Tag: structural

A more focused research system does not by itself solve structural deficits

Financial pressures across the higher education sector have necessitated a closer look at the various incomes and associated costs of the research, teaching and operational streams. For years, larger institutions have relied upon the cross-subsidy of their research, primarily from overseas student fees – a subsidy that is under threat from changes in geopolitics and indeed our own UK policies on immigration and visa controls.

The UK is now between a rock and a hard place: how can it support the volume and focus of research needed to grow the knowledge-based economy of our UK industrial strategy, while also addressing the financial deficits that even the existing levels of research create?

Several research leaders have recently been suggesting that a more efficient research system is one where higher education institutions focus on their strengths and collaborate more. But while acknowledging that efficiency savings are required and the relentless growth of bureaucracy – partly imposed by government but also self-inflicted within the HEIs – can be addressed, the funding gulf is far wider than these savings could possibly deliver.

Efficiency savings alone will not solve the scale of structural deficits in the system. Furthermore, given that grant application success rates are systemically below 20 per cent and frequently below ten or even five per cent, the sector is already only funding its strongest applications. Fundamentally, currently demand far outstrips supply, leading to inefficiency and poor prioritisation decisions.

Since most of the research costs are those supporting the salaries and student stipends of the researchers themselves, significant cost-cutting necessitates a reduction in the size of the research workforce – a reduction that would fly in the face of our future workforce requirement. We could leave this inevitable reduction to market forces, but the resulting disinvestment will likely impact the resource intensive subjects upon which much of our future economic growth depends.

We recognise also that solutions cannot solely rely upon the public purse. So, what could we do now to improve both the efficiency of our state research spend and third-party investment into the system?

What gets spent

First of all, the chronic underfunding of the teaching of UK domestic students cannot continue, as it puts even further pressure on institutional resources. The recent index-linking of fees in England was a brave step to address this, but to maintain a viable UK research and innovation system, the other UK nations will also urgently need to address the underfunding of teaching. And in doing so we must remain mindful of the potential unintended consequences that increased fees might have on socio-economic exclusion.

Second, paying a fair price for the research we do. Much has been made of the seemingly unrestricted “quality-related” funding (QR, or REG in Scotland) driven by the REF process. The reality is that QR simply makes good the missing component of research funding which through TRAC analysis is now estimated to cover less than 70 per cent of the true costs of the research.

It ought to be noted that this missing component exists over all the recently announced research buckets extending across curiosity-driven, government-priority, and scale-up support. The government must recognise that QR is not purely the funding of discovery research, but rather it is the dual funding of research in general – and that the purpose of dual funding is to tension delivery models to ensure HEI efficiency of delivery.

Next, there is pressing a need for UKRI to focus resource on the research most likely to lead to economic or societal benefit. This research spans all disciplines from the hardest of sciences to the most creative of the arts.

Although these claims are widely made within every grant proposal, perhaps the best evidence of their validity lies in the co-investment these applications attract. We note the schemes such as EPSRC’s prosperity partnerships and their quantum technology hubs show that when packaged to encompass a range of technology readiness levels (TRL), industry is willing to support both low and high TRL research.

We would propose that across UKRI more weighting is given to those applications supported by matching funds from industry or, in the case of societal impact, by government departments or charities. The next wave of matched co-funding of local industry-linked innovation should also privilege schemes which elicit genuine new industry investment, as opposed to in-kind funding, as envisaged in Local Innovation Partnership Funds. This avoids increasing research volume which is already not sustainable.

The research workforce

In recent times, the UKRI budgets and funding schemes for research and training (largely support for doctoral students) have been separated from each other. This can mean that the work of doctoral students is separated from the cutting-edge research that they were once the enginehouse of delivering. This decoupling means that the research projects themselves now require allocated, and far more expensive, post-doctoral staff to deliver. We see nothing in the recent re-branding of doctoral support to “landscape” and “focal” awards that is set to change this disconnect.

It should be acknowledged that centres for doctoral training were correctly introduced nearly 20 years ago to ensure our students were better trained and better supported – but we would argue that the sector has now moved on and graduate schools within our leading HEIs address these needs without need for duplication by doctoral centres.

Our proposal would be that, except for a small number of specific areas and initiatives supported by centres of doctoral training (focal awards) and central to the UK’s skills need, the normal funding of UKRI-supported doctoral students should be associated with projects funded by UKRI or other sources external to higher education institutions. This may require the reassignment of recently pooled training resources back to the individual research councils, rebalanced to meet national needs.

This last point leads to the question of what the right shape of the HEI-based research-focused workforce is. We would suggest that emphasis should be placed on increasing the number of graduate students – many of whom aspire to move on from the higher education sector after their graduation to join the wider workforce – rather than post-doctoral researchers who (regrettably) mistakenly see their appointment as a first step to a permanent role in a sector which is unlikely to grow.

Post-doctoral researchers are of course vital to the delivery of some research projects and comprise the academic researchers of the future. Emerging research leaders should continue to be supported through, for example, future research leader fellowships, empowered to pursue their own research ambitions. This rebalancing of the research workforce will go some way to rebalancing supply and demand.

Organisational change

Higher education institutions are hotbeds of creativity and empowerment. However, typical departments have an imbalanced distribution of research resources where appointment and promotion criteria are linked to individual grant income. While not underestimating the important leadership roles this implies, we feel that research outcomes would be better delivered through internal collaborations of experienced researchers where team science brings complementary skills together in partnership rather than subservience.

This change in emphasis requires institutions to consider their team structures and HR processes. It also requires funders to reflect these changes in their assessment criteria and selection panel working methods. Again, this rebalancing of the research workforce would go some way to addressing supply and demand while improving the delivery of the research we fund.

None of these suggestions represent a quick fix for our financial pressures, which need to be addressed. But taken together we believe them to be a supportive step, helping stabilise the financial position of the sector, while ensuring its continuing contribution to the UK economy and society. If we fail to act, the UK risks a disorderly reduction of its research capability at precisely the moment our global competitors are accelerating.

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January 5, 2026
Structural Advantage and Financial Resilience in American Higher Education
Historically White Institutions (HWIs) occupy a distinctive position in the U.S. higher education landscape. Defined by their origins as institutions serving predominantly White students during eras of segregation, HWIs today include many of the nation’s most prominent colleges and universities. While often overlooked in discussions about equity, their historical and structural context provides key insight into why these institutions remain financially resilient even as other colleges, particularly smaller or more diverse institutions, struggle (Darity & Hamilton, 2015; Jackson, 2018).

Understanding HWIs

HWIs are schools founded to educate White students in a segregated society. Unlike Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) or tribal colleges, HWIs historically excluded students of color. Today, they often enroll more diverse student populations than in the past, but their demographic and financial legacies remain.

Some of the largest and most prominent HWIs in the U.S. include:
- Brigham Young University (UT) — affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS); majority White enrollment; nationally recognized academic and athletic programs.
- University of Notre Dame (IN) — Catholic research university with a large endowment and historically majority White student body; high national profile academically and athletically.
- Boston College (MA) — Catholic research university; historically White, strong alumni networks, and notable national reputation.
- Marquette University (WI) — Catholic university; majority White; prominent regionally and nationally in academics and athletics.
- Select public flagships in predominantly White states — such as University of Wisconsin–Madison and University of Michigan, whose student bodies historically reflect state demographics and remain disproportionately White relative to national averages.
These institutions collectively represent a significant portion of the elite, high-profile U.S. higher education sector, and they share common financial and structural advantages rooted in their historical composition (Smith, 2019; Harper, 2020).

Financial Advantages Linked to Demographics

Several factors stemming from HWI status contribute to financial stability:
1. Alumni Wealth and Giving
  
  Historically, HWIs drew students from communities with greater intergenerational wealth. Today, this translates into strong alumni giving networks, major gifts, and multi-generational planned giving (Darity & Hamilton, 2015; Gasman, 2012). Universities like Notre Dame, BYU, and Boston College leverage these networks to maintain robust endowments and fund major campaigns.
2. Endowment Growth and Stability
  
  HWIs often have substantial endowments accumulated over decades. Early access to philanthropic networks and preferential funding opportunities during eras when colleges serving communities of color were systematically underfunded contributed to long-term financial resilience (Gasman, 2012; Perna, 2006). Endowments provide flexibility for scholarships, faculty hiring, campus infrastructure, and new initiatives — crucial buffers against enrollment volatility.
3. Religious and Regional Networks
  
  Many prominent HWIs are faith-based (BYU, Notre Dame, Boston College, Marquette). Their institutional networks foster recruitment, donations, and career placement. These social structures create operational and financial advantages that are difficult for newer or demographically diverse institutions to replicate (Harper, 2020; Museus & Quaye, 2009).
Comparative Risks: HWIs vs. Other Institutions

The financial and structural advantages of large HWIs become especially apparent when compared to smaller or mid-sized colleges that have closed or struggled in recent years, including faith-based and regional institutions with smaller endowments or more diverse student populations (Perna, 2006; Gasman, 2012). The historical demographic composition of HWIs — and the associated alumni wealth and networks — provides a buffer that allows them to weather challenges that might otherwise threaten institutional survival.

Challenges and Future Considerations

While HWIs enjoy structural advantages, they are not invulnerable. Changing demographics, particularly declining percentages of White high school graduates in key regions, present long-term enrollment challenges (Harper, 2020). HWIs that fail to diversify both their student bodies and donor bases may find these historical advantages eroded over time.

Moreover, institutions must balance financial stability with commitments to equity and inclusion. Over-reliance on historically White alumni networks can reinforce systemic inequities if not paired with active strategies to support students of color and broaden philanthropy (Smith, 2019; Jackson, 2018).

Legacies of Religion and White Privilege

Historically White Institutions provide a clear example of how demographic legacy intersects with financial resilience in higher education. Large HWIs such as Notre Dame, BYU, Boston College, Marquette, and select public flagships have leveraged endowments, alumni networks, and religious and regional structures to maintain stability and prominence.

Yet these advantages carry responsibilities: HWIs must adapt to shifting demographics, diversify both student and donor populations, and ensure that financial strength supports equity alongside institutional growth. Understanding HWIs is essential for policymakers, educators, and funders seeking to navigate the complex landscape of American higher education.

Selected Academic Sources
- Darity, W.A., & Hamilton, D. (2015). Separate and Unequal: The Legacy of Racial Segregation in Higher Education. In The Color of Crime Revisited.
- Gasman, M. (2012). The Changing Face of Private Higher Education: Wealth, Race, and Philanthropy. Journal of Higher Education, 83(4), 481–508.
- Harper, S.R. (2020). Racial Inequality in Higher Education: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion. Review of Research in Education, 44(1), 113–141.
- Jackson, J.F.L. (2018). Diversity and Racial Stratification at Predominantly White Colleges. New Directions for Higher Education, 181, 7–23.
- Museus, S.D., & Quaye, S.J. (2009). Toward an Understanding of How Historically White Colleges and Universities Handle Racial Diversity. ASHE Higher Education Report, 35(1).
- Perna, L.W. (2006). Understanding the Relationship Between Resource Allocation and Student Outcomes at Predominantly White Institutions. Review of Higher Education, 29(3), 247–272.
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December 21, 2025
A Structural Approach to Writing

This presentation introduces a powerful structural framework for academic writing that helps writers organize their essays and research papers more effectively. The Thesis Statement Map approach demonstrates how a well-crafted thesis statement can serve as a blueprint for the entire paper, guiding both the writer and the reader through a logical progression of ideas.

At the core of this method is the understanding that a good thesis statement does more than simply state an argument. It maps directly to the sections of your paper in a clear, predictable way. The thesis statement serves dual purposes: it prepares the reader’s mind for background information, definitions, and contexts about the subject, while also introducing the key topics that will contain supporting evidence. This evidence can take various forms, including statistics, historical information, examples, illustrative scenes, personal experiences, or lab and field results.

The structural framework begins with the thesis statement at the top, which should clearly state your rhetorical goal followed by the key topics that will map to your body sections. This is followed by a section providing background, contexts, and definitions that connects to the reader’s existing experience and knowledge. The body of the paper then unfolds through three main topic sections, each beginning with a strong topic sentence and supported by relevant evidence.

The discussion section plays a crucial role in synthesizing ideas, pointing out connections between topics, proposing counterarguments, and incorporating thoughts from other scholars or sources. Finally, the conclusion brings together the thesis and topics, highlights new insights gained through the analysis, discusses broader implications, and offers suggestions or recommendations.

This systematic approach helps writers avoid common organizational pitfalls and ensures that every section of the paper serves a clear purpose in supporting the overall argument.

— Susan Smith Nash, Ph.D.

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October 22, 2025
The higher education sector needs an honest broker to support structural change

Of all the current headwinds faced by the higher education sector, one of the most challenging is a lack of expertise and experience in the area of structural change.

In an environment where radical collaboration and merger are increasingly seen – rightly or wrongly – as a solution to the sector’s financial challenges, the expertise needed to broker and execute a successful merger or other collaboration seems to be patchy.

As, arguably, are the somewhat different competences required to steward the longer term strategic integration of two or more distinct institutions, each with their own teaching and research portfolios and cultures. The answer to the question “who has done this before?” can only be answered in the affirmative by a handful of people.

This issue was acknowledged in Mills & Reeve’s joint report with Wonkhe Connect More with the following insight from a one of the heads of institution we interviewed:

We all have a skills matrix for boards and for courts and for councils. I think, increasingly, that needs to reflect people who’ve got some expertise and some background in this space…I don’t think there are many vice chancellors who would necessarily have the skills, the knowledge, and the background. Really, this is new territory, potentially, for us, it’s new turf.

Of course, it wasn’t always thus. One of the ironies of the current dearth of experience is that large numbers of providers are themselves the product of historic mergers and collaborations. Taking the long view, the history of many providers is a complex genealogy, a narrative of mergers past and more recent.

In part, the steady decline in institutional experience of these things was the natural result of a relatively benign financial environment. It’s easy to forget in the current climate but the period of low inflation and cheap borrowing meant that, at an institutional level, there was little impetus to challenge the operating model and, of course, the introduction of a marketised funding model meant that competition, rather than collaboration, was very much the order of the day.

That marketised model was also accompanied by a marked shift in approach from the regulator. While HEFCE adopted a relatively low-key approach to mergers and collaboration – generally leaving the impetus to come together to institutions themselves – it did publish guidance on mergers and had a collaboration and restructuring fund to assist institutions to explore and implement structural change.

Crucially, HEFCE was widely accepted to be a neutral broker who would help facilitate institutions coming together – and it had the funding to help smooth the path. By contrast, OfS, in its response to a question from the House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee, made it clear that it does not consider itself to have “the remit, powers or funding to intervene to prevent closure or to facilitate mergers or acquisitions.”

Skills gap

Where, then, does that leave providers? Typically, there is a reliance on the institution’s executive team, in particular, the vice chancellor, to steer the merger. But most higher education executives are not from the business world with experience in mergers and to a significant degree they have a conflict of interest. There is also a need to continue with their day jobs and manage business as usual in case the merger doesn’t happen.

The next most obvious port of call is to look for expertise among their own governing bodies, and, specifically, their external members. After all, one of the main motivations of having lay external members is to draw upon their expertise and to fill gaps which (understandably enough) exist within the skill sets of senior management teams and the institution more widely.

The problem, however, is that merger and radical collaboration require a very particular set of skills. It’s very easy for universities to get starry-eyed about a governor just because they happen to be an investment banker, an accountant, or have experience of public sector mergers in the NHS, for example. But the skills required in a university merger or a complex debt restructuring are very specific and even a governing body which is well-stocked with members from across different professional services and backgrounds cannot assume that its trustees have the requisite expertise to drive forward a merger of two institutions.

Of course, an institution can buy in a certain level of expertise. But what perhaps can’t always be replicated by professional advice are the experience and war stories of those who have lived and breathed mergers and collaborations from the inside – particularly from the education and adjacent sectors. In Mills & Reeve’s joint report with KPMG UK – Radical collaboration: a playbook – we drew out some of those lived experiences in the form of case studies. However, written case studies need to be seasoned with real-life personal experience. What is really needed when scoping a potential merger or other kind of radical collaboration is access to a “hive mind” of critical friends.

An HE Commissioner model

Other sectors have taken a strategic approach to developing this expertise. The Further Education Commissioner is the most obvious parallel. Between 2015 and 2019 the FE sector saw 57 mergers, three federations, three joint FE and HE institutions and 23 academy conversions. If most of UK higher education no longer has institutional memory of mergers, FE has it in bucket loads.

The FE Commissioner and their team offer a range of services to FE colleges – ranging from informal chats and financial health checks, through to more formal invention assessments. Their team – a mix of former leaders and finance professionals from within the sector – have genuinely seen and done it all before. Higher education deserves the same deep pool of knowledge to draw on, especially if the worst case scenario of institutional insolvency and/or disorderly market exit is to be avoided.

For this to work successfully in HE there would need to be some level of funding and a decision as to whether a commissioner’s role might sit within DfE or OfS. Our sense – particularly given the size and complexity of universities and the involvement of key stakeholders such as banks and private placement bondholders – is that there will still be a large role played by private sector consultants, lawyers, and accountants. However, there is room for a more collegiate level of engagement from DfE and OfS than arguably exists at present.

As well as pooling expertise on how to collaborate, placing an HE commissioner role on a formal footing might also allow it to broker conversations between providers seeking to work together more closely – something which, in our experience, is done very hesitantly at present, both because of the fear of breaching competition rules and, more generally, because every potential collaboration partner is, in a very real sense, also a competitor.

What can’t be underestimated is how urgently this function is needed. Providers are capable of doing this alone, as recent examples such as the Anglia Ruskin/Writtle and St George’s/City mergers testify. However, how much better for the long-term future of the sector it would surely be if providers had ready access to some critical friends and some “protected” spaces to have conversations about how best to achieve and implement forms of radical collaboration.

This article is published in association with Mills & Reeve.

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October 14, 2025