Tag: tells

  • What the saga of Oxford Business College tells us about regulation and franchising

    What the saga of Oxford Business College tells us about regulation and franchising

    One of the basic expectations of a system of regulation is consistency.

    It shouldn’t matter how prestigious you are, how rich you are, or how long you’ve been operating: if you are active in a regulated market then the same rules should apply to all.

    Regulatory overreach can happen when there is public outrage over elements of what is happening in that particular market. The pressure a government feels to “do something” can override processes and requirements – attempting to reach the “right” (political or PR) answer rather than the “correct” (according to the rules) one.

    So when courses at Oxford Business College were de-designated by the Secretary of State for Education, there’s more to the tale than a provider where legitimate questions had been raised about the student experience getting just desserts. It is a cautionary tale, involving a fascinating high-court judgment and some interesting arguments about the limits of ministerial power, of what happens when political will gets ahead of regulatory processes.

    Business matters

    A splash in The Sunday Times back in the spring concerned the quality of franchised provision from – as it turned out – four Office for Students registered providers taught at Oxford Business College. The story came alongside tough language from Secretary of State for Education Bridget Phillipson:

    I know people across this country, across the world, feel a fierce pride for our universities. I do too. That’s why I am so outraged by these reports, and why I am acting so swiftly and so strongly today to put this right.

    And she was in no way alone in feeling that way. Let’s remind ourselves, the allegations made in The Sunday Times were dreadful. Four million pounds in fraudulent loans. Fake students, and students with no apparent interest in studying. Non-existent entry criteria. And, as we shall see, that’s not even as bad as the allegations got.

    De-designation – removing the eligibility of students at a provider to apply for SLC fee or maintenance loans – is one of the few levers government has to address “low quality” provision at an unregistered provider. Designation comes automatically when a course is franchised from a registered provider: a loophole in the regulatory framework that has caused concern over a number of years. Technically an awarding provider is responsible for maintaining academic quality and standards for its students studying elsewhere.

    The Office for Students didn’t have any regulatory jurisdiction other than pursuing the awarding institutions. OBC had, in fact, tried to register with OfS – withdrawing the application in the teeth of the media firestorm at the end of March.

    So everything depended on the Department for Education overturning precedent.

    Ministering

    It is “one of the biggest financial scandals universities have faced.” That’s what Bridget Phillipson said when presented with The Sunday Times’ findings. She announced that the Public Sector Fraud Authority would coordinate immediate action, and promised to empower the Office for Students to act in such cases.

    In fact, OBC was already under investigation by the Government Internal Audit Agency (GIAA) and had been since 2024. DfE had been notified by the Student Loans Company about trends in the data and other information that might indicate fraud at various points between November 2023 and February 2024 – notifications that we now know were summarised as a report detailing the concerns which was sent to DfE in January 2024. The eventual High Court judgement (the details of which we will get to shortly) outlined just a few of these allegations, which I take from from the court documents:

    • Students enrolled in the Business Management BA (Hons) course did not have basic English language skills.
    • Less than 50 per cent of students enrolled in the London campus participate, and the remainder instead pay staff to record them as in attendance.
    • Students have had bank details altered or new bank accounts opened in their name, to which their maintenance payments were redirected.
    • Staff are encouraging fraud through fake documents sent to SLC, fake diplomas, and fake references. Staff are charging students to draft their UCAS applications and personal statements. Senior staff are aware of this and are uninterested.
    • Students attending OBC do not live in the country. In one instance, a dead student was kept on the attendance list.
    • Students were receiving threats from agents demanding money and, if the students complained, their complaints were often dealt with by those same agents threatening the students.
    • Remote utilities were being used for English language tests where computers were controlled remotely to respond to the questions on behalf of prospective students.
    • At the Nottingham campus, employees and others were demanding money from students for assignments and to mark their attendance to avoid being kicked off their course.

    At the instigation of DfE, and with the cooperation of OBC, GIAA started its investigation on 19 September 2024, continuing to request information from and correspond with the college until 17 January 2025. An “interim report” detailing emerging findings went to DfE on 17 December 2024; the final report arrived on 30 January 2025. The final report made numerous recommendations about OBC processes and policies, but did not recommend de-designation. That recommendation came in a ministerial submission, prepared by civil servants, dated 18 March 2025.

    Process story

    OBC didn’t get sight of these reports until 20 March 2025, after the decisions were made. It got summaries of both the interim and final reports in a letter from DfE notifying it that Phillipson was “minded to” de-designate. The documentation tells us that GIAA reported that OBC had:

    • recruited students without the required experience and qualifications to successfully complete their courses
    • failed to ensure students met the English language proficiency as set out in OBC and lead provider policies
    • failed to ensure attendance is managed effectively
    • failed to withdraw or suspend students that fell below the required thresholds for performance and/or engagement;
    • failed to provide evidence that immigration documents, where required, are being adequately verified.

    The college had 14 days to respond to the summary and provide factual comment for consideration, during which period The Sunday Times published its story. OBC asked DfE for the underlying material that informed the findings and the subsequent decision, and for an extension (it didn’t get all the material, but it got a further five days) – and it submitted 68 pages of argument and evidence to DfE, on 7 April 2025. Another departmental ministerial submission (on 16 April 2025) recommended that the Secretary of State confirm the decision to de-designate.

    According to the OBC legal team, these emerging findings were not backed up by the full GIAA reports, and there were concerns about the way a small student sample had been used to generalise across an entire college. Most concerningly, the reports as eventually shared with the college did not support de-designation (though they supported a number of other concerns about OBC and its admission process). This was supported by a note from GIAA regarding OBC’s submission, which – although conceding that aspects of the report could have been expressed more clearly – concluded:

    The majority of the issues raised relate to interpretation rather than factual accuracy. Crucially, we are satisfied that none of the concerns identified have a material impact on our findings, conclusions or overall assessment.

    Phillipson’s decision to de-designate was sent to the college on 17 April 2025, and it was published as a Written Ministerial Statement. Importantly, in her letter, she noted that:

    The Secretary of State’s decisions have not been made solely on the basis of whether or not fraud has been detected. She has also addressed the issue of whether, on the balance of probabilities, the College has delivered these courses, particularly as regards the recruitment of students and the management of attendance, in such a way that gives her adequate assurance that the substantial amounts of public money it has received in respect of student fees, via its partners, have been managed to the standards she is entitled to expect.

    Appeal

    Oxford Business College appealed the Secretary of State’s decision. Four grounds of challenge were pursued with:

    • Ground 3: the Secretary of State had stepped beyond her powers in prohibiting OBC from receiving public funds from providing new franchised courses in the future.
    • Ground 1: the decision was procedurally unfair, with key materials used by the Secretary of State in making the decision not provided to the college, and the college never being told the criteria it was being assessed against
    • Ground 4: By de-designating courses, DfE breached OBCs rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions – in this case the courses themselves)
    • Ground 7: The decision by the Secretary of State had breached the public sector equality duty

    Of these, ground 3 was not determined, as the Secretary of State had clarified that no decision had been taken regarding future courses delivered by OBC. Ground 4 was deemed to be a “controversial” point of law regarding whether a course and its designation status could be a “possession” under ECHR, but could be proceeded with at a later date. Ground 7 was not decided.

    Ground 1 succeeded. The court found that OBC had been subject to an unfair process, where:

    OBC was prejudiced in its ability to understand and respond to the matters of the subject of investigation, including as to the appropriate sanction, and to understand the reasons for the decision.

    Judgement

    OBC itself, or the lawyers it engaged, have perhaps unwisely decided to put the judgement into the public domain – it has yet to be formally published. I say unwisely, because it also puts the initial allegations into the public domain and does not detail any meaningful rebuttal from the college – though The Telegraph has reported that the college now plans to sue the Secretary of State for “tens of millions of pounds.”

    The win, such as it is, was entirely procedural. The Secretary of State should have shared more detail of the findings of the GIAA investigation (at both “emerging” and “final” stages) in order that the college could make its own investigations and dispute any points of fact.

    Much of the judgement deals with the criteria by which a sample of 200 students were selected – OBC was not made aware that this was a sample comprising those “giving the greatest cause for suspicion” rather than a random sample, and the inability of OBC to identify students whose circumstances or behaviour were mentioned in the report. These were omissions, but nowhere is it argued by OBC that these were not real students with real experiences.

    Where allegations are made that students might be being threatened by agents and institutional staff, it is perhaps understandable that identifying details might be redacted – though DfE cited the “”pressure resulting from the attenuated timetable following the order for expedition, the evidence having been filed within 11 days of that order” for difficulties faced in redacting the report properly. On this point, DfE noted that OBC, using the materials provided, “had been able to make detailed representations running to 68 pages, which it had described as ‘comprehensive’ and which had been duly considered by the Secretary of State”.

    The Secretary of State, in evidence, rolled back from the idea that she could automatically de-designate future courses without specific reason, but this does not change the decisions she has made about the five existing courses delivered in partnership. Neither does it change the fact that OBC, having had five courses forcibly de-designated, and seen the specifics of the allegations underpinning this exceptional decision put into the public domain without any meaningful rebuttal, may struggle to find willing academic partners.

    The other chink of legal light came with an argument that a contract (or subcontract) could be deemed a “possession” under certain circumstances, and that article one section one of the European Convention on Human Rights permits the free enjoyment of possessions. The judgement admits that there could be grounds for debate here, but that debate has not yet happened.

    Rules

    Whatever your feelings about OBC, or franchising in general, the way in which DfE appears to have used a carefully redacted and summarised report to remove an institution from the sector is concerning. If the rules of the market permit behaviour that ministers do not like, then these rules need to be re-written. DfE can’t just regulate based on what it thinks the rules should be.

    The college issued a statement on 25 August, three days after the judgement was published – it claims to be engaging with “partner institutions” (named as Buckinghamshire New University, University of West London, Ravensbourne University London, and New College Durham – though all four had already ended their partnerships with the remaining students being “taught out”) about the future of the students affected by the designation decision – many had already transferred to other courses at other providers.

    In fact, the judgement tells us that of 5,000 students registered at OBC on 17 April 2025, around 4,700 had either withdrawn or transferred out of OBC to be taught out. We also learn that 1,500 new students, who had planned to start an OBC-delivered course after 2025, would no longer be doing so. Four lead providers had given notice to terminate franchise agreements between April 2024 and May of 2025. Franchise discussions with another provider – Southampton Solent University – underway shortly before the decision to de-designate, had ended.

    OBC currently offers one course itself (no partnership offers are listed) – a foundation programme covering academic skills and English language including specialisms in law, engineering, and business – which is designed to prepare students for the first year of an undergraduate degree course. It is not clear what award this course leads to, or how it is regulated. It is also expensive – a 6 month version (requiring IELTS 5.5 or above) costs an eyewatering £17,500. And there is no information as to how students might enroll on this course.

    OBC’s statement about the court case indicates that it “rigorously adheres to all regulatory requirements”, but it is not clear which (if any) regulator has jurisdiction over the one course it currently advertises.

    If there are concerns about the quality of teaching, or about academic standards, in any provider in receipt of public funds they clearly need to be addressed – and this is as true for Oxford Business College as it is for the University of Oxford. This should start with a clear plan for quality assurance (ideally one that reflects the current concerns of students) and a watertight process that can be used both to drive compliance and take action against those who don’t measure up. Ministerial legal innovation, it seems, doesn’t quite cut it.

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  • What the Fall of Rome Tells Us About the American Oligarchy

    What the Fall of Rome Tells Us About the American Oligarchy

    There are tax farmers squeezing a province dry. There are soldiers fighting for the emperor’s baton. And then there are a few who dread the empire’s fall and dream of the old republic.

    This is not just the story of ancient Rome. It’s also an apt metaphor for the state of contemporary America—a late-stage empire defined by extreme inequality, militarization, and a governing class that clings to power while the social fabric unravels.

    In Rome, the Senate once stood as the heart of the Republic, composed of elite Patrician families who wielded enormous religious, political, and economic influence. But as historian and economist Michael Hudson writes in The Collapse of Antiquity, these elites became entrenched creditors and landlords, a rentier class unwilling to compromise or adapt. They refused debt cancellation, land redistribution, or any reforms that might curb their power—transforming what was once a dynamic, if imperfect, republic into a brittle and parasitic empire.

    This refusal to evolve created an unsustainable system. Wealth concentrated in fewer hands. Small farmers and urban workers were crushed under debts. The rural economy collapsed as latifundia (large estates) displaced independent farmers. Military commanders, frustrated with elite gridlock, seized power for themselves. And the Senate, once a genuine force of governance, became a ceremonial shell. What followed was a long descent: civil wars, authoritarianism, economic stagnation, and eventually the re-feudalization of the West.

    Hudson’s view is clear: the Roman Senate and elite, by prioritizing their creditor rights over the common good, destroyed the economic base that sustained the Empire. In their greed and rigidity, they ensured the fall they feared.

    Now consider the United States. Like Rome, America has become dominated by a professional ruling class: oligarchs, financiers, tenured politicians, credentialed technocrats, and think-tank warriors. Institutions of higher education, once engines of democratic possibility, have increasingly become training grounds for this elite. And like the Roman Senate, they are largely unaccountable—privatizing gains, socializing losses, and suppressing reform.

    Just as Roman tax farmers drained the provinces, today’s student loan servicers, for-profit colleges, and hedge fund–backed housing firms squeeze the public to fund private empires. Just as Roman generals became emperors, today’s billionaires and media moguls wield near-sovereign power over public discourse, elections, and foreign policy. And just as the Roman elite clung to legal fictions while society crumbled, our ruling class insists the republic is healthy—even as inequality soars, infrastructure decays, and democratic norms erode.

    There are still those who long for a return to the “old republic”—to a time when education was a public good, when civic virtue mattered, and when government sought the common welfare. But those voices are increasingly drowned out in a landscape of imperial spectacle, culture wars, and managed decline.

    Hudson reminds us that ancient societies that survived economic collapse—like those in Mesopotamia—did so by recognizing the need for periodic resets. They canceled debts. They redistributed land. They prioritized stability over elite entrenchment. Rome—and perhaps America—refused to learn those lessons.

    In this moment of crisis, the choice is stark: will we continue down the path of empire, ruled by debt and extraction? Or will we recover some measure of republic, with institutions that serve people, not just capital?

    One thing is certain: empires fall. But their people don’t have to fall with them—if they choose to resist.

    Sources:

    • Michael Hudson, The Collapse of Antiquity: Greece and Rome as Civilization’s Oligarchic Turning Point, 2023

    • Mary Beard, SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome, 2015

    • Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1776–1789

    • Kyle Harper, The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire, 2017

    • Higher Education Inquirer, ongoing coverage on student debt and elite university structures

    • U.S. Department of Education, data on student debt and institutional concentration of resources

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  • What the latest HESA data tells us about university finances

    What the latest HESA data tells us about university finances

    The headlines from the 2023-24 annual financial returns were already pretty well known back in January.

    Even if you didn’t see Wonkhe’s analysis at the time (or the very similar Telegraph analysis in early May), you’d have been well aware that things have not been looking great for the UK’s universities and other higher education providers for a while now, and that a disquieting number of these are running deficits and/or making swingeing cuts.

    What the release of the full HESA Finance open data allows us to do is to peer even deeper into what was going on last academic year, and start making sense of the way in which providers are responding to these ongoing and worsening pressures. In particular, I want to focus in on expenditure in this analysis – it has become more expensive to do just about everything in higher education, and although the point around the inadequacy of fee and research income has been well and frequently made there has been less focus on just how much more money it costs to do anything.

    Not all universities

    The analysis is necessarily incomplete. The May release deals with providers who have a conventional (for higher education) financial year – one that matches the traditional academic year and runs through to the end of August. As the sector has become more diverse the variety of financial years in operation have grown. Traditional large universities have stayed with the status quo – but the variation means that we can’t talk about the entire sector in the same way as we used to, and you should bear this in mind when looking at aggregate 2023-24 data.

    A large number of providers did not manage to make a submission on time. Delays in getting auditor sign off (either because there was an audit capacity problem due to large numbers of local authorities having complex financial problems, or because universities themselves were having said complex financial problems) mean that we are down 18 sets of accounts. A glance down the list shows a few names known to be struggling (including one that has closed and one that has very publicly received a state bailout).

    So full data for the Dartington Hall Trust, PHBS-UK, Coventry University, Leeds Trinity University, Middlesex University, Spurgeon’s College, the University of West London, The University of Kent, University of Sussex, the Royal Central School of Speech and Drama, The Salvation Army, The London School of Jewish Studies, Plymouth Marjon University, the British Academy of Jewellery Limited, Multiverse Group Limited, the London School of Architecture, The Engineering and Design Institute London (TEDI) and the University of Dundee will be following some time in autumn 2025.

    Bad and basic

    HESA’s Key Financial Indicators (KFIs) are familiar and well-documented, and would usually be the first place you would go to get a sense of the overall financial health of a particular university.

    I’m a fan of net liquidity days (a measure showing the number of days a university could run for in the absence of any further income). Anything below a month (31 days) makes me sit up and take notice – when you exclude the pension adjustment (basically money that a university never had and would never need to find – it’s an actuarial nicety linked to to the unique way USS is configured) there’s 10 large-ish universities in that boat including some fairly well known names.

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    Just choose your indicator of interest in the KFI box and mouse over a mark in the chart to see a time series for the provider of your choice. You can find a provider using the highlighter – and if you want to look at an earlier year on the top chart there’s a filter to let you do that. I’ve filtered out some smaller providers by default as the KFIs are less applicable there, but you can add them back in using the “group” filter.

    I’d also recommend a look at external borrowing as a percentage of total (annual) income – there are some providers in the sector that are very highly leveraged who would both struggle to borrow additional funds at a reasonable rate and are likely to have substantial repayments and stringent covenants that severely constrain the strategic choices they can make.

    Balance board

    This next chart lets you see the fundamentals of your university’s balance sheet – with a ranking by overall surplus and deficit at the top. There are 29 largeish providers who reported a deficit (excluding the pension adjustments again) in 2023-24, with the majority being the kind of smaller modern providers that train large parts of our public sector workforce. These are the kind of universities who are unlikely to have substantial initial income beyond tuition fees, but will still have a significant cost base to sustain (usually staffing costs and the wider estates and overheads that make the university work).

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    This one works in a pretty similar way to the chart above – mousing over a provider mark on the main surplus/deficit ranking lets you see a simplified balance sheet. The colours show the headline categories, but these are split into more useful indications of what income or expenditure relates to. Again, by default and for ease of reading I have filtered out smaller providers but you could add them in using the “group” filter. For definitions of the terms used HESA has a very useful set of notes below table 1 (from which this visualisation is derived)

    There’s very little discretionary spend within the year – everything pretty much relates to actually paying staff, actually staying in regulatory compliance, and actually keeping the lights on and the campus standing: all things with a direct link to the student experience. For this reason, universities have in the past been more keen to maximise income than bear down on costs although the severity and scope of the current pressure means that cuts that students will notice are becoming a lot more common.

    What universities spend money on

    As a rule of thumb, about half of university expenditure is on staff costs (salaries, pensions, overheads). These costs rise slowly but relatively predictably over time, which is why the increase in National Insurance contributions (which we will see reflected in next year’s accounts) came as such an unwelcome surprise.

    But the real pressure so far has been on the non-staff non-finance costs – which have risen from below 40 per cent a decade ago to rapidly approach 50 per cent this year (note that these figures are not directly comparable, but the year to date includes most larger providers, and the addition of the smaller providers in the regular totals for other years will not change things much).

    What are “other costs”? Put all thoughts of shiny new buildings from your mind (as we will see these are paid for with capital, and only show up in recurrent budgets as finance costs) – once again, we are talking about the niceties of there being power, sewage, wifi, printer paper, and properly maintained buildings and equipment. The combination of inflationary increases and a rise in the cost of raw materials and logistics as a result of the absolute state of the world right now.

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    Though this first chart defaults to overall expenditure you can use it to drill down as far as individual academic cost centres using the “cc group” and “cc filters”. Select your provider of interest (“All providers” shows the entire sector up to 2022-23, “All providers (year to date)” shows everything we know about for 2023-24. It’s worth being aware that these are original not restated accounts so there may be some minor discrepancies with the balance sheets (which are based on restated numbers).

    The other thing we can learn from table 8 is how university spending is and has been split proportionally between cost centres. Among academic subject areas, one big story has been the rise in spending in business and management – these don’t map cleanly to departments on the ground, but the intention to ready your business school for the hoped-for boom in MBA provision is very apparent.

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    That’s capital

    I promised I’d get back to new builds (and large refurbishment/maintenance projects) and here we are. Spending is categorised as capital expenditure when it contributes to the development of an asset that will realise value over multiple financial years. In the world of universities spend is generally either on buildings (the estate more generally) or equipment (all the fancy kit you need to do teaching and research).

    What’s interesting about the HESA data here is that we can learn a lot about the source of this capital – it’s fairly clear for instance that the big boom in borrowing when OfS deregulated everything in 2019-20 has long since passed. “Other external sources” (which includes things like donations and bequests) are playing an increasingly big part in some university capital programmes, but the main source remains “internal funds” drawn from surpluses realised in the recurrent budget. These now constitute more than 60 per cent of all capital spend – by contrast external borrowing is less than ten per cent (a record low in the OfS era)

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    What’s next?

    As my colleague Debbie McVitty has already outlined on the site, the Office for Students chose the same day to publish their own analysis of this crop of financial statements plus an interim update giving a clearer picture of the current year alongside projections for the next few.

    Rather than sharing any real attempt to understand what is going on around the campuses of England, the OfS generally uses these occasions to complain that actors within a complex and competitive market are unable to spontaneously generate a plausible aggregate recruitment prediction. It’s almost as if everyone believes that the expansion plans they have very carefully made using the best available data and committed money to will actually work.

    The pattern with these tends to be that next year (the one people know most about) will be terrible, but future years will gradually improve as awesome plans (see above) start to pay off. And this iteration, even with the extra in year data which contributes to a particularly bad 2025-26 picture, is no exception to this.

    While the HESA data allows for an analysis of individual provider circumstances, the release from OfS covers large groups of providers – mixing in both successful and struggling versions of a “large research intensive” or “medium” provider in a generally unhelpful way.

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    To be clear, the regulator understands that different providers (though outwardly similar) may have different financial pressures. It just doesn’t want to talk in public about which problems are where, and how it intends to help.

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  • When the government tells you that you cannot pray

    When the government tells you that you cannot pray

    When Abdul Kadeer returned from Saudi Arabia in last month to celebrate the Muslim festival of Eid-ul-Fitr with his family in Meerut, a city northeast of New Delhi in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, the 32-year-old found himself gripped by fear. The local administration had announced tough restrictions on Eid-ul-Fitr prayers for Muslims. 

    Eid-ul-Fitr is one of two major holidays celebrated by Muslims and commemorates the end of the holy month of Ramadan, in which Muslims fast daily from before dawn until sunset.

    Because mosques and designated grounds for prayers, known as Eidgahs, have insufficient space to accommodate the large number of worshippers during these holidays people often stop on roadsides to offer prayers. 

    But just days before the festival, Meerut police announced that offering prayers on roads and other public places could lead to passport cancellations. 

    “I came home to celebrate with my family, but now we are living in fear,” Kadeer says. “Why is it that when we pray, it becomes a problem, but during other festivals, roads are blocked and nothing happens?”

    Jamia Masjid Srinagar closed for Eid prayers in Kashmir. (Photo by Sajad Hameed)

    A minority religion

    For Kadeer, losing his passport would cost him his job.

    “I work in Saudi Arabia to support my family here,” he said. “Why are we being targeted for a prayer that lasts barely 20 minutes?”

    The state of Uttar Pradesh has a predominantly Hindu population, with Hindus comprising around 80% of the total population, while Muslims make up approximately 19%.

    Across Meerut, sentiments like Kadeer’s resonate deeply. Many Muslims in the city ask why they face restrictions when Hindu festivals frequently involve processions on public roads without similar consequences.

    “Why is it that only during Eid, roads become a law-and-order issue?” questions a shopkeeper in the city’s old quarter. “During Holi or Diwali, no one is threatened with legal action.”

    Holi and Diwali are major Hindu festivals celebrated with their own distinct rituals rooted in mythology, seasonal change and spiritual themes. Holi celebrates spring with colors, water fights and sweets, symbolizing good over evil. Diwali, the festival of lights, involves lamps, fireworks and sharing food, marking prosperity and the return of the Hindu god Rama.

    When the Indian government restricts public prayer during Muslim festivals like Eid-ul-Fitr it says it does so to maintain public order and prevent communal tensions. Authorities may cite concerns about large gatherings in public spaces causing traffic disruptions, noise pollution or potential clashes, especially in areas with a history of religious friction. 

    Tensions peaked on 31 March, for example, when violence erupted after the Eid prayer in Siwalkhas, a town northeast of New Delhi. According to police, members of two groups clashed, with reports of gunfire. Security forces quickly intervened, dispersing the crowds, but not before more than six Muslims were injured.

    A double standard?

    The restrictions on prayer have sparked national debate. Popular comedian Munawar Faruqui criticised the decision on social media, questioning why a short prayer was being singled out. But Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath defended the measure, citing the Maha Kumbh in Prayagraj as an example of religious discipline. 

    “[Six hundred and sixty million] people attended the Maha Kumbh without any incidents of violence, harassment or disorder. Roads are meant for walking,” he said, suggesting that Muslims should learn from Hindu festival gatherings. 

    Nasir Qureshi, 47, of Bijnor, said that even before Eid, they were warned not to gather in large numbers for prayers. “But when Hindus celebrate their festivals, there are no such restrictions,” he said “Why is there one rule for us and another for them?”

    The directive has drawn criticism not only from opposition parties but also from within the allies of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP.

    Iqra Hasan, a member of parliament for the socialist Samajwadi Party, questioned the intent behind the restrictions while Chirag Paswan, a BJP ally, called for a focus on broader issues rather than communal divisions. And Union Minister Chaudhary Jayant Singh compared the crackdown to authoritarian measures described in George Orwell’s book “1984”.

    Opponents to restrictions argue that the Hajj in Mecca, with 2–3 million Muslims praying peacefully, shows that large Muslim gatherings can be managed safely, like the Maha Kumbh’s 400 million Hindus. With proper planning, India could allow Eid prayers fairly, avoiding bias.

    Police and worshippers

    In Meerut, protests took shape in subtle ways. Some worshippers displayed posters stating, “It’s not just Muslims who pray on roads.” The banners listed instances of Hindus and others conducting religious activities on public streets.

    Authorities forcibly removed the posters, leading to further tensions. Among the congregation, expressions of solidarity with Palestine were visible, with worshippers seen holding “Free Palestine” placards and some donning traditional Palestinian attire.

    Mohammed Saeed, 29, a resident of Meerut, said that the police didn’t let them complete their prayers. “They stormed in, shouting at us to leave, and when people protested, they started hitting us,” Saeed said. “Even elderly men were pushed around.”

    Police have registered cases against those raising Palestine-related issues in previous instances, making this a sensitive act of defiance. Beyond Meerut, other decisions have added to the sense of alienation. In Haryana, the state government removed Eid from its list of gazetted holidays, relegating it to a restricted holiday status. This means government offices will remain open on Eid and employees —Hindus or Muslims — must request leave if they wish to observe it.

    Asaduddin Owaisi, an member of parliament from Hyderabad and chief of the right-wing political party All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, said that these kind of decisions are a direct attack on Muslim minorities in the country. 

    He also said that earlier last year the central government ordered a survey of the Jamia Masjid in Uttar Pradesh, a 500-year-old mosque that is part of a UNESCO World Heritage site. It turned into violence with five people killed and 30 injured. 

    “Hundreds were detained only to deny the survey,” Owaisis said. “These decisions will increase the hate in the communities nothing else.”

    Religious clashes elsewhere

    While India sees frequent communal flashpoints between Hindus and Muslims, other South Asian nations have also witnessed religious tensions manifesting in different ways.

    In Pakistan, religious minorities, particularly Hindus and Christians, have often faced restrictions on their religious practices, though state-imposed bans on mass religious gatherings have been rare.

    In Bangladesh, political conflicts sometimes intertwine with religious identity, leading to incidents of violence during Hindu Durga Puja celebrations. Sri Lanka has seen its own set of religious tensions, with growing restrictions on Muslim practices such as a ban on the niqab — a face veil worn by women — following the 2019 Easter bombings when 269 people were killed in six suicide bombings in churches and hotels. 

    In Kashmir, meanwhile, the state’s approach to religious gatherings has taken a different but equally restrictive form. On 31 March, as Muslims worldwide prepared for Eid-ul-Fitr, authorities in Srinagar locked down the historic Jamia Masjid, preventing worshippers from offering prayers there.

    The region’s chief cleric, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, was placed under house arrest, a move he strongly condemned.

    “When huge claims of ‘normalcy’ are made every day by the authorities, why are Muslims in Kashmir being kept away from their religious places and practices?” Mirwaiz said in a statement. “What is the agenda? Is the collective identity of Kashmiri Muslims a threat to the rulers?”

    The Jamia Masjid closure follows a pattern seen in recent years, where authorities have restricted access to religious sites on key Islamic occasions, citing security concerns.

    Earlier in March, the mosque was locked for Shab-e-Qadr and Jummat-ul-Vida prayers, triggering strong reactions from opposition parties in Kashmir.

    Darakhshan Andrabi, who is a senior BJP leader and chairs the Jammu and Kashmir Wakf Board, a body that controls the use of religious and charitable properties, justified the decision, stating that Eid prayers could not be held at Eidgah grounds due to ongoing construction work. However, many local residents and religious leaders see such restrictions as politically motivated and part of broader efforts to control religious expression in the region.

     

    Questions to consider: 

    1. What is Eid-ul-Fitr?

    2. What is a rationale the Indian government has to restrict public prayer during Muslim festivals?

    3. Do you think that the government should be able to regulate religion? Why?

     

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  • Trump tells agencies to plan for mass layoffs

    Trump tells agencies to plan for mass layoffs

    The Trump administration on Wednesday ordered federal agencies to start preparing for “large-scale reductions in force,” the latest step in a broader effort to dramatically reduce the federal workforce.

    The memo from the Office of Management and Budget and Office of Personnel Management applies to all federal departments, and the Department of Education could face heavy cuts as a result of Trump’s promise to “sweepingly reform” what he calls a “bloated, corrupt federal bureaucracy.” 

    The president has repeatedly talked about shutting down the Education Department, and this memo’s orders could give him an opportunity to diminish the agency. Specifically, the OMB document tells agency heads to eliminate all “non-statutorily mandated functions”—an action proponents of abolishing the department have supported.

    The OMB memo cites an executive order, “Implementing The President’s ‘Department of Government Efficiency’ Workforce Optimization Initiative,” that was signed Feb. 11 as justification and directed agencies to submit a reorganization plan by March 13.

    “Pursuant to the President’s direction, agencies should focus on the maximum elimination of functions that are not statutorily mandated while driving the highest-quality, most efficient delivery of their statutorily-required functions,” wrote OMB director Russell Vought and Charles Ezell, the acting director of the Office of Personnel Management. “Agencies should also … implement technological solutions that automate routine tasks while enabling staff to focus on higher-value activities … and maximally reduce the use of outside consultants and contractors.”

    The memo notes that reduction should not impact positions necessary to meet border security, national security or public safety responsibilities, nor should it affect agencies or services that are directly provided to citizens “such as Social Security, Medicare, and veterans’ health care.”

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  • Treasurer tells big banks to ease HECS home loan rules

    Treasurer tells big banks to ease HECS home loan rules

    Treasurer Jim Chalmers said he spoke to the banks on Tuesday night. Picture: Martin Ollman



    By: NCA Newswire

    in News, Top Stories


    February 12, 2025

    Big banks have agreed to review the impact of university debts for degrees on home loan approvals following an intervention by Treasurer Jim Chalmers.

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