand areas.

    In the past decade, some cross-subsidy and assumptions that the Russell Group wouldn’t expand disproportionately helped. But efficiency has done what efficiency always does.

    Both of the assumptions are now gone – the RG returning to the sort of home student numbers it was forced to take when the mutant algorithm inflated A-Levels in 2020.

    Efficiency in market terms – optimising resources to meet measurable demand – conflicts directly with EDI and A&P goals like fair access and diverse provision. A system that efficiently “produces” large numbers of business graduates in large urban areas while eliminating classics, philosophy, and modern languages might satisfy immediate market metrics while failing dramatically at broader social missions.

    And that’s all made harder when, to save money, providers are reducing elective and pathway choice rather than enhancing it.

    Choice and voice

    When we visited Maynooth University last year we found structures that allow students to “combine subjects across arts and sciences to meet the challenges of tomorrow.” It responds to what we know about Gen Z demands for interdisciplinary opportunities and application – and allows research-active academics to exist where demands for full, “headline” degrees in their field are low.

    In Latvia recently, the minister demanded, and will now create the conditions to require, that all students be able to accrue some credit in different subjects in different institutions – partly facilitated by a kind of domestic Erasmus (responding in part to a concern about the emigration caused by actual Erasmus).

    Over in Denmark, one university structures its degrees around broad disciplinary areas rather than narrowly defined subjects. Roskilde maintains intellectual diversity while achieving operational efficiency – interdisciplinary foundation years, project-based learning that integrates multiple disciplines, and a streamlined portfolio of just five undergraduate degrees.

    As one student said when we were there:

    The professors teaching the classes at other universities feel a need to make their little modules this or that, practical or applied as well as grounded in theory. Here they don’t have that pressure.

    And if it’s true that we’re trapped in a reductive binary between lumbering, statist public services on the one hand, and lean, mean private innovative operators on the other, the false dichotomy paralyses our ability to imagine alternative approaches.

    As I note here, in the Netherlands there’s an alternative via its “(semi)public sector” framework, which integrates public interest accountability with institutional autonomy. Dutch universities operate with clear governance standards that empower stakeholders, mandate transparency, enforce quality improvement, and cap senior staff pay – all while receiving substantial public investment. It recognises that universities are neither purely market actors nor government departments, but entities with distinct public service obligations.

    When Belgian student services operate through distinct governance routes with direct student engagement, or when Norwegian student welfare is delivered through regional cooperative organisations, we see alternatives to both market competition and centralised planning.

    They suggest that universities could maintain subject diversity and geographical access not through either unfettered market choice or central planning mandates, but through governance structures that systematically integrate the voices of students, staff, and regional stakeholders into portfolio decisions. The prisoner’s dilemma is solved not by altering individual incentives alone, but by fundamentally reimagining how decisions are made.

    Other alternatives include better-targeted funding initiatives for strategically important subjects regardless of market demand, proper cross-institutional collaboration where universities collectively maintain subject breadth, regulatory frameworks that actually incentivise (rather than just warn against extremes in removing) geographical distribution of specialist provision, new metrics for university performance beyond enrolment and immediate graduate employment and better information for prospective students about long-term career pathways and societal value when multiple subject areas are on the degree transcript.

    Another game to play

    Game theory suggests that communication, coordination, and changing the incentive structure can transform the outcome.

    First, we need policy interventions that incentivise the public good nature of higher education, rather than just demand minimums in it. Strategic funding for subjects – and crucially, minor pathways or modules – that are deemed nationally important, regardless of their current market demand, can maintain intellectual infrastructure. Incentives for regional subject provision might ensure geographical diversity.

    Universities will need to stop using CMA as an excuse, and develop cooperative rather than competitive strategies. Regional consortia planning, subject-sharing agreements, and collaborative provision models are in the public interest, and will maintain breadth while allowing individual institutions to develop distinctive strengths.

    Flexible pathways, shared core skills, interdisciplinary integration – all may prove more resilient against market pressures than narrowly defined single-subject degrees. They allow universities to maintain intellectual diversity while achieving operational efficiency. And they’re what Gen Z say they want. Some countries’ equivalents of QAA subject benchmarking statements have 10, or 15, with no less choice of pathways across and within them. In the UK we somehow maintain 59.

    At the sector level, collaborative governance structures that overcome the coordination failure means resource-sharing for smaller subjects, and student mobility within and between regions even for those we might consider as “commuter students”.

    OfS’ regulatory framework could be reformed to incentivise and reward collaboration rather than focusing primarily on institutional competition and financial sustainability. Funding could reintroduce targeted support for strategically important subjects, informed by decent mapping of subject (at module level) deserts and cold spots.

    Most importantly, universities’ governing instruments should be reformed to explicitly recognise their status as “(semi)public sector bodies” with obligations beyond institutional self-interest – redefining success not as market share growth but as contributing to an accessible, diverse, and high-quality higher education system that serves both individual aspirations and collective needs.

    Almost every scandal other than free speech – from VC pay to gifts inducements, from franchising fraud to campus closures, from grade inflation to international agents – is arguably one of the Simons’ deleterious side effects, which are collectively rapidly starting to look overwhelming. Even free speech is said by those who think there’s a problem to be caused by “pandering” to student consumers.

    Universities survive because they serve purposes beyond market demands. They preserve and transmit knowledge across generations, challenge orthodoxies, generate unanticipated innovations, and prepare citizens for futures we can’t yet imagine.

    If they respond solely to market signals, the is risk losing what makes them distinctive and valuable. That requires bravery – seeing beyond the apparent rationality of individual market optimisation to recognise the collective value of a diverse, accessible, and geographically distributed higher education sector.

    It doesn’t mean running provision that students don’t want to study – but it does mean actively promoting valuable subjects to them if they matter, the government intervening to signal that quality can (and does) exist outside of the Russell Group, and it means structuring degrees such that some subjects and specialisms can be studied as components if not the title on the transcript.

    It also very much requires civil servants and their ministers to wean themselves off the dominant orthodoxy of regulated markets as being the best or only way to do stuff.

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