It’s hard to imagine that the universities that we are so familiar with could be a frontier of international power struggles.
Depending who you listen to, universities are near the epicentre of the transplanting of spies and trading of secrets. This is the university that is a “prime target for foreign states.” The one which is “almost certainly” subject to espionage from Iran. And the one which now has a hotline to report suspected interference by foreign actors. This is the university as the centre of global politics. And, depending on your outlook, the place that has been too relaxed about the threat of spying, the place where geo-politics play out on campus and the home to research which can be used by hostile actors for malicious ends.
New guidance has now been published on supporting universities to deal with foreign interference. Usually, the problem with spies and spying is that much goes unsaid. The provision of advice on spies and spying has almost entirely the opposite challenge in that guidance is voluminous complicated, overlapping and covers such an enormous range of issues as to abrogate easy case studies and advice.
The hard of the matters
There is a lot of regulation of partnerships and interactions with institutions and people from outside of the UK.
The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme covers specific activities that amount to political interference in issues such as referenda, ministerial decisions, party-political activity and the disbursement of money in some cases. Remember, this is a register of activities not of people. The new guidance is clear that there is a difference between international collaboration where “foreign states try to shape decisions on issues of importance to them in an open and transparent manner” and foreign influence which is where a foreign state attempts to “interfere in decision making or other activities at UK providers in ways that are deceptive, corrupt, or coercive.”
As well as the plethora of advice and guidance which may be dependent on whether the interference is related to cyber-crime, research security, exports, partnerships or recruitment, there is also a regulatory angle. The Office for Students, in England, regulates to ensure providers are securing freedom of speech within the law.
There are a grab-bag of examples on international issues including universities can’t allow proscribed groups to speak on campus, protests (in some circumstances) shouldn’t interfere with the “essential functions of the university”, general unhappiness with the views of an international speaker shouldn’t be enough to cancel their presence, and providers shouldn’t suspend students who publish things that the leadership of some countries don’t like. Universities should also not be accepting research funding which restricts freedom of speech or amounts to coercion.
Universities now find themselves with new guidance issued, the new MI5 hotline (or the Academic Interference Reporting Route), a new Defence Universities Alliance to encourage graduates into defence, and the existing reporting routes. The size, scale, or nature of the espionage threat is never wholly revealed publicly but it is reasonable to assume the intelligence agencies briefing to 70 universities was more candid about which countries are targeting which programmes, at what scale.
The (regulatory) power and the glory
The interesting question is not why these interventions have happened now. Take your pick. It’s either a timely intervention as debates over state interference in research, relationships on campus and in freedom of speech, make the headlines. Equally, successive governments have been continually ramping up their work to engage universities in the defence of their assets against foreign interference.
The more interesting question is whether the solution to the problem the government has identified, the vulnerability of some parts of universities to being coerced, captured, or otherwise compromised, into acting against the UK’s interests, can be resolved by ever more sophisticated guidance and advice.
Fundamentally, universities are always going to be vulnerable as sites for international interference. A significant proportion of their work is dependent on international partnerships which in turn depend on the transfer of people, ideas, assets and cash, which are regulated by institutions. Espionage is not inevitable but the sheer volume of work with the sheer number of partners makes it more likely something will go awry.
There are vanishingly few examples of universities as breeding grounds for spying like the Cambridge Spy Ring. Unless there is and they are so far getting away with it; such is the nature of spying. However, it is inconceivable to believe that malign actors won’t continue to use the openness of universities as a basis to undermine the UK’s security more generally. The challenge then is what can universities do to minimise the risks if they cannot eliminate them entirely.
The quiet American(s)
The best defence in many cases will be clarity. Universities are complicated places but it is made more complicated by the lack of clarity on international partnerships. Over in America, MIT is pretty clear about who they won’t work with, which technologies they won’t help develop, and the expected risk mitigations they expect academics to put in place. This is backed up with an information ecosystem that would be the envy of many in the UK.
There is also a question about capacity. There are very few specialised university roles that focus exclusively on reducing the threats of international malfeasance. There are roles focused on international partnerships, risk, cyber-security, and campus relationships. There is less work to coordinate these roles together to look at the systematic exposure to risks and how they may be responded to.
The harder element of all of this work is building a culture that makes reporting both easier and proportionate. Internally, the quickest way to destroy any trust on campus is the overreporting, questioning and suspicion of students, staff,and partners. It is hard to imagine a more effective means of ensuring nobody ever reports anything.Leaders are required to both build cultures of trust and respect and continually reinforce institutional priorities when it comes to partnerships. It is not an easy task.
Universities should be clear eyed that they are the centre of global proxy campaigns for power, influence, and technological advantage. They should be honest in the shortcomings in their own capacity to deal with the capabilities of state actors, open in their discussions with staff and students, and clear where they will and will not engage with partners. Stories of interference are likely to keep coming up. Universities may not be able to stop every bad actor but it is reasonable to expect they can explain what they are doing to keep staff, students, and the country safe.